COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

James F. Cook, Jr., D/B/A Cook Properties, v. Consolidated Stores Corp., Belz Investco, L.P., Urco, Inc., Union Realty Co. LTD., and South Plaza Co.
01A01-9605-CH-00245
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert S. Brandt

This appeal involves a dispute over a real estate commission on four retail properties in Memphis. After a former client leased these properties, a real estate broker filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a commission from its former client and the lessors of the four properties. The trial court granted the former client’s motion for summary judgment and, following a bench trial, dismissed the broker’s claims against the four lessors. On this appeal, the broker asserts that the trial court erred by granting his former client’s summary judgment motion and that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s dismissal of his claims against the four lessors. We have determined that the trial court properly granted the summary judgment motion and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s judgment in favor of the four lessors.

In the matter of: S.M.L. (DOB 12/26/88), C.B.L. (DOB 4/14/92), D.K.J. (DOB 5/8/93) Children under the age of 18.
07-93-017-CC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd

C.L.H. has filed a timely Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition for rehearing and a Tenn. R. App. P. 14 motion to consider post-judgment facts. She asserts that our original opinion filed on June 12, 1998 misapprehends material facts with regard to her more recent self-improvement efforts, and she offers new evidence regarding her educational attainments and the stability of her living environment.

Shelley Sackett v. Hal Roseman
M2002-00587-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson
This interlocutory appeal was brought to determine whether the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Joint Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).

Henry Collier vs. Methodist Hosp., et al
02A01-9607-CV-00165
Trial Court Judge: Dick Jerman, Jr.

02A01-9707-CH-00157
02A01-9707-CH-00157
Trial Court Judge: W. Michael Maloan

Bradson Mercantile vs. Joseph Crabtree
02A01-9710-CV-00272

Connatser vs. Connatser
03A01-9801-CV-00005

King vs. King
03A01-9710-CH-00441

Kellogg Co., vs. TN Comm., et al
02A01-9612-CH-00302
Trial Court Judge: C. Neal Small

Fye vs. Kennedy
03A01-9707-CV-00287

Sanjurjo vs. Woods
03A01-9708-CH-00330

Wilhoite vs. Proffitt
03A01-9801-CH-00004

Judd's vs. Muir
03A01-9801-CH-00002

03A01-9712-CV-00532
03A01-9712-CV-00532

Moore vs. Feathers
03A01-9802-CV-00063

City of Knox vs. Garuin
03A01-9801-CV-00038

Purkey vs. Purkey
03A01-9707-CV-00317

Canonie vs. Tennessee
03A01-9710-CH-00481

Hankins vs. Seaton
03A01-9710-CV-00468

Eblen vs. Johnson
03A01-9709-CH-00423

Atkins vs. Grooms
03A01-9708-JV-00337

Roach vs. Renfro
03A01-9711-CH-00517

3A01-9801-CH-00034
3A01-9801-CH-00034

3A01-9801-CV-00033
3A01-9801-CV-00033

Stone vs. Stone
M1997-00218-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
This appeal involves a former spouse's efforts to extricate himself from the spousal support obligations contained in a marital dissolution agreement. Approximately one year after the entry of the divorce decree approving the agreement, the former husband requested the Chancery Court for Putnam County to set the agreement aside because he did not have independent legal advice and his judgment was impaired by antidepressant medication when he signed the agreement. The trial court modified portions of the decree but did not relieve the former husband of his spousal support obligation. Thereafter, the former husband filed a second motion seeking to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligations because of his former wife's improved financial circumstances. The trial court again declined to relieve the former husband of his obligation to pay spousal support. On this appeal, the former husband renews his argument that he should no longer be required pay spousal support because of his former wife's improved financial circumstance and his own weakened financial condition. We affirm the trial court's decision that the former husband has failed to prove the existence of a substantial, material change in circumstances that would warrant modifying his spousal support obligation.