Leo Charles Hillman et al. v. Young Street Partners II, LLC et al
This case involves the interpretation of a commercial lease provision containing a tenant improvement allowance. Following a hearing, the trial court initially entered an order in August 2020, granting partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs/assignees and directing the defendant/assignor, Young Street Partners II, LLC (“Young Street”), to reimburse the plaintiffs for $92,000.00 they had paid to a tenant claiming the improvement allowance, as well as costs, attorney’s fees, and statutory prejudgment interest. Upon the filing of subsequent competing motions for summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court confirmed its prior judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and further dismissed Young Street’s counterclaim for attorney’s fees and costs in an order entered in January 2021, thereby denying Young Street’s motion for partial summary judgment. Following entry of an order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice against all defendants except Young Street and upon the plaintiffs’ motion, the trial court entered an order certifying its January 2021 order as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Young Street has appealed. Determining that the trial court improvidently granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, we vacate the judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. We deny the plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Donna McCullough v. Anthony McCullough
Donna McCullough (“Wife”) and Anthony McCullough (“Husband”) executed a marital dissolution agreement (the “MDA”) on June 14, 2018. The agreement provided that Husband was to pay Wife $4,521.00 per month in alimony and that the obligation terminated upon the death of either party. The parties were divorced by the General Sessions Court for Hardin County on September 21, 2018. Several months later, Husband sought to set aside the final decree of divorce, arguing that the alimony provision in the MDA was void. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Husband’s motion and granted Wife her attorney’s fees incurred in defending the action. Husband appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bonnie E.
In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the McMinn County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) determined that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Nasser Luby Saleh v. Lystacha G. Pratt
This appeal arises after the trial court found the defendant in contempt of an order of protection and sentenced him to 510 days of incarceration. We affirm the judgment holding the appellant in contempt in its entirety. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Abraham A. Augustin v. Tennessee Department of Safety And Homeland Security
This case arises from the 2009 seizure of Appellant’s property and the subsequent forfeiture of same. Appellant petitioned for judicial review, and the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, we conclude that because Appellant’s petition was not filed within sixty days of receiving notice of the forfeiture, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b)(1)(A)(iv), the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the forfeiture. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Khalil J.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that three grounds for termination as to both mother and father were proven: (1) persistent conditions; (2) mental incompetence; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the child. Both the mother and the father appeal. We reverse the juvenile court’s finding of persistent conditions as to the mother and the father, but otherwise affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Brown et al. v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland and Security
This case arises from the seizure of property owned by Appellants and the ensuing forfeiture action brought against them by Appellee Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security. After Appellee voluntarily dismissed the forfeiture action, the Administrative Law Judge awarded Appellants a portion of their requested attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325(a). The Chancery Court of Davidson County reversed the award of fees on its finding that Appellee did not issue a “citation” as required for recovery of attorney’s fees under section 4-5-325(a). The trial court also held that Appellants were not entitled to recover attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Debra Jean Griffith-Ball v. Stanley Lauren Ball
A husband and wife divorced after a long marriage. They disputed whether certain assets were marital or separate property and whether the wife was entitled to alimony. The trial court found that the disputed assets were the husband’s separate property. And it awarded the wife alimony in futuro, as well as attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Upon our review, we find the evidence preponderates against the finding that the assets are separate property. So, with those assets included in the marital estate, we remand for a new property division. And, because the division of marital property is a factor in awarding alimony, we vacate the alimony awards. On remand, the court should consider whether alimony is still appropriate under its new property division and, if so, the type, amount, and duration of the award. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company v. David Payne, et al.
This appeal concerns a dispute over insurance coverage. Amy Higgs (“Higgs”) individually and on behalf of her deceased son, Cayson Emmit Turnmire (“Cayson”), sued David Payne (“Payne”) for the negligent maintenance of his property in relation to Cayson’s death by drowning in Payne’s swimming pool. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”), Payne’s homeowners’ insurance carrier, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) against Payne and Higgs. Tennessee Farmers argued that, due to an exclusion in Payne’s homeowners’ insurance policy against claims “arising from or in connection with the swimming pool,” it is not obligated to defend or indemnify Payne. Tennessee Farmers and Higgs filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Tennessee Farmers’ motion and denied Higgs’ motion. Higgs appeals. Citing the concurrent cause doctrine, Higgs argues that Tennessee Farmers must defend and indemnify Payne as, apart from the pool, certain non-excluded causes contributed to Cayson’s death—namely, Payne’s failure to fence or gate his property. We hold, inter alia, that each of Higgs’ alleged non-excluded concurrent causes are bound up inextricably with Cayson’s tragic drowning in Payne’s pool, an excluded cause under Payne’s insurance policy. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Vatisha Evans-Barken v. Madison County, Tennessee
Appellee, a Sergeant with the Madison County Sheriff’s Department, sought judicial review of the Civil Service Board’s affirmance of the Sheriff Department’s decision to terminate her employment. On its finding that the Board failed to consider all relevant evidence presented, the trial court exercised its discretion to remand the case to the Board for rehearing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). Appellant, Madison County, Tennessee, filed the instant appeal. We conclude that the trial court’s remand order is not a final, appealable order under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). As such, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Appeal dismissed. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Arianna B. et al.
In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the two minor children on the ground of abandonment by failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Analesia Q.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Cindy B. (“Mother”) and Francisco Q. (“Father”) to their minor daughter, Analesia Q. (the “Child”). Following a bench trial, both parents’ rights were terminated pursuant to several statutory grounds, and Father appeals. He challenges the statutory grounds for termination, the trial court’s finding that termination of his rights was in the Child’s best interests, and the trial court’s decision to admit hearsay testimony regarding potential abuse of the Child pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 803(25). We reverse the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights for abandonment by failure to visit and severe abuse, and vacate the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights for failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the Child. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights as to the remaining grounds, as well as the holding that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interests. The ultimate decision of the trial court is therefore affirmed. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zachery Brandon
The Defendant, Zackery Brandon, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempted aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to an effective term of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in admitting the unsworn recorded statement of one of his |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. $133,429 In U.S. Currency Seized From Joni Assefa Kilenton, et al.
In this seizure and forfeiture action, we do not reach the substantive issues because the order granting the forfeiture does not comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58 for entry of judgments. Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 to take jurisdiction of the appeal for the limited purpose of instructing the trial court to enter an order on remand that not only complies with Rule 58, but also makes sufficient findings to enable this Court to make a meaningful review as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Vacated and remanded. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Ann Standley v. Carl Anthony Standley
In this post-divorce action, Mother appeals the trial court’s award of Father’s attorney’s fees on his petition to modify child custody. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Father attorney’s fees, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Washington v. Tony Parker as Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Corrections
An inmate filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Corrections (“TDOC”). The action was filed in Wayne County Chancery Court instead of Davidson County Chancery Court as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(a). The trial court found that venue in Wayne County Chancery Court was not proper and that it was not in the interest of justice to transfer venue to Davidson County because Defendant neither had paid any portion of the filing fee, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-807,nor had he named the agency, TDOC, as a party to the action as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(a). The trial court, therefore, dismissed the inmate’s petition. We find that the inmate had not failed to comply with the partial filing fee payment because the trial court had not assessed the initial filing fee to be paid. However, the trial court was correct that the inmate had failed to include TDOC as a party to the action as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(a). Upon consideration of the appellee’s argument concerning the timeliness of the inmate’s notice of appeal, we hold that we have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Although we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion regarding the inmate’s compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-807, we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the inmate’s action because the inmate failed to name TDOC as a party to the action. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Rita A. Roach v. Moss Motor Company, Inc. et al.
The trial court denied a defendant’s motion to amend to include a cross-claim against another defendant. We reverse. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re J.H. Et Al.
Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed two children from the custody of Polly H. (“Mother”) and Billy H. (“Father”) in March 2020 after receiving a referral regarding the family and allegations of abuse, and after Mother’s partner was found at the home with Mother and the children in violation of a permanent restraining order against Mother’s partner. In December 2020, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. DCS alleged, as statutory grounds for termination, abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse. Father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights on the day of the trial. The trial court found that DCS proved four of the five grounds for termination of Mother’s rights by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate holding that the parental rights of Mother should be terminated. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Miranda T., et al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Crockett County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Tiffany T. (“Mother”) to her minor children, Miranda and Baylee (“the Children”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on four grounds and finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing solely that the Juvenile Court erred in its best interest determination. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that DCS proved four grounds for termination of parental rights against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Charles Smallbone v. Jennifer Elizabeth Smallbone
As part of a divorce decree, the trial court fashioned a permanent parenting plan for three minor children. The court’s plan provided for substantially equal parenting time and joint decision making for major decisions. The plan was expressly conditioned on the parents remaining within the children’s current school district after the divorce. The father argues that neither equal parenting time nor joint decision making were appropriate based on the evidence presented. And he maintains that the court lacked authority to include a residency requirement in the plan. He also contends that the court failed to address some of his claims. We conclude that the court, either expressly or implicitly, resolved all claims between the parties. And because the court did not abuse its discretion in establishing the parenting plan, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security v. David Shell
Following the return of his seized property under the forfeiture statutes, claimant asked the administrative law judge to award him attorney’s fees under two separate statutes, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The administrative law judge awarded fees under only the former statute. Upon review by the chancery court, the decision to award fees under section 4-5-325(a) was reversed; the chancery court also ruled that claimant’s request for fees under the federal statute was waived or abandoned. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that claimant is not entitled to fees under section 4-5-325(a). We remand to the trial court for consideration of the previously pretermitted claim for attorney’s fees under section 1988(b). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David Simpkins et al. v. John Maher Builders, Inc. et al.
In this action concerning a newly-constructed home, the plaintiffs asserted,inter alia, claims of breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, negligence, and unfair and deceptive business practices by the defendant construction company and its owners. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants based upon expiration of the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims of injury to real property. We determine that although the trial court properly applied the three-year statute of limitations to the plaintiffs’ claims of injury to their real property, the trial court improperly determined that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment would not apply to toll the accrual of such limitations period concerning the plaintiffs’ claims for damages caused by the defendants’ failure to seal the utility penetrations beneath the home, a fact which allegedly was concealed by the defendants. We also determine that the plaintiffs stated claims of breach of contract, including breach of any express or implied warranties provided by the contract, and that the trial court improperly dismissed these claims based on the incorrect statute of limitations. We therefore vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the breach of contract and contractual warranty claims, as well as the claims based on the defendants’ failure to seal the utility penetrations, and we remand those claims to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the remaining portion of the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Keveena Marie Martin Judzewitsch v. George Aaron Judzewitsch
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. We have determined the petition must be summarily dismissed due to numerous and substantive failures to comply with Rule 10B section 2.02, including the failure to file a copy of the motion for recusal, supporting documents filed in the trial court, and a copy of the trial court’s order denying recusal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Andrew W. Et Al.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three of her children. The juvenile court terminated on grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for her children. The court also determined that termination was in her children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Pratik Pandharipande, MD. v. FSD Corporation
This is a dispute between a property owner and his homeowners’ association concerning the scope and applicability of restrictive covenants. Two restrictive covenants are at issue. One is a covenant contained in the neighborhood’s 1984 Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions that limited usage of the homes to residential use as “a residence by a single family.” The other is a covenant contained in a 2018 Amendment that relaxed the 1984 residential use restriction by authorizing short-term rentals of no less than 30 consecutive days, subject to specific criteria. The plaintiff, who purchased a home in the development in 2015 and has been leasing it on a short-term vacation rental basis to third parties as a business venture, seeks a declaratory judgment that he may lease his home for rentals as short as two days. For its part, the homeowners’ association seeks to enforce the restrictive covenants in the 1984 Declaration as well as the 2018 Amendment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners’ association on both issues. In doing so, the court held that restrictions in the 1984 Declaration prohibited non-residential renting. The court also held that Plaintiff’s current use of his property is subject to the 2018 Amendment, which authorized short-term leasing subject to stipulations including that “[t]the length of the lease must be for a minimum of 30 consecutive days.” The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals |
