Jeremy Shane Johnson vs. State of Tennessee
Petitioner had entered a plea of delinquent to firing a weapon within the city limits and illegal possession of a firearm in Juvenile Court, and subsequently sought relief in a Post-Conviction Petition in the Trial Court. The Trial Court dismissed the Petition on the grounds that petitioner was not in custody of the Department of Children’s Services at the time he filed the Petition for Relief. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Annette Cecilia Blakes v. Nicholas J. Sims
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred: (1) in modifying the Parties’ Final Decree of Divorce absent proof of a material change in circumstances affecting the best interest of the Parties’ child; (2) in making temporary modifications to the Final Decree of divorce absent clear and convincing proof that the child was being harmed or would be harmed in the situation that existed when the modifications were made; and (3) in finding that Father’s motives for relocating were vindictive, and in its concerns about Father’s willingness to comply with future court orders or to provide for the child. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of : The Estate of Allen Crawford Roberts, Deceased
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the probate court erred when it granted Appellee’s motion for a directed verdict. The probate court found that Appellants, in their proof in chief, did not satisfactorily make out a prima facie case of the Antenuptial Agreement’s validity under the statutes and appellate opinions of Tennessee as Appellants failed to establish that there was a satisfactory disclosure of Mr. Roberts’ assets. On appeal, Appellants contend that the motion for a directed verdict was improperly granted as reasonable minds could conclude that the Antenuptial Agreement was presented to, read, and understood by Appellee at execution and that the Antenuptial Agreement constituted a full and fair disclosure as required by Tennessee law. Although Appellants have urged an incorrect standard of review, we find, after a de novo review of the evidence, that Appellants made out a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. We reverse and remand to the probate court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Emily N. Williams v. Charles Cliburn
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her personal injury action as barred by the savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. The trial court measured the period for refiling the action from the date of entry of an Order of Non-Suit which had been sent to the court by facsimile rather than from the date of entry of the hard copy of the order. We find that the trial court correctly held that the operative date for purposes of the Tennessee savings statute was the date of entry of the first order received and signed by the court, but that Plaintiff was not given notice of entry of the order, as his counsel had requested. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of this action and remand for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Jones And Billy Jones v. Lisa June Cox
This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant/Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Appellees/Plaintiffs’ complaint for legal malpractice. Appellant, a licensed attorney, represented the Appellees in a lawsuit following an automobile accident. Appellant failed to effect service of process on the party-defendant to that suit. Appellees retained other counsel and filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Appellant. Appellees’ new counsel made a strategic decision to withhold service of process on Appellant pending the outcome of the underlying case. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3) for intentional delay of service of process. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed. We reverse and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Ice Stores, Inc. v. Gregory Reier Holmes
This appeal involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment. In 1997, the defendant pled nolo contendere to a criminal charge in a Texas court. As a part of his sentence, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution. The judgment of conviction listed the party to whom restitution should be paid. In 2005, the plaintiff corporation filed a lawsuit in Tennessee, seeking to enforce the Texas judgment. In his response, the defendant noted that the plaintiff corporation was not the party named in the Texas judgment to receive restitution from the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the entity listed in the Texas judgment to receive restitution was the plaintiff’s “doing business as” name, and that the plaintiff was in fact the proper party to enforce the Texas judgment. A hearing on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was held before expiration of the required thirty-day period after service of a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff corporation. The defendant now appeals. He argues that the trial court erred by holding the hearing on the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion before expiration of the T.R.C.P. 56.04 thirty-day period. He also argues that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff corporation to domesticate and enforce the foreign judgment. We affirm, finding that the defendant was not prejudiced by being deprived of the T.R.C.P. 56.04 thirty-day period between service of the motion for summary judgment and the hearing, and that summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff corporation was otherwise proper. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Cedric Renee Mims & Angela Brown
This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. The children were taken into protective custody soon after the birth of the youngest child, and were ultimately found to be dependent and neglected. The father was not appointed an attorney at this stage of the proceedings. Both the mother and father underwent psychological evaluations; both were found to be in the mild range of mental retardation and lacking the mental capacity to care for their children. DCS sought termination of their parental rights, alleging several grounds, including abandonment and mental incapacity. After a hearing, the lower court terminated the parental rights of both parents. The father appeals, arguing that DCS did not prove abandonment and mental incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. He also argues that the failure to appoint an attorney for him during the dependency and neglect proceedings was a denial of his right to due process. We affirm the trial court’s finding on the ground of mental incompetence. We also find that any violation of Father’s due process rights in relation to the dependency and neglect proceedings was remedied by procedural protections in place in the termination proceedings. Therefore, we affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Earnest Edwin Gilchrist v. Juan T. Aristorenas, M.D
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim. The defendant physician performed an operation on the plaintiff patient. Complications occurred during the surgery; as a result, the patient required several more procedures and spent approximately three weeks in the hospital. The patient hired an attorney, who obtained an opinion letter from a physician expert, in which the expert opined that the defendant physician breached the standard of care during the patient’s initial operation. After securing the expert opinion, the patient filed this lawsuit against the defendant physician for medical malpractice. After the case had been pending for several years, the attorney for the defendant physician took the deposition of the patient’s expert. At the deposition, the patient’s expert changed his opinion, and testified that he believed that the defendant physician’s care of the patient was not below the standard of care. The next day, the defendant physician filed a motion for summary judgment. Several months later, the patient filed a motion under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07 requesting a continuance of the summary judgment motion because he had been unable to engage another expert. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a continuance and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician. The patient appeals. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to continue the motion for summary judgment. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the request for a continuance, and thus in the grant of summary judgment in the defendant’s favor. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Ex Rel., Margaret V. Hickman v. Ronald L. Dodd
This is a Title IV-D child support case. Appellee father executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and a consent paternity order. After discovering that he was not the child’s biological father, Appellee sought relief from both his retroactive and future child support obligations. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion on the ground that he was not the biological father. The State of Tennessee seeks review of the trial court’s decision. We conclude that the trial court did not have authority to forgive Appellee’s child support arrears. Moreover, Appellee has neither alleged sufficiently specific facts to challenge the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity as required under Tenn. Code. Ann. § 24-7-113, nor has he satisfied the necessary requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P.60.02 to gain relief from either the consent paternity order, or the order on child support entered in the chancery court. We reverse and remand. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Debra J. Eaton v. Stephen G. Portera, M.D.
This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee doctor on grounds of insufficient service of process, and failure of Appellant patient to come forward with the required expert proof to refute the motion for summary judgment. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald E. Crook v. Landon Despeaux
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in a personal injury case. The plaintiff, a diabetic, consumed a substantial amount of alcohol and then proceeded to drive south towards an intersection. At about the same time, the defendant was traveling east toward the same intersection. The plaintiff’s vehicle skidded, hit the curb, and then collided with a telephone pole. After the onecar accident, the plaintiff followed the defendant and his family to a nearby parking lot and accused the defendant of running the stop sign at the intersection and causing the plaintiff’s accident. After that, the police arrived and gave the plaintiff a breathalyzer test, which he failed. The plaintiff was later convicted of reckless driving and driving under the influence of an intoxicant in connection with the accident. At his criminal trial, the plaintiff admitted drinking alcohol and that his tires were in poor condition. The plaintiff nevertheless filed a negligence claim against the defendant. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that, based on the plaintiff diabetic’s intoxication and faulty tires, he was, as a matter of law, at least fifty percent at fault for his own injuries. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lovie Mitchell, as Executive of the Estate of Mack Mitchell, Deceased v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc, et al.
This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement between a nursing home and one of its patients. Although the trial court found that the patient’s spouse had authority to sign the agreement under the terms of a power of attorney, the court concluded that the spouse did not knowingly and voluntarily waive the patient’s right to a jury trial. Therefore, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. After reviewing the entire record, we find that thefacts do not support the trial court’s conclusion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Manufacturers Acceptance Corporation v. U.S. Bank National Association
In this declaratory judgment action, the Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment on the issue of priority of liens on real property. On the Petition to Set Up a Lost Instrument, the Trial Court following an evidentiary hearing, held that defendant was entitled to set up the lost instrument by a copy of its original. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court’s decision in establishing the lost instrument, but vacate the summary judgment on the issue of the priority of liens and remand for trial on that issue. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Oakwell Farms Limited Partnership et al. v. Metropolitan Board of Fire & Building Code Appeals et al.
An apartment complex owner filed a petition for writ of certiorari to challenge a decision of the Metro Board of Fire and Building Code Appeals denying the owner’s appeal of the fire marshal’s citation of the apartment complex for failure to install pull station alarms in certain areas. We agree with the chancellor’s conclusion that the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction, did not act illegally or arbitrarily, and based its decision upon material evidence. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anderson Properties v. International Knife & Saw, Inc. and Simonds International Corporation
This is an appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of defendant-lessee on an action to collect back rent and other expenses pursuant to a long-term commercial lease agreement with plaintiff-landlord. Lessee filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy prior to the filing of the instant action. We have concluded that the commercial lease upon which landlord relies was deemed rejected by operation of law in the bankruptcy proceedings and that landlord is therefore barred from recovering the damages it seeks. Judgment of the chancery court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Venita Decosta Gilliam v. Rollie Gilliam, Jr.
When the trial court entered its divorce decree, husband, who was in prison in another state, was representing himself. Husband asserts that the trial court erred because it lacked personal jurisdiction over him and lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. We have concluded that husband waived the personal jurisdiction issue. However, because the trial court failed to rule on husband’s pending motions before adjudicating the divorce, we vacate and remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Angie L. Gleaves v. Gary W. Gleaves
In this divorce action, Wife contends that the trial court erred in ordering the marital home sold; finding Husband’s down payment on the marital home to be separate property; failing to award her alimony; and failing to award her counsel fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
High Country Adventures, Inc. vs. Polk County
The issues in this case are whether operators of whitewater rafting ventures responsible for collecting a county privilege tax imposed upon consumers participating in commercial rafting ventures in Polk County have standing to challenge the tax and if so, whether the tax is invalid because it is preempted by federal law. Upon careful review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the operators have standing to contest the legality of the privilege tax and that the tax is preempted by federal law and is, therefore, invalid. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Watson v. Roberto Garza, et al.
This appeal involves a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process. The summons issued for service on the defendant-appellee was served by the deputy sheriff on a co-defendant. The trial court granted the defendant-appellee’s motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Pedro and Griselda Valadez, Individuals and as parents and next Friends of Fatima Valadez, a Minor v. Newstart, Llc,
In this appeal we are asked to reverse the trial court’s grants of summary judgment to Appellees and adopt a loss of chance theory of recovery, thus allowing Appellants to recover for Appellees’ alleged failure to timely notify them that their unborn child was afflicted with spina bifida such that they could participate in a clinical trial. Because our supreme court has expressly stated that Tennessee does not recognize a cause of action for loss of chance, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Muhammad Ziyad v. Estate of William B. Tanner, Sr.
This appeal involves a claim against a decedent’s estate for one million dollars. The probate court denied the claim on various grounds, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Trail v. State of Tennessee, Department of Commerce and Insurance (Insurance Division)
The Commissioner revoked appellant’s license to sell insurance and fined her $7,000.00. Appellant petitioned for review by the Trial Court, who affirmed the determination made by the Commissioner. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Stricklan and husband, Reed Stricklan, v. Johnny C. Patterson
In this action for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident, the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs. Defendant has appealed and on appeal raises the issues of whether there was sufficient and competent proof to support plaintiff’s claim for medical expenses; whether the Court erred in allowing plaintiff's treating physician to offer an opinion on permanent impairment, and he questioned whether the jury verdict was contrary to the "weight of evidence". On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
James D. Young, Administrator, Estate of Alva L. Young, v. Jere R. Young
In this Estate, the Executor sued a legatee for a debt owing the Deceased. The parties settled that action by an Order stating that the indebtedness owed to the Decedent by the legatee at the time of death would be treated as an advancement to the legatee in the distribution of the Estate. In the final accounting by the Special Master, the Master found that the legatee defendant owed the Estate $45,942.64. This finding was concurred in by the Trial Court and, on appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Goodman, et al. v. Kathy Jones Kelly
Travis and Stephanie Goodman (“Buyers”) filed a lawsuit for monetary damages or rescission of a residential deed due to defects in a septic system. Buyers sued under the theories of breach of contract, misrepresentation, fraud and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Buyers argue that they did not plead a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-208 (2004) of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosures Act; however, the trial court treated the case as one under the Act. The jury returned a verdict for Seller. Reviewing the record de novo, we hold that the theories of breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation were pleaded and supported by the proof. These causes of action should have been charged to the jury. We also hold that the parties litigated the issue of intentional misrepresentation and that the trial court charged the jury on this issue. In addition we hold that material evidence supports the jury’s verdict for Seller under theories of intentional or willful misrepresentation of the condition of the subject property under the statute or common law. Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part and remand with instructions. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals |
