Columbus Medical Services, LLC v. David Thomas and Liberty Healthcare Corporation
This appeal involves a claim of tortious inducement to breach a non-compete covenant in an employment agreement. The plaintiff staffing agency employed the defendant therapists at a State residential care facility for severely disabled persons. The plaintiff agency staffed the facility under an exclusive contract which was set to expire by its own terms in June 2003. The therapists had executed restrictive covenants in their employment agreements with the plaintiff staffing agency under which they were prohibited from working at the State facility for one year after the termination of their employment with the plaintiff. The State requested bids to staff the facility under a new contract. Through the bidding process, the defendant staffing agency was awarded the contract. The defendant agency then met with the defendant therapists (who were incumbent employees), staffed through the plaintiff agency, and offered to hire them to continue working at the facility. The defendant staffing agency was aware of the non-compete covenants and agreed to indemnify the defendant therapists if the plaintiff staffing agency tried to enforce the covenants. The defendant therapists accepted positions with the defendant agency and continued working at the facility. The plaintiff agency filed this lawsuit against the individual defendant therapists and the defendant agency. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the non-compete covenants were enforceable, that the defendant therapists had breached their covenants, and that the defendant staffing agency had tortiously induced the individual defendant therapists to breach their employment contracts. The defendants now appeal. We reverse, concluding that, while the plaintiff agency had a legitimate protectable business interest, the non-compete covenants are not enforceable in light of the hardship to the defendant therapists and the adverse impact on the public interest. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Faye Black v. City of Memphis
This is a wrongful death case against a municipality. In 1987, the plaintiff’s teenage son was shot and killed by a police officer. The plaintiff sued the officer and the municipality, asserting claims under both federal and state law. Years of proceedings and delay ensued. By 2005, the only remaining claims were state law claims against the municipality. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed a motion for entry of judgment in the amount of $130,000, the maximum damage award under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John C. Blair v. Robert Sullivan, Jr., et al.
This appeal involves the plaintiff’s negligence claim which arose from a motor vehicle accident with the defendant. Plaintiff first asserts that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff’s positive drug test to be admitted as evidence. Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court’s jury instructions were improper and that the jury’s verdict is not supported by the evidence. Reviewing plaintiff’s first assertion, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the drug test as evidence. Likewise, we find that the jury instructions were proper and that there is material evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Adoption of : J.B.H.
Respondent/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights based on abandonment. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Corine Broadnax, Individually and as heir and on behalf of the Estate Of Mary Alice Johnson v. Quince Nursing And Rehabilitation Center, L.L.C., et al.
The parties to a nursing home Admission Agreement dispute the enforceability of its arbitration provision. The trial court refused to enforce the arbitration provision. The nursing home appealed. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Sams Tuetken v. Lance Edward Tuetken
This appeal involves the trial court’s decision to modify an arbitrator’s award in a dispute concerning the parties’ parenting plan and their child support obligations. Appellant contends that the trial court erred because modification of the arbitrator’s award was not permissible under the Uniform Arbitration Act. We have reviewed the trial court’s order referring this dispute to the arbitrator and concluded that the Uniform Arbitration Act is inapplicable. Instead, we find that this was a nonbinding dispute resolution proceeding governed by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to modify the arbitrator’s award. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney Marra v. Bank of New York
This appeal involves a court clerk’s fee for facilitating a foreclosure sale. The defendant bank held a foreclosure sale of the plaintiff’s home without giving the plaintiff proper notice. The plaintiff then filed this action and the sale was set aside. The trial court ordered that the property be re-auctioned and appointed the clerk and master of the chancery court as a special commissioner to facilitate the sale. At the second sale, the plaintiff purchased the property. The trial court ordered that the clerk be awarded 5% of the purchase price as his fee for services rendered in connection with the sale. The bank objected, arguing that the clerk’s fee was excessive. The trial court conducted a hearing and held that the fee to the clerk was reasonable. The bank appealed, naming the court clerk as an appellee in the notice of appeal, but failing to file a motion to add him as a party. The appeal was dismissed for lack of a final order. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Anderson Bonner, Jr., v. Johnnie Dobyns Miller Bonner
In this divorce action, the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce and awarded the wife $1,000.00 per month alimony. The husband appealed the award of alimony. We hold the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
City of Franklin, Tennessee v. Middle Tennessee Electric Membership Corporation
The City of Franklin, a member of the nonprofit Middle Tennessee Electric Membership Corporation, sued the corporation to obtain access to its records in order to determine whether it would be in the City’s interest to acquire those assets which lay within the City boundaries. The trial court dismissed the suit agreeing with the corporation that the City’s request was not in conformance with the statutory requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-66-102(c) that it be made “in good faith or for a proper purpose.” We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Harry Skipper, et ux v. State of Tennessee
Mr. Skipper filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission, alleging that Tennessee Department of Transportation snow plow operator Dennis Burns crossed the center line, striking him. Mr. Burns became ill with cancer, and his deposition was scheduled three times before it was successfully taken. Following Mr. Burns’ deposition, Mr. Skipper failed to advance his claim for a period of one year, and the Claims Commission dismissed his claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(b). Mr. Skipper sought relief from the dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 6.02, 59, and 60.02. Mr. Skipper’s counsel claimed that he failed to act in order to allow Mr. Burns time to recover, so that he could testify live at trial. He further stated that it was his understanding that the State would contact him once such recovery was made. The Claims Commission denied Mr. Skipper relief from the order of dismissal, and Mr. Skipper appealed to this Court. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Timmy Sykes et al. v. Chattanooga Housing Authority et al.
This opinion replaces one filed on March 31, 2009, which opinion was withdrawn by us “and held for naught” by order of April 21, 2009. The joint complaint filed by the plaintiffs, Timmy Sykes and Curtis Greene, who are African-Americans, actually involves the independent claims of the two plaintiffs against their former employer, the Chattanooga Housing Authority (“the CHA” or “CHA”), and the plaintiffs’ supervisor in that employment, Jeff Hazelwood, Chief of the CHA’s Public Safety Department, for wrongful termination of their employment and other claims. Sykes, who was a CHA criminal investigator, was terminated by the CHA on September 30, 2004, and Greene, also a criminal investigator, was terminated on January 19, 2005. They each seek damages for wrongful termination, asserting two theories of recovery. Sykes also seeks damages from Chief Hazelwood for alleged defamatory statements made by him and both plaintiffs sue Hazelwood for interfering with their CHA employment. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted as to all claims. The plaintiffs appeal. They raise three issues in common and Sykes complains of the trial court’s judgment with respect to his defamation claim. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
David Ramey, Former Perry County Sheriff v. Perry County, Tennessee
The sheriff of Perry County sued the county mayor under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 seeking additional employees, equipment, and vehicles to properly perform his duties. The trial court ordered the county to provide the sheriff’s office with funding for two additional deputies as well as gasoline, equipment, and uniforms. We have concluded that the trial court erred in ordering the county to fund two new road deputies and in authorizing expenditures to support road deputies. The evidence supports the need for one new detention officer and a part-time detention officer. We remand for a hearing on the reasonableness of the attorney fee award. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel Samelba P. Lewis (Robinson) v. T.J. Robinson, III
In this post-divorce proceeding, the father claims that his child support obligation should have been reduced due to his health and financial circumstances. The chancellor confirmed the child support referee’s recommendation to deny the father’s petition, finding that the father failed to file a timely request for a hearing before the chancellor following the hearing before the referee. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Maggie Barron, et al. v. Emerson Russell Maintenance Company d/b/a ERMC II, L.P., et al.
After being abducted from a mall parking lot, the plaintiff filed suit against the security company that provided security services to the mall. The trial court granted summary judgment to the security company, concluding that only the premises owner, i.e., the mall, owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Andrea S. Martin v. Patricia L. Williams, et al.
The central issue in this case is which of two insurance companies is required to provide uninsured motorist coverage to the Plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to the company through which Plaintiff had automobile insurance, finding that the company insuring the automobile in which Plaintiff was a passenger held the primary policy. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donnie Vaught, et al. v. Alan Jakes, Sr. and Wife Deborah Jakes, et al. - Order
In response to an opinion by this Court, filed on May 26, 2009, Alan Jakes Sr. and the other defendants in this case have filed a timely Tenn. R. App. P. 39 Petition to Rehear. In our opinion, we reversed the Chancery Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ trespass claim and granted the plaintiffs judgment on that claim. The defendants note that the opinion erroneously stated that the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint at the conclusion of all the proof. In fact, the defendants raised an oral motion for involuntary dismissal of the complaint at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ proof, and the trial court granted their motion. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Donnie Vaught, et al. v. Alan Jakes, Sr. and wife Deborah Jakes, et al.
A group of Rutherford County landowners whose property abutted one side of a private road which they maintained at their own expense filed a suit for trespass against a neighbor and developer who used the same road for access to houses he was building on the other side. Their suit also included a due process claim against the County for erroneously granting building permits for those houses. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ proof, the trial court announced that it agreed that the building permits were granted in error, but it ruled that the county’s action was an innocent error rather than a due process violation. The trial court also granted the developer’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against him, holding that he was entitled to use the road because of a permanent easement he had acquired from his predecessors-in-interest. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the due process claim. However, we vacate its dismissal of the trespass claim because the plaintiff was able to present evidence that the individual who sold the property to the defendant had abandoned the easement and, thus, that the defendant had no right to use the road. We remand this case for further proceedings to give the defendant the opportunity to present evidence. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Baptist Memorial Hospital and Baptist Memorial Health Care Corporation v. Argo Construction Corporation, Hanson Pipe & Products South, Inc., and ETI Corporation and ARGO Construction Corporation v. Hanson Pipe & Products South, Inc.
This appeal involves a cross-claim for indemnity. The cross-plaintiff construction company served as the general contractor on a drainage improvement project for a hospital. The cross-defendant subcontractor manufactured and provided concrete pipe for the project, which was installed by the general contractor. After completion of the project, a sinkhole developed in the hospital’s parking lot. An investigation revealed that the internal steel reinforcement for the concrete pipe was improperly positioned. The hospital sued, among others, the general contractor and the pipe subcontractor. The general contractor then filed a cross-claim against the pipe subcontractor for indemnity in the event the hospital received a judgment against the general contractor. The subcontractor filed a motion for summary judgment as to the general contractor’s indemnity claim, arguing that the claim was barred by (1) the one-year limitations period contained in the parties’ contract, as permitted under Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-2-725, and (2) the exclusive remedy provision in the parties’ contract, which provided that the only remedies available to the general contractor were repair, replacement, or refund of the purchase price of the pipe. The general contractor argued that the one-year contractual limitations period was not applicable to its indemnity claim, and that the exclusive remedy provision did not preclude its indemnity claim. In the alternative, the general contractor argued that, because the defect in the pipe was latent and not discoverable upon reasonable inspection, the exclusive remedy in the contract failed of its essential purpose and the general contractor was not bound by it. The trial court granted the subcontractor’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the indemnity claim was barred by the one-year contractual limitations period and the exclusive remedy provision, and also that the latency of the alleged defect in the pipe did not cause the exclusive remedy to fail of its essential purpose. The |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
East Ridge Dental Center, Inc., and Drew Shabo, DDS., vs. Joseph D. Prince, DDS.
Plaintiffs sued the defendant, alleging breach by defendant of the contract with defendant to purchase his dental practice. Included in the agreement was a restrictive covenant not to compete. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial Court held that the $75,000.00 that was paid for the restrictive covenant should be returned to the plaintiffs under the theory of unjust enrichment, because the covenant was not enforceable. On appeal, we hold that defendant abided by the terms of the restrictive covenant for five of the seven years that the covenant covered and, as a matter of equity, the Judgment of the trial court should be reduced proportionately. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Marlow Williams, et al. - Dissenting
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Marlow Williams, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child at issue in this case. Finding that the grounds of abandonment, unwillingness to assume custody, and failure to establish paternity are not established by clear and convincing evidence in the record, we reverse in part, affirm in part and dismiss. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
T.O.T.S., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corporation
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its complaint for failure to state a claim. We dismiss the appeal for failure to appeal a final judgment. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Lena Jaden v. Vanderbilt University
A graduate student at Vanderbilt sued after the university terminated her graduate studies. She claimed that Vanderbilt breached its contract with her. The trial court granted summary judgment to Vanderbilt. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Edwards, et al. v. City of Memphis
The Charter of the City of Memphis provided for automatic promotion of police officers to the rank of captain after thirty years of service. In 2005, the rank of thirty-year captain was abolished, except for pension purposes. Plaintiffs, police officers with the City of Memphis, filed suit stating that they had been denied promotions to which they were entitled under the Charter, and asking the court to require that such promotions be given. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim, finding that the suit was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Megan Griswold v. Josh Williams, et al
Sellers of truck appeal award of damages and attorneys fees awarded to purchaser based on finding that sellers violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |
