H.P. Large, and Terrance R. Craig, d/b/a Greenfield Land and Cattle Company, v. Greene County, Tennessee
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant had constructed a bridge over Lick Creek which was adjacent to their property, and the bridge had caused their property to repeatedly flood. They further alleged that they were entitled to recover damages under the theory that the County maintained a temporary nuisance which damaged their property. Defendant filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings which characterized plaintiffs’ cause of action as an inverse condemnation action. Affidavits and other documents were filed in the record and the Trial Court agreed with the defendant that plaintiffs’ action was based on inverse condemnation and the statute had run on that action. The Trial Judge also ruled that the statute had run on the nuisance claim. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Judge’s holding that plaintiffs’ action was a nuisance type taking and was governed by the inverse condemnation statute, and we agree that the record demonstrates that the statute of limitations had run on plaintiffs’ claims. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
HP Large, et al. v Greene County, Tennessee - Dissenting
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Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Aaron Benjamin Rutherford v. Southern College of Optometry
The plaintiff/appellant voluntarily withdrew from graduate school when it became certain he would not successfully remediate a previously failed course. The school permitted the student to re-enroll the following academic quarter subject to several specific conditions of readmission. The school eventually dismissed the student after it determined that he had failed to earn a “C” or better in two audited courses, which it considered a violation of the student’s readmission conditions. The student filed suit following his dismissal, but not until after he entered into an agreement resolving the underlying dispute. The school counterclaimed for breach of contract, damages, and enforcement of the parties’ agreement. The jury determined that (1) the school violated its policies and procedures when it dismissed the student, (2) the parties agreed to settle any differences that they may have had as set forth in the proof, and (3) neither party violated the agreement. The trial court accordingly entered judgment in favor of the school. Finding material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Judson Eremity v. George Little and the Tennessee Department of Correction
Certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks review of disciplinary board proceeding finding him guilty of assault on another inmate and revoking his sentence reduction credits. Petitioner asserts that disciplinary board acted arbitrarily and illegally in its utilization and application of Tennessee Department of Correction policies and, further, that the disciplinary board’s handling of the hearing violated his rights to due process of law. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Olin Morris, Successor Trustee of The U.A.B. Holding Trust v. Martin A. Grusin, Former Trustee of U.A.B. Holding Trust, et al.
A Trust was created in 1985. In both 1997 and 1999, the grantor consented to the use of the Trust’s stocks for the benefit of a separate entity, of which the Trust owned a one-half interest. In 2001, an agreement was entered whereby the Trust’s stocks were pledged to a bank in return for a loan to the Trust. The Trust then transferred the loan monies to the separate entity to pay off the separate entity’s indebtedness. After the Trustee’s resignation, the successor Trustee brought suit, alleging breach of fiduciary duties, civil conspiracy, and misappropriation and conversion. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that they had not engaged in unlawful conduct. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Drayton D. Berkley v. Household Financial Center and Beneficial Tennessee, Inc.
This appeal concerns an attempt to obtain the discharge of a debt. The plaintiff attorney executed two promissory notes in favor of the defendants financial institutions. The notes called for monthly payments. Just over a year later, the plaintiff mailed correspondence and a check to the institution’s payment processing center. The correspondence offered an amount in excess of the monthly payment in exchange for extinguishing each debt. At the payment center, the envelopes were opened by machine and the correspondence was separated from the checks. The checks were posted to the plaintiff’s account. The correspondence was forwarded to another department. The plaintiff made no more payments on the notes, and then filed a complaint for declaratory relief. The defendants answered and counterclaimed for the amount owed under the note. After conducting a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint, granted a judgment on the counterclaim to the defendants, and awarded attorney’s fees. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Sowell v. Estate of James W. Davis
This appeal involves Tennessee’s savings statute. The plaintiff filed a tort lawsuit against the defendant. During the pendency of the action, the defendant died. The plaintiff did not file a motion to substitute the proper party for the deceased defendant, as required under T.R.C.P. 25.01. The lawsuit was not dismissed on that basis. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit. The plaintiff re-filed the instant lawsuit within one year, making the same allegations as in the original action but naming the estate of the decedent as the defendant. The estate filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the savings statute was inapplicable because the original lawsuit should have been dismissed pursuant to T.R.C.P. 5.01 for failure to substitute the proper party, and because the defendants in the original lawsuit and the re-filed lawsuit were not identical. The trial court granted the estate’s motion to dismiss on both grounds. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse, finding that the estate’s argument that it is not an entity capable of being sued has been waived, and concluding that the trial court erred in determining that the savings statute was inapplicable. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy King, R.N. and Patricia Battle, R.N., et al. v. Virginia Betts,, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, in her Individual Capacity, et al
This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on alleged etaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Appellant claims that Appellees retaliated against her in her employment for speaking out against a hospital policy. Appellees assert the defense of qualified immunity. Appellant appeals from the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings to the Appellees. Finding that there are material issues of fact in dispute, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Further, we find that Appellant has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s decision to grant Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
T.O.T.S. v. Whirlpool Corporation
This appeal involves a complaint for breach of contract filed by a corporation that had been administratively dissolved prior to the date of the contract. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiff-corporation lacked capacity and/or standing to bring the suit. The plaintiff then filed a motion to amend, seeking to have the corporation’s founder substituted as the party plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion to amend and dismissed the complaint. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Migdalia Herbert v. Board of Education of The Memphis City Shools
A teacher was injured when she tried to break up a fight among students. The BOE classified her injury as resulting from an accident rather than from a physical attack, and that determination was upheld by the Board of Appeal, whose determination was final. The teacher filed suit in the chancery court alleging breach of contract, but her complaint was dismissed after the trial court found that no breach had occurred and that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The proper vehicle for reviewing the Board of Appeal’s classification was a writ of certiorari. Because the teacher failed to file such a petition, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cason D. McInturff v. Battle Ground Academy of Franklin TN - Concurring
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cason D. McInturff v. Battle Ground Academy of Franklin TN
The plaintiff ballplayer was hit by a baseball while sitting outside the dugout during a school baseball game. He sued the schools and the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (“TSSAA”) for failing to enforce the rules against his conduct. The trial court granted summary judgment to the TSSAA because the umpires were not agents of the TSSAA. The plaintiff appealed and we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Steele, et al. v. Michael Ritz
The plaintiffs/appellants in this lawsuit, an adult cabaret and three female employees of adult entertainment businesses and cabarets, filed a defamation suit against a county commissioner for a statement allegedly quoted in The Commercial Appeal and repeated at other venues.1 The county commissioner raised several defenses to the plaintiffs’ claim in a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. On consideration of the motion to dismiss, the trial court found as a matter of law that the plaintiffs could not prove their claim and dismissed their complaint. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State Automobile Insurance Company v. Jones Stone Company, Inc.
Insurer filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not required to provide coverage to insured in lawsuit filed against insured; insured filed a counter-complaint against insurer. At the close of all proof, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of insured on insurer’s declaratory judgment action and directed a verdict in favor of insurer on insured’s counterclaims of misrepresentation, bad faith, estoppel, and punitive damages. Insured’s two remaining counterclaims were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of insured for Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and breach of contract claims. Trial court subsequently awarded insured double damages and attorney’s fees under the TCPA. On appeal, both parties raise numerous issues with the judgment of the trial court, some of which are without merit or as to which no relief can be granted; such issues are dismissed. We reverse the award of double damages, vacate the award of counsel fees to the insured and remand for further consideration. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Julianna Walker and Mary S. White v. Calvin & Jimmy Beasley, Jack & Mary Hall, John Chorley, Taylor-Made Construction, Inc., Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, William R. Paschall, and June Rasmussen
This appeal involves insurance coverage. The plaintiffs purchased an undeveloped parcel of real property and hired a contractor to build a house on it. After the house was constructed, the plaintiffs discovered that cleared timber was buried underneath the land on which the house stood. Thereafter, the house developed structural problems, such as foundation cracks and non-alignment of doors and windows. The plaintiffs made a claim for coverage under their homeowners insurance policy; however, the insurer denied the claim, citing an exclusion of coverage for damages resulting from settling. The plaintiffs filed suit against inter alia the insurer alleging breach of contract and bad faith, and the plaintiffs and the insurer filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After conducting a hearing on the matter and considering expert testimony that the damage was caused by settling, the trial court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the settlement in this case is so excessive as to remove it from the ordinary meaning of the term “settling.” We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Romona D. Gore, et al v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water, Division of the City of Memphis
This is a claim for unemployment benefits. The claimant was denied unemployment benefits based on a finding that she falsified company records and therefore was discharged for misconduct connected with her employment. The claimant appealed the administrative decision to the Chancery Court. The Chancery Court reversed the administrative decision, finding that there was not substantial and material evidence to support the decision. Upon reviewing the record, we find that the administrative record contains substantial and material evidence to support the finding that the claimant falsified company records. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Chancery Court and remand for further action consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Don L. Wright v. Comfort Systems, U.S.A., and Walker-J-Walker, Inc.
This is a breach of contract case. When the plaintiff employee was hired as a department manager for the defendant employer, his employment contract provided that he would receive a bonus based on the net profit of the department. During the plaintiff’s term of employment, he received bonus payments; however, the parties had disagreements about how the department’s profit was calculated and thus about the amount of the bonus. After the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, the employee filed this lawsuit against the employer, alleging that the employer breached the contract by failing to pay the proper bonus amounts. The employer denied the allegation and asserted a counterclaim for excess amounts allegedly paid to the employee. The trial court referred issues on the plaintiff’s claim and the employer’s counterclaim to a special master. After conducting a hearing, the special master found that neither party carried its burden of proof and recommended that both the complaint and the counterclaim be dismissed. After considering the employee’s objection to the special master’s report, the trial court adopted the special master’s recommendations and dismissed the claims. The employee now appeals. We affirm, finding that there is material evidence to support the trial court’s concurrence. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
LaFrancine Gibson, as Surviving Relative and Next Friend of Georgia Jones, Deceased v. Metro Community Care Home, Inc., et al.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant common carrier, finding that Defendant had no notice that Decedent was mentally incapacitated and holding that Defendant had no duty to assess or probe Decedent in order to discover a latent or non-apparent psychological condition. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph R. Griffin v. Crompton Corporation, Uniroyal Co., Inc., Bayer AG, Bayer Corporation, Bayer Polymers LLC, Rhein Chemie Corporation, Dow Chemical Co., and BASF Corporation
This appeal involves competing class action lawsuits. The plaintiff/appellant filed a lawsuit in Tennessee on behalf of similarly situated consumers in Tennessee, asserting antitrust claims against various urethane manufacturers. Meanwhile, a separate class action was filed in Florida against some of the same manufacturers, asserting similar misconduct throughout the United States. The class in the Florida lawsuit included consumers in twenty-five states, including Tennessee. The Florida litigation settled, and the Florida court approved a plan to provide notice of the pending settlement to all class members. The notice plan did not include individual notice to the Tennessee plaintiff. The Florida notice plan was implemented. The Florida court then entered an order approving the settlement, finding that the notice plan satisfied the requirements of due process and gave class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances. Subsequently, in the instant Tennessee proceedings, the manufacturers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the doctrine of res judicata prohibited relitigation of the matters settled in the Florida case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant manufacturers. The plaintiff/appellant appeals, arguing that the Florida notice was insufficient because he did not receive individual actual notice. We affirm, finding that the Tennessee lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy White v. Warden Tommy Mills, Disciplinary Chairperson Sgt. Joe Spicer, and Sgt. Joel Smith
This appeal involves a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by a prisoner seeking review of his disciplinary conviction for possession of contraband. The respondents did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and the certified record was filed with the trial court. Upon review of the administrative record and the parties’ briefs, the trial court denied the petition, finding that the decision of the administrative disciplinary board was not illegal or arbitrary, and that it was supported by substantial and material evidence and had a rational basis. The petitioner prisoner now appeals. We affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Adoption of Gracie M. M.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights. Finding that the termination was contested and that the trial court failed to appoint a guardian ad litem, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph H. Johnston, Win Myint, William H. May, and Edward Hall v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville Davidson County and Paul G. Summers, Attorney General for the State of Tennessee
This zoning appeal involves Tennessee’s Open Meetings Act. A municipal legislative body began considering legislation to implement a conservation zoning overlay in a neighborhood within the municipality. The ordinance adopting the zoning change passed on the first and second reading. Prior to the final meeting on the subject, members of the legislative body sent numerous emails to each other discussing the proposed zoning change. In addition, prior to the final meeting, some members viewed information on the zoning issue in a non-public conference room in the legislative body’s office. The legislative body then adopted the zoning change at a public meeting. Thereafter, residents of the neighborhood who opposed the zoning change filed the instant lawsuit seeking a writ of certiorari to review the adoption of the ordinance. The petitioner residents argued, inter alia, that the email correspondence and the non-public meeting violated the Open Meetings Act, that the enabling statute violated the separation of powers doctrine, and that the enactment of the ordinance violated due process and was arbitrary and capricious. The trial court determined that the legislative body’s actions did not violate the Open Meetings Act, and rejected the other challenges to the zoning overlay ordinance. The neighborhood residents appeal. We reverse in part and affirm in part, finding among other things that while the email correspondence constitutes a violation of the Open Meetings Act, the legislative body engaged in a “new and substantial reconsideration” of the issues in the final meeting so as to cure the violation. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Damon A. Tatum v. Mercedeas A. Tatum
Wife filed a divorce complaint in Judge Robilio’s court, which she later voluntarily dismissed. Wife then filed a complaint in the Court of the Judiciary against Judge Robilio. Subsequently, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, and the matter was set in Judge Robilio’s court. Wife filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process of Husband’s divorce complaint, which was denied after the process server identified Wife as the person he had served. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Forrest Construction Company, LLC v. James L. Laughlin, II, et al. v. Thomas V. Naive
This action involves a variety of claims arising from the construction of a residence in Williamson County. A homeowner, James Laughlin, entered into a cost plus contract with Forrest Construction Company, LLC to construct a home for he and his wife. Prior to the home being completed, Forrest Construction stopped work, filed a lien on the residence, and thereafter filed a breach of contract action against Mr. Laughlin and an action to recover damages based on the doctrine of quantum meruit against Mrs. Laughlin. Forrest Construction claimed that Mr. Laughlin was in breach of the contract for failure to pay according to the contract. Mr. and Mrs. Laughlin filed a counter-claim for negligent construction, gross negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that Mr. Laughlin had materially breached the contract by failing to pay according to the terms of the contract, and awarded damages to Forrest Construction. Conversely, the trial court found for the Laughlins on their claim of negligent construction and awarded damages against Forrest Construction. Both parties appeal. Forrest Construction contends that the trial court erred in holding it liable for alleged defects because Mr. Laughlin committed the first material breach and failed to give Forrest Construction notice and the opportunity to cure the alleged defects. Mr. Laughlin contends the trial court erred in finding that he committed the first material breach. The Laughlins also contend the trial court erred in reducing the cost of the repairs to their residence and in failing to pierce the corporate veil. We find that Forrest Construction was the first to materially breach the contract by submitting requests for draws that were not properly supported by records of its costs and expenses as required by the contract, including submitting draws which erroneously included charges for work done on its other projects, and by failing to complete construction of the home. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s determination that Mr. Laughlin committed the first material breach and hold that Forrest Construction was the first to materially breach the contract. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the Laughlins were excused from the duty to give notice of the alleged defects and an opportunity to cure; thus, the Laughlins are entitled to recover damages due to the negligent construction by Forrest. As for the trial court’s substantial reduction of the damages requested by the Laughlins for the cost to repair the yet unrepaired defects to their home, we are unable to determine whether the trial court considered or overlooked $55,000 of the estimated cost to repair the defects; therefore, we remand this issue to afford the trial court the opportunity to either restate its previous ruling or to increase the award of damages, if it so determines, based on the evidence presently in the record. As for the issue of piercing the corporate veil, we remand that issue for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Steve Simmons And Jeannie L. Simmons v. City of Murfreesboro, et al.
Appellants granted a sewer line easement to the City. The City hired a sub-contractor to install the sewer line and to restore the property following construction. Appellants, who were dissatisfied with the sub-contractor’s restoration, filed suit against the City and the sub-contractor. The sub-contractor subsequently went out of business, and the trial court entered a judgment against the City for $13,070.00, representing the value of Appellants’ land plus the cost to repair a fence. Appellants appeal, claiming the proper measure of damages is the cost to restore their property–$137,779.62. On appeal, the City contends that Appellants may not sue the City, that Appellants breached the contract by refusing the sub-contractor access to their property, and that the trial court’s award should be reduced by $132.00. The proper measure of damages in this case is the lesser of the cost to restore Appellants’ property or the difference in reasonable market value of the premises immediately prior to and immediately after the injury. Although neither party presented evidence regarding the property’s diminished value, we find that the trial court considered the appropriate factors in setting the amount of damages. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |
