Baird Tree Company, Inc. vs. City of Oak Ridge, et al
In 2004, Baird Tree Company, Inc. ("Baird Tree") unsuccessfully bid on a tree trimming and removal project with the City of Oak Ridge ("Oak Ridge"). Baird Tree filed a lawsuit claiming, inter alia, that Oak Ridge's bidding process violated the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 47-25-101. We affirmed the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants because the contract at issue was a contract for services, not goods, and, therefore, the Tennessee Trade Practices Act did not apply. We also concluded that Baird Tree could not challenge the bidding process because it had failed to submit a valid bid in the first place. See Baird Tree Co., Inc. v. City of Oak Ridge, No. E2007-01933-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2510581 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2008). When the same project came up for bid in 2007, Baird Tree again submitted a fatally defective bid. When it was not awarded the contract, Baird Tree filed the present lawsuit raising various challenges to Oak Ridge's bidding process. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to all defendants. We, again, conclude that Baird Tree does not have standing to challenge the bidding process because it submitted a fatally defective "bid" in the first place. The judgment of the Trial Court is, therefore, affirmed. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Webb v. David Brian Hays, et al.
Plaintiff, a non-resident, brought this action against defendant real estate agent for releasing funds from a sale to defendant Hays, who had been employed by the plaintiff to sell items of personalty for plaintiff and improve plaintiff's real estate properties for sale. Further, that Hays improperly filed a lien against plaintiff's property, resulting in damages to plaintiff. The Trial Court granted the real estate agent summary judgment and, after a trial, entered a monetary judgment against Hays in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals the issue of summary judgment in favor of the real estate agent, and Hays appeals the monetary judgment entered against him in favor of plaintiff. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gina Scarlett Ferrari Pace v. Ward Redden Pace
This is a post-divorce modification of child custody and support. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court's order, which increased his child support obligation, modified his parenting time, and ordered him to pay Mother/Appellee's attorney's fees. Finding that the trial court erred in eliminating Father's one-week of uninterrupted summer visitation and not allowing him an additional night per week visitation, we reverse that portion of the order. Further, we find that the trial court erred in providing Father with a "credit" towards his child support in exchange for his payment of Mother's mortgage. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's amount of child support ordered, as well as the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Mother. We affirm the trial court's findings on both Mother's and Father's income. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; vacated in part and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Danny J. Phillips vs. William T. Mullins
Danny J. Phillips ("Plaintiff") sued William T. Mullins ("Defendant") after a truck driven by Defendant struck and injured Plaintiff who was riding a bicycle. Defendant moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order granting Defendant summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We reverse the grant of summary judgment finding that there are disputed issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse Arvil Cantrell v. Pamela Renee Cantrell
This appeal arises from a divorce action. After a trial, the court entered a divorce decree and divided the marital property. The trial court awarded the marital real property to Husband, and Wife, a pro se litigant, appeals the trial court's division of the marital property. We affirm in part, modify in part, and remand. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Corey Gerulis and wife Sara Felmlee v. Daniel A. Jacobus, et al
Prospective buyers entered into a contract with construction company for purchase of a home; the contract was amended to provide that a garage would be constructed. A letter was subsequently prepared specifying a time for the buyers to tender payment for the garage. The buyers failed to secure a loan to finance construction of the garage until a year after closing. When the construction company refused to build the garage for the amount specified in the contract amendment, the buyers initiated this action. The trial court found that the letter clarified the amendment by setting a time for performance and that the buyers' failure to pay within that time was a breach of the agreement which relieved the construction company of its contractual obligations; the court consequently dismissed buyers' action. Finding that there was not an agreement between the parties, the trial court's determination that the letter clarified the amendment is reversed. Finding that a reasonable time for performance was 90 days from closing on the home, and that the buyers' failure to tender payment within such period was a material breach, we affirm the trial court's determination that the construction company was relieved of its contractual obligations. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Carr, et al. v. Moosa Valinezhad, et al.
This appeal arises out of an elderly woman's attempt to recover assets from her daughter and former son-in-law, who allegedly exercised undue influence over her financial decision-making for a period of years following the death of her husband. In a motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs sought to invalidate two transfers of substantial assets to the defendants. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion and certified the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court's order does not dispose of a claim between the parties, we vacate the entry of final judgment and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Duane McCrory v. Anthony Tribble and Cynthia Tribble
This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff worker allegedly injured his knee while in the defendants’ home. The plaintiff visited a doctor the next day, and ultimately had surgery on the knee the next month. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendants, alleging premises liability. A jury trial was held. After the testimony concluded, the trial court declined to include a jury instruction requested by the plaintiff. During closing arguments, the plaintiff’s attorney started to read from a deposition that had not been entered into evidence; the trial court sustained a timely objection. Also during closing argument, the closing remarks of the defendant’s attorney alerted the plaintiff’s attorney to the fact that a particular medical record was not a part of the evidence submitted to the jury. While the jury was deliberating, the plaintiff sought to reopen proof to admit into evidence the omitted medical record; the trial court declined to reopen the proof. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Jones and Howard Jones v. Renga I. Vasu, M.D., The Neurology Clinic, and Methodist Lebonheur Hospital
This appeal involves delay of service of process. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging medical malpractice by the defendants almost a year earlier. The plaintiffs delayed service on the defendants until they had an expert witness review their claim. Summonses were issued to the defendants over eleven months after the complaint was filed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, alleging insufficiency of service of process, and asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion. The defendants appeal. We reverse and remand for entry of an order dismissing the complaint, finding that the delay of prompt service of process rendered the filing of the complaint ineffective to commence the action and stop the running of the statute of limitations. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Cook, Jr. v. Permanent General Assurance Corp.
This appeal involves the alleged breach of an insurance policy. The plaintiff insured had an automobile insurance policy with the defendant insurance company. The insured paid his insurance premium by check. He subsequently was involved in an automobile accident and notified the insurance company of the accident. The check was later returned for insufficient funds. The insurance company notified the insured that if he did not bring the premium current by a date certain, his insurance policy would be cancelled. The insured gave the insurance company a valid check for the premium, which was negotiated. The insurance company later cancelled the policy, retroactive to a date prior to the insured’s automobile accident. The insured sued the insurance company for breach of contract. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff insured. The insurance company appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Patterson v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by an inmate seeking review of his disciplinary conviction for assaulting a fellow inmate. TDOC did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and the certified record was filed with the trial court. Upon review of the record, the trial court denied the petition, and we affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Jane Bridgewater v. Robert S. Adamczyk , et al.
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Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Jane Bridgewater v. Robert S. Adamczyk , et al.
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Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Studsvik Logistics, LLC v. Royal Furniture Company
This appeal involves a judgment creditor's attempt to enforce a Mississippi default judgment in the general sessions court of Shelby County. The trial court concluded that the general sessions court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the judgment, and it set aside a conditional judgment entered by the general sessions court based on the Mississippi judgment. The judgment creditor appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Eric H. McPherson v. William E. George, Inc., and John H. Roebuck & Associates, Inc.
This appeal involves the breach of a real estate contract. The plaintiff hired the defendant auctioneer to sell his home at auction. After the defendant corporate purchaser was the high bidder at the auction, it signed a sales contract and made a substantial down payment on the property. The down payment was retained by the auctioneer as his commission. Shortly after that, the auctioneer promised the purchaser that the purchaser’s real estate agent would be paid a commission on the sale. Later, the defendant auctioneer refused to pay the purchaser’s agent a commission and, consequently, the purchaser refused to close on the sale. The auctioneer retained the earnest money. The seller filed this lawsuit against the purchaser for failing to close on the sale, and against the auctioneer for breach of fiduciary duty. The purchaser filed a counterclaim against the seller and a cross-claim against the auctioneer for breach of contract. All of the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller against the purchaser, but held in favor of the auctioneer against the seller. The trial court ordered the purchaser to pay damages to the seller for its breach of the sales agreement and permitted the auctioneer to retain the earnest money. The purchaser now appeals. We affirm, rejecting the purchaser’s claim of fraudulent inducement, and concluding that the seller is entitled to damages pursuant to the plain language of the sales agreement. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Studsvik Logistics, LLC v. Royal Furniture Company
This appeal involves a judgment creditor’s attempt to enforce a Mississippi default judgment in the general sessions court of Shelby County. The trial court concluded that the general sessions court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the judgment, and it set aside a conditional judgment entered by the general sessions court based on the Mississippi judgment. The judgment creditor appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Patterson v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by an inmate seeking review of his disciplinary conviction for assaulting a fellow inmate. TDOC did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and the certified record was filed with the trial court. Upon review of the record, the trial court denied the petition, and we affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Gerald Riley, and wife, Tanya Riley, Individually and as next of kin for Hunter Riley v. James Orr
This is an appeal of a jury verdict. The plaintiff was hunting with his son. The defendant was also hunting in the general area, and accidentally shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for negligence, and included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his son. The parties stipulated as to the defendant's liability, and a jury trial was held on the issue of damages. The jury instructions included instructions on the plaintiff father's mental pain and suffering and the son's emotional injury, but did not separately address the plaintiff father's emotional injury. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff father as well as an award for the son's emotional injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The defendant now appeals. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on several elements of damages, and argues that the inconsistency in the jury instructions on emotional injury necessitates a new trial. We affirm in part, vacate in part, suggest remittitur as to the awards for future medical expenses and for emotional injury, and remand for further proceedings. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Effie Rivers v. Northwest Tennessee Human Resource Agency
This is a personal injury case. The defendant’s employee negligently backed the defendant’s vehicle into the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had reported discomfort in her shoulders to her physician. At some point after the accident, the plaintiff reported to her physician that she had pain in her right shoulder. Ultimately, the plaintiff required shoulder replacement surgery. The plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence. The parties stipulated to the defendant’s liability, and a bench trial was held on causation and damages. Based in part on deposition testimony of physicians, the trial court found that the accident caused the plaintiff’s injury and the ensuing surgery and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Melinda Long, as Administrator of the Estate of Opal Hughes v. Hillcrest Healthcare - West et al. - Concur
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that, to the extent the allegations of the complaint allege medical malpractice1, the defendants are entitled to summary disposition of that claim. This is true because the material filed by the defendants in support of their motion clearly establishes that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the pre-filing requirements of the applicable statute as it pertains to a complaint sounding exclusively in medical malpractice. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (Supp. 20092). I cannot concur, however, that the allegations of the complaint sound exclusively in medical malpractice. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Melinda Long, as Administrator of the Estate of Opal Hughes, v. Hillcrest Healthcare - West, et al.
Opal Hughes sustained injuries while in the care of defendant Hillcrest Healthcare - West, and her administrator brought this action for damages. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff's complaint was a complaint for malpractice against defendant. Plaintiff argued that the complaint was for simple negligence, and the Trial Court held the complaint was for medical malpractice and since statutory requirements for filing a medical malpractice complaint had not been met, dismissed the case. On appeal, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Devon W., et al.
Former foster mother and her new husband filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the adoption of three children by the current foster parents. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Joseph McHugh vs. Carole Ann McHugh
This appeal concerns the distribution of marital property. After a bench trial, the court entered the Final Decree of Divorce and distributed the marital property. Wife subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and for attorney's fees. The trial court denied the motion in part and awarded approximately $2,087.50 in attorney's fees and litigation expenses to Wife. Wife appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Pam Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc.
In this action charging retaliatory discharge, the Trial Court granted defendant a dismissal of action based on its Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 12 Motion. On appeal, we vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Villas on Blue Mountain, L.P., et al., v. Tennessee Housing Development Agency
Plaintiffs attempted to submit an application for Low-Income Housing Tax Credit with the Tennessee Housing Development Agency. The Agency refused to accept the application and plaintiffs subsequently sued, asking the Court to require the Agency to accept and process their application. The Trial Court determined that the issue was moot and plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's summary judgment that the case was moot. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
