Denise Elizabeth Bailey (Price) v. Gregory Ross Price
The trial court reduced a divorced husband's alimony obligation because of a decline in his income from existing and expected future reductions in his overtime hours at the Post Office. The wife argues on appeal that her medical condition continues to prevent her from working, so her need remains the same as it was before, and that a reduction in alimony is therefore unjustified, even if the husband's ability to pay declines. She also argues that the trial court erred in taking future reductions in husband's overtime hours into consideration, which she characterizes as speculative. We find that under the circumstances of this case the reduction in alimony ordered by the trial court did not constitute an abuse of its discretion, and we therefore affirm its judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Donald M. Merriweather v. Luther Smith, Jr.
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
The Estate of Ella Mae Cockrill
The son of a woman who died at the age of ninety-four filed a petition for probate in solemn form of his mother's lost will. After examining a photocopy of the alleged will and hearing proof from six witnesses, the trial court granted the petition. One of the granddaughters of the decedent appealed, and she has presented a number of arguments to suggest that the trial court erred. We have considered her arguments on appeal, but in the absence of a trial transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must assume that the trial court's decision is fully supported by the record. We accordingly affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Wondimu Borena v. Yellow Cab Metro, Inc., et al.
The former attorney for the plaintiff, who is seeking to recover a contingency fee pursuant to an attorney's lien she filed after her services were terminated, filed this appeal challenging the trial court's finding that the parties did not enter into a binding settlement agreement and the involuntary dismissal of the underlying personal injury action. The action was dismissed because the pro se plaintiff did not comply with orders of the court. The plaintiff's former attorney claims she has the independent right to enforce a settlement she negotiated, but which her client rejected, in order to recover a fee. The pro se plaintiff also seeks to set aside the involuntary dismissal of his case. Finding no merit to the arguments asserted on appeal, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Gallon, et al. v. Harry Elberson, et al.
The plaintiff home buyers filed suit against two home inspectors and a home inspection company after discovering defects in the home that were not mentioned in the inspection report. The court found that the defendants were negligent and granted the plaintiffs a judgment for damages against the home inspectors and the inspection company, individually, jointly and severally. The defendants argue on appeal that the judgment was not supported by the evidence and that in holding them individually liable, the court pierced the corporate veil without the proof of the extraordinary circumstances normally required for a court to do so. We affirm the finding of liability and the judgment for damages, but we vacate the judgment as to one of the individual defendants, because the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that he was in partnership with the other individual defendant. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jack H. L. B-K.
Father appeals the trial court's decision to allow Mother to relocate to California with the parties' minor child. Mother and Father lived separately in California when their only child was born. Mother moved with the minor child to Tennessee in April 2008; Father also moved to Tennessee to be near the child. A year later, Father filed a Petition to Register a Foreign Decree and Modify and Enforce Visitation in the Williamson County Juvenile Court. In June 2009, Mother notified Father she intended to return to California with their child and sought court permission to do so. When the juvenile court referee denied the relocation, Mother sought a de novo hearing before the juvenile court judge. Following a full hearing, the juvenile court judge granted Mother's request to relocate finding that Father, who did not have substantially equal parenting time, failed to carry his burden under the parental relocation statute, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-6-108(d)(1). We affirm the trial court's findings that Father did not prove that Mother's move is not for a reasonable purpose, poses a specific or serious threat of harm to the child, or is vindictive. We also affirm the trial court's decision denying Mother's request for attorney's fees and deny her request for attorney's fees on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: Amber M. S. and Stefanie L. S.
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Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Jessica Hooper McQuade (now Burnett) v. Michael Vincent McQuade
This is a divorce appeal involving subject matter jurisdiction. The parties, the parents of one minor child, resided in Tennessee when divorce proceedings were initiated in the Tennessee trial court. The trial court entered a pendente lite order designating the father as the child's primary residential parent and setting the mother's child support obligation. Before the trial, a special master made a recommendation on the mother's child support obligation. In May 2008, after a trial, the Tennessee trial court entered an order declaring the parties divorced and designating the father as primary residential parent, but did not rule on child support. By the time of the divorce order, both parties had moved to Kentucky. Almost immediately afterward, the mother filed an objection regarding the amount of her child support obligation, and the Tennessee trial court entered an order temporarily modifying her child support. In February 2009, the mother filed a petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent. The Tennessee trial court conducted a hearing on the mother's objection to the amount of child support and her petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent. It declined to change the designation of primary residential parent, and also held that the mother owed no back child support arrearage. Both parties appeal. We hold that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Tennessee trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother's petition to change the designation of primary residential parent. We also hold that, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother's request for modification of child support. Therefore, we vacate the trial court's orders modifying the parenting plan and modifying child support. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Shemain Sherille Riley, et al. v. Edith Swift
The General Sessions Court awarded the plaintiffs an $8,500 judgment for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The pro se defendant attempted to appeal the judgment to the Circuit Court, but failed to have the case docketed within 45 days after filing the notice of appeal, as is required by Davidson County Local Rule 20(b). The plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of untimeliness and to enforce the order of the General Sessions Court. The defendant did not respond to the motion, nor did she appear for the motion hearing. The Circuit Court granted the plaintiffs' motion and made the judgment of the General Sessions Court the judgment of the Circuit Court. The defendant then retained counsel, who filed a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment eight months after it was rendered. The Circuit Court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Chris Lawrence vs. Leigh Ann Lawrence
Leigh Ann Lawrence ("Mother") secretly tape recorded her 2 1/2-year-old daughter's telephone conversation with the child's father, Chris Lawrence ("Father"), during the course of a divorce and custody dispute. After the divorce was concluded, Father filed a complaint against Mother seeking damages for, among other things, wiretapping in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _39-13-601 (2006). Father filed a motion for partial summary judgment which the trial court denied upon finding that "[n]o set of facts would create liability under _39-13-601 et seq. for [Mother's] interception of [Father's] communication with his daughter." The court then entered partial summary judgment in favor of Mother and certified the judgment as final. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Fieldstone Farms Homeowners Association, et al. v. Cavender Enterprises, LLC
The trial court found that a parcel designated as a recreational facility in a planned unit development was a "lot" under the terms of the governing declarations such that it could not be subdivided or subjected to a revised use. Under the original declaration, the recreational parcel was expressly excluded within the definition of lot but the later supplemented declaration omits the exclusion. Finding that according to its terms the Supplementary Declaration could not conflict with the original declaration, we find the parcel was not included within the definition of lot. Consequently, it is not subject to the restrictions placed on lots. As there is no prohibition to subdivision or conversion to residential use in the documents governing the parcel, then the parcel may be subdivided and converted to residential use. Accordingly, the trial court is reversed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Monya Jill Rayanne Roberts vs. James Kevin Roberts
On appeal, James Kevin Roberts ("Husband") challenges the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance to allow his fifth attorney time to prepare for trial, the trial court's refusal to exclude an expert witness called by Monya Jill Rayanne Roberts ("Wife"), the division of the marital estate, the amount of child support and the award of discretionary costs to Wife. Wife challenges the trial court's denial of her request for "supplemental" attorney's fees. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
New South Federal Savings Bank vs. Brenda Pugh
This is an appeal of two unlawful detainer actions consolidated below. New South Federal Savings Bank ("New South") filed separate detainer warrants against Brenda Pugh seeking possession of two non-adjacent properties conveyed to New South at a foreclosure sale instituted after Pugh defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust on the 1 properties. The general sessions court dismissed the actions. On appeal, the trial court rejected Pugh's challenge to the foreclosure. The court held in favor of New South and ordered that it be restored to possession of the properties. Pugh appeals. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Tom Agnew vs. Meritan, et al
In this matter, the plaintiff appeals the decision of the Board of Review of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development that he is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-7-301, as a result of his failure to establish that he had covered wages not provided by an unemployment workrelief program financed by a federal agency under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-7-207(c)(5)(G). The trial court upheld the decision of the Board of Review. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Richard L. Holllow, Trustee, et al vs. Michael L. Ingram, et al
The parties, owners of a tract of land, ultimately agreed to the sale of the property by a Special Master appointed by the Court. The sale was held and the Master ultimately reported the purchase and asked that the sale be confirmed. Before the Court acted on the Master's Report, the plaintiff moved for a dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 41, which the Trial Court granted and dismissed the case. On appeal, we hold that the Trial Court was required to act on the Master's Report before entertaining any motion to dismiss the case, and reinstate the action and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Billy Joe Walls
This appeal arises out of a challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Upon the death of the testator, Billy Joe Walls, wills executed by him were submitted for probate in different states. Patricia Pemberton was appointed personal representative under a 2009 will admitted to probate in the trial court. Barbara Brown is the appointed personal representative under a 2007 will admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Alabama. Brown initiated these proceedings by filing a complaint in the trial court 1 to contest the will submitted by Pemberton. Subsequently, Brown sought summary judgment, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, Brown moved to transfer the case to Alabama under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The trial court dismissed Pemberton's petition on both grounds. She appeals. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jane Doe and John Doe v. Walgreens Company, et al.
This is an appeal from the grant of Appellees/Defendants' Tenn. R Civ. P 12.02 motion to dismiss. Appellant Jane Doe, who is HIV positive, was employed by Appellee Walgreens. In an effort to keep her medical condition private, Ms. Doe had her prescriptions filled at a Walgreens location other than the one at which she worked; therefore, Ms. Doe was also a customer of Walgreens. A co-worker of Ms. Doe's accessed Ms. Doe's prescription history in the Walgreens' database, and then disseminated her medical information to other coworkers and to Ms. Doe's fianc_. Ms. Doe and her fianc_ filed suit. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the Does' exclusive remedy was under the workers' compensation act. Finding that the injuries sustained by Ms. Doe do not arise out of her employment with Walgreens, and that she has sufficiently pled causes of action outside workers' compensation law, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ray Bell Construction Co. vs. State of Tennessee, Department of Transportation - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission. I believe the Claims Commission erred in finding a latent ambiguity in the contract, and as this was the purported basis for the Claims Commission’s decision, I would reverse the decision of the Claims Commission and grant judgment to the Tennessee Department of Transportation. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ray Bell Construction Co. vs. State of Tennessee, Department of Transportation
Tennessee Claims Commission - This case concerns an alleged breach of contract involving the incentive clause of a Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT") road construction contract. Before the Claims Commission, TDOT argued that the contract language was clear in prohibiting an extension, alteration, or amendment of the incentive clause. The Claims Commission agreed with the position of Ray Bell Construction Company ("RBCC") that it was entitled to a modification of the incentive provision. To so find, the Commission held that "a definite latent ambiguity exists for which parol evidence not only is admissible, but frankly, absolutely necessary in both understanding and deciding the issues in this case." TDOT has appealed. We affirm the decision of the Claims Commission. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Cardwell vs. Donald Christopher Hutchinson
Amy E. Cardwell ("Petitioner") was sexually abused by Donald Christopher Hutchinson ("Respondent"), who was the Youth Leader at petitioner's church. Petitioner, who is mentally disabled, filed for and obtained an order of protection prohibiting respondent from having any contact with petitioner. Respondent also was prohibited from attending the church where he abused petitioner so long as petitioner continued to attend that church. The order of protection expired in one year, at which time both petitioner and respondent agreed to extend it for another one year period. At the expiration of the second one year term, petitioner filed a motion seeking another one year extension. Respondent opposed the second extension. Following a hearing, the trial court extended the order of protection for another year. Respondent appeals, and we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Kline, et al. v. Club 616, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves a lawsuit filed against a nightclub and several individuals who, according to Plaintiffs, were owners of the nightclub at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit. The trial court granted summary judgment to two of those individuals, finding that they had produced "conclusive" evidence that they had no ownership interest in the club at the relevant time. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jelani Stinson v. Margaret Washington
This is a child custody dispute between a biological father and the children's maternal grandmother. The trial court awarded custody to the grandmother. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Madison K. P.
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Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Rawdon, et al. v. Jimmie Lee Johnston, et al.
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Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Dillard Construction, Inc. vs. Haron Contracting Corp., et al.
The only parties left litigating in what started out as a complex construction dispute are, on one side, Dillard Construction, Inc , and, on the other, Dillard's demolition subcontractor, Havron Contracting Corp. After a bench trial and several post-trial motions, the court held that (1) Dillard, while not having a contract with Havron, was required by quantum meruit to pay Havron $91,100 for work performed by Havron's subcontractors; (2) Dillard was not entitled to an offset against that judgment for damage done to electrical equipment by Havron's subcontractor; (3) Havron was entitled to recover from Dillard, under a "passthrough" indemnity theory, the attorney's fees awarded against Havron and in favor of its subcontractor; and (4) Havron was not entitled to recover the attorney's fees that it, Havron, incurred in defending against the claims of its subcontractor. Dillard appeals challenging both the quantum meruit award and the denial of an offset. Havron challenges the trial court's denial of indemnification for attorney's fees Havron incurred in defending the claims of its subcontractor. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
