David Larkin Wall v. Amy Ballesteros Wall
This is a post-divorce petition to modify a parenting plan. In the divorce decree, the mother was designated as the primary residential parent of the parties’ daughter. Two years later, the father filed this petition to modify the decree to designate him as the primary residential parent, alleging that the mother had inadequate child care arrangements while the mother was at work, and that the mother had not been adequately caring for the child’s basic personal and educational needs. The parenting plan was temporarily modified to designate the father as the temporary primary residential parent. Nevertheless, the father was ordered to continue paying child support to the mother pending the trial, in order to maintain the status quo. After a hearing, the trial court found a material change in circumstances, but found it was not sufficient to change the designation of primary residential parent to the father on a permanent basis. The father was awarded substantially more parenting time. The father now appeals the denial of his petition to change the designation of primary residential parent and the award of child support to the Mother while he was the temporary primary residential parent. We affirm the award of child support, but reverse the denial of the petition to change the designation of the primary residential parent based on the mother’s consistently poor judgment in decisions related to the care of the child. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Hosie Johnson et al. v. Nick Dattilo et al.
The purchasers of a lot and newly constructed residence filed this action against the builders, seeking damages and rescission of the construction and sale agreement. The plaintiffs allege the defendants breached the agreement by failing to construct the home in accordance with “good building practices,” and breached the implied warranty of workmanship. They also allege that statements made by the foreman during construction, concerning the condition of the property, amount to a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104(b)(7), as well as common law negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation.The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on all claims. Finding plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of key elements in each of their claims, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Swift Roofing, Inc. v. State of Tennessee, Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development
This appeal arises from a petition seeking judicial review of an administrative agency order, which affirmed citations for workplace safety violations. The Chancery Court affirmed the citations. After reviewing the appellate record, we conclude that the administrative agency did not provide the required findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for its decision. Consequently, judicial review is not possible based on the record before this Court. Therefore, we vacate the order of the Chancery Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Commercial Bank, Inc., et al., v. Hollis Fay Summers, et al.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had borrowed money from the Bank and executed a trust deed to secure the loan and the property was properly foreclosed by the Bank as the successful bidder. Further, that defendants then filed numerous documents in the Register of Deeds office to slander plaintiffs' title. Defendants never answered the Complaint and after several months plaintiffs moved for a default judgment which was granted at a hearing before the Trial Court. The Trial Court ruled that the various documents filed by the defendants in the Register of Deeds office were null and void and assessed costs to the defendants. Defendants appealed pro se, and we dismiss the appeal on the grounds that they failed to comply with any of the applicable rules of appellate procedure governing appeals. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Angela L. (Lyles) Melton v. Jackie B. Melton
In this divorce case, the husband challenges the trial court’s distribution of the marital property, valuation of the marital residence, and award of alimony to the wife. Without a transcript or statement of the evidence, this court cannot adequately review the issues raised by the husband. Finding that the trial court did not err as a matter of law, we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Gribble Waddell v. Gregory C. Rustin
This case stems from a lawsuit over an alleged implied partnership. Rebecca Gribble Waddell (“Waddell”) and Gregory C. Rustin (“Rustin”) were involved romantically for a number of years. After the couple separated, Waddell sued Rustin in the Chancery Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”), alleging, among other things, that a partnership existed between Waddell and Rustin. The Trial Court held, inter alia, that there was no partnership between Waddell and Rustin and ordered divestiture of certain property from Waddell to Rustin. Waddell appeals to this Court, and both parties raise multiple issues. Rustin also argues that this appeal is frivolous. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court on all issues except for that concerning divestiture of certain property from Waddell, which we reverse. We decline to hold this appeal frivolous. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: Shyronne D. H., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case with an unusual procedural history. Following an incident with one of her children, Appellant Mother was charged with one count of aggravated child neglect or endangerment and one count of aggravated child abuse of a child under eight years of age. She pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to six years’ incarceration. In a separate proceeding, the children were adjudicated to be dependent and neglected and victims of severe child abuse. At the termination of parental rights hearing, which is the subject of this appeal, the trial court determined that the previous finding of severe child abuse was res judicata and did not permit the parties to relitigate the issue. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding the issue of severe child abuse to be res judicata because the order finding the children to be dependent and neglected and victims of severe child abuse is not a final judgment. Consequently, Appellant should have been permitted to present evidence and argument at the termination proceeding as to whether she committed severe child abuse. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ann Laure Chamberlain v. Jeremy Steven Moore
On December 10, 2010 the Trial Court entered an Agreed Order on Parenting Time. Ann Laure Chamberlain (“Appellant”) filed a motion to set aside the December 10, 2010 order. On February 28, 2011 the Trial Court entered its order, inter alia, denying the motion to set aside, reserving child support matters, and stating that the parties may mediate any remaining issues regarding parenting time. Appellant appeals to this Court. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Gabriel D.A., ET AL
The order from which the appellant William E. J. seeks to appeal was entered on Tuesday, April 12, 2011. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Thursday, May 19, 2011, the 37th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not filed timely, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jada Flack v. Curtis McKinney
This appeal arises out of dependency and neglect proceedings in which custody of the minor child was awarded to the father. The mother appealed, but she failed to provide this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence. Due to our inability to review the evidence, we affirm the decision of the lower court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky Lynn Hill v. Tennessee Department of Corrections
Inmate appeals the grant of summary judgment to the Tennessee Department of Corrections in declaratory judgment action wherein inmate sought to be given credit on his sentence for work performed while housed in county jail. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Archie Story v. Civil Service Commission of the State of Tennessee, et al.
A highway patrolman was terminated for allegedly deploying a tire deflation device without prior authorization in violation of General Order 412 and for untruthfulness regarding such. On appeal, the trooper argues that his partial extension of the device did not constitute a “deployment.” Thus, he contends he did not violate General Order 412, nor was he untruthful when he denied deployment. We affirm the ALJ’s finding that the trooper “deployed” the device in violation of General Order 412 and that he was untruthful about doing so. Accordingly, we find there existed substantial and material evidence to support his termination. Additionally, we find that the trial court did not err in denying the trooper’s request to admit additional evidence and to supplement his brief. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Angelia Lynette Maupin v. Paul Wayne Maupin
The order of the trial court entered February 16, 2011, from which the appellant Angelia Lynette Maupin seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth E. Ramsey
The order of the trial court entered February 9, 2011, from which the appellant Kenneth E. Ramsey seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Santiago Toscani v. Nader Rahbe
The order from which the appellant Nader Rahbe seeks to appeal was entered on Wednesday, January 5, 2011. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Tuesday, February 8, 2011, the 34th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, the motion of the appellee to dismiss is granted. This appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Stabler v. Ramie Stabler-Marston
The order from which the appellant Ramie Stabler-Marston seeks to appeal was entered on February 24, 2010. Notices of appeal were filed by the appellant on October 18, 2010, and October 20, 2010. Because neither of the notices of appeal was timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John L. Houston v. Rhey Houston, et al.
The order of the trial court entered November 29, 2010, from which the appellant John L. Houston seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Emily L.
In this Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father to two minor children, the Trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing, terminated the parental rights of the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment and held that it was in the best interests of the children that the father's parental rights be terminated. The father appealed, and upon our review we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: D.L.
In this Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father to two minor children, the Trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing, terminated the parental rights of the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment and held that it was in the best interests of the children that the father's parental rights be terminated. The father appealed, and upon our review we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
The Bank of Fayette County v. Simon M. Woody, Jr., d/b/a Royal Kingdom Builders
This is an action by the bank to recover against the debtor for defaulting on a loan. The plaintiff bank made a loan to the defendant debtor for the purchase of real property, and the property was pledged to secure the loan. The debtor defaulted on the loan, the property was sold, and the proceeds were applied to the debt. The bank filed this lawsuit against the debtor for the deficiency. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the bank. The debtor now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant him a continuance in order to obtain counsel. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Epps v. Civil Service Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, and the Metropolitan Action Commission
This appeal arises out of a dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari in which review was sought of the denial of a grievance filed by an employee of the Metropolitan Action Commission’s Head Start program. The grievance was initially denied by the Executive Director of the Metropolitan Action Commission. The employee then appealed the grievance to the Metropolitan Civil Service Commission, which assigned the appeal to an administrative law judge; after a hearing, the administrative law judge denied the grievance. Upon further appeal, the Civil Service Commission overturned the administrative law judge’s decision and held in favor of the employee; the Civil Service Commission transmitted its decision to the Board of Commissioners of the Metropolitan Action Commission as a recommended final order. The Board of Commissioners rejected the recommended decision and voted to deny the grievance. When the employee sought to appeal the Board of Commissioner’s decision to the Civil Service Commission, that Commission responded that it had no further authority to hear the appeal because the employee was not an employee in classified service and because the Metropolitan Action Commission had final authority on grievance decisions involving employees of the Head Start program. The employee then sought review by writ of certiorari in chancery court, which found that the employee was not a civil service employee and was, therefore, not entitled to a second appeal to the Civil Service Commission; the court also found that the Metropolitan Action Commission had conformed to the applicable grievance process. On appeal, the employee asserts that she was employed in a civil service position and entitled to the grievance process set forth in the civil service rules. Finding that the grievance procedure applicable to employees in the classified service is not applicable to the employee and that the Action Commission properly exercised final authority on the grievance, we affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Bruce Colston v. Melinda Kay Colston
In this post-divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to pay an alimony arrearage of $86,000.00. We affirm the judgment for the arrearage and remand the case for reconsideration of the requirement that Husband pay the arrearage at $1,500.00 per month. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy H. Wright v. James Charles Wright
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court granted the father sole custody and decision making authority over the parties’ minor children. The mother appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on all issues. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Cadlerock, LLC v. Sheila R. Weber
The plaintiff, an assignee to a foreign judgment, filed a petition to domesticate the judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-101 et seq. The defendant objected to the enrollment of the foreign judgment because it was assigned. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to domesticate the foreign judgment and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. Our review of the record reveals that the plaintiff properly followed the statutory requirements to enroll a foreign judgment. Accordingly, the trial court erred. We reverse. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Denise Jeremiah and Timothy Jeremiah v. William Blaylock
The plaintiff home buyer and defendant home seller entered into an agreement to repair a drain at some future date because it had been improperly piped out of the buyer’s house. When the time for performance came, the drain was not moved, resulting in damages to the buyer’s home. The buyer sued for breach of contract. The circuit court granted a directed verdict to the defendant on the ground that there was no consideration to support the contract. We find that the mutual promises made by the parties constituted adequate consideration. We accordingly reverse the trial court and remand this case for such further proceedings as necessary. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals |
