Tracy Hepburn v. Corrections Corporation of America, et al.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Gorge A. Rubio v. Geneva Vaughn, et al.
Appellant’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter and this appeal must be dismissed. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Matthew Brown v. Jennifer Lindsey (Williams) Brown
Husband filed a petition pursuant to Rule 60.02 to set aside a provision of the parties’ divorce decree that required him to pay $80,000 to Wife in accordance with an antenuptial agreement. He sought relief under Rule 60.02(2) for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. The trial court denied Husband’s petition and “confirmed” the divorce decree. We find that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, and as a result, it did not properly exercise its discretion. We also find that Wife’s conduct constituted misrepresentation or other misconduct within the meaning of Rule 60.02(2). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Husband’s Rule 60 petition and we vacate the challenged portion of the divorce decree. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Matthew Brown v. Jennifer Lindsey (Williams) Brown - Dissenting
For the reasons discussed below, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Michael M. Shofner v. Eddie Mahaffey v. Midstate Finance Company, Inc.
A trial court granted Third-Party Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute where Third-PartyPlaintiff took no steps to pursue his claims against Third-PartyDefendant more than six years after Third-PartyPlaintiff was granted a new trial, and where Third-Party Plaintiff failed to comply with the trial court’s scheduling order, thereby causing additional delays. Third-Party Plaintiff appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Trial courts have broad discretionary authority to control their dockets and proceedings, and the court here did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Third-Party Plaintiff’s complaint against Third-Party Defendant. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Bradford Stahr Fakes v. Patricia Nicole Zahorik
Unmarried parents who had been involved in extensive litigation over custody of their two children finally entered into an agreed order that gave custody of their six year old son to the father and custody of their two year old daughter to the mother. Two years later, the father filed a petition for modification of custody, alleging improper conduct by the Mother. After a hearing, the trial court found that there had been a material change of circumstances and awarded the father primary custody of the little girl. The mother argues on appeal that the trial court’s final order was deficient because it did not specifically identify the material change of circumstance that justified reopening the question of custody and because the court did not apply the statutory factors found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) to the question of the children’s best interest. We affirm the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Clyde Deuel v. The Surgical Clinic, PLLC
A surgeon left a sponge in the abdomen of a patient, closing the incision after receiving assurances from two operating room nurses that all the surgical sponges used in the operation had been fully accounted for. A second surgery was required to remove the sponge from the patient’s body. The patient died of unrelated causes seven months later. The patient’s widow filed a medical malpractice complaint against the surgeon and argued that the evidence of negligence was so plain that she could be excused from the normal requirement of producing expert testimony to prove that medical malpractice had occurred. The defendant surgeon presented expert testimony during trial to prove that the surgical standard of care entitled him to rely on the accuracy of the sponge count provided by his nurses. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant surgeon. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the use of expert testimony in a case that is based on the common knowledge exception and res ipsa loquitur. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Wesley Green, Individually and as Shareholder of Champs-Elysees, Inc. v. Champs-Elysee, Inc. et al.
Plaintiff raises a plethora of issues on appeal from an action that began as a declaratory judgment action seeking to enforce a sales contract and turned into complex litigation involving numerous claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges, inter alia, the trial court’s decisions regarding the exclusion of evidence pursuant to the Dead Man’s Statute, the denial of a motion to amend to add an additional party, issues related to discovery, the trial court’s grant of directed verdict on numerous claims to the Defendants, and several other rulings by the trial court. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth LaFon Western Vinson v. James Gerald Vinson
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Father challenges numerous rulings by the trial court, regarding both parenting issues and financial issues. We affirm in part, as modified, we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
John D. Glass v. Suntrust Bank, et al.
Plaintiff beneficiary filed an action challenging the reasonableness of an executor’s fee taken by SunTrust as Executor. The probate court upheld the executor’s fee, and Plaintiff then filed an action against SunTrust Bank and SunTrust as Trustee. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment to Defendants based upon collateral estoppel and res judicata. We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and we remand for further proceedings |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Margie R. Huskey et al v. Rhea County, Tennessee
In this negligence action, the trial court, following a bench trial, found the defendant 51% at fault and the plaintiff 49% at fault for a severe injury plaintiff, Margie R. Huskey, suffered to her left arm at the Rhea County Convenience Center. The trial court assessed total compensatory damages at $298,376.65, which it reduced by 49%, awarding $152,172.09 to Ms. Huskey. The court further assessed damages of $25,000.00 for loss of consortium in favor of plaintiff, Norman Huskey, which it likewise reduced by 49%, awarding $12,750.00. The County raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by finding the County liable for negligence; (2) whether the injured plaintiff was at least 50% at fault and therefore barred from recovery; and (3) whether the damages awarded were excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Ragland, et al. v. Roy Morrison
This appeal arises from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellants claimed that Appellee was liable for injuries caused by dogs that Appellee allegedly owned and allowed to run loose in the Appellants’ neighborhood. The trial court’s order fails to state the legal ground upon which the court granted the motion for summary judgment. Further, there is no indication in the record of the trial court’s reason(s) for granting the motion. Because Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04 mandates inclusion of the trial court’s legal ground in the order on the motion for summary judgment, we vacate and remand. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
George R. Vraney, M.D. v. Medical Specialty Clinic, P.A.
This is a breach of contract case. Appellant, a medical doctor, was hired by Appellee Clinic under terms outlined in an employment agreement. After four years employment, the relationship between the parties reached an impasse and Appellant made plans to leave the Clinic to open his own practice. When the parties could not agree concerning payments due under the contract, the instant lawsuit was filed by Appellant, claiming that the Appellee had breached the contract. Appellee counter-sued for breach of contract, breach of duty of loyalty, and conversion, claiming that the Appellee had retained certain of his accounts receivable and had limited his work schedule in contravention of the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee on the breach of contract and duty of loyalty claims, and set damages pursuant to the report of the Special Master. Appellant appeals. We conclude that remaining questions of law and fact preclude the grant of summary judgment, but that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s claim for unpaid vacation time and properly referred the issue of damages to the Special Master. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Court of Appeals | ||
James Glen Kirk v. Gloria Taylor Kirk
This appeal involves the trial court’s disposition of Wife’s post-judgment motions and redivision of marital property. Following the trial court’s entry of the final decree of divorce, Wife filed several post-judgment motions seeking relief from the final decree based on Husband’s misrepresentation and concealment of assets prior to the trial court’s division of the marital estate. After an extensive period of discovery, the trial court agreed with Wife and concluded that she was entitled to a new division of marital property and relief from the final decree under either Rule 59 or Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court further ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees and expert fees. Husband appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dominique Johnson v. South Central Correctional Facility Disciplinary Board, et al.
This case involves a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed by a pro se inmate. The Defendants/Appellees filed motions to dismiss the Petition, arguing that the Petition was untimely and that it lacked the required verification pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-8-104. The trial court dismissed the Petition without ruling on the inmate’s motion for an enlargement of time to respond to the motion to dismiss. The inmate appealed. On appeal, the Appellees argue that the inmate’s Notice of Appeal was untimely. We conclude that the inmate’s Notice of Appeal was timely filed. In addition, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to rule on the inmate’s pending motion was harmless, as the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to consider the petition by the inmate’s failure to verify the truth of the petition. Affirmed and remanded. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
3L Communications L.L.C. v. Jodi Merola, Individually, and d/b/a NY Telecom Supply
Appellee/Buyer purchased certain telecommunications equipment from Appellant/Seller. Upon inspection, Appellee discovered the equipment was defective and rejected the goods. Appellant contends that the returned goods were never delivered and that Appellee bears the risk of loss under the Tennessee Uniform Commercial Code. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Appellee/Buyer, finding that, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 47-2-510, the risk of loss remained with Appellant/Seller. Appellant appeals this finding, as well as the award of prejudgment interest and attorney fees in favor of Appellee. We reverse the award of attorney fees. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Daniel Fry v. Yuriko Shinoda Fry
Husband and Wife were divorced in 2000 and Wife was awarded one-half of the retirement benefits Husband earned from the military during the parties’ ten-year marriage. Wife has been unable to collect her portion of these benefits because the language of the court’s decree does not satisfy the requirements of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §1408, et seq. Shortly after the divorce was granted, Wife filed a Rule 60 motion to amend the court’s Final Decree of Divorce to comply with the Act, which the trial court granted. Husband appealed because the trial court made substantive changes to Wife’s award beyond what was necessary to comply with the Act. The Court of Appeals agreed with Husband on appeal and issued a mandate directing the trial court to amend its Final Decree using language meant to comply with the Act’s requirements to enable Wife to receive her portion of Husband’s retirement benefits directly from the military. Wife still has not been able to collect her portion of Husband’s retirement benefits and filed another Rule 60 motion seeking to amend the Final Decree again to comply with the Act’s requirements. The trial court denied Wife’s motion and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. Wife presents extraordinary circumstances entitling her to relief pursuant to Rule 60.02(5). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cecilia Gonzalez v. Mauricio Gonzalez
This case involves the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of a Rule 60.02 Motion to Set Aside a Final Judgment. The trial court previously dismissed Mother’s Petition for Divorce, after finding that the marriage was void due to Mother’s preexisting marriage in Chile. Mother subsequently filed a Rule 60.02 Motion, with supporting documentation purporting to show that she was never legally married in Chile. The trial court refused to set a hearing and dismissed the Rule 60.02 Motion. We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Mother’s Rule 60.02 Motion. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Allison N.A., et al
This is a termination of parental rights case regarding Allison N.A., David M.B., and Raven H.B. (“the Children”), the minor children of Rebecca A.B. (“Mother”) and Jerry W.E.B. (“Father”). Mother and Father are divorced and reside in different states. Mother and the Children resided in Tennessee in a home with Mother’s then-boyfriend, Troy R. (“Boyfriend”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Children, then ages eight, four and three, respectively, from Mother’s care after Boyfriend was arrested for a physical assault against the youngest child. Relatives, with whom the Children were first placed, proved not to be able to care for them. DCS obtained custody and the Children entered foster care. Thereafter, they were adjudicated dependent and neglected. Father was located and he was notified of the Children’s situation. He did not seek custody. More than a year after the Children were placed in foster care, DCS filed a petition to terminate both parents’ rights. After a trial, the court granted the petition based on its finding that multiple grounds for termination exist as to both parents and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Both findings were said to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Nicole Goeser, et al. v. Live Holdings Corporation, et al.
A patron at a sports bar shot and killed a man without threat or warning. The widow of the murdered man and his daughter filed separate lawsuits which were later consolidated, naming the owner of the bar as defendant, and claiming that the victim’s death was the result of inadequate security on the premises. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment contending that he did not violate any duty owed to the plaintiffs, because the shooting that occurred was completely unforeseeable under the circumstances. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of John J. Goza v. James M. Wells, III, et al.
The trial court dismissed this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm and grant Appellees’ request for damages for a frivolous appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Billy W. Huffman, et ux v. Whitney Nichole Huffman
This appeal arises from a dispute over grandparent visitation. Whitney Nichole Huffman Lewis (“Mother”) is the mother of the minor child Isaiah Huffman (“the 1 Child”). Billy W. Huffman and Lora D. Huffman (“the Grandparents,” collectively), father and stepmother of Mother, filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) to establish visitation rights with the Child. The Child had visited often with the Grandparents, but Mother ended the visits after a falling out with Mr. Huffman. Following a trial, the Trial Court denied the Grandparents’ petition after finding there was no significant relationship between the Grandparents and the Child and that there was no risk of substantial harm to the Child. The Grandparents appeal to this Court. We find and hold that while the Grandparents and the Child did have a significant existing relationship, the Grandparents failed to prove that cessation of this relationship would pose a danger of substantial harm to the Child. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Amelia M.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Amelia M., the minor child (“Child”) of James M. (“Father”) and Bethany L. (“Mother”). On September 14, 2011, Mother filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father, which was subsequently joined by Mother’s new husband, William H. (“Stepfather”). Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit her and willfully failing to provide financial support in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley King v. Wilson and Associates, PLLC, US Bank, Bank of America, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,Inc.
This appeal involves a self-represented litigant’s continued efforts to occupy property which is the subject of foreclosure proceedings. After dismissal of his second action regarding the property, the appellant files this appeal. We dismiss the appeal for failure to file a brief that complies with the appellate rules and conclude that this is a frivolous appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sheila Dunlap v. Laurel Manor Health Care, Inc.
Sheila Dunlap (“plaintiff”) brought this action alleging liability for the wrongful death of her daughter (“deceased”) on the part of the nursing home operated by Laurel Manor Health Care, Inc. (“defendant”) where deceased was living. Although the allegations of the complaint were couched in terms of ordinary negligence, the trial court determined that the cause of action was one for medical malpractice. The court dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122, which requires the filing a certificate of good faith with a medical malpractice complaint. We hold that the plaintiff’s claims that the nursing home failed to properly administer medication and a medical device prescribed by a physician, and failed to monitor the medical condition of the deceased at all times prior to her death, sound in medical malpractice. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals |
