John R. Roberts, M.D. v Saint Thomas Health Services d/b/a Saint Thomas Hospital, et al
St. Thomas Hospital suspended a surgeon’s hospital privileges and restored them less than three months later, as part of a settlement in which the doctor also waived a “fair hearing,” which was the next step in the hospital’s procedures. The surgeon subsequently sued the hospital, contending that it had not properly followed its own bylaws in regard to the suspension of his privileges and that he was therefore entitled to damages for breach of contract, defamation of character, and tortious interference with business relations. The hospital denied that it had violated any of its bylaws and asserted that it was entitled to immunity for its actions under the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 and the Federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986. The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital. Because the surgeon failed to show that the hospital did not follow its bylaws, because of his settlement and waiver of a fair hearing, the hospital was entitled to the immunity granted to the peer review process. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Romalis Gray v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
The petitioner, a state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for declaratory order, in which he alleged that the respondents, Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and Morgan County Correctional Complex (“MCCX”), denied his due process rights and violated TDOC policies when he was placed on administrative segregation following a disciplinary hearing. The trial court found that the petitioner had failed to pay court costs from a previously filed action and dismissed his petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-812 (2010). Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Chandra Berry v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Individually and as Nominee for Mortgage Lenders Network USA, et al.
Plaintiff defaulted on her mortgage and Defendants advised Plaintiff of their plan to foreclose. Plaintiff then sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order preventing foreclosure, which it dissolved after granting Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Rickman v. Virginia Rickman, et al
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Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Wolff Ardis, P.C. v. Jonathan C. Dailey, et al.
This appeal involves the issue of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state attorney. Defendant is an attorney who resides in Washington D.C. and practiced with a law firm in Virginia. He sought the assistance of Plaintiff, a Memphis law firm, in connection with a lawsuit that Defendant had filed in Maryland. After several discussions, Defendant, Plaintiff, and the client eventually entered into a contract whereby Plaintiff associated with Defendant as co-counsel in the Maryland case. After trial, Defendant allegedly refused to pay his onehalf share of the expenses, as provided by the parties’ contract. Plaintiff then filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant in Tennessee. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Citizens For Safety And Clean Air, et al v. City Of Clinton, et al
This appeal arises from a dispute over the zoning of a certain tract of land in Clinton, Tennessee. Clinton annexed property (“the Property”) belonging to Rogers Group, Inc., and assigned zoning classifications to the newly annexed tract. The group Citizens for Safety and Clean Air, and individual local residents Walt Warren, Patricia Warren, Charles Goins, and Judy Goins (“the Plaintiffs,”collectively) sued the City of Clinton, Tennessee, Clinton Municipal Planning Commission, and Rogers Group (“the Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) seeking declaratory judgment. The Plaintiffs, opposed to the prospective development of a quarry and asphalt plant on the Property, challenged the heavy industrial zoning classification of a portion of the Property on the basis that it was arbitrary and capricious; constituted illegal contract zoning; and, constituted illegal spot zoning. Alternatively, the Plaintiffs sought to enforce the Master Settlement Agreement (“the MSA”), an agreement settling an annexation dispute entered into by Anderson County, Clinton, and Rogers Group. The Plaintiffs alleged they were third-party beneficiaries to the MSA. The Trial Court found in favor of the Defendants on all issues. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Parson Hill (Bowron) v. Mark David Hill
Mother sued Father for one-half of child’s college expenses based on the language of their Marital Dissolution Agreement’s parenting plan. Father defended based on the same language. The trial court found the language ambiguous and, based on all the circumstances, found that Father was required to pay one-half of the child’s college expenses at the University of Alabama. Father appealed. We do not find the language ambiguous, but agree with the trial court that the language requires Father to pay one-half of the expenses. We reverse the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest and remand for a calculation of that interest. We also award Mother attorney’s fees for this appeal and remand to the trial court for a calculation of those fees. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Dale Roberts Crafton v. James Frederick Roberts
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William J. Denning v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
This appeal arises from a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff in an action filed pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”). Defendant appeals denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the trial court’s determination that post-judgment interest is properly awarded in the amount provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-14-121 and not federal law. On cross-appeal, Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to exclude certain evidence and its determination that post-judgment interest is properly calculated from the date the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict rather than the date the jury rendered its verdict as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-14-122. We affirm denial of Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the trial court’s evidentiary decisions. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that post-judgment interest is properly awarded at the rate provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-14-121. We reverse the trial court’s determination that post-judgment interest accrues from the date provided by federal law. We hold that state law controls the calculation of post-judgment interest to be awarded in FELA actions adjudicated in state court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Penelope Lynne Allen v. Gordon Carmack Allen
Mother and Father were divorced in 2001 and the Final Decree required Father to pay a fixed amount to Mother each month as child support in addition to a percentage of his fluctuating income. Father was also ordered to provide Mother with proof of his income on a quarterly basis. In response to Mother’s motion to modify in 2003, the trial court averaged three years of Father’s gross income and increased Father’s monthly child support payments. Mother moved in 2011 to hold Father in contempt of court for failing to continue providing her with proof of his income and sought a child support arrearage based on Father’s failure to pay a percentage of his fluctuating income for the years 2003 through 2010. The trial court awarded Mother the arrearage she sought and found Father was in civil contempt for failing to continue providing Mother with proof of his income. The court awarded Mother her attorney’s fees based on Father’s civil contempt. Father appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. The governing statute requires child support payments to be for a definite amount, not an amount that fluctuates. The existing order did not include the requirement that Father provide proof of income. Therefore, we also reverse the trial court’s award to Mother of attorney’s fees incurred in the civil contempt proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Austin Wells, a disabled person, by and through his conservator and natural mother Carron C. Wells Baker v. State of Tennessee and Donald Estes and University of Memphis Foundation
A University of Memphis student fell down an elevator shaft while removing artwork following a required University function at property owned by Donald Estes. The student sued Donald Estes and Estes, LLC, the University, and The University of Memphis Foundation. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the Foundation. The jury returned a verdict of $4,103,720.00, and the fault was ultimately allocated as follows: the State 40%; the student 15%; Estes 45%. Based upon an indemnification agreement, the trial court found the State liable for Mr. Estes’ share of the jury verdict, or $1,436,215.20. We find that the trial court erred in concluding that the indemnification agreement indemnified Mr. Estes for his own negligence and in granting summary judgment in favor of the Foundation. However, we affirm the trial court’s admission of testimony regarding $410,000 in medical bills, its exclusion of evidence regarding the student’s alleged drug use, and its capping of the State’s liability at $300,000. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer E. Patterson v. Natalie D. Grant-Herms
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer E. Patterson v. Natalie D. Grant-Herms - Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gayle Connelly v. Peter Napolitano
The trial court in this case entered two identical final judgments fifteen days apart. The appellant filed her notice of appeal within thirty days of the second judgment, but not the first. Because the thirty day time limit for filing a notice of appeal runs from the entry of the first judgment, the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Although the appellant may seek relief from the trial court pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P.60, the failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kathleen Baker and Rick Baker v. Deborah A. Snedegar
Plaintiff filed suit against a medical legal examiner alleging the medical legal examiner was negligent in failing to inform her of certain preventative medications. The medical legal examiner contended she was a government employee protected from liability by the Governmental Tort Liability Act and moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion because the medical legal examiner could not prove she was paid by the payroll department of the governmental entity at issue, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20107(a)(2). The medical legal examiner appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. Karen Lesley and City of Memphis Civil Service Commission
A Memphis police officer’s employment was terminated without a pre-termination hearing because the City of Memphis was of the opinion that she was a probationary employee and not entitled to a hearing. The officer sought review of her termination, and the Memphis Civil Service Commission agreed with the City’s position that the officer was a probationary employee and not entitled to a hearing. The officer filed a petition for review before the chancery court, and the chancery court reversed the Commission, finding that the officer had already completed her probationary period, and as a non-probationary employee, she was entitled to due process protections including a pre-termination hearing. This order was not appealed. On remand to the Commission, the City stipulated that the officer was not given a pre-termination hearing and sought to relitigate the issue of whether she was a probationary employee. The Commission declined to reconsider the issue and determined that the officer was denied procedural due process. The Commission reinstated the officer to her previous position of employment. The chancery court affirmed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Adcock, et al. v. Cheatham County Board of Education
This is an appeal from a summary judgment order awarding the plaintiffs an easement across the defendant’s property. Because the order does not dispose of the plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Martha Elaine Weaver Carter v. David Ray Carter
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision on her petition to modify parenting time. While we find no error in the trial court’s ruling on parenting time, we have concluded that the trial court erred in disqualifying mother’s attorney from representing her in future proceedings and in ordering mother to produce bank records. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Mary E. P. et al
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and father on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and willful abandonment by failure to visit, and upon the determination that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Both parents appeal. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Mark A. L.
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Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Moses v. Jayanta K. Dirghangi, MD
This case involves allegations of medical battery and medical malpractice surrounding an exam performed on a patient while she was admitted to a hospital to give birth. The trial court dismissed any allegations for medical battery for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, finding that the patient’s complaint failed to include allegations that the exam was performed without the patient’s authorization. The trial court further dismissed any remaining malpractice claims for failure to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act notice requirements. Discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Turner (Short) v. Jessie Lee Short, Jr.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Mullins v. Alfred L. Locke, et al
This is a suit by Terry Mullins seeking a declaration that the Defendants, the Lockes (who are brothers) and the Gillespies (who are husband and wife) – whose properties lie near to, and south of, the Plaintiff’s property – have no right to the use of a driveway across the Plaintiff’s property to Vera Drive in Rhea County. The Defendants claim that they have a prescriptive easement, measuring some 47 feet long and 50 feet wide, enabling them to access Vera Drive over the Plaintiff’s property. This matter was before us at an earlier time. Because the statement of the evidence presented to us on the first appeal was, in our words, “a one-sided argumentative presentation of the evidence favorable to the Plaintiff,” we remanded this case to the trial court, pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-3- 128 (2000). (Emphasis in original.) In our remand, we advised the parties that we were taking this action “so a proper statement of the evidence c[ould] be prepared.” (Footnote in original omitted.) Such a statement has now been filed. Upon consideration of the very thorough statement prepared by the trial court, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s judgment finding and holding that the Defendants have a prescriptive easement over the property of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Clayman Sitz v. William Grant Sitz
After some 16 years of marriage, Sharon Clayman Sitz (“Wife”) sued William Grant Sitz (“Husband”) for divorce. Following a bench trial, the court awarded Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The court adopted Wife’s proposed parenting plan, which made Wife the primary residential parent of their minor child and divided the marital property. The court further determined that Husband was voluntarily underemployed and imputed additional income to him in order to calculate his child support obligation. Husband appeals. We affirm with one modification. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jeremiah I. R.
Spenser R.S. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor son, Jeremiah I.R. (“the Child”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Child from his mother’s custody after a babysitter took the Child and two siblings to the emergency room for injuries to the siblings. Father’s whereabouts were then unknown and his paternity of the Child had not yet been established. The Child’s mother entered into an agreed order with DCS stipulating that the Child was dependent and neglected in her care. Thereafter, the mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. Some 18 months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights. The trial court granted the petition based on its findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
