In Re Zayne P.
This appeal arises from a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights filed by the foster parents. The Department of Children’s Services removed the child from the mother and father’s custody and placed the child in the custody of the foster parents because, shortly after the child was born, the child tested positive for drugs. On the petition of DCS, the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected based on the finding that the parents committed severe child abuse. Thereafter, DCS filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights based, in part, on the records provided by the case worker. Subsequently, DCS determined that the case worker had falsely reported that the parents were noncompliant with the permanency plan. Following an inquiry that revealed the parents were in substantial compliance with the permanency plan and that all drug tests were negative, DCS dismissed its petition with court approval. Thereafter, the foster parents commenced a new and independent action to terminate mother and father’s parental rights; the petition also named DCS as a respondent. The foster parents subsequently filed a motion to compel joinder of DCS as a co-petitioner on the ground that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(h)(1)(D) mandated that DCS file a petition to terminate parental rights if a juvenile court has made a finding that the parents committed severe child abuse. DCS opposed the motion on the ground that it had the discretion not to pursue termination of parental rights if a compelling reason existed. The trial court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial on the foster parents’ petition. Following trial, the court found that the foster parents proved severe child abuse by clear and convincing evidence; however, the court determined that termination of the parents’ rights was not in the child’s best interests and dismissed the petition. This appeal followed. Having determined that the foster parents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parents’ rights was in the child’s best interests, we affirm. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Emma S.
A mother’s parental rights were terminated on the ground of abandonment by willfully failing to visit her daughter. Mother appeals, arguing that the petition initiating the proceeding did not include the notice required by Rule 9A of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; that the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence that she abandoned her child; and that termination was not in the child’s best interest. Upon our review, we conclude that the proof does not clearly and convincingly establish the ground of abandonment by failure to visit. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the petition. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
City of Lebanon Ex Rel. Philip Craighead v. Derek M. Dodson
This appeal concerns the Tennessee Violence in the Workplace Act. After a citizen was disruptive at several city council meetings, the city filed a petition under the Act, seeking to enjoin the citizen from attending city council meetings and from contacting city officials. The trial court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order and, following an evidentiary hearing, granted an injunction for three years. On its own motion, the court also issued a three-year injunction “separate and apart” from the Act. Because the city failed to meet its burden of proof under the Act and there was no other basis on which to grant injunctive relief, we reverse. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Geoffrey Cale Vermilyea v. Jessica Lynn Vermilyea
Geoffrey Cale Vermilyea (“Husband”) sued Jessica Lynn Vermilyea (“Wife”) for divorce. After trial, the Chancery Court for Dickson County (“Trial Court”) entered its Final Decree of Divorce on June 13, 2017 (“Final Decree”) declaring the parties divorced, distributing the marital assets, denying Wife’s request to relocate to Canada with the parties’ minor child (“Cale”), denying Wife alimony, and entering a Permanent Parenting Plan with regard to Cale. Wife appeals the Final Decree raising issues regarding the Trial Court’s order denying Wife’s request to relocate to Canada with Cale and denying her an award of alimony. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding that it was not in Cale’s best interest to relocate to Canada and, therefore, denying Wife’s request to relocate. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife alimony. We, therefore, affirm the Final Decree. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Julie A. Sloan v. Employee Benefit Board of The Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee
This case stems from an employee benefit board’s decision to change a former employee’s disability pension from “in-line-of-duty” to “medical.” The former employee appealed the board’s decision to the trial court. The trial court reversed the board’s determination on the ground that the board had misapplied the applicable legal standard. Determining that the board relied on the appropriate legal standard and based its decision on substantial and material medical evidence, we reverse the trial court’s decision |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mariel Bentz Rich v. David Tate Rich, Jr.
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s recusal motion. Following a review of the record and the trial court’s ruling, we apply the de novo standard of review mandated by Supreme Court Rule 10B and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate Of James E. Miller
This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because we find no evidence of any bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Karesa Rivera Et Al. v. Westgate Resorts, LTD., L.P. Et Al.
The plaintiffs accepted an offer of judgment from the defendant company, which included payment of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses in an amount to be determined by the trial court. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to the plaintiffs in the amount of $56,423.24, expressly determining such amount to be reasonable. The defendant company has appealed. Inasmuch as the trial court failed to consider the factors listed in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 (“RPC 1.5”) when making its determination regarding a reasonable award of attorney’s fees, we vacate the trial court’s fee award and remand this matter for further proceedings concerning this issue. We accordingly decline to award fees to the plaintiffs on appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Madison County, Tennessee, et al. v. Delinquent Taxpayers for 2012, et al.
This appeal involves the right of redemption after a tax sale. After the tax sale occurred, the original property owners purportedly conveyed their right of redemption to a third party through a contract of sale and quitclaim deed. The third party filed a motion to redeem the property. The trial court denied the motion to redeem, concluding that the third party did not meet the relevant statutory definition of a person entitled to redeem the property. For the following reasons, we affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Elgain Ricky Wilson v. Shane Adcock, et al.
This appeal arises from an inmate filing a common law writ of certiorari challenging the actions of a prison grievance committee. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; specifically, that decisions of a prison grievance board are not reviewable under a common law writ of certiorari. The trial court dismissed the petition. Inmate appeals. We affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Addalyne S.
In this parental termination case, maternal Grandparents sought termination of both Mother’s and Father’s rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support and (2) abandonment by willful failure to visit. The trial court found no grounds for termination as to Mother and only one ground—failure to support—as to Father. The trial court however found that it was not in the child’s best interest to terminate Father’s rights. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Kristina Marie Bolin v. Jeffrey Michael Bolin
In this divorce action, the mother argues that, in making the father the primary residential parent, the trial court did not give adequate weight to the father’s relocation with the children against her wishes at the time of the parties’ separation. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
C.D.B. v. A.B.
Mother appeals from the denial of her motion to recuse the trial court after the trial court, sua sponte, ordered Mother to undergo a mental examination pursuant to Rule 35.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court’s actions in this case do not create the appearance of bias, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Howard L. Greenlee v. Sevier County, Tennessee
This action involves a claim for compensatory damages for personal injury caused by a police dog. The defendant sought summary judgment, arguing that the victim, an officer acting in the course and scope of his employment, was a participant in the act or conduct that prompted the need for the dog’s services, thereby removing liability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 44-8-413(b)(1). The court agreed and granted summary judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Wayne Goodwyn v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, TN
After the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals granted a special exception permit for a nearby property, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Davidson County Circuit Court. The trial court ultimately concluded that the permit was properly issued. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth E. Ivey Goodrich v. John Exera Goodrich, Jr.
As part of a divorce proceeding, the trial court ordered a father to pay child support. Within two months thereafter, the father lost his job as a finance manager for an automotive dealership. The father filed a motion to modify his child support obligation and took a job in another field, making significantly less money. The father claimed that a more lucrative job was not available to him because he only had a high school education. And he did not wish to pursue another job as an automotive dealership finance manager due to the long hours, pressure, and deleterious effect of the job on his health. The mother opposed the motion to modify, claiming that the father was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court agreed. On appeal, the father challenges only the court’s determination that he was voluntarily underemployed. After a review of the record, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kisha Dean Trezevant v. Stanley H. Trezevant, III
This is a divorce case between parties who amassed a great amount of wealth and lived an extravagant lifestyle for many years. There are no minor children involved, and this appeal is limited to the trial court’s identification, classification, valuation, and division of marital property, the trial court’s awards of alimony to Wife, and Husband’s convictions for several counts of criminal contempt. One of the most salient issues raised by Husband on appeal relates to the trial court’s decision to use a financial statement prepared by Husband in 2012 to value several properties in the marital estate rather than the certified appraisals that were prepared in the course of litigation for the purpose of valuing the marital estate. According to Husband, this resulted in the court grossly overvaluing the marital estate. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s identification and classification of marital property as well as the trial court’s findings and sentencing related to Husband’s criminal contempt. We vacate the trial court’s valuation and distribution of the parties’ marital property and awards of alimony. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Smith v. Shelby County Sheriff's Department
This appeal involves an incarcerated inmate’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the time for filing such a petition had passed. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ravyn R., Et Al.
This is an appeal from an adjudicatory order of the circuit court in a dependency and neglect appeal. Because the order appealed is not a final, appealable judgment, we dismiss the appeal and remand for further proceedings. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Lester Byrd, Jr. v. Appalachian Electric Cooperative
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim of outrageous conduct/intentional infliction of emotional distress filed against his employer because the plaintiff had previously filed a workers’ compensation claim against the employer, seeking compensation for injuries arising out of the same incident. The plaintiff has appealed the dismissal of his claim. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. We decline Appalachian’s request for an award of attorney’s fees, determining that Mr. Byrd’s appeal was not frivolous or taken solely for delay. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Khurshid Ismoilov v. Sears Holdings Corporation, Et Al.
This case presents the issue of a seller’s liability for damages caused by an allegedly defective water heater. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant seller concerning the plaintiff’s claims of products liability, strict liability, breach of implied warranty, negligence, and unfair or deceptive trade practices, finding these claims to be barred by the expiration of the ten-year statute of repose applicable to products liability actions. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the seller regarding the plaintiff’s remaining claim of breach of express warranty. Determining that no material factual disputes existed, the court held that the seller was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the seller had demonstrated that it had fully complied with the warranty on the water heater at issue. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend, also requesting a more specific order. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend except that it provided a more definite statement of the basis for its grant of summary judgment in favor of the seller. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kyle F.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving a two-year-old child, Kyle F. (“the Child”). In January 2016, the Sullivan County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he has remained since that date. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Child’s mother, Debra F. (“Mother”), on September 19, 2016.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that DCS had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Child through conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child prior to her incarceration. Determining that no statutory ground existed for termination of Mother’s parental rights, the trial court declined to address the best interest of the Child. The guardian ad litem timely filed a notice of appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Wafa Badawi Hindiyeh v. Waleed Fawzi Abed
This appeal arises from a divorce. Wafa Badawi Hindiyeh (“Wife”) sued Waleed Fawzi Abed (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, granted Wife a divorce, entered a permanent parenting plan with respect to the parties’ minor son (“the Child”) awarding Wife 285 days to Husband’s 80, and awarded Wife a judgment for the value of a Cadillac less $2,500 Wife received on the sale of her original vehicle for a total judgment of $13,400. Husband appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court found no statutory factors applicable to justify such a paltry award of parenting time to him and that the Cadillac at issue was not even marital property subject to division. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment with respect to the residential parenting schedule and remand for the Trial Court to award Husband significantly more time with the Child. Finding that the Cadillac was not marital property, we modify the Trial Court’s award of $13,400 to Wife to $2,000 to account for only the sale of Wife’s original vehicle. We otherwise affirm the Trial Court. We, therefore, affirm as modified, in part, and vacate, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jennie Roles-Walter, Et Al. v. Robert W. Kidd, Et Al.
This is a property damage case. Appellants assert that their property is being damaged by the defective gutter systems of adjacent buildings, which are owned by Appellees. The trial court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to dismiss Appellants’ complaint, finding that Appellants’ claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims for property damage. Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-105. Appellants contend that their complaint sounds in nuisance, specifically temporary nuisance, and not in negligence. Accordingly, Appellants argue that the statute of limitations renews with each rain. While we agree with the trial court that Appellants’ claim is one for negligence and not for nuisance, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred. Applying the discovery rule and giving Appellants all reasonable inferences based on the averments in their complaint, we conclude that Appellants have pled facts sufficient to survive the motions to dismiss. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Fisher Dezevallos v. Terry Burns Insurance Agency, LLC
Appellee brought a claim against Appellant insurance agency for “unlawfully and fraudulently” withdrawing funds from Appellee’s bank account and accepting premium payments on two insurance policies after Appellee allegedly cancelled his policies. Although not asserted as a claim in its general sessions summons, the circuit court, on appeal, awarded Appellee a judgment for unjust enrichment in the amount of $397.00. Because the preponderance of the evidence does not support the judgment, we reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
