Judy Morrow Wright, et al. v. Matthew G. Buyer, et al.
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right from the denial of a motion for recusal. In their petition for recusal appeal, Petitioners admit that they did not promptly file the recusal motion after the facts forming the basis for the motion became known. As such, Petitioners waived their right to challenge the probate judge’s impartiality. The record is also insufficient to support a finding of error on the part of the probate judge because the motion for recusal was unaccompanied by an affidavit as required by the rules. Thus, we affirm the probate court’s denial of the recusal motion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Delores Conley v. Tennessee Farmers Insurance Company
This appeal involves a dispute between an insurance company and one of its insureds. Following a fire to her home, the insured brought suit requesting that the insurance company be required to pay a claim for personal property damage. The insurance company defended on the ground that the insurance policy was void because a misrepresentation by the insured on her application for insurance increased the “risk of loss.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-103. The trial court agreed with the insurance company and granted summary judgment in its favor. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Claiborne County v. Delinquent Taxpayer, Albertano Alvarez Et Al.
This appeal arises from a delinquent taxpayer action. The appellants were lienholders on a parcel of real property sold to a separate purchaser during a delinquent tax sale. Following the tax sale, the lienholders filed a petition for redemption. In response, the purchaser filed a motion to protest the validity of the lien or, alternatively, a claim to recover $8,579.60 in “lawful charges” that he and a friend had incurred to clear debris and personalty from the real property. The lienholders then filed a “cross claim” against the purchaser, alleging conversion and trespass to chattels. The lienholders sought an award of actual damages for removal of personalty and a “steel building” from the real property, as well as punitive damages for the purchaser’s allegedly malicious actions. The purchaser filed an answer, denying all substantive allegations. The purchaser subsequently withdrew his objection to the validity of the lien. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the lienholders’ petition for redemption upon the conditions that the lienholders pay all delinquent taxes, penalties, and fees; reimburse the purchaser and his friend in the amount of $8,579.60 for expenses incurred in the removal of debris and personalty; and reimburse the purchaser and his friend in the amount of $600.00 for storage of personalty. The lienholders have appealed. Having determined that the order appealed from fails to resolve the lienholders’ claims of conversion and trespass to chattels, we conclude that it is not a final order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: R.S. ET AL.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the two minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1- 113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); (3) substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(2) and 37-2-403(a)(2). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Because there is clear and convincing evidence to support both the grounds for termination of Appellant’s parental rights and the trial court’s finding that termination is in the children’s best interest, we affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gabriel B.
A juvenile court terminated a father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. The father appeals the termination of his rights. We conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s termination on these grounds and affirm the judgment. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc. v. Sheri Baker, Et Al.
Plaintiff sued a defendant for filing an unauthorized financing statement. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and later a motion to disqualify the judge, both of which were denied. The court also ordered Defendant to file an answer. When Defendant failed to comply, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment. Defendant’s husband intervened shortly thereafter, claiming that he filed the financing statement. Defendant’s husband likewise filed a motion to dismiss and a later motion to disqualify. The court denied both motions and ordered husband to file an answer. When Husband failed to do so, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment against Husband. Husband filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which was denied. This appeal followed. We affirm. Deeming this appeal frivolous, we award Plaintiff attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County v. Delinquent Taxpayers As Shown On The 2011 Real Property Tax Record
A delinquent taxpayer’s property was sold at a tax sale on January 22, 2014. The taxpayer subsequently conveyed her interest in the property to a third party that redeemed the property within the one-year statutory redemption period. The proceedings were stayed a year and a half due to the redeeming party’s bankruptcy; after the stay was lifted, the trial court held a hearing on the tax-sale purchaser’s motion for additional costs and then entered an order finalizing the redemption. In that order, the trial court ruled that the redeeming party was required to, among other things, pay interest on the price paid by the tax-sale purchaser at the tax sale for the entire period between the tax sale and entry of the final order. The redeeming party appeals, arguing that the statute only allowed interest to be charged from the date of the tax sale through the date the redemption process began. We agree, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jason Garner Williams v. Stacy Brown Williams
This is a divorce case. The trial court entered a final decree of divorce designating Husband as the primary residential parent for the parties’ minor child and concluding that Husband is not under-employed for purposes of calculating child support. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we vacate the trial court’s judgment as to the issues raised on appeal. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
AMCO Insurance Company v. Ralph W. Mello, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between an insurance company and its insured regarding the application of exclusion clauses in a homeowners’ insurance policy and a personal umbrella liability policy. After malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims were filed against the insured in Alabama by a law firm, the insurance company accepted the defense under a reservation of rights and filed the present action seeking a declaration that it is not required to provide coverage for the damages complained of in the Alabama lawsuit. Following a bench trial held on stipulated facts, the trial court determined that the insured was, in fact, entitled to certain coverage. We reverse. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Diawn B.
This appeal arises from an action for grandparent visitation. The child’s father died when she was seven weeks old, and when the mother denied visitation to the paternal grandmother, the paternal grandmother filed a petition for grandparent visitation. After a trial, the court determined that the mother opposed visitation, the presumption of substantial harm was not overcome, and grandparent visitation was in the child’s best interests. The court ordered grandparent visitation the third weekend of each month, Thanksgiving break in odd years, every Christmas break, and every summer break. The court also gave the grandmother four of the parental rights found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(3)(B)—the right to educational records, the right to be free from derogatory remarks, the right to be notified of medical emergencies, and the right to be notified of extracurricular activities and the opportunity to participate in or observe them. The mother filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and the grandmother filed a response and a motion to strike the hearsay contained in mother’s motion. Grandmother also requested attorney’s fees in connection with her motion to strike hearsay. The trial court entered an “amended” order that was substantively the same as its original decision granting grandparent visitation, and it ordered the mother to pay the grandmother’s attorney’s fees in connection with the grandmother’s motion to strike hearsay. On appeal, the mother asks this court to determine (1) whether the trial court erred “by awarding appellee grandmother a visitation schedule which is essentially a ‘tweaked’ parenting plan, along with the rights of a parent under Tennessee law,” and (2) whether the trial court erred by awarding the grandmother her attorney’s fees in opposing the mother’s motion to amend. We have determined that the extensive visitation schedule impermissibly interferes with the mother’s parental rights under the Tennessee Constitution, and therefore, it is not “reasonable” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(c). We have also determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(3)(B) is inapplicable in actions for grandparent visitation; therefore, the grandmother is not entitled to any of the rights listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306. Further, we have determined that the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees to the grandmother because we find no contractual or statutory basis for the award. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and this matter is remanded with instructions for the trial court to establish a grandparent visitation schedule that comports with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(c) and minimizes interference with the mother’s fundamental constitutional rights |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
James Jones v. Raymond M. Hargreaves
In this health care liability action, the defendant doctor filed an unopposed motion for summary judgment. After the motion was granted, he filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122, requesting the court to compel the plaintiff or his counsel to provide the court with a copy of the expert’s signed written statement that was relied upon in executing the certificate of good faith that accompanied the complaint. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the matter should have been raised in the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or a motion for discretionary costs. Upon our review of the statute, we do not find a requirement that the request for the expert witness’ statement be made in the manner held by the trial court; accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further consideration of the defendant’s motion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Delinquent Taxpayers as Shown On The 2011 Real Property Tax Records Of The Metropolitan Government Of Nashville & Davidson County., Et Al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County. , Et Al.
A landowner’s real property was sold at a delinquent tax sale on August 14, 2013. The taxpayer subsequently conveyed her interest in the property to a third party that redeemed the property within the one-year redemption period. In the interim, new legislation took effect that altered the redemption process. The purchaser at the tax sale and two creditors of the taxpayer moved the court to set aside the redemption, contending that the redeeming party failed to comply with the new law. The trial court held that the redemption procedure set forth in the new legislation applied, that the redeeming party did not follow the redemption process set forth in the new legislation, and thus, that the redemption failed. The redeeming party appeals. We hold that the trial court correctly determined that the redeeming party was entitled to redeem but erred in concluding that the new statute applied to this redemption and that the redemption failed due to the redeeming party’s failure to follow the new redemption process; accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Lee Odom v. Rachel Lea Zamata Odom
In this divorce action, the wife was found to be in “willful, direct and summary contempt of court beyond a reasonable doubt,” based on her responses to the trial court judge’s questions during a motion hearing. The wife has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We decline to award to the husband his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffery Todd Burke v. Sparta Newspaper, Inc.
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant publisher of an allegedly defamatory newspaper article concerning plaintiff. The article was based upon a one-onone, private interview between the public information officer for the White County Sheriff’s Office and a newspaper reporter. The court determined that the interview given by the public information officer constituted an “official action” of government that the article fairly and accurately reported. As such, the court concluded that any alleged defamatory statements included in the article were privileged under the common-law “fair report privilege.” Plaintiff appealed, arguing in part, that the fair report privilege does not apply. Because we conclude that the interview did not constitute an official act of government, we reverse the grant of summary judgment. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Frank Trojan v. Wayne County, Tennessee
An inmate in state custody who was being housed in a county jail filed suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover for injuries he suffered while on a work detail. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-123(d)(2) grants counties that allow inmates to work on road details and other projects immunity from liability for injuries. The inmate appeals, contending he was not in the class of inmates defined in section 41-2-123 and, consequently, that the county’s immunity was removed. Concluding that section 41-2-123(d)(2) controls over the provisions of the Tort Liability Act, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that the county was immune and its dismissal of the suit. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Brent Christopher Dishon v. Lisa Renee Dishon
This appeal arose from a divorce action filed by the husband. The parties entered into a mediation agreement in December 2014, wherein the parties agreed, inter alia, that the husband would pay to the wife $1,200 per month in alimony, that the husband’s alimony obligation would cease if the wife were cohabitating with a person of the opposite sex, and that the wife would be designated as the primary residential parent for the parties’ minor child. Following execution of the mediation agreement, the husband’s employment hours were decreased by his employer. The wife subsequently filed a “Motion to Restore Payment Agreement,” in which she alleged that the husband had failed to adhere to his financial responsibilities pursuant to the mediation agreement. The husband thereafter filed a response to the wife’s motion, alleging that a material change in circumstance had occurred subsequent to the mediation agreement. The trial court entered a judgment on February 25, 2016, enforcing the mediation agreement but determining, due to the husband’s decrease in income, that a material change in circumstance had occurred since the mediation agreement was entered into by the parties. The trial court further found that the wife had been cohabitating with a person of the opposite sex. Nonetheless, the trial court determined that the wife remained the economically disadvantaged spouse following the divorce and reduced the husband’s alimony responsibility to $500 per month. The trial court further determined that it was in the best interest of the child for the wife to be the primary residential parent of the child. The husband subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the trial court’s judgment and a motion to terminate his alimony obligation, both of which were denied by the trial court. Husband timely appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred by failing to cease Husband’s alimony responsibility, in compliance with the enforced mediation agreement, upon its finding that the wife was cohabitating with a person of the opposite sex, we reverse the alimony award. We affirm the remaining aspects of the trial court’s judgment. Because the husband’s payment history regarding alimony is unclear from the record, we hereby remand for a determination by the trial court regarding whether Husband owes Wife alimony incurred prior to February 25, 2016, or whether Husband is owed reimbursement of alimony paid past February 25, 2016. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Brent Ray, Et Al. v. Thomas Neff, Et Al.
Plaintiffs/Appellants sued Defendants/Appellees for nuisance and trespass claims over a dispute in the change of water flow onto Appellants’ property due to modifications, namely the installation of a pipe, on Appellees’ property. Appellants voluntarily non-suited the case twice, and ultimately filed the instant complaint almost five years after the filing of their original complaint. Appellees moved for summary judgment on both claims. In a three-part ruling spanning thirteen months, the trial court granted summary judgment and determined (1) that the pipe was a permanent nuisance and, therefore, any nuisance claim was time-barred; (2) that the trespass was a permanent trespass and, again, time-barred; and (3) that Appellants could not establish causation as to the trespass claim. We affirm the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Blake A., Et Al.
The parents of two children adopted a parenting plan in which Mother was designated the primary residential parent and parenting time was split equally; a special provision in the parenting plan prevented either parent from relocating with the children without the other parent’s permission. Mother subsequently informed Father of her intent to relocate to another state with the children. In response, Father filed a petition in opposition to removal and to modify the parenting plan. The court denied Mother’s relocation, holding that the provision in the parenting plan superseded the application of the parental relocation statute; the court further determined that the parties were spending substantially equal time with the children and that relocation was not in the children’s best interest. Mother appeals. We conclude that the court erred in holding that the provision in the parenting plan prevented Mother from relocating; that the court did not make sufficient findings of fact to support its holding that the parents were spending substantially equal time with the children; and that the finding that relocation is not in the best interest of the children is supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in part, affirm in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Greg Hearn v. American Wash Co., Inc., Et Al.
This is an appeal by the prevailing party of an award of damages in a breach of contract action arising out of a commercial lease agreement. Upon our review, we find no reversible error and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Cage v. Harris E. Dowlen
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on March 12, 2018. Because the defendant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph H. Johnston v. Mark Goins
Action brought by write-in candidate for tax assessor seeking declaratory judgment relative to the duties of the State Coordinator of Elections in the administration of Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-7-133(i). Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the chancellor. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ky'Auri M.
Relying on due process grounds, the mother of the parties’ child contends the juvenile court erred by modifying the parenting plan and designating the father as the primary residential parent. The only petition before the court was the father’s petition for contempt. The juvenile court magistrate who presided over the initial hearing informed the mother “that the issue before the Court was whether the mother was in contempt of this Court and upon the Court’s own motion, if she should remain custodian of the child.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate found “that because of the mother’s lack of compliance and cooperation, she was in Contempt of Court and that custody of the child would be granted to the father. . . .” The mother filed a request for rehearing in the juvenile court, and the juvenile court judge affirmed the magistrate’s order. This appeal followed. Because neither party petitioned the court to modify the existing permanent parenting plan or the designation of the primary residential parent and due process requires, at a minimum, “notice reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections,” Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374, 377 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 884 (Tenn. 1993)), it was error for the juvenile court to modify the permanent parenting plan and change the primary residential parent. As a result, we vacate the juvenile court’s order modifying the permanent parenting plan and designating the father as the primary residential parent and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Gerald Largen v. The City Of Harriman
This case involves a claim brought by a landowner challenging the validity of certain annexation ordinances that incorporated his property into the City of Harriman (the “City”). In December 2014, the landowner filed a declaratory judgment action against the City in the Roane County Circuit Court (“trial court”), alleging that several 1959 annexation ordinances passed by the City were void ab initio because a river adjacent to the City prevented land on the opposite side of the river from being contiguous with the City’s original boundaries. The landowner alleged that as a result of the first annexation’s purported invalidity, all subsequent annexations based on contiguity with the lands annexed in the 1959 ordinances were void by extension. The landowner sought a judgment voiding the challenged annexation ordinances, recovery of the real estate taxes he had paid to the City for his real property included in the annexed land, and a permanent injunction preventing the City from imposing any charges or taxes against him. The City responded with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02, arguing that the landowner’s sole remedy would have been an action in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51- 103 (2015). In the alternative, the City argued that dismissal was proper because the landowner had not joined necessary parties who would be affected by the judgment he sought. Determining that other landowners with title to real property inside the annexed areas in question were indispensable to the landowner’s claim, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and directed the landowner to join the necessary parties. The trial court also directed the landowner to amend his complaint to specify the challenged ordinances and affected properties. In November 2016, the landowner filed a motion for class action certification, which the trial court denied following a hearing. On March 10, 2017, the trial court dismissed the landowner’s complaint, finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The landowner subsequently filed a “Motion to Set Aside Order,” which the trial court denied. The landowner has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Carlene Guye Judd, et al v. Carlton Guye, et al
Plaintiff, a shareholder in the corporation at issue who obtained a judgment against the corporation in a prior action, now seeks to pierce the corporate veil to hold the other shareholder personally liable for the balance owing on the judgment. The trial court summarily pierced the corporate veil and held the defendant shareholder personally liable for the corporation’s debt to Plaintiff. The defendant shareholder appeals arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in allowing Plaintiff to pierce the veil of her own corporation. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dwight Jenkins v. Michael Schmank, ET Al.
This appeal involves the plaintiff’s filing of a complaint for unjust enrichment and conversion against his business partner’s spouse after the plaintiff discovered that his partner converted partnership funds for personal use. The trial court dismissed the complaint following a bench trial. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |
