Gary Haiser Et Al. v. Michael McClung Et Al.
This case involves two consolidated actions brought by opposing boards of directors of a residential development community club, with each board claiming legitimacy. The plaintiffs to the original action were owners of real property in the development who held a special meeting in September 2011 in order to elect a new board of directors for the community club. The previous board of directors and defendants to the original action contested the validity of the election, claiming that none of the counted votes were cast by members in good standing. The defendants subsequently met in November 2011 and again in March 2012 to ratify their positions on the community club board of directors. In December 2011, the “new” board of directors, purportedly elected in September 2011, filed a declaratory judgment action against the original board of directors in the Cumberland County Chancery Court, requesting that the court declare which board of directors was legally in control. The complaint also requested that the court declare whether the purported developer properly possessed developer’s rights and that the court award damages to the new board for breach of fiduciary duties by the original board. In April 2012, the original board filed a separate declaratory judgment action against the new board in the Cumberland County Chancery Court, making similar allegations and requesting a declaratory judgment, an injunction preventing the new board from acting on behalf of the community club, and damages for conversion. The trial court consolidated the two actions in July 2012 and conducted a bench trial on the matter over the course of seven non-consecutive days in 2015 and 2016. At the conclusion of trial, the court determined that the new board was prevented from challenging the developer’s status due to a statute of limitations. The trial court further determined that neither board was legitimately in control and appointed a special master to conduct an accounting of dues and a supervised election. The trial court also directed each side to pay its own attorney’s fees, ordering the boards to repay to the community club any funds used to pay attorney’s fees. The original board was re-elected during the supervised election, and the special master determined that both sides had paid attorney’s fees from their respective annual assessments collected. The trial court conducted a hearing on the parties’ objections to 08/29/2018 2 the special master’s report before adopting the master’s findings in total. The trial court thereby affirmed the original directors as current directors; ordered those directors to repay $54,157.41 to the community club funds; and ordered the plaintiffs to repay $143,513.55 to the community club funds. The plaintiffs have appealed. Determining that the trial court improperly relied upon a statute of limitations that is inapplicable to the plaintiffs’ action, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We further reverse the trial court’s alternative rulings for lack of evidentiary basis. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Rufus S. Johnson, III v. Elaina Irene Johnson
In this divorce case, the trial court denied wife’s request for a continuance of the trial and then, during the trial, excluded an exhibit proffered by wife. Wife contends that the trial court erred in both respects. Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either decision, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Vallaree Goodwin v. Kebede G. Hanebis
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict. The case arises from a motor vehicle accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee, and the trial court entered a final judgment for $68,995.02. Because the trial court erred in excluding relevant medical records, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new jury trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
April Doris Schmidt v. Aaron Errol Ankrom
In this appeal, the marital dissolution agreement at issue stated the parties’ intent to enter into a separate farm lease agreement for up to 7 years, upon completion of which the exwife could sell the property subject to the ex-husband’s right of first refusal. However, the parties never entered into the contemplated farm lease. The ex-wife, desiring to sell the property prior to the passing of 7 years, brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of the rights of the parties under the marital dissolution agreement. The trial court held that the ex-wife would be in breach of the agreement if she sold the property prior to 7 years and awarded attorney’s fees to the ex-husband. The ex-wife appeals. We reverse. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Michael Denver Shell
In this probate action, the intestate decedent owned real property at the time of his death that was titled solely in his name. The decedent’s spouse subsequently died within 120 hours of the decedent’s death. The trial court ruled that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-3-120 (2015), the spouse’s heirs possessed no claim to or interest in the real property at issue. The spouse’s heirs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. We decline to award attorney’s fees to the decedent’s estate as damages, determining that this appeal is not frivolous. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
American Heritage Apartments, Inc. v. Hamilton County Water And Wastewater Treatment Authority, Hamilton County, Tennessee
In this interlocutory appeal, the issue is whether a statutory amendment barring class action lawsuits against the defendant, Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-221-608(e)(4) (Supp. 2017), applies retroactively thereby requiring the denial of the plaintiff’s previously-filed request for class certification under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 23. We hold that the statutory language at issue, providing that, “[t]his part shall not authorize or permit any class action lawsuits against any authority,” is unambiguous, and therefore reference to its legislative history is unnecessary and improper. Because this provision is procedural and remedial in nature, not affecting substantive rights of the plaintiff, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that it applies retroactively to bar plaintiff’s class certification request. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Alexis C.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Bethany C. (“Mother”), to her minor child, Alexis C. (“the Child”), who was two years of age at the time of trial. The Child was born in 2014 to Mother and Jeremy C. (“Father”). In August 2015, the Maury County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) entered an order removing the Child from Mother’s custody and placing the Child into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she remained at the time of trial. The trial court subsequently entered an order on October 12, 2015, wherein the trial court found that the Child was dependent and neglected due to Mother’s and Father’s incarceration. On August 23, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, (3) the conditions leading to removal still persisted and other conditions persisted that would in all probability cause the Child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, and (4) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of and financial responsibility for the Child. The court further found clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Patterson, Individually And As Surviving Spouse Of David Charles Patterson, Deceased v. STHS Heart, LLC
Appellant sought disqualification of the trial judge pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. The trial judge denied the motion to recuse. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Johnny Stephen Francis v. Janet Kimberley Hughes Et Al.
The trial court determined that the defendant, Janet Kimberly Hughes, breached her fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, Johnny Stephen Francis, by utilizing a power of attorney to withdraw funds from Mr. Francis’s bank account for Ms. Hughes’s sole benefit. The trial court ordered Ms. Hughes to repay those funds. Ms. Hughes timely appealed. Because Ms. Hughes has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Nicole Joseph v. William Edge SalonSpa, LLC
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on April 24, 2018. Because the appellant did not file either her motion to alter or amend or her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Charles T.
This appeal arises from the juvenile court’s ruling terminating the father’s parental rights to his son on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, failure to support, and wanton disregard; substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume responsibility. The court further determined that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We affirm as modified. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Julia Browning v. Mark D. Browning
A creditor obtained a default judgment in general sessions court and the debtor appealed the judgment to circuit court. The debtor was not in the courtroom when the case was called in circuit court, and the court awarded the creditor a default judgment. The debtor appeals the circuit court’s judgment, and we affirm based on the language of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 27-5-106 and -107. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Noe v. Solid Waste Board Of Hamblen County/Morristown
The petitioner in this Tennessee Public Records Act proceeding requested hard copies and electronic copies of records relating to a landfill maintained by the Solid Waste Board of Hamblen County/Morristown and an upcoming meeting of the Board. The trial court held a hearing as required by the TPRA, after which it dismissed the petition, holding that, under the facts presented, the petitioner was given access to the records in compliance with the TPRA. Upon our review, we conclude that, while some of the records sought were not available at the time of petitioner’s request, some records were available and were not produced for petitioner’s review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in part and affirm in part; we remand the case for further proceedings. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Hampton Crane Service, Inc. v. Burns Phillips, Commissioner Of Tennessee Department of Labor & Workforce Development, Et Al.
Employer appeals from the agency’s decision to award unemployment benefits to an employee. Because the record contains substantial and material evidence to support the agency’s decision, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Crystal Herpst v. Parkridge Medical Center, Inc. Et Al.
This case involves a second healthcare liability action brought by Crystal Herpst on behalf of the estate of her deceased father, James Ingram. The defendants are Dr. LeAnthony A. Hardy – Mr. Ingram’s treating physician – as well as Parkridge Medical Center, Inc., Chattanooga Diagnostic Associates, LLC, and Columbia Medical Group- Parkridge, Inc. (the Parkridge defendants). The trial court determined that plaintiff could not avail herself of Tennessee’s saving statute because her first complaint was not filed prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The court therefore dismissed plaintiff’s second complaint as untimely filed. She appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Crystal Herpst v. Parkridge Medical Center, Inc. Et Al. - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that it was unnecessary for the trial court to treat the motions of LeAnthony A. Hardy, M.D., Parkridge Medical Center, Inc. Chattanooga Diagnostic Associates, LLC, and Columbia Medical Group-Parkridge, Inc. to dismiss as motions for summary judgment. But I reach that conclusion without resort to the pleadings filed in another case. Examining the allegations of the complaint filed in this action only, Crystal Herpst filed outside the applicable statute of limitations. So on the basis of the pleadings filed in this case I would affirm the dismissal of the complaint. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Atrivium K., Et Al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. Upon our review, we conclude that the order of termination fails to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k)’s requirement that the court make specific factual findings, which precludes our meaningful review. We vacate the order and remand for entry of an order that complies with subsection 113(k). |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
Little Hurricane Properties, LLC v. Ralph Cafaro, et al.
Little Hurricane Properties, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed its Complaint to Remove Cloud on Title and for Injunction against Ralph Cafaro and Margetta Langlois (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”). The properties at issue are located in Cumberland and DeKalb Counties. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Defendants appealed. We hold that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to quiet title to land in DeKalb County, Cumberland County is not the proper venue. We vacate that element of the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for this case to be transferred to an appropriate court in DeKalb County to address Plaintiff’s action to quiet title to land in that county. Otherwise, we affirm the Trial Court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Les Stiers
This appeal stems from an ouster proceeding that was commenced against the former mayor of Jellico, Tennessee. When the mayor was defeated in his bid to seek reelection, the trial court dismissed the ouster complaint as moot. Notwithstanding this outcome, the defendant argued that the trial court should consider his “Counter- Complaint” that he filed in connection with the underlying proceeding. The trial court, however, ultimately dismissed the “Counter-Complaint.” For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Neas Welding & Steel Fabricating, Inc. v. Patricia Neas
This appeal involves a corporation’s debt collection action. The corporation, a steel welding and fabricating company, was previously owned jointly by husband and wife. After nearly thirty years of marriage, husband filed for divorce, after which he was awarded sole ownership of the company. Following the divorce, the corporation brought a separate suit in a different court against the former wife for money she had taken from the company and which the divorce court had determined was a debt she owed to the company. The former wife argued the debt was for rent money the company owed to her. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the money was a debt that the former wife owed to the corporation. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Taylor C.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and willful failure to visit. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1- 102(1)(A)(i). Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ava H.
Adam R. P. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child Ava H. (“the Child”) after finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence had been proven that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Koczera, Et Al. v. Christi Lenay Fields Steele, Et Al.
This negligence action primarily concerns a failed attempt at service of process in an underlying healthcare liability action filed in 2008. After the dismissal of a defendant doctor in the underlying suit, the plaintiffs filed the present case asserting that the defendants prevented the doctor from being served with process in the healthcare liability action. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court, among other rulings, granted the motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s various rulings. In an opinion filed on April 28, 2017, we affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ motions for default judgment, to dismiss their own complaint as moot, and for additional time to conduct discovery; however, we vacated the order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for entry of an order that complied with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. On remand, the trial court again granted summary judgment explaining that its decision was based on its conclusion that no duty of care was owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristin McKenzie Et Al. Women's Health Services-Chattanooga, P.C. Et Al.
Kristin McKenzie and her husband, Joshua McKenzie, filed this health care liability action individually, and on behalf of their infant child, Jacob, who sustained injuries during his birth. As a result of these injuries, Jacob has limited use of his left arm. The plaintiffs allege that defendant Dr. Matthew A. Roberts was negligent in the delivery of Jacob. They assert that he applied a vacuum extractor during the delivery without first obtaining mother’s informed consent. Following a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Roberts and his employer. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court committed several errors that entitle them to a new trial. They claim that the court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence that violates the collateral source rule. Specifically, they argue that the defendants were allowed to extensively cross-examine plaintiffs’ witnesses regarding possible health insurance benefits under the Affordable Care Act and other benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants pursued this line of interrogation in an attempt to show that some of Jacob’s needs would be covered by these collateral sources. The plaintiffs state that the trial court also erred in restricting the scope of the plaintiffs’ argument. Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding the concepts of “foresight” and “hindsight.” Plaintiffs appeal, arguing reversible errors on the part of the trial court. We vacate the trial court’s judgment on the jury verdict. We affirm some of the actions of the trial court, actions that are challenged by plaintiffs. We vacate the trial court’s order awarding the defendants $81,343.47 in discretionary costs. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Piper B., Et Al.
A mother’s parental rights to her two daughters were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support; substantial noncompliance with permanency plans; failure to manifest an ability and willingness personally to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the children; and persistence of conditions. The court also found that termination was in the children’s best interest. The mother appeals. Upon our review, we hold that the evidence in the record does not support a finding that Mother willfully failed to abandon the children by her failure to pay support; in all other respects, we affirm the termination. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals |
