Katherine E. Anderson v. Ming Wang, Et Al.
This is a health care liability case. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Appellant’s res ipsa loquitur claim under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(c). Appellant appeals. Because Appellant presented sufficient evidence at the summary judgment stage to create a dispute of fact, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Marneasha D., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of two fathers to their respective children who were born to the same mother. On March 21, 2017, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and the children’s guardian ad litem jointly filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the children’s mother and the two fathers. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the parents’ parental rights to the children on multiple statutory grounds and upon a determination that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Because we are unable to ascertain whether the trial court’s judgment is an independent judgment of the trial court, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1- 113(k) (2017). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tina Y. Vaughn v. Kimberly Dickens-Durham
Appellant, surviving child of Decedent, brought suit against Appellee, Decedent’s granddaughter, for alleged violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. Appellant filed the lawsuit in her individual capacity, and the trial court dismissed the case, finding that Appellant lacked standing. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Adriane Allen v. American Yeast, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves a post-mediation agreement reached between a plaintiff and the defendants following a car collision in Memphis, Tennessee. After the agreement was executed, the plaintiff refused to perform under the contract. The trial court determined that the agreement was an enforceable contract and ordered compliance with its terms. The plaintiff continued to refuse to perform, and the defendants filed a motion to hold the plaintiff in civil contempt. The plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion requesting the trial court to require the defendants to interplead the settlement funds despite the plaintiff’s nonperformance. The trial court denied the motion for civil contempt, granted the motion for interpleader of the settlement funds, and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, we conclude that the plaintiff lost the ability to appeal the validity of the post-mediation agreement by failing to file a timely appeal. We further conclude that the trial court erred in considering the motion to interplead the settlement funds filed by the plaintiff’s attorney but affirm the trial court’s final order in all other respects. We, therefore, vacate in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Delbert Collier v. Legends Park, LP, et al.
This is a personal injury lawsuit. Plaintiff, while standing on a public street outside of his apartment, owned by Defendants, was approached from behind by an assailant. The assailant shot Plaintiff in each leg with an assault rifle and proceeded to rob him. Plaintiff sued Defendants for negligence, alleging that Defendants knew or should have known of the foreseeable presence of dangerous persons and that their failure to maintain the property in a safe condition was the direct cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff presented no proof that Defendants had notice of the assailant’s presence or an opportunity to prevent the shooting. We affirm, although on different grounds. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Vicki Baumgartner, Personal Representative Of The Estate of Richard R. Baumgartner v. Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System
This appeal involves the forfeiture of the retirement benefits of a former Tennessee trial judge after he was convicted in federal court of numerous felonies arising out of his official capacity as a trial judge and constituting malfeasance in office. The former trial judge appealed the termination of his benefits and participated in a contested case proceeding before an administrative law judge, who ultimately determined that the retirement benefits were properly terminated based on the felony convictions and that the statute requiring such forfeiture was not unconstitutional as applied to the former trial judge. The chancery court agreed with these conclusions. We likewise conclude that the application of the forfeiture statute did not unconstitutionally impair the pension contract of the former trial judge, nor did it unilaterally impose an impermissible retrospective law or constitute an excessive fine. We further conclude that the retirement benefits were suspended as of the appropriate date, despite the former trial judge’s insistence to the contrary. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the chancery court and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Janet Thornton v. Coffee County Board of Education
This interlocutory appeal involves a complaint for damages under the Public Employee Political Freedom Act. The chancery court transferred the case to circuit court after determining that only unliquidated damages were “available” under the statute. We conclude that the complaint failed to allege any liquidated damages. As such, the chancery court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this case. The trial court’s decision to transfer this case to circuit court is therefore affirmed. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kaycee M.
This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support, abandonment based upon his conduct prior to incarceration, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Advanced Banking Services, Inc. v. Zones, Inc.
This action involves the applicability of a forum selection clause contained within a contract for the installation of two network telephone systems. On April 8, 2015, the seller corporation sent to the buyer corporation a twenty-four-page, itemized quote for equipment and licensing required for the network telephone systems, which the buyer corporation’s president signed and returned to the seller. The quote, consisting of a purchase order with specified terms and conditions on each page, contained provisions for “Shipping Terms” and “RETURNS.” Under the heading for returns, the purchase order stated that additional terms and conditions applied and were available on the seller’s website. Following a dispute, the buyer filed a complaint in the Rhea County Circuit Court (“trial court”) against the seller, alleging breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligence, and unjust enrichment. The seller subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, citing a forum selection clause contained in the “General Terms and Conditions of Sale” from the seller’s website, which specified King County, Washington, as the sole venue for litigating the terms of the contract. In an Order entered September 27, 2017, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the forum selection clause was valid and enforceable. The buyer has appealed. Determining that the additional terms and conditions from the seller’s website were only applicable to returns and not to the contract as a whole, we reverse the trial court’s grant of the seller’s motion to dismiss. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Mason C.
Appellant/Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); and (2) severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-113(g)(9). Mother also appeals the trial court finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because Appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, does not defend the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on that ground. We affirm the termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the sole ground of severe child abuse and on the trial court’s finding that termination of her rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Mattie L. Mettetal, Deceased
The petitioner, Ray W. Mettetal, Jr., filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that the will of his mother, the deceased Mattie L. Mettetal, directs that the real property devised to him in the will should be administered as part of the estate. Petitioner asked the trial court to declare that the will required the administrator to pay the $40,057.35 in costs and improvements expended by petitioner on the real property out of the residuary of the estate. The court denied petitioner’s request. It held that the real property vested immediately in petitioner at the deceased’s death, and therefore it was not part of the probate estate for administration purposes. We affirm that decision. We reverse the trial court’s order to the extent it directs that attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses accrued in a prior appeal to this Court be deducted from petitioner’s distributive share of the estate. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
City of La Vergne v. Brian Ristau
The case involves the defendant’s violation of a city ordinance. The city cited the defendant for parking his commercial semi-truck on his private driveway and on city streets, which the city claimed was cracking the sidewalk and bringing mud into the street. The municipal court found the defendant in violation of the ordinance, and the defendant appealed the municipal court’s decision to the circuit court. The defendant raised several state and federal constitutional issues regarding the ordinance, but the circuit court found his arguments to be without merit and affirmed the municipal court’s decision. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Lawrence B. Hammet, II Et Al. v. Wells Fargo Bank NA
This is a residential foreclosure case. Homeowners appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their claims regarding the foreclosure of their home under Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon our review, we conclude that the Appellants’ claims should not have been dismissed on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Sue Hassler v. Ridley David Hassler
The parties negotiated, signed, and submitted to the trial court a marital dissolution agreement. The trial court approved and incorporated the MDA into its final judgment. Twenty-nine days after entry of the judgment, Ridley David Hassler (husband) filed a “motion to set aside” the final judgment and MDA. He told the trial court that he wanted to repudiate the MDA, arguing that it was ambiguous and that he and Linda Sue Hassler (wife) had differing interpretations of it. The trial court denied the motion, finding the MDA unambiguous, valid, and enforceable. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Nedra Finney v. Franklin Special School District Board Of Education, Et Al.
This is an appeal of the termination of a tenured teacher’s employment pursuant to the Tenure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-5-501 to – 515. The Director of Schools of the Franklin Special School District filed Charges for Dismissal of the tenured teacher on the grounds of unprofessional conduct, incompetence, inefficiency, insubordination, and neglect of duty. The charging document alleged multiple incidents of unprofessional conduct based on a lack of adherence to required procedures, particularly in the area of special education laws and procedures. It further alleged that the teacher was placed on a Corrective Action Plan for the 2014-2015 school year, during which the teacher was found to be in violation of the plan on multiple occasions. Moreover, at the end of the 2014-2015 school year, the teacher was suspended for three days without pay as a result of an incident that occurred on May 11, 2015, during which the teacher improperly restrained a special education student, which violated the student’s individualized education plan. The charging document also identified, inter alia, an incident that occurred on October 28, 2015, when the teacher got into a physical altercation with a special education student who refused to return the teacher’s day planner and which resulted in the two falling to the floor. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Impartial Hearing Officer recommended dismissal on the grounds of unprofessional conduct. When the school board voted to sustain the Hearing Officer’s decision, the teacher sought review in chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the teacher’s dismissal based on the grounds of unprofessional conduct and incompetence. This appeal followed. Because the Hearing Officer did not find that the ground of incompetence had been proven, and that decision was not appealed, the ground of incompetence was not before the court. Therefore, it may not be considered as a ground for dismissal. However, we affirm the decision to dismiss the tenured teacher’s employment with the school district on the ground of unprofessional conduct. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
William James Jekot v. Pennie Christine Jekot
Following his retirement, an alimony obligor petitioned to terminate his alimony. The parties agreed that the obligor’s retirement represented a substantial and material change in circumstances since the original support decree. But the obligor also conceded his ability to pay the alimony. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the obligor failed to meet his burden of proof and denied his request to terminate his alimony obligation. The court also awarded the obligor’s former spouse her attorney’s fees without specifying the basis for the award. On appeal, the obligor argues, among other things, that his former spouse had the burden of proving her continuing need for alimony once a substantial and material change in circumstances was conceded. We affirm the denial of the request to terminate alimony but vacate the award of attorney’s fees. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Rachel L. Bell v. Michael Gardner
A debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case hired an attorney to represent him in his divorce. Several years later, the attorney filed suit against the debtor for unpaid legal fees. The debtor raised the statute of limitations as a defense. The attorney claimed she delayed filing suit after receiving a letter from the debtor’s bankruptcy counsel. The letter asked the attorney to “[p]lease cease collection pursuant to the automatic stay of 11 USC § 362.” Applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the trial court “decline[d] to apply the statute of limitations as unjust” and granted judgment to the attorney for the unpaid fees. Because the court erred in concluding that the debtor was equitably estopped from asserting his statute of limitations defense, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Clair Vanderschaaf, Et Al. v. Victor Bishara, Et Al.
Following his retirement, an alimony obligor petitioned to terminate his alimony. The parties agreed that the obligor’s retirement represented a substantial and material change in circumstances since the original support decree. But the obligor also conceded his ability to pay the alimony. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the obligor failed to meet his burden of proof and denied his request to terminate his alimony obligation. The court also awarded the obligor’s former spouse her attorney’s fees without specifying the basis for the award. On appeal, the obligor argues, among other things, that his former spouse had the burden of proving her continuing need for alimony once a substantial and material change in circumstances was conceded. We affirm the denial of the request to terminate alimony but vacate the award of attorney’s fees. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Misty Oliver Allen v. Mario Pryor Allen
This is a post-divorce child custody and relocation action involving one child, who was seven years of age when the case was commenced. Following the parties’ divorce, the mother was designated as the primary residential parent of the child and was awarded 225 days of co-parenting time annually. The father was awarded 140 co-parenting days per year with the child. In response to notice that the mother intended to relocate to California with the child, the father filed a petition in opposition to relocation and a petition to modify custody. The mother subsequently filed an answer and a petition requesting injunctive relief and modification of the existing permanent parenting plan. After the father’s attorney failed to appear for the hearing or inform the trial court in advance of his whereabouts, the trial court dismissed the father’s petitions for failure to prosecute. The trial court subsequently granted the mother’s petition for injunctive relief and allowed the mother to move to California with the child. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: E.M.
The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of L.B.M. (mother) and J.W.H. (father) with respect to their only child, E.M. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence for terminating mother’s rights on the ground of severe child abuse. By the same quantum of proof, the court found that termination of mother’s rights is in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her rights. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Howard Hawk Willis v. Grand Jury Foreperson Beverly Johnson
The pro se appellant, a state inmate incarcerated on capital murder convictions, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Bradley County Chancery Court (“trial court”). Claiming to have information regarding a homicide other than those for which he was convicted, the petitioner requested that the trial court direct the Bradley County Grand Jury foreperson to grant him the right to testify before the grand jury pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-12-104 (2014). The petitioner subsequently filed a motion to be transported for a hearing, requesting that the trial court issue a habeas corpus ad testificandum. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) then filed a response in opposition to the petition for writ of mandamus. The petitioner responded by filing a motion to strike the State’s response, arguing that the State was not a proper party to this action. On October 26, 2017, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition for writ of mandamus, finding, inter alia, that the petitioner possessed no mandatory right to appear before the grand jury. The petitioner has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Waste Administrative Services, Inc. v. The Krystal Company, Et Al.
We granted the Rule 9 application for an interlocutory appeal filed by The Krystal Company (“Krystal”) to consider whether certain communications between Krystal’s chief legal officer and David Jungling (“Jungling”), an employee of Krystal vendor Denali Sourcing Services, Inc. (“Denali”), are protected by attorney-client privilege. Waste Administrative Services, Inc. (“WASI”), which provided refuse service for Krystal, sued Krystal, Denali, and Jungling in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that Krystal breached their contract by unilaterally terminating it and that Denali and Jungling induced the breach. The Trial Court held that communications between Jungling and Krystal’s chief legal officer after June 9, 2014— at which time Krystal and Denali executed a master agreement—are protected by attorney-client privilege while prior communications are not. We hold that Jungling was the functional equivalent of a Krystal employee as of October 31, 2013 when he was told by Krystal’s President to “take lead” on Krystal’s dealings with WASI, and that his subsequent communications with Krystal’s chief legal officer qualify for attorney-client privilege belonging to Krystal. We, therefore, modify the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
George A. Bavelis v. Ted Doukas Et Al.
This is a fraudulent transfer case. Defendant-debtor purportedly orchestrated the removal and transfer of large sums of money to and from several different business entities—all of which are controlled by Defendant. Plaintiff-creditor sued, at first naming only Defendant and one entity; however, during the course of litigation, Plaintiff discovered two other entities possibly involved in Defendant’s scheme. After being added as defendants, these two additional entities moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s TUFTA claim against them pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), which the trial court granted. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ivy Lonzo Armstrong
Heirs of intestate decedent appeal the probate court’s construction and interpretation of a trust agreement established by the decedent’s wife and the decedent’s wife’s will. The trust terminated at the death of the decedent and court awarded the assets remaining in the trust in accordance with the residual clause of the decedent’s wife’s will, rather than allowing the assets to go to Husband’s estate, as sought by the decedent’s heirs. We conclude that the trial court’s construction and interpretation of the instruments and distribution of assets aligns with the decedent’s wife’s expressed intent and accordingly, affirm the judgment. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: C.T. ET AL.
J.S. (father) appeals the trial court’s adjudication that his children C.T. and L.T. were dependent and neglected and severely abused in the care of father and A.T. (mother). Mother, who did not appeal, testified, among other things, that father bought her illegal drugs while she was pregnant, and that she and father abused drugs and alcohol during her pregnancy. Father denied mother’s allegations. The twin children were born prematurely and tested positive for opana, an opioid, and oxycodone. The trial court expressly credited mother’s testimony and discredited father’s. On appeal, father bases his assertion of error solely on his argument that the trial court incorrectly assessed the credibility of the witnesses, and that the trial court should have believed him instead of mother. We affirm. |
Union | Court of Appeals |
