Lytoniona Lee, et al.v. Quince Nursing and Rehabilitation, LLC
Nearly three years after the court dismissed the plaintiff’s healthcare liability action against the defendant, Plaintiff filed this breach of contract action based on the same underlying facts and circumstances. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kay Armstrong v. Kevin C. Morrison
This appeal concerns a clerk and master’s petition for additional staff. Kay Solomon Armstrong, Clerk and Master of Greene County (“Petitioner”), filed a petition against the County Mayor (“Defendant”) in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) seeking additional staff for her office. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order replacing one half-time position in the office with one full-time position. The Trial Court also awarded Petitioner attorney’s fees and expenses to be paid from the fees of the Clerk and Master’s Office. Defendant appeals to this Court, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s decision to award additional funding for a new full-time assistant to replace a half-time assistant and that Petitioner was not entitled to recover any attorney’s fees. We hold that reasonable attorney’s fees were recoverable by Petitioner pursuant to statute. We hold further that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual findings, including the Trial Court’s core finding that Petitioner’s workspace is so structurally inefficient that her office requires more staff. We modify the Trial Court’s order on fees and expenses to the extent it failed to award Petitioner expenses she paid out of pocket. On remand, the Trial Court is to determine and enter an award including reimbursing Petitioner for her reasonable out-of-pocket fees and expenses. We affirm, as modified, the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Wayne Hixson Et Al. v. American Towers, LLC
Wayne Hixson and Eric Hixson (the Hixsons) granted a perpetual, exclusive easement to American Towers, LLC (ATC)1 to operate a telecommunications system at the top of a hill on their property. For many years, the hill experienced progressive slope failures. A recent mudslide caused thousands of dollars in property damage to the Hixsons and All Things Fast Motorsports, LLC (All Things Fast), a metal fabrication business owned by Wayne Hixson’s grandson. ATC spent thousands of dollars to move a generator away from the slope failure. The parties fear that the cell tower could collapse. In the trial court, the Hixsons and All Things Fast filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the parties’ respective maintenance responsibilities under the easement agreement. They also sought damages arising from ATC’s alleged breach of the easement agreement and other tortious conduct. ATC filed a counterclaim alleging similar causes of action. After a bench trial, the court ruled that ATC has a duty to maintain the easement and that the Hixsons have a duty to maintain the surrounding hillside for the benefit of ATC. Because the court found that the Hixsons and ATC were equally at fault for failing to prevent the recent mudslide, the court rejected their claims of negligence and breach of the easement agreement. However, the court awarded $1,245.20 to All Things Fast on its negligence claim. The court also awarded $179.99 to the Hixsons on their trespass claim. Finally, the court ordered the Hixsons and ATC to pay half of the costs necessary to stabilize the hill in accordance with the remediation plan proposed by the Hixsons. ATC appeals. We modify the trial court’s declaratory judgment, vacate the award of damages to All Things Fast, and remand for further proceedings. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Johnny Nesmith v. Samuel C. Clemmons, Et Al.
Defendants appeal the judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff in this breach of contract action arising out of a failure to pay a promissory note. Defendants argue that the trial court erred in several pretrial rulings, in concluding that the contract was ambiguous and considering parol evidence, in holding that the attorney that drafted the agreement represented Defendants and construing the ambiguous term against them, and in denying their motion to supplement the appellate record. Upon our review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Joshlin, et al. v. Hollis H. Halford, III, M.D., et al.
In this interlocutory appeal, the defendants appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss a medical malpractice lawsuit on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 25.01. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David Campbell v. City of Chattanooga
David Campbell (“Appellant”) was a police officer with the Chattanooga Police Department (“CPD”). On May 29, 2016, Mr. Campbell was dispatched to an apartment complex on report of a fight there. When Mr. Campbell arrived on scene, there were approximately 20-30 people in the parking lot. Mr. Campbell and other officers directed the crowd to clear the parking lot. While Mr. Campbell was giving these instructions, Hanson Melvin, a resident of the complex, walked by Mr. Campbell, and Mr. Campbell initiated an encounter with him. Mr. Melvin was known to Mr. Campbell because, on several previous occasions, Mr. Campbell had stopped Mr. Melvin for various alleged offenses, including driving without a valid driver’s license. Mr. Melvin was walking toward a silver vehicle with his friend, Coheleach Holmes. During this interaction, Mr. Campbell handcuffed Mr. Melvin and arrested him for disorderly conduct. Mr. Campbell placed Mr. Melvin in the back of his police car and took him to jail. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Talat Parveen Et Al. v. ACG South Insurance Agency, LLC Et Al.
This appeal arises from an action commenced by two insured parties against their insurance agent and the insurance agency where he was employed after the insureds’ insurance carrier refused to provide excess uninsured motorist coverage because it was not included in the insureds’ policy. The insureds alleged that their insurance agent failed to procure the requested insurance on their behalf and that they consequently had suffered monetary losses. The Trial Court applied a statutory rebuttable presumption that the insureds had accepted the provided coverage by paying their insurance premiums, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-135(b). Upon its finding that the insureds had not rebutted that presumption, the Trial Court dismissed the insureds’ action. The insureds have appealed. Upon our determination that Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7- 135(b) does not apply to actions against an insurance agent for failure to procure insurance coverage as directed, we reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for the action to proceed. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Sara Kelley Poole v. Ronald Ellis Kinslow
In this divorce action, the trial court equitably divided the marital estate, adopted a permanent parenting plan for the parties’ minor child, and set child support. On appeal, the husband challenges the allocation of marital debt, the denial of his request for equal parenting time, and the calculation of child support. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Carla Jo Capps Jones v. Joseph R. Jones
In this post-divorce action, the husband sought to modify his alimony obligation to the wife. The trial court denied the husband’s petition to modify, determining that the husband had failed to prove that a substantial and material change in circumstance had occurred since entry of the divorce decree. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of JD Bush
Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we conclude that he waived consideration of all issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Vivian Khah v. Jonathan Capley
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a personal injury action in which the alleged tortfeasor died before suit was filed. Upon a motion to dismiss, the trial court determined that the suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Because no personal representative was appointed for the deceased tortfeasor and more than a year had elapsed following the accrual of the plaintiff’s cause of action, we affirm the dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shauneille Sharifa (Morton) v. Wells Fargo/ASC
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse and award of summary judgment. Plaintiff-homeowner took out a loan secured by a deed of trust on a parcel of real property. After defaulting on the loan, plaintiff and defendant-bank entered into a loan modification agreement. Plaintiff, however, again defaulted on the loan, and, after she failed to make the required acceleration payments, defendant initiated foreclosure proceedings pursuant to the deed of trust. The real property ultimately was sold at foreclosure for less than the balance owed on the loan. Plaintiff then sued defendant for breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure. Defendant moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff never responded to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Three days prior to the hearing on the summary judgment, plaintiff filed a motion for a change of venue, which the trial judge treated as a recusal motion pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B and which, following a hearing, he denied. The trial court subsequently granted defendant’s summary judgment motion and dismissed plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals both the trial court’s denial of the motion to recuse and its granting of the motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel., Amanda C. Sensing v. Bradley K. Sensing
The trial court denied Father’s petition to modify child support. Because Father failed to establish his current gross monthly income, as necessary to prove a significant variance, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE EX REL. ANGELA HOCKETT v. TRACY JOY
The trial court entered an order awarding a mother retroactive child support and calculating the amount of support the father owed. The father filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Several months later, he amended his motion to assert that he was entitled to relief from the judgment because his attorney sustained an injury and died, which prevented the father from timely receiving a copy of the judgment so he could appeal it. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the father failed to raise the issue within a reasonable time, and then awarded the mother one-half of her attorney fees. The father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion, but we vacate the award of attorney fees because the trial court failed to consider their reasonableness. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Franklin, Tennessee v. W. L. Hailey & Co., Inc. Et Al.
Appellant city appeals from the dismissal of its negligent misrepresentation claim on the basis of the economic loss doctrine, arguing that Tennessee law recognizes an exception to the economic loss doctrine for negligent misrepresentations. Because we conclude that Tennessee law does not recognize a negligent misrepresentation exception to the economic loss doctrine, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
E Solutions For Buildings, LLC v. Knestrick Contractor, Inc., Et Al.
This appeal involves payment disputes arising out of a public construction project. Among other things, the case involves claims made by an equipment supplier against a subcontractor, the project’s general contractor, and the general contractor’s bonding company, and claims made by the same subcontractor against the general contractor. Following a trial, the trial court granted the supplier a judgment against the subcontractor and granted the subcontractor a judgment against the general contractor. The supplier’s claim against the general contractor and its bonding company was denied. The propriety of these rulings and numerous other issues are now before this Court. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm in part, affirm in part as modified, reverse in part, and remand the case for such further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Adrian M.-M., et al.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Obion County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Emily M. M.-A. (“Mother”) to her minor children Adrian, Maribel, Alisiana, and Elena (“the Children”). The Children had been exposed to methamphetamine in Mother’s care. After trial, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; abandonment by failure to visit; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; severe child abuse; and, being sentenced to more than two years’ imprisonment for child abuse. The Trial Court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. On appeal, Mother argues that she has made improvements such that termination of her parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest. First, apart from the grounds of failure to visit and failure to provide a suitable home, which we reverse, we affirm the grounds for termination found by the Trial Court. Regarding best interest, we find that Mother has no meaningful relationship with the Children and that her purported improvements are insufficient. The evidence is clear and convincing that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Jeanie Morgan Beltz Et Al v. Brett Anthony Heffner
This appeal arises from the denial of a petition based on Tennessee’s Grandparent Visitation Statute. The parents of the deceased mother of a new-born child filed a petition to obtain visitation with their three-month-old granddaughter. The child’s father opposed the petition. Following discovery, the father filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the ground that there was no danger of substantial harm to the child if visitation was denied because there was no evidence that the grandparents had a significant relationship with the child. The petitioners opposed the motion relying on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(b)(4), which established a rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child if visitation was denied because their daughter, the child’s mother, was deceased. The trial court found there was no significant existing relationship between the grandparents and the child. After analyzing the child’s best interests under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-307, the court granted summary judgment to the father, finding the petitioners did not meet the requirements of the Grandparent Visitation Statute. We have determined that the trial court misconstrued the statutory scheme. The trial court failed to recognize that because the petitioners are the parents of the child’s deceased mother, they were entitled to the rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child if visitation was denied without having to establish that a “significant” relationship with their grandchild existed. Moreover, we have determined that more than one conclusion or inference can reasonably be drawn from the facts, thereby precluding summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Diane Kikue-Yasutake Winne v. Scott Anderson Winne
Husband petitioned the court to modify his alimony obligation after Wife moved in with her boyfriend. Wife maintained that her new living arrangement did not affect her need for alimony because she and her partner shared expenses equally and her living expenses after the move were unchanged. The trial court disagreed and suspended a portion of Husband’s alimony obligation. Both sides raise issues with the trial court’s decision. Contrary to Wife’s assertion, we conclude that the alimony provision in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement did not preclude modification of the alimony award as authorized by statute. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in basing its modification decision on the evidence of Wife’s financial circumstances at the time of trial. We affirm the alimony modification, but we modify the judgment so that the modification applies retroactively to the date of Husband’s petition. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
101 Construction Company v. Lawrence B. Hammet, II Et Al.
Plaintiff client sued Defendant attorney and law firm for damages tied to a breach of an attorney’s fees contract following the completion of an arbitration matter. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appeals the denial of its motion for directed verdict and motion for new trial. Because the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict on interpretation of the written contract at issue, we reverse the verdict entered by the trial court and remand with instructions to enter a directed verdict against the attorney and law firm in the amount of $67,335.69 and to determine whether prejudgment interest is warranted in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sonya Lee Westbrooks v. Earl Lavon Westbrooks
Appellant/Husband appeals the trial court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to reopen proof in this divorce case. By his motion, Husband sought to introduce allegedly “newly discovered evidence” concerning the premarital value of his retirement account. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidence, which consisted of Husband’s previous divorce decree, was a matter of public record and was available to Husband during discovery in the instant divorce matter. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Husband’s motion. Affirmed and remanded. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Alexis S.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s termination of a mother’s parental rights and denial of the maternal grandmother’s petition for grandparent visitation. The court terminated the mother’s rights on the grounds that she abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit and support the child, and failed to manifest an ability or willingness to assume personal custody of the child. The court also found that termination of the mother’s rights was in the child’s best interest. The court awarded guardianship of the child to her paternal grandparents and denied the maternal grandmother’s intervening petition for visitation, finding that the risk of harm in permitting visitation was greater than the risk of harm in denying it. The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, and the grandmother appeals the denial of her petition for visitation. Because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k), we reverse the trial court’s determination that the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support the child was established and remand the issue for the trial court to make the requisite findings and to enter judgment accordingly. We reverse the court’s determination that the other two grounds for termination were proven because the record fails to establish either ground by clear and convincing evidence. Because no ground for termination has been proven, we also reverse the court’s determination regarding the child’s best interests. Because the court terminated the father’s parental rights, we affirm the court’s appointment of the paternal grandmother and her husband as the child’s guardians, subject to the mother’s rights, which have not been terminated. We also affirm the denial of the maternal grandmother’s petition for visitation. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Takesha Curtiss Nelvis v. Lafayette Baptist, Jr.
Father appeals the juvenile court’s decision to deny him equal parenting time. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the statutory best interest factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a), we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for the entry of a proper order. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brewco, LLC et al. v. Martha R. Scent
The plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking recovery for improvements they had made to real property that had been purchased at a foreclosure sale by the defendant. When the plaintiffs originally purchased the property, the defendant as mortgagee held a deed of trust on it. Due to a fraudulently recorded release of that deed of trust, however, the plaintiffs purchased and improved the property, believing that they had clear title. The defendant did not learn of the various improvements to the property until after the improvements were complete. At approximately the same time, the defendant discovered that a third party had recorded a release of the deed of trust without her consent, with such release containing a forgery of her signature. The defendant filed suit against the third party who purportedly forged the release, the plaintiffs, and others, and she ultimately received a monetary judgment that resulted in a judicial foreclosure to enforce her deed of trust. At the foreclosure sale, the defendant purchased title to the property in question with a credit bid. Shortly before the foreclosure sale, the plaintiffs filed this action, ultimately asserting claims of unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, constructive trust, and an equitable lien. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment concerning the plaintiffs’ claims, determining that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated facts supporting their theories of recovery. The plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Dr. Victor W. McLaughlin, M.D. v. Elizabeth King McLaughlin a/k/a Rev. Elizabeth King
The plaintiff filed this action on a sworn account, seeking to recover $20,451.00 that he had allegedly loaned in several money transfers to the defendant, plus prejudgment interest and costs. In her answer to the complaint, the defendant denied all substantive allegations but failed to raise any affirmative defenses. At trial, the defendant stipulated to having received the money transfers. However, she requested that the court allow her to orally swear under oath that the transfers did not constitute a valid debt. The trial court found that the defendant was attempting to assert an affirmative defense that the transfers constituted gifts rather than loans and that she had waived such a defense pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8.03 by failing to raise it in her responsive pleading. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the total amount of $33,942.69, including prejudgment interest. The defendant filed a motion to alter or amend, requesting that the judgment be vacated on the ground that under Tennessee Code Annotated § 24-5-107 (2017), she should have been allowed to raise any defense orally at trial. Following a hearing, the trial court found that because the defendant had elected to file a responsive pleading, she was required to raise the affirmative defense in the pleading. The trial court thereby declined to vacate the judgment. The defendant has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals |
