Bharat Gandhi v. William Rucker M2001-00271-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes
This is an appeal by Defendant from denial by the trial court of a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside a judgment on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The trial court denied the motion, and on consideration of the record, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a trial on the merits.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Gloria Snow-Koledoye vs. Horace Mann Ins. Co. M2000-02954-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
This case involves a settlement of an insurance claim under the comprehensive coverage of an automobile insurance policy. Wife, named insured in the policy, sued the insurance company for breach of contract in delivering to husband a settlement check made jointly payable to wife and her husband, after husband apparently negotiated the check. Wife amended her complaint to name her ex-husband as an additional defendant, and he filed an answer to the complaint. In a nonjury trial, the trial court entered judgment for plaintiff-wife against the insurance company. Insurance company appealed. We vacate.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Janet Goodart vs. Kamalin Kazmar-Grice M2001-00663-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Leonard W. Martin
Former wife and children of decedent sued in the chancery court to enroll a foreign decree of divorce and, inter alia, to impose a constructive trust on proceeds of a Servicemen's Group Life Insurance policy payable to the decedent widow after the decedent prior to his death changed the policy beneficiary contrary to a marital dissolution agreement and final decree of divorce. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of decedent widow. Former wife appealed. We affirm.
Stewart
Court of Appeals
Ray C. Hall v. TN. Workers Credit Union M2001-01346-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
Husband and Wife obtained a loan from a credit union and pledged their home as security for the note under a Deed of Trust. The Deed of Trust required Husband and Wife to maintain property taxes and insurance on the property. The credit union foreclosed on the property after Husband and Wife continuously failed to maintain the taxes and insurance. Husband and Wife filed suit against the credit union, arguing that the agreement between the parties did not provide the remedy of foreclosure for mere nonpayment of taxes and insurance. The trial court granted summary judgment for the credit union. Because we find that the agreement between the parties provides the remedy of foreclosure for breach of any promise made under the agreement, including the promise to pay property taxes and insurance, we find that the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment for the credit union and affirm that decision.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Jerry Noe v. Melissa Noe (Barnes) M2001-02223-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Leonard W. Martin
This is an appeal by the Wife in a divorce case complaining of the disposition of marital property. The Husband also complains about an award of alimony in solido against him. We affirm the Chancellor.
Cheatham
Court of Appeals
James Randall Slaughter, et al. v. Duck River Electric Membership Corporation, et al. M2000-00453-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Chancellor Vernon Neal
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Holloway
This is an appeal from an order of the trial court granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Duck River Electric Membership Corporation and the third-party defendant, Osborne Electrical Contractors, Inc., on the ground that Duck River Electric Membership Corporation was a statutory employer for the purposes of the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act at the time the plaintiff, James Randall Slaughter, received a severe electrical shock resulting in massive injuries. For the reasons herein stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand.
Maury
Court of Appeals
Cox Oil vs. Lexington Beer Bd. W2001-01489-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
This is an action challenging the denial of a beer permit. The plaintiff business applied for a beer permit with the defendant beer board. The board denied the permit because plaintiff's location was within 500 feet of a church. This proximity to a church was in violation of a city ordinance. The plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari in the trial court, seeking a reversal of the board's decision because the 500-feet ordinance had been applied in a discriminatory manner. The trial court found that the board had allowed another establishment that was within 500 feet of a church to maintain its beer permit, and concluded that the board had therefore applied the ordinance in a discriminatory manner. Consequently, the denial of the plaintiff's beer permit was reversed. The board now appeals that order. We affirm, finding that the board had applied the ordinance in a discriminatory manner, and that the trial court did not err in reversing the denial of the plaintiff's beer permit.
Henderson
Court of Appeals
Doug Jones vs. Eddie Gillette, Sr., et al E2001-01499-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
The defendants/appellants, Eddie Gillette, Sr., and Vivian Gillette, the maternal grandparents of A.B.J., contend that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted custody of A.B.J. to her father, the plaintiff/appellee, Doug Jones. The Gillettes further contend that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied their oral motion to stay enforcement of its judgment pending appeal and when it denied their oral motion to award them visitation pending appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
M.P.P.,al vs. D.L.K. In Re: C.E.P. E2001-00706-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: William E. Lantrip
The stepfather, M.P.P. ("Stepfather"), and the biological mother, A.P.P. ("Mother"), of a minor child ("Child") filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Child's biological father, D.L.K. ("Father"), so that Stepfather could adopt the Child. When the Child was 17 months old, Father received a 130-month prison sentence. The Trial Court granted partial summary judgment as a matter of law to Mother and Stepfather and terminated Father's parental rights. Father appeals. We affirm, in part, and vacate, in part, and remand.
Peggy Gaston vs. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. E2001-01487-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Lawrence H. Puckett
This appeal from the Circuit Court of McMinn County questions whether the Trial Court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company because it refused to pay its policyholder, Peggy Gaston, under the uninsured motorist provision of her policy which covered Peggy Gaston. We vacate and remand.
McMinn
Court of Appeals
Peggy Gaston vs. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. E2001-01487-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Lawrence H. Puckett
This appeal from the Circuit Court of McMinn County questions whether the Trial Court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company because it refused to pay its policyholder, Peggy Gaston, under the uninsured motorist provision of her policy which covered Peggy Gaston. We vacate and remand.
McMinn
Court of Appeals
City of Collegedale vs. Hamilton County Water Treatment E2001-02041-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
This is a suit brought by the City of Collegedale, seeking a declaration that Hamilton County Wastewater and Wastewater Treatment Authority is required to arbitrate a dispute between them in connection with the City annexing certain property served by the Authority. The complaint also sought a declaration that in the event the City prevails the Authority would not be entitled to prosecute a suit to condemn and re-acquire the facilities in question. The Trial Judge found in favor of the City on both issues and the Authority appeals. We affirm in part and vacate in part.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Elizabeth Petty vs. State E2001-02124-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Vance W. Cheek
In this action, the Commission found no contract between the parties and dismissed the claim. On appeal, we affirm.
Court of Appeals
Jamie Mason vs. Charles Mason, Jr. E2001-02208-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
This appeal from the Chancery Court of Cocke County questions whether the Trial Court erred in failing to grant Mr. Mason standard visitation with his minor son. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
Mark Graham vs. Michael J. Mohr E2001-00824-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: L. Marie Williams
These consolidated cases arise out of a two-vehicle accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mark Graham, assigning 51% of the fault to Michael J. Mohr and 49% to Graham. Mohr appeals, raising issues pertaining to the propriety of the trial court's ruling excluding the testimony of the police officer who investigated the accident. We affirm.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Lynn Hall, et al vs. Mark Bookout E2001-01172-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
Lynn and Lillian Hall, the maternal grandparents ("Grandparents") of the minor child ("Child"), filed a Petition for Custody seeking permanent custody of the Child, naming the Child's biological father ("Father"), Mark Bookout, as the defendant. The Grandparents had temporary custody of the Child pursuant to an ex parte order. At the close of proof at trial, the Trial Court found that the Father was not unfit. In its Order, however, the Trial Court made no specific finding regarding the risk of substantial harm if the Child was placed in Father's custody. The Trial Court denied the Grandparents' petition but did not order the Child returned to Father's custody by any set date but instead provided only that the "ultimate goal" was for the Child to be returned to Father. Father appeals. We affirm, in part, and modify, in part, and remand.
