LaFrancine Gibson, as Surviving Relative and Next Friend of Georgia Jones, Deceased v. Metro Community Care Home, Inc., et al.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant common carrier, finding that Defendant had no notice that Decedent was mentally incapacitated and holding that Defendant had no duty to assess or probe Decedent in order to discover a latent or non-apparent psychological condition. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph R. Griffin v. Crompton Corporation, Uniroyal Co., Inc., Bayer AG, Bayer Corporation, Bayer Polymers LLC, Rhein Chemie Corporation, Dow Chemical Co., and BASF Corporation
This appeal involves competing class action lawsuits. The plaintiff/appellant filed a lawsuit in Tennessee on behalf of similarly situated consumers in Tennessee, asserting antitrust claims against various urethane manufacturers. Meanwhile, a separate class action was filed in Florida against some of the same manufacturers, asserting similar misconduct throughout the United States. The class in the Florida lawsuit included consumers in twenty-five states, including Tennessee. The Florida litigation settled, and the Florida court approved a plan to provide notice of the pending settlement to all class members. The notice plan did not include individual notice to the Tennessee plaintiff. The Florida notice plan was implemented. The Florida court then entered an order approving the settlement, finding that the notice plan satisfied the requirements of due process and gave class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances. Subsequently, in the instant Tennessee proceedings, the manufacturers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the doctrine of res judicata prohibited relitigation of the matters settled in the Florida case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant manufacturers. The plaintiff/appellant appeals, arguing that the Florida notice was insufficient because he did not receive individual actual notice. We affirm, finding that the Tennessee lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy White v. Warden Tommy Mills, Disciplinary Chairperson Sgt. Joe Spicer, and Sgt. Joel Smith
This appeal involves a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by a prisoner seeking review of his disciplinary conviction for possession of contraband. The respondents did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and the certified record was filed with the trial court. Upon review of the administrative record and the parties’ briefs, the trial court denied the petition, finding that the decision of the administrative disciplinary board was not illegal or arbitrary, and that it was supported by substantial and material evidence and had a rational basis. The petitioner prisoner now appeals. We affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Adoption of Gracie M. M.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights. Finding that the termination was contested and that the trial court failed to appoint a guardian ad litem, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph H. Johnston, Win Myint, William H. May, and Edward Hall v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville Davidson County and Paul G. Summers, Attorney General for the State of Tennessee
This zoning appeal involves Tennessee’s Open Meetings Act. A municipal legislative body began considering legislation to implement a conservation zoning overlay in a neighborhood within the municipality. The ordinance adopting the zoning change passed on the first and second reading. Prior to the final meeting on the subject, members of the legislative body sent numerous emails to each other discussing the proposed zoning change. In addition, prior to the final meeting, some members viewed information on the zoning issue in a non-public conference room in the legislative body’s office. The legislative body then adopted the zoning change at a public meeting. Thereafter, residents of the neighborhood who opposed the zoning change filed the instant lawsuit seeking a writ of certiorari to review the adoption of the ordinance. The petitioner residents argued, inter alia, that the email correspondence and the non-public meeting violated the Open Meetings Act, that the enabling statute violated the separation of powers doctrine, and that the enactment of the ordinance violated due process and was arbitrary and capricious. The trial court determined that the legislative body’s actions did not violate the Open Meetings Act, and rejected the other challenges to the zoning overlay ordinance. The neighborhood residents appeal. We reverse in part and affirm in part, finding among other things that while the email correspondence constitutes a violation of the Open Meetings Act, the legislative body engaged in a “new and substantial reconsideration” of the issues in the final meeting so as to cure the violation. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Damon A. Tatum v. Mercedeas A. Tatum
Wife filed a divorce complaint in Judge Robilio’s court, which she later voluntarily dismissed. Wife then filed a complaint in the Court of the Judiciary against Judge Robilio. Subsequently, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, and the matter was set in Judge Robilio’s court. Wife filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process of Husband’s divorce complaint, which was denied after the process server identified Wife as the person he had served. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Forrest Construction Company, LLC v. James L. Laughlin, II, et al. v. Thomas V. Naive
This action involves a variety of claims arising from the construction of a residence in Williamson County. A homeowner, James Laughlin, entered into a cost plus contract with Forrest Construction Company, LLC to construct a home for he and his wife. Prior to the home being completed, Forrest Construction stopped work, filed a lien on the residence, and thereafter filed a breach of contract action against Mr. Laughlin and an action to recover damages based on the doctrine of quantum meruit against Mrs. Laughlin. Forrest Construction claimed that Mr. Laughlin was in breach of the contract for failure to pay according to the contract. Mr. and Mrs. Laughlin filed a counter-claim for negligent construction, gross negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that Mr. Laughlin had materially breached the contract by failing to pay according to the terms of the contract, and awarded damages to Forrest Construction. Conversely, the trial court found for the Laughlins on their claim of negligent construction and awarded damages against Forrest Construction. Both parties appeal. Forrest Construction contends that the trial court erred in holding it liable for alleged defects because Mr. Laughlin committed the first material breach and failed to give Forrest Construction notice and the opportunity to cure the alleged defects. Mr. Laughlin contends the trial court erred in finding that he committed the first material breach. The Laughlins also contend the trial court erred in reducing the cost of the repairs to their residence and in failing to pierce the corporate veil. We find that Forrest Construction was the first to materially breach the contract by submitting requests for draws that were not properly supported by records of its costs and expenses as required by the contract, including submitting draws which erroneously included charges for work done on its other projects, and by failing to complete construction of the home. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s determination that Mr. Laughlin committed the first material breach and hold that Forrest Construction was the first to materially breach the contract. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the Laughlins were excused from the duty to give notice of the alleged defects and an opportunity to cure; thus, the Laughlins are entitled to recover damages due to the negligent construction by Forrest. As for the trial court’s substantial reduction of the damages requested by the Laughlins for the cost to repair the yet unrepaired defects to their home, we are unable to determine whether the trial court considered or overlooked $55,000 of the estimated cost to repair the defects; therefore, we remand this issue to afford the trial court the opportunity to either restate its previous ruling or to increase the award of damages, if it so determines, based on the evidence presently in the record. As for the issue of piercing the corporate veil, we remand that issue for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Steve Simmons And Jeannie L. Simmons v. City of Murfreesboro, et al.
Appellants granted a sewer line easement to the City. The City hired a sub-contractor to install the sewer line and to restore the property following construction. Appellants, who were dissatisfied with the sub-contractor’s restoration, filed suit against the City and the sub-contractor. The sub-contractor subsequently went out of business, and the trial court entered a judgment against the City for $13,070.00, representing the value of Appellants’ land plus the cost to repair a fence. Appellants appeal, claiming the proper measure of damages is the cost to restore their property–$137,779.62. On appeal, the City contends that Appellants may not sue the City, that Appellants breached the contract by refusing the sub-contractor access to their property, and that the trial court’s award should be reduced by $132.00. The proper measure of damages in this case is the lesser of the cost to restore Appellants’ property or the difference in reasonable market value of the premises immediately prior to and immediately after the injury. Although neither party presented evidence regarding the property’s diminished value, we find that the trial court considered the appropriate factors in setting the amount of damages. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Sean Lanier, Individually and as Mother and Next of Kin of Jane Doe, A Minor v. City of Dyersburg, et al.
This is a negligence case filed by a student’s mother against the city, as operator of the city school system, due to an alleged assault on the student by another student. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city, finding the assault unforeseeable as a matter of law. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Cassandra Lynn Rudd v. Howard Thomas Rudd - Concurring
I concur in the Court’s decision but write separately to clarify my view of the evidence as it relates to S.R. I believe that the evidence would support a finding by the trial court, by clear and convincing evidence, that any visitation with Father would result in harm to S.R. However, because the trial court did not make the required finding of harm, I agree with the decision to remand the case on the issue of visitation. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Cassandra Lynn Rudd v. Howard Thomas Rudd
I concur in the Court’s decision but write separately to clarify my view of the evidence as it relates to S.R. I believe that the evidence would support a finding by the trial court, by clear and convincing evidence, that any visitation with Father would result in harm to S.R. However, because the trial court did not make the required finding of harm, I agree with the decision to remand the case on the issue of visitation. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
George Sanders and SMS Contracors,Inc. v. Dr. Sammy Holloway, et al. - Memorandum Opinion
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
The Estate of Maynie Bess Morris, Deceased v. Anita Morris
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant based on the statute of limitations in this will contest action. We affirm. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County by and through The Office of The Assessor of Property v. Lamar Tennessee, LLC d/b/a Lamar Advertising of Nashville
This case involves a subpoena issued by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, on behalf of the Davidson County Assessor of Property, which required the appellant to provide information regarding its business operations. When the appellant did not comply with the subpoena, Metro filed a complaint seeking to enforce it. The trial court ruled that the appellant must provide the requested information. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jason Morris v. City of Memphis Civil Service Commission
This is an appeal from the decision of the Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis, upholding the decision to terminate Appellant, Jason Morris’ employment with the Memphis Police Department. We find that the Civil Service Commission failed to make the required findings of fact and conclusions therefrom. Accordingly, it is impossible for this Court to review the case based on the record before it. Therefore, we vacate the order of the Chancery Court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charlotte Branson v. Joyce Fitzgerald, D/B/A Realty Executives of Kingston
Charlotte Branson (“Plaintiff”) sued Joyce Fitzgerald, d/b/a Realty Executives of Kingston with |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In RE: M.M.M. (d/o/b 10/13/2007), A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the appellant, L.M. (“Mother”), on April 7, 2009. The court found multiple grounds for termination and concluded that termination was in the best interests of the child. Mother appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Mary E. Dillard, Deceased v. Tennessee Bureau of Tenncare
Bureau of TennCare filed a petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-1-301 seeking the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased TennCare recipient in order to recover the amount of medical assistance and services provided decedent. Trial court declined to appoint an administrator, finding that the statute of limitations at Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-310(b) barred the claim of TennCare. We reverse the trial court decision in light of In Re: Estate of Martha M. Tanner and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
K.A.G. v. B.L.I.
This appeal stems from a paternity action in which K.A.G (“Mother”) filed a petition against B.L.I. (“Father”) seeking legitimation of Z.R.G. (“the Child”), her then 14-year-old son, and an award of child support. The parties stipulated that Father was the biological father of the Child based on the results of DNA testing. An agreed order was entered setting Father’s current child support obligation under the Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). Following a hearing on the remaining issues, Father was ordered to pay child support retroactive to the filing of the petition plus 36 months. Father was also ordered to pay a portion of the Child’s orthodontic and dental expenses. Mother appeals, contending that the trial court erred in declining to award her child support back to the date of the child’s birth. We conclude that the court abused its discretion in deviating from the presumption that child support should be awarded retroactively to the date of the child’s birth. We vacate that portion of the trial court’s judgment pertaining to retroactive child support and remand for a hearing at which the trial court will calculate, in a manner consistent with the Guidelines, the child support due Mother from the date of the Child’s birth to the date of filing of the petition. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: B.A.C. (d/o/b 6/16/07), A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age
This appeal arises out of a termination of parental rights. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of Rebecca Cornelius (“Mother”) on April 7, 2009, after finding grounds of severe child abuse and persistence of conditions.1 We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Burks v. The Kroger Company
This is a negligence action resulting from a slip and fall by a customer at a Kroger grocery store. The plaintiff slipped on a pool of water created by one of several leaks in the roof of the grocery store. The plaintiff filed suit against three defendants, The Kroger Company, Roof Management, Inc., a roofing consultant responsible for facilitating necessary repairs to the roof of the grocery store, and Village Roofing Company, Inc., the roofing contractor which made repairs to the roof when called upon to do so. Village Roofing and Roof Management each filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to both Village Roofing and Roof Management finding they did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff and if they did owe a duty that their acts and omissions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. We have determined there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude a determination of whether Village Roofing or Roof Management owed a duty of care to the plaintiff or whether their actions were or were not the legal cause of Ms. Burks’ injuries. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Village Roofing and Roof Management and remand for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Anne Gho Massey v. Gregory Joel Casals
This is a child support case. The mother filed a petition to increase the father’s child support obligation, alleging that he had misrepresented his gross income. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court judge entered an order finding that the father’s testimony was not credible and that he earned significantly more income than he previously represented. The order increased the father’s monthly child support obligation, retroactive to the date of the filing of the mother’s petition. It also required the father to pay for the child’s private school tuition, and awarded the mother her attorney’s fees. The father appeals, arguing inter alia that the trial court erred in not using evidence such as his tax returns to determine his income, in not finding the mother voluntarily underemployed because she worked part-time, and in requiring him to pay private school tuition. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby County, Tennesse v. James M. Crews, Jr., et al
This is a condemnation case. The appellee county for many years had possession of a small strip of land owned by the appellant family. The county filed a petition for condemnation of the strip of land. A consent order was entered granting the county ownership and possession of the subject parcel, and a hearing was scheduled to determine the amount of compensation due. A week before the hearing, the county gave notice of voluntary dismissal. The family objected to voluntary dismissal, citing Anderson v. Smith, 521 S.W.2d 787 (Tenn. 1975). The trial court permitted the county to voluntarily dismiss its petition. The family appeals. We reverse, finding that voluntary dismissal is precluded where the trial court grants the condemnor right of possession and only the issue of compensation is left to be resolved. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re S.J.M.
Father in Nebraska allowed his child’s caregiver to take the child to Tennessee. A strange series of events led to DCS’s being given custody of the child by the Dickson County Juvenile Court and the placement of the child in a foster home. Meanwhile, Father ran afoul of the law (again) and became an involuntary guest of the federal penal system under a fifteen-year sentence. The foster parents petitioned for termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment and sought adoption of the child. Father’s mother intervened. Mother did not defend and her rights were terminated. Father defended. The trial court found Father had not abandoned the child, but that the parties had tried by consent the issue of Father’s being sentenced to prison for a term of ten years or more when the child is younger than eight years of age, circumstances which present a ground for termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant t Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). The trial court then granted the adoption. Father filed a motion to alter or amend, presenting to the trial court a document showing that Father’s sentence had been reduced to seven and one-half years. The motion was denied. Father appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination that the issue was tried by consent of the parties. Our decision necessitates that the adoption order be vacated and the child be returned to the legal custody of DCS. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Frazier, et al v. Walter Jerry Mitchell, et al
One of many heirs to certain property in Rutherford County opposed the partition by sale of the property. The property was sold and the proceeds distributed. The heir appealed. Due to the lack of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we affirm the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |
