Effie Rivers v. Northwest Tennessee Human Resource Agency
This is a personal injury case. The defendant’s employee negligently backed the defendant’s vehicle into the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had reported discomfort in her shoulders to her physician. At some point after the accident, the plaintiff reported to her physician that she had pain in her right shoulder. Ultimately, the plaintiff required shoulder replacement surgery. The plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence. The parties stipulated to the defendant’s liability, and a bench trial was held on causation and damages. Based in part on deposition testimony of physicians, the trial court found that the accident caused the plaintiff’s injury and the ensuing surgery and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Melinda Long, as Administrator of the Estate of Opal Hughes v. Hillcrest Healthcare - West et al. - Concur
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that, to the extent the allegations of the complaint allege medical malpractice1, the defendants are entitled to summary disposition of that claim. This is true because the material filed by the defendants in support of their motion clearly establishes that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the pre-filing requirements of the applicable statute as it pertains to a complaint sounding exclusively in medical malpractice. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (Supp. 20092). I cannot concur, however, that the allegations of the complaint sound exclusively in medical malpractice. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Melinda Long, as Administrator of the Estate of Opal Hughes, v. Hillcrest Healthcare - West, et al.
Opal Hughes sustained injuries while in the care of defendant Hillcrest Healthcare - West, and her administrator brought this action for damages. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff's complaint was a complaint for malpractice against defendant. Plaintiff argued that the complaint was for simple negligence, and the Trial Court held the complaint was for medical malpractice and since statutory requirements for filing a medical malpractice complaint had not been met, dismissed the case. On appeal, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Devon W., et al.
Former foster mother and her new husband filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the adoption of three children by the current foster parents. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Joseph McHugh vs. Carole Ann McHugh
This appeal concerns the distribution of marital property. After a bench trial, the court entered the Final Decree of Divorce and distributed the marital property. Wife subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and for attorney's fees. The trial court denied the motion in part and awarded approximately $2,087.50 in attorney's fees and litigation expenses to Wife. Wife appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Pam Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc.
In this action charging retaliatory discharge, the Trial Court granted defendant a dismissal of action based on its Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 12 Motion. On appeal, we vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Villas on Blue Mountain, L.P., et al., v. Tennessee Housing Development Agency
Plaintiffs attempted to submit an application for Low-Income Housing Tax Credit with the Tennessee Housing Development Agency. The Agency refused to accept the application and plaintiffs subsequently sued, asking the Court to require the Agency to accept and process their application. The Trial Court determined that the issue was moot and plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's summary judgment that the case was moot. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Strine, et al vs. Joshua Walton, et al
On July 7, 2005, Ashley Strine ("Plaintiff") was injured while riding in a vehicle being driven by Joshua Walton ("Walton"). The vehicle was owned by James Rice ("Father"), who had given the vehicle to his son, Kevin Rice ("Son"), for Son's personal use. On the day of the accident, Son had given Walton permission to use his vehicle to pick up Plaintiff. Walton and Plaintiff were planning on attending a birthday party later that day. Plaintiff originally sued only Walton and Father. As to Father, Plaintiff asserted liability based on the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. Over two years later, Son was added as a defendant. An order of compromise and dismissal was entered as to Walton. Thereafter, Father and Son filed a joint motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Father summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. With regard to Son, the Trial Court concluded that all claims against him were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby R. Hopkins vs. Doyle K. Riggs, et al
Bobby R. Hopkins ("Hopkins") sued Doyle K. Riggs and Ruth Riggs ("the Riggs") alleging, in part, that the Riggs had contracted to construct a road on the Riggs' property for Hopkins' use and had failed to construct an adequate road. The Riggs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Trial Court granted them summary judgment. The Riggs then sought attorney's fees pursuant to the parties' contract. The parties then reached an agreement with regard to attorney's fees, an agreement which the Riggs subsequently alleged was breached by Hopkins. The Riggs then filed a motion and the Trial Court entered an order granting the Riggs additional attorney's fees. Hopkins appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney's fees. We affirm the grant of summary judgment, hold that the Riggs were entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the parties' contract, vacate the Trial Court's November 25, 2008 Order granting additional attorney's fees, and remand this case to the Trial Court for entry of an order that complies with the parties' August 6, 2008 agreement. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
John Skipper and Brenda Skipper v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Wells Fargo purchased foreclosed property, which it then sold to the Skippers. The Skippers contracted to sell the property, but before the sale was completed, two IRS tax liens against the previous owners were discovered. The Skippers sued Wells Fargo, and the trial court awarded them their lost profits from the anticipated sale. Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Skipper And Brenda Skipper v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Wells Fargo purchased foreclosed property, which it then sold to the Skippers. The Skippers contracted to sell the property, but before the sale was completed, two IRS tax liens against the previous owners were discovered. The Skippers sued Wells Fargo, and the trial court awarded them their lost profits from the anticipated sale. Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation v. Ida B. Street
In 1991, Ms. Street executed a note and deed of trust in favor of National Bank of Commerce. National Bank of Commerce immediately assigned the deed of trust to Troy & Nichols, Inc. In 1994, Chase acquired Troy & Nichols, and in 2003, National Bank of Commerce released the deed of trust. Chase brought suit claiming that the deed of trust had been erroneously released, seeking to rescind the releases and to reinstate the deed of trust. The trial court granted summary judgment to Chase, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John H. Key, II, and Wanda Morrison v. Carolyn Lyle, et al
Appellees, as shareholders, leased a commercial building and property from a relative. When the relative died, the property was left to numerous heirs, including Appellees and the non-shareholder Appellants, and Appellee Carolyn Lyle was named property manager. Appellees fell behind on their rent owed pursuant to the lease, but ultimately repaid the arrearage, and disbursements were made to the property co-owners. Appellants sued, claiming that Lyle should be removed as property manager, that she was obligated to declare the lease in default and to re-let the property, and that the Appellees breached their fiduciary duties to the other property co-owners. The trial court denied Appellants' claims, and we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Kevin Adams v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
The plaintiff made a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy after his house burned. The insurer denied the claim because, after the policy was issued, the plaintiff deeded the property to his sons so that it would pass to them if he died, and he did not notify the insurer. The plaintiff sued the insurer for breach of contract. The insurer claimed that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the property, that he breached a “warranty of ownership” under the policy, that he had a duty to disclose the change of ownership after the policy issued, and that he violated a provision of the policy addressing concealment and fraud. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the insurer to pay him approximately $72,000 in accordance with the policy limits. The trial court also awarded discretionary costs to the plaintiff, but it denied the plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest. The insurer appeals, claiming that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the policy for various reasons, and that the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff discretionary costs. The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in declining to award prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court’s award pursuant to the insurance policy and its award of discretionary costs, and we vacate the portion of the judgment denying the request for prejudgment interest and remand for such an award. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Samantha Mackus Knight v. James Darrell Mackus
At the parties’ divorce, Mother was named primary residential parent of their minor child and Father was allowed visitation. The parties continued living together for approximately one year following their divorce, and thereafter, they exercised alternating one-week visitation for approximately one year. Father petitioned to be named primary residential parent citing his increased visitation with the child as a material change in circumstances. The trial court denied his petition without making the findings required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)(i). We vacate the trial court’s order denying Father’s petition, and we remand to the trial court with instructions to make the necessary findings and then to render its decision accordingly. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Laura Wilburn, as the Personal Representative of Son Jones, Deceased v. City of Memphis
Decedent was struck and killed by an on-duty City of Memphis police officer while attempting to cross the street. The trial court awarded $7,500.00 in a wrongful death award. Decedent’s personal representative appeals, seeking an increased award. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Gazley, D/B/A Personalized Planting, Inc., v. Tulsi Associates, et al., and The Estate of Howard Sexton, for decedent Howard Sexton, et al., D/B/A Precision Construction Company
Plaintiff subcontractor, sued contractor, who constructed a hotel for co-defendant owner of hotel for breach of contract. Construction company cross-filed against defendant hotel owner. The Trial Court, after hearing proof, entered a joint settlement judgment against both defendants on behalf of the plaintiff and based the judgment on the terms of the settlement agreement which had been entered in a prior action in a suit between the defendants. The owner of the hotel appealed. We hold the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of the settlement agreement between the defendants, and set aside the judgment against appellant and direct that the contractor is liable for all the damages awarded, based on appellants' cross-action against the contractor. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Alvin Flatt, Attorney in Fact and Next of Kin if Decedent Falnetta Noble v. Claiborne County Hospital and Nursing Home
In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff offered evidence of the standard of care required of defendant by an expert witness, and defendant offered evidence that it complied with the standard of care by an expert witness, who was accepted as an expert by the Trial Court. The Trial Judge ruled in favor of defendant, essentially accepting the defendant's evidence that it had met the standard of care for the deceased. Plaintiff appealed, insisting that the Trial Court did not "correctly weigh the conflicting expert testimony" in its ruling for the defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Wayland-Goodman Properties, LP., v. Southside Package Store, Inc.
Plaintiff landlord brought a detainer action against defendant in Sessions Court. On appeal to the Circuit Court, the Trial Court in its Judgment, awarded possession to plaintiff and awarded plaintiff a Judgment of $17,800.00 for the rent due and one-half of the 2009 ad valorem property taxes. Defendant has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Alvin Flatt, Attorney in Fact and Next of Kin of Decedent Falnetta Nobel vs. Claiborne County Hospital and Nursing Home
In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff offered evidence of the standard of care required of defendant by an expert witness, and defendant offered evidence that it complied with the standard of care by an expert witness, who was accepted as an expert by the Trial Court. The Trial Judge ruled in favor of defendant, essentially accepting the defendant's evidence that it had met the standard of care for the deceased. Plaintiff appealed, insisting that the Trial Court did not "correctly weigh the conflicting expert testimony" in its ruling for the defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Gazley, d/b/a Personalized Planting, Inc., v. Tulsi Associates, et al., and The Estate of Howard Sexton, for decedent Howard Sexton, et al., d/b/a Precision Construction Company
Plaintiff subcontractor, sued contractor, who constructed a hotel for co-defendant owner of hotel for breach of contract. Construction company cross-filed against defendant hotel owner. The Trial Court, after hearing proof, entered a joint settlement judgment against both defendants on behalf of the plaintiff and based the judgment on the terms of the settlement agreement which had been entered in a prior action in a suit between the defendants. The owner of the hotel appealed. We hold the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of the settlement agreement between the defendants, and set aside the judgment against appellant and direct that the contractor is liable for all the damages awarded, based on appellants' cross-action against the contractor. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Poole v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.
The plaintiff/appellant, an owner-operator truck driver, entered into a note, disclosure, and security agreement with the defendant/appellee, Union Planters Bank, for the purchase of a tractor-trailer truck. At the time of the original agreement, the bank promised to have the vehicle's title converted to a Tennessee certificate of title. The plaintiff filed suit several years later to recover damages incurred due to the bank's failure to timely provide a copy of said title. Prior to trial, the bank moved to compel arbitration and to strike the plaintiff's jury demand based on contractual language found in the original agreement and a subsequent refinancing agreement. The trial court declined to compel arbitration but granted the motion to strike. At trial, the plaintiff recovered in breach of contract. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the enforcement of his pre-dispute contractual waiver of the right to trial by jury, the involuntary dismissal of his Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim, the calculation of his damages, and the denial of his claim for prejudgment interest. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jason Sherwood v. Cheryl Blackburn, Judge
This is an appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the Appellant's petition for writ of mandamus for failure to state a claim. Because the Appellant failed to timely file his notice of appeal, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Poole v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.
The plaintiff/appellant, an owner-operator truck driver, entered into a note, disclosure, and security agreement with the defendant/appellee, Union Planters Bank, for the purchase of a tractor-trailer truck. At the time of the original agreement, the bank promised to have the vehicle’s title converted to a Tennessee certificate of title. The plaintiff filed suit several years later to recover damages incurred due to the bank’s failure to timely provide a copy of said title. Prior to trial, the bank moved to compel arbitration and to strike the plaintiff’s jury demand based on contractual language found in the original agreement and a subsequent refinancing agreement. The trial court declined to compel arbitration but granted the motion to strike. At trial, the plaintiff recovered in breach of contract. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the enforcement of his pre-dispute contractual waiver of the right to trial by jury, the involuntary dismissal of his Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim, the calculation of his damages, and the denial of his claim for prejudgment interest. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Anderson Charles Carter, III, Deceased
This appeal involves a mother’s claims against her deceased adult son’s estate. The trial court denied the majority of her claims but granted her partial relief on one issue that was not disputed by the son’s estate. The mother appealed. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals |
