John Doe, Alias a Citizen and Rresident of Hamilton County, Tennessee, v. Mark Gwyn, Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, et al.
This declaratory judgment action challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-201 et seq, on the grounds that plaintiff should not be required to register because his criminal convictions occurred in other states prior to the passage of the Tennessee Act, as applied to him. The Trial Judge declared that plaintiff was required to register under the Act, and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Chancellor's Judgment which requires plaintiff to register in accordance with the Act. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Clarence E. Johnson v. Tanner-Peck, L.L.C.; William B. Tanner; Individually and d/b/a Tanner-Peck Outdoor, et al.
This is the second appeal in this breach of contract case. The plaintiff employee filed this lawsuit against the defendants for breach of an oral employment agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him damages. The defendants filed a motion to revise the summary judgment order and submitted an affidavit in support of the motion. The trial court struck the supporting affidavit and denied the motion to revise. The defendants filed the first appeal. In the first appeal, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, including the award of damages, was affirmed, but the cause was remanded to the trial court for findings on its denial of the motion to revise. On remand, the trial court explained that it struck the affidavit submitted with the motion to revise for lack of personal knowledge and because it violated the Dead Man’s Statute. The defendants now appeal the trial court’s order denying the motion to revise. We reverse the denial of the motion to revise and remand for a recalculation of damages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy Freeman, Personal Representative and Administratrix of the Estate of John R. Freeman, Deceased v. CSX Transportation, Inc., et al.
In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to determine: (1) whether the Tennessee savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a), may be invoked twice within the one-year savings period to save otherwise untimely actions; and (2) whether the Appellee acted with the diligence and good faith necessary to invoke the protection of the savings statute. We conclude that Appellee’s suit was properly brought within the protection of the Tennessee savings statute. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, et rel. Frances Craig Creighton v. Wilbur Foster Creighton
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order, finding Appellant in criminal contempt of court for willful failure to pay his ordered child support. Appellant appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in: (1) denying Appellant a full transcript of the hearing at the State’s expense; (2) giving little or no credence to the evidence offered by Appellant’s witness; and (3) finding Appellant in criminal contempt for willful failure to pay child support. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Central Parking Systems of Tennessee, Inc. v. Nashville Downtown Platinum, LLC
NDP purchased property upon which Central Parking operated pay-parking lots pursuant to lease amendments with the prior owner. Central Parking calculated the rent it owed NDP pursuant to the amendments, but due to a computer glitch, paid double the rent it claimed was owed. NDP refused to refund the money, claiming the payment equaled the fair rental value of the property. Central Parking sued NDP for the alleged overpayment, and the trial court dismissed Central Parking’s claims. Because Central Parking’s only basis for relief on appeal–an implied notice theory–was first raised in a Rule 59.04 motion, and an issue first raised in a motion to alter or amend is not properly raised before the trial court, we find the issue is waived on appeal. The trial court’s dismissal of Central Parking’s claims is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Melody Jennings Bowers v. Daniel R. Bowers
Alleging Husband’s failure to pay child support and alimony as required, Wife filed petitions for contempt. The trial court found Husband guilty of seven counts of willful criminal contempt and entered a judgment against him for unmet obligations. On appeal, Husband claims the trial court erred in finding him in contempt, in imputing a $1,000 per month income to Wife, in upholding his work-related childcare obligation, in denying his counterpetition to modify spousal and child support, and in excluding certain witness testimony. He also argues that he was denied a hearing regarding Wife’s attorney fees. Because the trial court failed to make a finding regarding Husband’s ability to pay, we reverse Husband’s criminal contempt conviction. Additionally, we find the trial court erred in upholding the workrelated childcare award, and we remand for a determination of Husband’s retroactive credit for amounts paid subsequent to the filing of his petition to modify and for a recalculation of his future support obligations. However, we find that the trial court did not err in imputing Mother’s income, in refusing to allow Father’s witness to testify, nor in awarding Wife her attorney fees without a hearing. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Martin Goss/Unknown Tenant of Foreclosed Property
The plaintiff foreclosed on real property following the default on a loan secured by a deed of trust. The plaintiff then filed a detainer warrant in General Sessions Court and the defendant appeared claiming rightful possession to the property because of a quit claim deed. After hearing the evidence, the General Sessions Court awarded possession of the property to the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Knox County Circuit Court. A jury trial commenced, and at the close of proof, the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the directed verdict and awarded possession of the property to the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Martin Goss/Unknown Tenant of Foreclosed Property - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the decision of the majority to affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of American General Financial Services, Inc. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Goss’s appeal is not so devoid of merit as to warrant a holding that his appeal is frivolous in nature. When an appellant seeks to reverse or modify a trial court’s judgment based upon an alleged error grounded in the facts of the case, but fails to present us with a verbatim transcript or statement of the evidence, the appellant’s appeal has no chance of success. An appeal is deemed frivolous if it is devoid of merit or if it has no reasonable chance of success. Bursack v. Wilson, 982 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). See also Linn v. Howard, E2006-00024-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 208442 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed on January 26, 2007). When the only issues on an appeal are factual ones – as opposed to legal questions – we must have a record that permits us to reach those issues. In my judgment, this appeal is – by definition – a frivolous appeal. I would remand for a hearing to determine “just damages” due the appellee pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (2000). |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Duff L. Brumley v. The City of Cleveland
This lawsuit stems from a grievance process initiated by a detective with the Cleveland Police Department, Duff L. Brumley (“Brumley”). Brumley was instructed to undergo retraining as a result of a citizen complaint letter written in connection with his investigation of a possible burglary. Brumley was dissatisfied with the mandatory retraining and initiated the grievance process under the City of Cleveland’s official policy. The grievance reached an appeal hearing before the City Manager. The City Manager affirmed the order to Brumley to undergo retraining. Brumley filed an Application for Writ of Certiorari in the Trial Court. The Trial Court denied Brumley’s Writ of Certiorari. Brumley appeals, claiming that the Trial Court improperly excluded additional evidence Brumley wanted to introduce and found a material basis for the City Manager’s decision where none existed. We hold that the Trial Court did not err in its decision as to the additional evidence Brumley sought to admit. We further hold that the City Manager did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and had a material basis for her decision. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Healthmart USA, LLC et al. v. Directory Assistants, Inc.
In a dispute over the enforceability of an arbitration provision in a consulting contract, the trial court found the provision ambiguous and denied the appellant’s motion to dismiss or to compel arbitration. We find that the provision is not ambiguous. We remand for a ruling on the condition precedent to arbitration: whether the appellant made a good faith effort to come to a mutual agreement before unilaterally selecting an arbitration service, location, and choice of law forum. We have also concluded that should the parties reach arbitration, the issue of fraud in the inducement is arbitrable. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Cumberland Properties, LLC v. Ravenwood Club, Inc., et al.
This is a contract case. Appellant, a Nashville Country Club, hired Appellee, a real estate development and consulting firm, to help the Club procure the best price available for the sale of its real property. Appellee claimed that it was due fees under the parties’ written agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant appeals, arguing that: (1) the parties’ contract was not supported by adequate consideration; (2) the parties’ contract was void as against public policy based upon Appellants’ allegation that Appellee was acting as a broker; (3) the trial court erred in allowing parol evidence and in its interpretation of the terms of the parties’ agreement; and (4) the trial court erred in calculating Appellee’s damages. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand for determination of Appellee’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in defending this appeal. Affirmed and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert A. Stolze v. Janet F. Stolze
In this divorce action, Husband appeals trial court’s award of alimony to Wife, grounds for divorce, and overall division of marital assets. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the nature or amount of alimony awarded, grounds for divorce, or the overall division of marital assets, the judgment is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel Natalie L. Dancy v. Paul L. King
The petitioner executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity shortly after the birth of a child. Several years later, after he was ordered to pay child support, he filed a petition seeking to rescind the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, or alternatively seeking court-approved DNA testing, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-113. The juvenile court denied his petition upon finding that he failed to prove fraud in the procurement of the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding concerning fraudulent procurement, we reverse and remand for further proceedings to include parentage tests. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeff Burkhart v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee, et al.
Assistant Chief Shift Commander of city fire department appeals trial court affirmance of hearing committee’s finding of just cause for his termination. Finding that the trial court appropriately applied the proper standard of review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Watson v. Robert L. Payne, Jr.
amount of “zero.” The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for additur. We vacate the trial court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or additur, and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Shelby L. B.
The divorced mother of a nine year old girl joined with an unrelated man in a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s father and to adopt, with the intention of having the unrelated man adopt the child in place of the father, while the mother retained her own parental rights. The trial court granted the father’s motion to dismiss the petition, holding that the petitioner lacked standing because the statutes governing termination of parental rights and adoption require that the mother relinquish her parental rights or that they be terminated before an adoption by an unrelated individual or non stepparent may proceed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
April Amanda Worley v. Richard Thomas Whitaker
Plaintiff sought and obtained an Order of Protection from the trial court against defendant, Subsequently, following an evidentiary hearing, the Court found defendant in contempt of the Order of Protection, and sentenced him to 1830 days in prison. Defendant has appealed to this Court inter alia, seeking a reduction in the sentence. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court, but modify by reducing his sentence to 730 days. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Mary Pauline Stumpe Schorn, Deceased
In March of 2004, the trial court entered an order to probate the Last Will and Testament of Mary Pauline Stumpe Schorn (“Deceased”) and appointed John H. Schorn the Personal Representative of Deceased’s estate (“Personal Representative”). On April 13, 2010, the trial court entered an order that, inter alia, ordered the Personal Representative to “compile a complete list of where the estate monies are and what has been spent since the last accounting was provided to the beneficiaries …,” within thirty days, and to close and settle the estate within ninety days. The Personal Representative appeals the April 13, 2010 Order to this Court. We hold that the order appealed from is not a final judgment, and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is dismissed. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse L. Rogers, III., v. State of Tennesse
Plaintiff, an incarcerated prisoner, appealed a Circuit Court's decision dismissing his writ of habeas corpus to Chancery Court. The Chancellor held that an appeal from Circuit Court would not lie in Chancery Court which has no jurisdiction to try a writ of habeas corpus related to criminal proceedings. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Chancery Court and remand. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Ralph Kenneth Freeman v. City of Chattanooga
The Chattanooga City Police Department terminated petitioner for violation of policies, and the City Council upheld petitioner's termination. Petitioner filed a writ of certiorari in Chancery Court and the Chancellor upheld petitioner's termination. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Chancery Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse R. Miltier v. Bank of America, N.A.
This is a tort action for wrongful foreclosure. Suit was filed by Jesse R. Miltier against his lender, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”). In his complaint, Miltier demanded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury awarded Miltier $750,000 compensatory damages itemized on the verdict form as $350,000 out of pocket money losses “related solely to foreclosure,” $100,000 out of pocket losses “related solely to lawsuit,” $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to foreclosure” and $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to lawsuit.” The jury also awarded Miltier $300,000 in punitive damages. BOA filed post-judgment motions asking that the compensatory damages be remitted to eliminate “amounts related solely to the lawsuit” and amounts awarded in excess of the $200,000 demanded in the complaint. Miltier responded asserting that the issue of damages over $200,000 was tried by consent. The trial court entered an order reducing the award of compensatory damages to $200,000. Later, the court entered a final order approving the jury’s award of punitive damages in the amount of $300,000. Miltier appeals challenging the reduction of the verdict. His issues include a challenge to the constitutionality of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02 which forbids amendment of pleadings after verdict to increase the ad damnum clause. The Attorney General has appeared on appeal to defend the constitutionality of Rule 15.02. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Carlie G. C.
Philip C. (“Father”) appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, Carlie G. C. (“the Child”), who was five years old at the time of trial. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds for termination exist and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals and challenges the trial court’s findings. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Anthony V. Jackson v. Ginger Jackson
This appeal involves countless motions filed over a period of nearly nine years following the parties’ contentious divorce. The mother appeals, challenging numerous rulings by the trial court. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony V. Jackson v. Ginger Jackson - Concurring/Dissenting
I agree with most of the majority opinion in this case. I find I must dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the award to Father of statutory interest on Mother’s child support arrearage. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Becka L. A. K.
The trial court allowed the mother of a twelve year old girl to move out of state with the child over the objections of the father and set out a generous visitation schedule so the father could maintain a close relationship with his daughter. Shortly after the move, the father filed a petition for contempt and for change of custody, alleging that the mother had deliberately thwarted his court-ordered visitation to defeat his parental rights. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the father had proved his allegations, and it transferred custody of the child to him. Since we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings, we reverse and reinstate the parenting plan in effect before the father filed his petition and remand to the trial court for crafting of a transition plan. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals |
