Larry Hendricks v. Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari alleging that the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole acted arbitrarily and illegally in denying him parole. After reviewing the record, the chancery court concluded that the Board acted lawfully, and it dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals, and we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Saint Rogers v. Louisville Land Company, et al.
.Betty Saint Rogers (“Plaintiff”) sued Louisville Land Company and Joe V. Williams, III (“Defendants”) alleging claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the Tennessee statutes governing cemeteries, outrageous conduct, and breach of contract, among other things. After a non-jury trial, the Trial Court entered its final judgment awarding Plaintiff a judgment of $250.00 for breach of contract, $45,000.00 for intentional infliction of emotional distress, $250,000.00 in punitive damages, $37,306.25 in attorney’s fees, and $556.42 in discretionary costs. Defendants appeal to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiff did not prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, and we, therefore, reverse the judgments for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. We also find and hold that because Plaintiff abandoned her statutory claim, she was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the statute, and we reverse the award of attorney’s fees. We further find and hold that Plaintiff did prove breach of contract, and we affirm the award of damages for breach of contract, and the remainder of the Trial Court’s final judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Cory Tyler Meeks v. Kimberly Ann Meeks
This is an appeal from a divorce decree entered by the Circuit Court for Grundy County on March 14, 2011. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
Byron Avenue 3501, LLC v. Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, TN
The purchaser of historic property appeals the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission’s denial of a demolition permit based on economic hardship. The Commission’s denial was affirmed by the chancery court. We find that the Commission’s denial was not supported by material evidence and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to return the matter to the Commission for a new hearing. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathleen Anne Dilley v. James Kevin Dilley
In this divorce case the father appeals the trial court’s naming of the mother as the primary residential parent, the calculation of the mother’s income for purposes of child support, and the trial court’s valuation and division of marital assets. We find the record supports the trial court’s decision to name the mother the primary residential parent. We further find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s valuation and division of the parties’ marital assets. An equitable division of marital assets does not require an equal division between the parties, and the court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. The trial court did not err in calculating the parties’ incomes for child support purposes. We conclude the mother is entitled to an award of some of the attorney’s fees she incurred in this appeal. We affirm the trial court in all respects and remand the case for a determination of the amount of the mother’s attorney’s fees on appeal to be paid by the father. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth W. Taylor v. Lawrence County, Tennessee Election Commission et al.
Unsuccessful sheriff candidate sued to void the August 5, 2010 Lawrence County sheriff’s election based on the ineligibility of one of the five candidates. The trial court found the challenged candidate ineligible but declined to void the election. On appeal, we find the plaintiff guilty of gross laches in waiting to file suit to the prejudice of the defendants. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas L. Grimes, et al. v. Helen Cornell
This appeal involves a will contest in which the trial court found that a will executed in 2005 was the product of undue influence and, as a consequence, admitted a will executed by the testator in 2004 to probate. The proponent of the 2005 Will appeals the finding of undue influence as well as the dismissal of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiffs to be paid from the estate. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Johnathan Leonard Sullivan v. Tracy L. Brooks
Mother appeals trial court’s decision to change the parties’ nonmarital child’s surname to that of the father. Finding that the father failed to meet his burden of proving that a name change was in the child’s best interest, we reverse. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Darby Burgess, Ind. and as Administratrix/Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert E. Darby, Deceased et al. v. Harris Morgan Deere et al.
The plaintiffs have appealed from an order upholding a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and two of the defendants. Because the order appealed does not resolve the plaintiffs’ claims against all the defendants or the two defendants’ cross claim, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Mark H. Ruth v. Robin M. Ruth
This appeal is before the Court due to the failure of appellant to respond to a Show Cause Order in this Court as to why the appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Appellant failed to respond to this Show Cause Order, and we order this appeal dismissed as premature. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
David G. Young, et al. v. City of LaFollette
This case stems from the suspension and later termination of David G. Young (“Young”) from his position as City Administrator for the City of LaFollette (“LaFollette”). Young filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Campbell County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court ruled in favor of Young and annulled the LaFollette proceedings that resulted in Young’s suspension and termination. The Trial Court also awarded Young, as the prevailing party, certain discretionary costs. LaFollette appeals. We hold that LaFollette did not act fraudulently, illegally, or arbitrarily in its termination of Young’s employment. We reverse. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Danny A. Stewart v. Gayle Ray, Commissioner, TDOC et al.
Danny A. Stewart, a prisoner serving multiple sentences, some concurrently and some consecutively, filed a petition for certiorari naming as respondents the Commissioner of the Department of Correction and heads of various other agencies allegedly responsible for determining his eligibility for parole (collectively referred to as “TDOC”). He alleges TDOC is incorrectly calculating his eligibility for parole in that it is basing its calulation on the aggregate consecutive sentences of 42 years, whereas the correct method is to calculate eligibility on each separate sentence so that he would start serving his next consecutive sentence as an “in custody” parolee of his earliest consecutive sentence. The trial court dismissed the case based on Stewart’s failure “to exhaust his administrative remedies,” i.e., by seeking a “declaratory order from TDOC before filing the present action.” Stewart appeals. We vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Patti Zakour a/k/a Patti Smith v. UT Medical Group Inc.
The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment arising from a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiffs in this medical malpractice/wrongful death action. It also conditionally granted Defendant’s alternative motion for a new trial. In light of Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Tylon L.D.
This is a termination of parental rights case pertaining to Tylon L.D. (“the Child”), the minor child of Pamela D. (“Mother”). Eighteen months after the Child was placed in her care, the Child’s prospective adoptive parent, Carman E. (“Foster Mother”), filed a complaint seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights and asking to adopt the Child. After a trial before Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson, II (“the trial court”), the court terminated Mother’s rights upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds existed for terminating her parental rights and that termination was in the Child’s best interest. 1 Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Wayford Demonbreun, II v. State of Tennessee
This petition was filed as a common law writ of certiorari in the circuit court of Davidson County to challenge the validity of the petitioner’s 1998 felony convictions in the criminal court of Davidson County. The circuit court dismissed the writ finding it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition and that the claims pertain to actions governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for which there is no relief under a common law writ of certiorari. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Janice Davis Boelter and Richard Davis v. Jackie Curtus Reagan, et al.
Decedent executed a will in 1988 which could not be found upon her death. Decedent’s stepchildren sought to establish a copy of the 1988 will as Decedent’s last will and testament, but the trial court found that they had failed to rebut the presumption that the will had been destroyed and revoked. We find that Appellants failed to prove that Decedent did not revoke her will. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s involuntary dismissal of Appellants’ claim as well as its order that Decedent’s Estate be administered as an intestate estate. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Dana Moulton, et al. v. Delores Moulton, et al.
In this action plaintiff alleged she was injured when the roof on the deck at defendant's house fell upon her, causing injuries. Defendant denied any responsibility for plaintiff's injuries and moved for summary judgment. The Trial Court, in sustaining the summary judgment motion, held that none of the parties knew of any defect in the patio roof, and there was no evidence in the record of what actually caused the collapse of the roof. The defendant possessed no constructive notice of any defective condition causing the collapse. Plaintiffs have appealed and we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Anne Lavoie and Jodee Lavoie v. Franklin County Publishing Company, Inc.
These consolidated actions are before this Court on a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. We are asked to consider whether, as a matter of law, a plaintiff is barred from maintaining a suit against an employer under a sole theory of respondeat superior where the plaintiff settles her claim against the employee, executes a release of all claims as to the employee, but reserves her claim against the employer in a court order dismissing the employee with prejudice. We hold that the plaintiff’s suit is barred. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, summary judgment is granted to the employer, and the case is dismissed. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Maston G. Lyons, III, et al. v. Kimberly G. Leffew, et al.
Plaintiffs appeal from the denial of a second Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion. Eight months after the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute, Plaintiffs filed the first of two Rule 60.02 motions alleging they did not receive notice of the motion to dismiss their case and that they did not receive the order dismissing the case. The trial court denied the first Rule 60.02 motion and plaintiffs did not appeal that ruling. Plaintiffs then filed a second Rule 60.02 motion, asserting the same grounds as in the first motion. The trial court denied the second Rule 60.02 motion, which is the ruling at issue in this appeal. We have determined the issues presented in the second motion are res judicata because no new issues were presented in the second motion and, therefore, affirm the trial court. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Lonnie E. Roberts, et al. v. Claude Russell Bridges, a/k/a Leon Russell, et ux.
This appeal involves the enforcement of a restrictive covenant. A group of neighbors filed suit seeking permanently to enjoin a musician and his wife from using their property for nonresidential purposes. The trial court ruled in favor of the neighbors after a bench trial, prohibiting the homeowners from parking a tour bus, two panel trucks, and several employee vehicles on their property and ordering the homeowners to remove a portion of a parking lot and driveway built to accommodate the vehicles. The court later awarded discretionary costs to the neighbors. We reverse the grant of injunctive relief requiring the homeowners to remove a portion of the parking lot and driveway but affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Garman v. Guy Garman
This is a divorce case. Wife appeals the trial court’s order concerning: (1) the valuation of Husband’s medical practice; (2) the division of certain marital debt; and (3) the award of transitional alimony, rather than alimony in futuro, and the amount thereof. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Joshua Cooper, et al. v. Logistics Insight Corp., et al.
This appeal arises out of a personal injury lawsuit, wherein plaintiff filed suit for injuries suffered in the course of his employment. Plaintiff's employer was allowed to intervene to assert a subrogation lien to recover workers’ compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff settled his claim against the defendants, and an order of voluntary dismissal was entered. The intervenors moved to set the case for trial, asserting that the settlement between plaintiffs and defendants was negotiated without the consent of the intervenors and did not take into account plaintiff’s future medical expenses, for which intervenors would be responsible. The trial court granted the intervenors’ motion to set the case for trial, but subsequently dismissed the intervening petition, finding that the settlement resolved all claims against the defendants and that the intervening petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finding that dismissal of the intervening petition was error, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Marshall H. Murdock, v. State of Tennessee, et al.
Petitioner brought this action styled: "Petition for Declaratory Judgment", naming the Tennessee Department of Corrections and the Tennessee Board of Paroles as defendants. The Trial Judge, responding to a Motion to Dismiss, dismissed the Department of Corrections on the grounds that it was not a proper party to challenge a parole board decision. The Trial Court then treated the Petition as a common law writ of certiorari, and held that the writ was not timely filed. Petitioner has appealed to this Court and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Greg Lance v. Randall York, District Attorney General, 13th Judicial District
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition for access to public records under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 10-7-505. The trial court dismissed the petition upon its finding that: (1) the Appellee records custodian responded to Appellant’s records request; (2) the fee charged to Appellant was reasonable and in compliance with those set by the open records counsel; and (3) Appellant had, in fact, received the records that he requested. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Shaolin P. et al.
The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to provide support and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. Because we have concluded that the Department of Children’s Services failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father’s failure to pay support was willful or that the Department’s efforts to help Father find housing were reasonable, we reverse the juvenile court’s decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |
