Swift Roofing, Inc. v. State of Tennessee, Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development
This appeal arises from a petition seeking judicial review of an administrative agency order, which affirmed citations for workplace safety violations. The Chancery Court affirmed the citations. After reviewing the appellate record, we conclude that the administrative agency did not provide the required findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for its decision. Consequently, judicial review is not possible based on the record before this Court. Therefore, we vacate the order of the Chancery Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Commercial Bank, Inc., et al., v. Hollis Fay Summers, et al.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had borrowed money from the Bank and executed a trust deed to secure the loan and the property was properly foreclosed by the Bank as the successful bidder. Further, that defendants then filed numerous documents in the Register of Deeds office to slander plaintiffs' title. Defendants never answered the Complaint and after several months plaintiffs moved for a default judgment which was granted at a hearing before the Trial Court. The Trial Court ruled that the various documents filed by the defendants in the Register of Deeds office were null and void and assessed costs to the defendants. Defendants appealed pro se, and we dismiss the appeal on the grounds that they failed to comply with any of the applicable rules of appellate procedure governing appeals. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Angela L. (Lyles) Melton v. Jackie B. Melton
In this divorce case, the husband challenges the trial court’s distribution of the marital property, valuation of the marital residence, and award of alimony to the wife. Without a transcript or statement of the evidence, this court cannot adequately review the issues raised by the husband. Finding that the trial court did not err as a matter of law, we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Gribble Waddell v. Gregory C. Rustin
This case stems from a lawsuit over an alleged implied partnership. Rebecca Gribble Waddell (“Waddell”) and Gregory C. Rustin (“Rustin”) were involved romantically for a number of years. After the couple separated, Waddell sued Rustin in the Chancery Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”), alleging, among other things, that a partnership existed between Waddell and Rustin. The Trial Court held, inter alia, that there was no partnership between Waddell and Rustin and ordered divestiture of certain property from Waddell to Rustin. Waddell appeals to this Court, and both parties raise multiple issues. Rustin also argues that this appeal is frivolous. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court on all issues except for that concerning divestiture of certain property from Waddell, which we reverse. We decline to hold this appeal frivolous. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: Shyronne D. H., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case with an unusual procedural history. Following an incident with one of her children, Appellant Mother was charged with one count of aggravated child neglect or endangerment and one count of aggravated child abuse of a child under eight years of age. She pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to six years’ incarceration. In a separate proceeding, the children were adjudicated to be dependent and neglected and victims of severe child abuse. At the termination of parental rights hearing, which is the subject of this appeal, the trial court determined that the previous finding of severe child abuse was res judicata and did not permit the parties to relitigate the issue. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding the issue of severe child abuse to be res judicata because the order finding the children to be dependent and neglected and victims of severe child abuse is not a final judgment. Consequently, Appellant should have been permitted to present evidence and argument at the termination proceeding as to whether she committed severe child abuse. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ann Laure Chamberlain v. Jeremy Steven Moore
On December 10, 2010 the Trial Court entered an Agreed Order on Parenting Time. Ann Laure Chamberlain (“Appellant”) filed a motion to set aside the December 10, 2010 order. On February 28, 2011 the Trial Court entered its order, inter alia, denying the motion to set aside, reserving child support matters, and stating that the parties may mediate any remaining issues regarding parenting time. Appellant appeals to this Court. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Gabriel D.A., ET AL
The order from which the appellant William E. J. seeks to appeal was entered on Tuesday, April 12, 2011. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Thursday, May 19, 2011, the 37th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not filed timely, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jada Flack v. Curtis McKinney
This appeal arises out of dependency and neglect proceedings in which custody of the minor child was awarded to the father. The mother appealed, but she failed to provide this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence. Due to our inability to review the evidence, we affirm the decision of the lower court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky Lynn Hill v. Tennessee Department of Corrections
Inmate appeals the grant of summary judgment to the Tennessee Department of Corrections in declaratory judgment action wherein inmate sought to be given credit on his sentence for work performed while housed in county jail. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Archie Story v. Civil Service Commission of the State of Tennessee, et al.
A highway patrolman was terminated for allegedly deploying a tire deflation device without prior authorization in violation of General Order 412 and for untruthfulness regarding such. On appeal, the trooper argues that his partial extension of the device did not constitute a “deployment.” Thus, he contends he did not violate General Order 412, nor was he untruthful when he denied deployment. We affirm the ALJ’s finding that the trooper “deployed” the device in violation of General Order 412 and that he was untruthful about doing so. Accordingly, we find there existed substantial and material evidence to support his termination. Additionally, we find that the trial court did not err in denying the trooper’s request to admit additional evidence and to supplement his brief. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Angelia Lynette Maupin v. Paul Wayne Maupin
The order of the trial court entered February 16, 2011, from which the appellant Angelia Lynette Maupin seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth E. Ramsey
The order of the trial court entered February 9, 2011, from which the appellant Kenneth E. Ramsey seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Santiago Toscani v. Nader Rahbe
The order from which the appellant Nader Rahbe seeks to appeal was entered on Wednesday, January 5, 2011. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Tuesday, February 8, 2011, the 34th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, the motion of the appellee to dismiss is granted. This appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Stabler v. Ramie Stabler-Marston
The order from which the appellant Ramie Stabler-Marston seeks to appeal was entered on February 24, 2010. Notices of appeal were filed by the appellant on October 18, 2010, and October 20, 2010. Because neither of the notices of appeal was timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John L. Houston v. Rhey Houston, et al.
The order of the trial court entered November 29, 2010, from which the appellant John L. Houston seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Emily L.
In this Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father to two minor children, the Trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing, terminated the parental rights of the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment and held that it was in the best interests of the children that the father's parental rights be terminated. The father appealed, and upon our review we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: D.L.
In this Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father to two minor children, the Trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing, terminated the parental rights of the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment and held that it was in the best interests of the children that the father's parental rights be terminated. The father appealed, and upon our review we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
The Bank of Fayette County v. Simon M. Woody, Jr., d/b/a Royal Kingdom Builders
This is an action by the bank to recover against the debtor for defaulting on a loan. The plaintiff bank made a loan to the defendant debtor for the purchase of real property, and the property was pledged to secure the loan. The debtor defaulted on the loan, the property was sold, and the proceeds were applied to the debt. The bank filed this lawsuit against the debtor for the deficiency. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the bank. The debtor now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant him a continuance in order to obtain counsel. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Epps v. Civil Service Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, and the Metropolitan Action Commission
This appeal arises out of a dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari in which review was sought of the denial of a grievance filed by an employee of the Metropolitan Action Commission’s Head Start program. The grievance was initially denied by the Executive Director of the Metropolitan Action Commission. The employee then appealed the grievance to the Metropolitan Civil Service Commission, which assigned the appeal to an administrative law judge; after a hearing, the administrative law judge denied the grievance. Upon further appeal, the Civil Service Commission overturned the administrative law judge’s decision and held in favor of the employee; the Civil Service Commission transmitted its decision to the Board of Commissioners of the Metropolitan Action Commission as a recommended final order. The Board of Commissioners rejected the recommended decision and voted to deny the grievance. When the employee sought to appeal the Board of Commissioner’s decision to the Civil Service Commission, that Commission responded that it had no further authority to hear the appeal because the employee was not an employee in classified service and because the Metropolitan Action Commission had final authority on grievance decisions involving employees of the Head Start program. The employee then sought review by writ of certiorari in chancery court, which found that the employee was not a civil service employee and was, therefore, not entitled to a second appeal to the Civil Service Commission; the court also found that the Metropolitan Action Commission had conformed to the applicable grievance process. On appeal, the employee asserts that she was employed in a civil service position and entitled to the grievance process set forth in the civil service rules. Finding that the grievance procedure applicable to employees in the classified service is not applicable to the employee and that the Action Commission properly exercised final authority on the grievance, we affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Bruce Colston v. Melinda Kay Colston
In this post-divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to pay an alimony arrearage of $86,000.00. We affirm the judgment for the arrearage and remand the case for reconsideration of the requirement that Husband pay the arrearage at $1,500.00 per month. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy H. Wright v. James Charles Wright
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court granted the father sole custody and decision making authority over the parties’ minor children. The mother appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on all issues. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Cadlerock, LLC v. Sheila R. Weber
The plaintiff, an assignee to a foreign judgment, filed a petition to domesticate the judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-101 et seq. The defendant objected to the enrollment of the foreign judgment because it was assigned. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to domesticate the foreign judgment and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. Our review of the record reveals that the plaintiff properly followed the statutory requirements to enroll a foreign judgment. Accordingly, the trial court erred. We reverse. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Marla H., Individually and as Next Best Friend to her Daughter Moriah F. H. v. Knox County, et al.
This is an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The mother of a middle school student filed suit against Knox County, the Knox County Board of Education, and the City of Knoxville after her daughter viewed graphic photographs of her dead father during a presentation on the dangers of drunk driving. The trial court found the City of Knoxville liable for the student’s emotional injuries because the school resource officer who distributed the photographs intended to evoke an emotional response. We conclude it was generally foreseeable that providing graphic accident scene photographs to seventh grade students could cause serious or severe emotional harm in a student related to a victim depicted therein. Thus, the school resource officer owed a duty to exercise reasonable care when displaying the photographs to a class that potentially included students related to the victims. The evidence, however, preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the school resource officer failed to exercise reasonable care. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sally Jo Witty v. Christopher Cantrell et al.
Sally Jo Witty is a teacher employed by the Blount County School System. She filed this action after her request to draw pay from a pool of donated sick leave was denied. She named as defendants the trustees appointed to administer the pool (collectively “the Trustees”). She also sued the Blount County Board of Education (“the School Board”) and alleged it is vicariously liable. She demanded the full monetary value of the requested sick leave and also asked for damages to compensate her for the mental suffering resulting from the “wrongful” decision to deny her benefits. The trial court held that the Trustees were an independent body for which the School Board could not be held vicariously liable. It also held that the Trustees were immune from liability in their individual capacities and that the action filed against the Trustees in their official capacity was a petition for writ of certiorari that was not timely filed. Therefore, it dismissed the complaint. Witty appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and vacate it in part. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Faye Roland Camp v. Randy Coleman Camp
This post-divorce appeal involves recusal of the trial judge. In the initial divorce proceedings, the trial judge recused himself based in part on friendship with the parties. A special judge was appointed to hear the case. The special judge tried the divorce, divided the parties’ property, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. Several years later, the husband filed a petition to terminate or modify his alimony obligation. The trial judge who had previously recused himself declined to do so for the post-divorce proceedings. After a hearing, the trial judge terminated the husband’s alimony obligation. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial judge should have recused himself and that he erred in terminating the alimony. We reverse the trial court’s decision on recusal, and therefore vacate the trial court’s ruling on the husband’s petition to modify. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals |
