Dennis W. Blackmon, et al. v. LP Pigeon Forge, LLC, et al
This is a nursing home negligence case involving an arbitration agreement. The son of the decedent signed documents admitting his mother to the defendant nursing home. The admission documents included an arbitration agreement. After his mother’s death, the son filed a lawsuit on behalf of her estate against the defendant nursing home and others connected to its administration. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement signed by the son. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the son was not the decedent’s agent and did not have authority to sign on her behalf. The defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Porsha Perkins v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
A social worker employed by an agency of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County was discharged from her job following an allegation that she had pinched a child attending a Head Start program. She then filed a discrimination and wrongful termination claim with the Metro Civil Service Commission. After the allegations against her proved to be baseless, she settled her claim with Metro for $45,000 and agreed not to be reinstated in her former job. She subsequently filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Davidson County for retaliatory discharge and for employment discrimination. The discrimination claim was eventually dismissed by agreed order. Metro filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim for wrongful discharge. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning among other things that because of the settlement of her claim and her agreement not to be reinstated, she could not prove, as a matter of law, that she was “adversely affected” in any material way by the termination of her employment. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Peggy Diana Schroer v. Richard Michael Schroer
The trial court granted both parties an absolute divorce after a marriage of twenty-four years, divided the marital property equally between them, and declared that neither party was to be awarded alimony. The husband appeals, arguing that the property division was inequitable because he came into the marriage with $500,000 worth of separate property while the wife only owned a negligible amount of separate propertyat the time of the parties’ marriage, and also because he was also the primary wage earner during the marriage. He also argues that the trial court should have awarded him alimony. The wife asserts that the husband’s separate assets became maritalpropertyover the years through the processesof commingling of assets or transmutation, and that the equal division of that property was equitable. She also denies that the husband is entitled to alimony. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Paul Scott v. James Kevin Roberson
Plaintiff injured in automobile accident died while his negligence action was pending. Plaintiff’s counsel filed a suggestion of death but neglected to move to substitute a party for the deceased plaintiff within 90 days, as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01(1). Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which led plaintiff’s estate to file a motion to enlarge time within which to move to substitute pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.02. The trial court determined plaintiff’s counsel’s neglect in moving to substitute within 90 days was not excusable and granted defendants’ motions, dismissing the action. On appeal we affirm the trial court’s judgment because we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the neglect was not excusable. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Harrison A. Azari v. Greyhound Bus Station, Nashville, Tennessee
Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 against the owner of a bus line alleging security guards assaulted him while he was waiting for a bus in 2003. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff’s action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-104(a)(1) requires a plaintiff suing for personal injuries to file his complaint within one year of the date of the alleged assault resulting in injuries. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeanette Hill v. Michael Lester Hill
This is a post-divorce action. Appellant/Father, who is incarcerated for sexually abusing his step-daughter, appeals the trial court’s: (1) grant of Appellee/Mother’s petition to change the surnames of the two minor children that were born to the marriage; (2) denial of Appellant/Father’s petition to grant him visitation with the minor children; and (3) entry of an order requiring Appellant/Father to execute a qualified domestic relations order to effectuate the trial court’s award of assets as child support. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Shea (Matheny) Coyle v. Gregory E. Erickson, et al
Plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action to have the Court declare that she was entitled to the proceeds of a trust fund, as she was the legitimate child of her father. The Trial Court granted partial summary judgment on the grounds that all the records of her birth, baptismal records, and the parents divorce, and the father never questioning her legitimacy, established her legitimacy, and the defendant's son who challenged her right to the proceeds had no standing to question her legitimacy. On appeal, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Trevor Moore, et al. v. Houston County Board of Education, et al.
This matter arises from an assault of a student which occurred at Houston County Middle School. The parents of the victim sued the Houston County Board of Education, two HCMS students who participated in the assault, and the mothers of the students involved in the attack. Following a bench trial, the court granted Plaintiffs a judgment for $50,578.97. The court determined that the school board was 25 percent at fault; the court also found that the school board was immune pursuant to the discretionary function exception of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act and dismissed the case against the board. The court then granted plaintiffs judgment against the non-governmental defendants jointly and severally for 75 percent of the monetary award. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the Board was negligent, reverse the trial court’s ruling that the school board was immune, and modify the judgmentto hold the defendants jointlyand severallyliable for the entire amount of damages awarded. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy Vice, et al. v. Elmcroft of Hendersonville, et al.
The daughter of an eighty-seven year old woman was looking for an assisted living facility for her mother, who was suffering from dementia. Elmcroft of Hendersonville assured the daughter that it could care for her mother and admitted her after the daughter informed it of her concern about her mother’s risk for falls. Three weeks following her admission the mother fell, and then fell three more times before the daughter moved her out of Elmcroft. The final fall resulted in a broken clavicle, which caused the mother pain and decreased mobility for the rest of her life. The daughter, as her mother’s representative, sued Elmcroft and its administrator for negligence and negligent admission and retention of her mother. A jury awarded a judgment against the defendants for $250,000. There was evidence the Elmcroft staff did not follow Elmcroft’s fall prevention policies and procedures. Elmcroft argued that all claims filed against it involved matters of medical science or art requiring specialized skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons, and, therefore, this was a medical malpractice which should have been dismissed since the statutory requirements for such a claim had not been met. We conclude, based on the evidence herein, that the claims were ordinary negligence claims. Elmcroft also argued (1) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the negligence of the daughter and a physician from another state who indicated the mother may be cared for by an assisted living facility and (2) that the jury award was excessive, contained a punitive component, and was the result of passion, prejudice and caprice. We conclude the court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on the physician’s comparative fault or the daughter’s comparative negligence. We also conclude there was material evidence to support the jury’s award of damages. Consequently, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Tabitha Layne, et al. v. Tyron Layne Adkins, et al
Tabitha Layne, individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Freddie Steven Layne, and as Next Friend of Stephanie Layne and Teddy Layne “Plaintiff”) sued Tyron Layne Adkins, Kenneth Rowe, and a certain tract or parcel of Property Identified as Map #089, Parcel 060.01 (“the Property”) alleging, in part, that Ms. Adkins and Mr. Rowe had committed fraud with regard to deeds of conveyance of the Property. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that four specific deeds with regard to the Property were void; that legal title to the Property is held by the heirs of Ted Layne with the Estate of Freddie Steven Layne holding title to one-third interest, Nancy Bolton Layne holding title to one-third interest, and Tyron Layne Adkins holding title to onethird interest; and awarding Mr. Rowe a judgment against Tyron Layne Adkins of $139,000 as a result of a cross-claim. Mr. Rowe appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Baron H.S.M.
This is a termination of parental rights case regarding Baron H.S.M. (“the Child”), the son of Sandra M. (“Mother”). Mother maintained a long-term relationship with Ray C., before and since the Child’s birth. She contends that Ray is the Child’s biological father.1 Mother was incarcerated when the Child was born. She arranged to transfer the Child to the care of Ray’s sister, Peggy V. and her husband, Ronald V. collectively, “the Guardians”). Over two years after they took custody, the Guardians filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and adopt the Child. After a bench trial, the court terminated Mother’s rights upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that Mother had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit or support him and (2) that termination is in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of: Jada T.L.P. and Joseph D.P.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother on the grounds of persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the terms of her permanency plans, severe child abuse, and abandonment. The mother appeals, arguing the Department of Children’s Services did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children following their removal and did not clearly and convincingly prove termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Eddie C. Pratcher, Jr., Surviving Spouse of Sandra Y. Jones Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals, et al.
Appellant appealed the trial court's order granting Appellee's “Motion of Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals to Strike, or in the Alternative, Motion in Limine, or In the Alternative, for Partial Judgment and Memorandum.” We dismiss this appeal for lack of |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lee Brown and Guttershutter of Nashville, LLC v. David Styles, et al.
Appeal from a judgment confirming an arbitration award. The principle defense is that the appellant, the party against whom the arbitration award was issued, was never a party to the arbitration agreement at issue and did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award and enrolled a judgment against the appellant in the amount of $78,956.80 plus costs. We reverse the confirmation of the award against the appellant upon the finding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award. This is because the statute which confers jurisdiction upon the court to confirm arbitration awards, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-302, requires a written arbitration agreement between the parties, and there is no written agreement between the appellant and appellee to arbitrate. Thus, the trial court was without jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award against the appellant. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Pittman v. City of Memphis
Petitioner firefighter appeals denial of on-the-job injury benefits by the City of Memphis. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Anita J. Cash, City of Knoxville Zoning Coordinator v. Ed Wheeler
The City of Knoxville Board of Zoning Appeals granted defendant a variance and the Knoxville City Council then nullified the variance granted by the Board of Zoning Appeals. Defendant then appealed to the Chancery Court of Knox County contending that the city ordinance which permitted the City Council to review the decisions of the Board of Zoning Appeals was invalid, and the Chancellor agreed. On appeal, we hold that the ordinance at issue is valid under the State's statutory scheme. We reverse the Chancellor and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Noel B.F. The Department of Children's Services v. Veda L.M.
This is a parental termination case. The appellant mother has a history of serious mental illness and persistent difficulties in managing her mental illness, resulting in multiple hospitalizations and incarcerations. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services took custody of the child immediately following her birth. After the guardian ad litem and the Department of Children’s Services filed petitions to terminate the mother’s parental rights, the child’s aunt filed an intervening petition for termination of the mother’s parental rights and for custody. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights and did not grant the aunt’s intervening petition for custody. The aunt did not appeal. The mother appeals, arguing that the trial court’s decision to allow the child to remain with the foster parents, instead of placing the child with the aunt was not in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Monica Whitmore v. Shelby County Government
The trial court granted the defendant, Shelby County Government, judgment on the pleadings as to multiple causes of action brought by a former county employee. The trial court found, inter alia, the one-year statute of limitations of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) barred the plaintiff’s claim. Applying well-settled law, the court concluded the general saving statute does not apply to a claim non-suited and re-filed against a governmental entity under the GTLA. Although the trial court failed to address whether a different conclusion might apply to causes of action arising under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), we hold the saving statute does not “save” a claim non-suited and refiled against a State entity under the THRA. The trial court therefore properly concluded the plaintiff’s suit was time-barred. Because the trial court reviewed matters outside of the pleadings when deciding the defendant’s motion, we grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of Keely A.J.
The appellant contends that the trial court made several serious errors, by inter alia, dismissing her claim for child support arrearages, reducing the father’s child support obligation, and denying her numerous motions to alter the agreed order after its entry, etc. The problem with these allegations is that they are wholly unfounded because the appellant agreed to settle and/or voluntarily dismiss all of her claims following the third day of trial, prior to the end of the trial. As for her claim that the trial court erred in awarding $10,000 in attorney’s fees against her, we find this argument is also frivolous for she was discharged of this specific obligation in bankruptcy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court in all respects. Further, upon the finding this appeal is frivolous, we remand with instructions for the trial court to award the appellee his reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs against the appellant. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Sandi D. Jackson v. Mitchell B. Lanphere
The petitioner for an order of protection appeals the trial court’s decision dismissing her petition. While we reject most of the assignments of error identified by the petitioner, we agree that the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as now required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Settle v. Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute, et al.
The plaintiff, Mike Settle, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed a complaint on April 22, 2010, in which he sought injunctive relief in the form of a transfer from the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) to the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute (“MTMHI”). The defendants, MTMHI and former Chief Executive Officer, Lynn McDonald, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Vicki L. Hutchings v. Jobe, Hastings & Associates
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract of employment for a term of three years, wherein plaintiff would prepare tax returns for defendant tax firm. Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment before the three year term had expired and plaintiff appealed to this Court to reverse the Trial Court's finding of breach of contract and award her damages for the breach. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that the employer had just cause to terminate plaintiff. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
John Ambler Widener v. Stephanie Elizabeth Widener
Defendant Mother appeals the trial court’s judgment naming Plaintiff Father primary residential parent, the award of child support, and assignment of debt. We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Elizabeth Schwartz Brock v. Jeffery Brock
In this divorce case, the husband appeals the trial court’s award of spousal support and attorney’s fees to the wife. The husband claims his inability to pay outweighs the wife’s need for spousal support. After reviewing the record, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision to award spousal support and attorney’s fees to the wife. Therefore, we affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
William H. Thomas, Jr., d/b/a Thomas Investments, A Tennessee Sole Proprietorship v. Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff’s action was filed beyond the limitations period. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm summary judgment on the basis of standing and ripeness. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
