Ashley King v. Kenneth J. Wulff
In this dispute over child support arrearage, father argues that the trial court erred in increasing the amount of his monthly payment. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly L. Smith v. Gary E. Mills, M.D., et al
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. The jury entered a judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Angelica S.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Angelica S. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Irene S. (“Mother”) and Jose S. “Father”). When the Child was five, Mother left her with Father. Mother never returned. Father, an illegal immigrant, subsequently married Melissa S. (“Stepmother”) and made her the Child’s legal custodian. In 2009, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took custody of the Child after the Child alleged that Stepmother had abused her. The following year, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Following a bench trial, the court granted 1 the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that both parents had abandoned the Child by failing to visit her in the relevant four-month time period and that termination is in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Michael G. McCall v. Jennifer Sue McCall a/k/a Jennifer Sue Jordan
Mother and Father, the divorced parents of two minor children, filed a joint motion in the trial court to modify the permanent parenting plan. The trial court denied the joint motion and Mother appeals. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Ina Ruth Brown
This appeal arises from a dispute concerning a contract to execute mutual wills. Ina Ruth Brown(“Mrs. Brown”), and her husband, Roy Brown, Jr. (“Mr. Brown”), executed mutual wills as agreed by contract. After Mr. Brown’s death, Mrs. Brown executed a new will. Mrs. Brown died. Rockford Evan Estes (“Defendant”), Mrs. Brown’s son, submitted the new will for probate. Mr. Brown’s adult children, Roy E. Brown, III, Joan Brown Moyers, and Donna Brown Ellis (“the Plaintiffs”) filed this will contest suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County, Probate Division (“the Trial Court”), contesting the new will on the basis that, among other things, the mutual wills between Mr. Brown and Mrs. Brown were irrevocable. Both the Plaintiffs and Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court denied Defendant’s motion, granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and voided the new will created by Mrs. Brown. Defendant appeals. We hold that the Trial Court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the Trial Court did have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this will contest based on this breach of contract claim. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in granting the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment after also finding that the June 13, 2002 contract to execute mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Mary Tucker v. Randy Simmons
When Father failed to pay child support as ordered, the State filed a petition for contempt against him. The juvenile court found him in civil contempt based upon his willful nonpayment. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Burnette, Individually and Next Friend of Sons, Joshua Burnette, and Jacob Burnette v. Joel Porter, Jr., et al.
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees on claims of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion, and conspiracy to commit that tort. Appellees were invitees, and there is no evidence that they exceeded the scope of the invitation despite the fact that Appellees had ulterior motives in procuring admission. Appellants failed to show that Appellees’ actions were objectionably unreasonable or highly offensive, which are essential elements of the invasion of privacy tort. Furthermore, in the absence of an underlying tort, there can be no conspiracy to commit the tort. Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marsha Bordes v. Julian Bordes
Husband filed a petition to modify the amount of alimony in futuro set in the divorce decree, asserting that health problems and a decrease in his income arising after the divorce constituted a substantial and material change in circumstances that warranted a reduction in the amount of alimony. Husband appeals the denial of the petition and award of attorneyfees to Wife. Finding that Husband was entitled to modification and that the award of attorney fees was inappropriate, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and modify the award of alimony. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Bob Keith Watson v. Tennessee Department of Safety
This appeal involves the forfeiture of personal property seized in connection with a criminal investigation. The petitioner’s home was searched pursuant to a search warrant executed on his home. Items of his personal property were seized by authorities, and later forfeited and sold. The petitioner property owner filed this lawsuit, arguing that administrative protocols regarding forfeiture proceedings were not followed and contesting the forfeiture of his personal property. The administrative law judge held that the forfeiture and sale were valid, and the property owner appealed to the trial court. The trial court affirmed. The property owner now appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry E. Parrish, P.C. v. Dodson, et al.
The former attorney of a client filed a seldom used “In Rem Complaint to Trace and Recover Res” to prosecute a chose-in-action assigned by the former client in payment of attorney’s fees. The funds to be recovered by this action were being held in trust by another law firm following the resolution of a separate, but related action. The former client filed an answer asserting that the assignment was unconscionable, thus, unenforceable; she also filed a counter-claim against her former attorney for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that certain provisions of the assignment were unconscionable and others were not and granted partial summary judgment to each party. Finding that the provision awarding $50,000 to the plaintiff was not unconscionable, the trial court granted a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor for that amount plus interest. The trial court also awarded the former client $10,000 in attorney’s fees upon a finding that she was the “prevailing party” in this action. Both parties appeal. We reverse upon a finding that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude a grant of summary judgment to either party and remand for further proceedings. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Doyle Sweeney v. David Tenney
Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging defendant owed money on a loan. Defendant defended on the ground that the contract was oral and the statute of frauds barred any collection. The Trial Court awarded Judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $4,500.00. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Doyle Sweeney v. David Tenney - Dissenting in part and Concurring in part
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J., dissenting in part and concurring in part. I agree with the majority that Tenny raised at trial the defense of the statute of frauds. I also agree with the majority that Tenny is liable to Sweeney in the uncontested amount of $4,500. I disagree with the majority’s reliance on the partial performance exception to the statute of frauds as I find such reliance unnecessary. In my judgment, a writing was not required in this case under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101(a)(5) (Supp. 2010) because we are dealing with an agreement that could have been performed within one year. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Rhoden v. Donald D. Rhoden
This is an action for unlawful detainer. The property at issue was deeded to the plaintiff and his father “as tenants in common with the right of survivorship.” For a time, the father, the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s brother all lived together on the property. The father died intestate. After the father’s death, the plaintiff asked his brother to leave the property, and the brother refused. The plaintiff then filed this action against his brother for unlawful detainer, claiming that he was the sole owner of the property after their father’s death based on his right of survivorship. After a bench trial, the trial court agreed and held in favor of the plaintiff. The brother now appeals. We affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
David Dawson Johnson v. Madison County, Tennessee
Madison County allegedly erroneously mis-assigned and sold a portion of Appellant’s property. Many years later, in 2006, Appellant learned of the alleged mistake and filed suit to quiet title against Madison County, two former owners, and the then-current property owner. In 2010, the matter was settled prior to trial, and the property was returned to Appellant. Appellant then filed suit against Madison County seeking to recover his litigation expenses incurred in the action to quiet title. The trial court, however, dismissed his claims as time-barred. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jozie C.C.
This is a modification of child custody case. Mother and Father entered into a consent order naming Father primary residential parent and giving Mother visitation. Mother petitioned the juvenile court to change custody. The court denied the petition to change custody, but modified Mother’s visitation. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
C.F. Property, LLC v. Rachel Scott et al.
This is a landlord-tenant dispute involving commercial property with a known and disclosed “leaky roof.” The lease states that the "property” is leased “as is where is.” In an email sent prior to the execution of the lease, the landlord stated it would “talk about” repairing the roof after the first year. The leakage increased dramatically after the first year. The tenant began withholding rent. The landlord filed an unlawful detainer action and the tenant filed a counterclaim for damages resulting from the leaky roof. A bench trial ensured. The court held that, by telling the tenant it would “talk about” repairing the roof, the landlord misrepresented that the roof was repairable when the landlord knew it could not be repaired, and that the landlord had a duty under the lease to repair the roof. The landlord appeals. We reverse the judgment and remand for a determination of the damages due the landlord under the lease. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Casandra Cornwell v. Troy Cornwell
This case involves the plaintiff’s motion seeking an order holding her former husband in contempt for failing to make certain monthly payments of $1,071 from his military retirement as required by the terms of a marital dissolution agreement incorporated into the parties’ divorce judgment. The wife’s former spouse stopped making the payments after the wife remarried. The trial court denied the motion upon finding that the payments in question were alimony subject to modification rather than a property distribution as the wife contends. The court held that Mr. Cornwell “properly” stopped paying the “alimony” when his former wife remarried. The wife has appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing on the wife’s motion. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Ginny Beth King, et al. v. Flowmaster, Inc.
Flowmaster invited a professional driver to attend an exhibition in which such driver allegedly lost control of his vehicle, killing or injuring many spectators. The plaintiffs sued numerous defendants, including Flowmaster, and the trial court granted Flowmaster’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Flowmaster was not a member of a joint venture. However, we find that Flowmaster failed to negate the duty element of the plaintiffs’ negligence claim, and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Flowmaster “engaged in” an ultrahazardous activity or “participated” in a “drag race,” and we remand on these issues. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Bradford v. Abe Stephens
The appellant, the former business partner of the appellee, appeals the trial court’s determination that the appellee did not breach their partnership agreement, as well as the trial court’s distribution of partnership profits. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial. We affirm the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial as well as its determination that the appellee did not breach the partnership agreement. We adjust the amount of the court’s awards to account for $5,000 of an $8,000 sale which the appellee kept rather than depositing it into the partnership account. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Wanda Leaver Williams, et al. v. Brandon Leaver, et al.
The trial court imposed a constructive trust on a six-acre parcel of real property to carry out the intent of the father that his son and daughter would divide the property. The court ordered the sale of the property and division of the proceeds. We have concluded that the more appropriate equitable remedy is a resulting trust and have modified the judgment with regard to the disposition of the sale proceeds. Otherwise, we affirm the result reached by the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Valerie Rochelle Evans Albertson v. Matthew Scott Albertson
After more than seventeen years of marriage, Valerie Rochelle Evans Albertson (“Wife”) sued Matthew Scott Albertson (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree of Divorce on December 17, 2010 nunc pro tunc to November 8, 2010. In the Final Decree of Divorce the Trial Court, inter alia, awarded Wife a divorce, awarded Wife transitional alimony, divided the marital assets and debts, entered a permanent parenting plan with regard to the parties’ minor child, and awarded Wife attorney’s fees. Husband appeals the property division and the award of alimony. The record on appeal contains no transcript or statement of the evidence. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Shonda M. Mickel v. Eric Cross, et al.
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of an order of the trial court which failed to adjudicate all claims. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Cude v. Gilbert E. Herren, M.D., et al.
The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s re-filed suit for failure to comply with the 60-day notice and certificate of good faith requirements set out in the Medical Malpractice Act. Because we find such requirements applicable to Plaintiff’s suit and no extraordinary cause to excuse her non-compliance, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya Renee Fletcher v. Glen Allen Fletcher
This post-divorce appeal involves parenting issues. The parties, parents of two minor children, divorced pursuant to a marital dissolution agreement. After post-divorce custody disputes arose, the parties went through mediation and arrived at an agreed parenting plan. The next day, the mother repudiated the agreement. The father then filed a motion to enforce the mediation agreement. The mother requested an evidentiary hearing on whether the parenting arrangement embodied in the mediated parenting plan was in the best interest of the children. The trial court declined to hear any evidence, and found that the mediated parenting plan was a valid, enforceable contract. It entered an order enforcing the mediated parenting plan. The mother now appeals. We reverse, holding that the trial court erred in applying contract analysis to the mediated parenting plan, and remanding for an evidentiary hearing on whether the parenting arrangement in the mediated parenting plan is in the best interest of the minor children. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Tyrone E. McClain d/b/a T-Mac Productions v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.
The plaintiff has appealed from an order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss some, but not all, of the plaintiff’s claims. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the plaintiff’s claims or the defendants’ counterclaim, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
