In Re: Jacob R.R., Brady E.R., and Kacey C.R.
The Department of Children's Services filed a Petition inter alia, to terminate the mother's parental rights to her three minor children. Following trial on the issues, the Trial Court ruled there were several statutory grounds for terminating the mother's parental rights, including that the mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan requirements, and abandonment of the children. The Court also determined that the evidence established that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the mother's parental rights. The mother has appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Romalis Gray v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al
Appellant, Romalis Gray,pro se, filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court and Motions. On April 19, 2012 this Court ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed and recites that the record reveals that the Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 days following the Final Judgment in the Trial Court. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Marquise T. G.
Father filed petition to modify custody, and maternal grandmother objected to Tennessee court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because she had cared for child in Indiana for preceding thirty months. Grandmother also sought to intervene in father’s action. The trial court concluded it had jurisdiction to determine the child’s custody pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-217(a) because both parents reside in Tennessee and the child has significant contact with Tennessee. The trial court allowed Grandmother to intervene only to protect her visitation rights. Grandmother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. Grandmother’s only rights with respect to the child are any visitation rights she may be entitled to under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Ann Claudia Short Bowers v. Frederick Allen Bowers
This post-divorce appeal concerns the classification and division of property, namely a house Wife owned prior to the marriage and a house purchased during the marriage. Following the grant of Wife’s request for divorce, the trial court classified the pre-marital house as Wife’s separate property and the house purchased during the marriage as marital property. The court ruled that Husband had dissipated the proceeds from the sale of the pre-marital house and ordered Husband to reimburse Wife. The court awarded Wife two-thirds of the equity in the marital house, leaving one-third of the equity to Husband. Husband appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas James Milam, Jr. v. Donna Lisa Vinson Milam
This appeal involves a post-divorce petition to modify child support. The trial court reduced Father’s child support obligation from $4,500 monthly to $2,500. Mother appeals. Finding that the trial court erred in the calculation of Father’s income and the number of days of his parenting time, we vacate the child support award and remand for a redetermination of the appropriate award under the Child Support Guidelines. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Melinda B. Busler (Lee) v. John C. Lee
Father appeals the trial court’s decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction and to transfer his petition to modify custody to a Florida court pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Lindsi Allison Connors v. Jeremy Phillip Lawson
In this appeal, the biological father sought to revise the permanent parenting plan to be named the child’s primary residential parent. The child had been conceived during illegal sexual contact meeting this State’s definition of statutory rape; the mother, however, allowed the father to have a relationship with the child. Upon remand after an earlier appeal by the father, the trial court determined that the mother, now married and living in Florida with the child, was in contempt for failing to cooperate with the father regarding certain co-parenting issues. Despite this finding, the court refrained from imposing any punishment on the mother. The court additionally denied the father’s request to modify custody, made a modest award of attorney’s fees to the father, and held that further proceedings relating to the child be conducted in Florida. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Alene S. Neal v. The State of Tennessee, Department of Human Services
The Department of Human Services determined that Plaintiff’s available resources exceeded he resource limit for purposes of Medicaid benefits in the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary category. The trial court affirmed the Department’s determination. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James H. Harris, III v. Edward K. White, III
This is a dispute between two attorneys. Attorney 1 hired attorney 2 to represent him. Attorney 2 sued attorney 1 for attorney fees, and attorney 1 counterclaimed for legal malpractice. The trial court granted attorney 2 summary judgment on the attorney fee claim, and a jury found in favor of attorney 2 on the legal malpractice claim. On appeal, attorney 1 challenges both decisions on multiple grounds. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of George H. Steil, II
The only issue in this case is whether a divorced wife was entitled to continue to receive alimony after the untimely death of her former husband. The wife argued that the support award was in the nature of alimony in solido, which is for a fixed total amount that does not abate upon the death of the obligor. She relies upon an Agreed Interim Order that provided that the husband would pay the wife “spousal support in the amount of $500 per month for a period of three years. . . .” The executrix of her former husband’s estate contended that the terms of the Agreed Interim Order were irrelevant, because the order was superseded by the Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA), which was incorporated into the final decree of divorce. The MDA included the $500 per month alimony provision, but provided that the husband’s alimony obligation would end if the wife remarried, and it did not mention the three year period or any other time limitation. The executrix accordingly argued that the MDA award was in the nature of alimony in futuro, which abates upon the death of the obligor by operation of law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(1). The trial court found that the omission of the three year period from the MDA was an inadvertent oversight, that the parties intended the alimony award to be in solido, and that the wife was accordingly entitled to receive support from her former husband’s estate. We reverse, because the MDA establishes the award and provided for alimony in futuro. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Shandra Kay Hattaway v. Kevin Todd Hattaway
In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the trial court’s division of marital property, alimony award, permanent parenting plan, award of discretionary costs, and award of attorney fees to Wife. We have determined that the trial court erred in requiring Husband to pay more rehabilitative alimony than he can afford, in awarding him only 28 days a year in parenting time, and in awarding discretionary costs for expert fees for case preparation. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Claudine Holland v. Robert Shields Holland
This appeal involves the “spousal impoverishment” provision of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. Mary Claudine Holland and Robert Shields Holland were married in 1967. Robert Shields Holland was placed in a nursing home for health-related problems in 2009. Mary Claudine Holland filed a complaint for separate maintenance in which she sought division of the marital assets and income. The trial court granted her request and filed an order reflecting its decision. The Tennessee Department of Human Services filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the order. The trial court denied the motions. The Tennessee Department of Human Services appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instruction to the court to reconsider the complaint for separate maintenance with the Tennessee Department of Human Services present as an intervening party. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Beth Proffitt v. Smoky Mountain Woodcarvers Supply, Inc., et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of Beth Proffitt (“Plaintiff”) from employment at Smoky Mountain Woodcarvers Supply, Inc. (“the Corporation”). Plaintiff, a minority shareholder in the Corporation, sued the Corporation, as well as the other shareholders Mac Proffitt and Ray Proffitt (collectively, “the Defendants”) in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court bifurcated the issues of liability and damages. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to her. After a trial on the matter of liability, the Trial Court found the Defendants liable for breach of fiduciary duty. After the hearing on damages, the Trial Court awarded damages to Plaintiff, including lost salary and bonus. The Trial Court also awarded Plaintiff her attorney’s fees. The Defendants appeal. We find that the Trial Court did not err in finding that the Defendants did breach their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. We, however, reverse the award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Joshua E.R., Jr.
The trial court terminated parents’ parental rights on the grounds of severe child abuse. We affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
John Leslie Byrnes v. Joyce Marie Byrnes
The parties, John Leslie Byrnes (“Husband”) and Joyce Marie Byrnes (“Wife”), were divorced in 1998. Under the divorce judgment, they were to have equal parenting time with their two minor children. Some six years later, in 2004, Husband filed a petition to change the custody arrangement. The petition was granted ex parte on an “emergency” basis. The ex parte order temporarily placed sole custody of the children with Husband and required Mother to pay monthly child support of $652. For reasons that Wife blames on Husband and the trial court, and Husband blames on Wife, a hearing was not held on the custody and support issues until 2009, more than five years after Husband was named the sole custodian. Eventually, the court entered an order, to which Wife agreed, decreeing that Wife was liable to Husband for a child support arrearage of $20,874.24, a figure that includes interest and Wife’s share of medical expenses. In the same order, the court decreed that Husband was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees in an amount to be determined at a future hearing. That hearing was later scheduled for a date certain. Wife’s counsel did not appear at the hearing on attorney’s fees and the court proceeded, in counsel’s absence, to hold Wife liable for fees of $30,315. Wife filed a motion to set aside the award of attorney’s fees which the court denied. She appeals, challenging the child support arrearage and the denial of her motion to set aside the award of attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Branch Banking & Trust Company v. Townsend, LLC and E. William Henry
This Court issued a Show Cause Order on April 19, 2012 directing appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
The Peoples Bank v. Raymond E. Lacy
Plaintiff Bank brought this action to enforce a Loan Modification Agreement and promissory note. The Bank alleged that defendant had breached the Agreement and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant answered, arguing that the Bank had breached its contract with him and was not entitled to judgment. The Bank moved for summary judgment and the Trial Court determined there was no disputed issue of material fact under the Loan Modification Agreement and the amount owed on the note, granted partial summary judgment to the Bank and ruled the partial summary judgment was final pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 54.02. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment and remand for trial on defendant's Counter-Claim. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Mahmoud Awad Mohammad v. Nairman Faraj Meri
This post-divorce appeal concerns a one-time, one-week extension of parenting time. The trial court granted the mother’s petition to extend her parenting time from one week to two weeks for a vacation with her family. After the mother’s vacation was over, the father filed his appeal. We dismiss the appeal on grounds of mootness. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Ann Fiorazo Beck v. James Martin Beck
This is a post-divorce action, concerning the Appellant Husband’s obligation to pay alimony in futuro to Appellee Wife. Husband and Wife entered into a marital dissolution agreement “MDA”), which was incorporated and made part of the final decree of divorce. The MDA provided that both parties would exchange tax returns each year and that, if these returns were not proferred, then alimony would be suspended until they were. Wife provided her tax returns after redacting her personal information. Husband concluded that the redaction was breach of contract and, without prior court approval, unilaterally stopped making alimony payments. Because the MDA provision for alimony in futuro lost its contractual nature upon being incorporated into the trial court’s order, and because Husband failed to obtain court approval before he suspended payments, we conclude that he lacked authority to stop those payments. Therefore, the award of arrears was proper. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Jean Langford v. James Harvey Harrison, Jr., et al.
Following appellant’s petition to eject from real property, appellees counterclaimed seeking a declaration of the boundaries between their properties and those of appellant, sole possession of their properties, a permanent injunction against appellant, and damages for libel or slander of title. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellees and find this appeal to be frivolous. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Allen, et al. v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiffs attempted to challenge annexation Ordinance 4321 via a complaint for declaratory judgment based upon alleged violations of the Open Meetings Act. Summary judgment was granted to the City of Memphis, but this Court reversed the grant and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, a trial was held and judgment entered in favor of the City. Because Plaintiffs failed to file a timely quo warranto action, which was the proper vehicle for Plaintiffs’ challenge, we dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the City and thus, we affirm the trial court’s upholding of Ordinance 4321. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Dale, single, Brian Lawhorn and wife, Pamela Lawhorn; and William Jenkins and wife, Elaine Jenkins v. B & J Enterprises, et al.
Homeowners filed this lawsuit against various individuals and entities shortly after purchasing their homes, when they discovered that their properties are affected by numerous sink holes. Original defendants identified a surveyor as a comparative tortfeasor, and the homeowners amended their complaint to add the surveyor as a defendant. The surveyor filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the homeowners’ claims were barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-114, which provides that all actions to recover damages against any person engaged in the practice of surveying for any deficiency, defect, omission, error or miscalculation shall be brought within four years from the date the survey is recorded on the plat, or else be forever barred. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs were subsequently granted permission by the trial court and this Court to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Finding that section 28-3-114 governs the homeowners’ claims, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Carlton J. Ditto v. Shapiro and Kirsch, LLP, et al.
In this action, a Show Cause Order was issued by the Court on April 13, 2012, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant responded to the Show Cause and acknowledged that the Notice of Appeal was filed late. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Herman v. Daniel Herman
Two years after the divorce, Father sought to be named primary residential parent due to Mother’s alleged deteriorating mental health. Father sought discovery of Mother’s mental health records. Mother objected. The trial court ordered production of the records for in camera inspection. Mother filed an appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10, which this court granted. We reverse the trial court’s order. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kyler R.C.H., et al.
In this case for parental termination, the Trial Court found statutory grounds for terminating the parents' parental rights to their three minor children. Only the father has appealed, and we hold that the evidence preponderates in favor of the Trial Court's finding for grounds of abandonment, as well as termination of parental rights being in the best interest of the children. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals |
