Holly Castle, Individually and as next friend of Emily Castle, a minor child, and Jana Clark v. David Dorris Logging, Inc., et al.
This case involves a post-trial dispute between one party to a personal injury case and their former counsel. After a jury verdict was entered in favor of Appellants, their former law firm filed an attorney lien and a motion to recover its attorney fees in the trial court. Appellants asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the former firm’s motion. The trial court disagreed and awarded the former firm its full requested fee. Appellants appeal both the award of attorney fees to its former law firm, and also the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ request to release funds held by the clerk. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the post-trial dispute and reverse the award of attorneys fees in this case. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to release funds. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas E. Holub, Jr. v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp. d/b/a First Tennessee Home Loans et al.
The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff on claims that a mortgage company and a title company erroneously encumbered a tract of his property. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in declining to award more than nominal damages. Because there is no appellate record for this court to review on the issue of damages, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Anthony R.
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to his son on the ground that Father engaged in conduct prior to incarceration exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. On appeal, Father contends that the petition to terminate parental rights did not allege wanton disregard as a ground upon which termination was sought. Because we conclude that the petitioner did not plead wanton disregard as a ground for termination, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights based upon that ground. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hannah Leah Wade v. Mark Wade
The appellant (“Mother”) appeals from an order of the trial court entered on November 27, 2012, which granted the counter-petition to alter or amend the parties’ Permanent Parenting Plan and to relocate to Indiana filed by the appellee (“Father”). The November 27, 2012 order stated that “[a]ll other issues raised” in Mother’s response in opposition to the petition to relocate and counter-petition to modify custody as well as Mother’s initial Motion for Contempt were “reserved for further hearing.” It is clear that the order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the proceedings below. As such, the order is not a final order and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Molly Rika Hatfield v. Rodney G. Hatfield
In this appeal from a divorce decree, husband asserts that the trial court erred in its property division and award of alimony. We have determined that the trial court erred in awarding almost all of the marital property to wife and, therefore, modify the property division to award the 401k to husband. We further modify the trial court’s decision in order to change the alimony in futuro to transitional alimony and to reduce the monthly amount. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
John Lowell Gulley v. Tammy Lynn Fletcher
In this child support dispute, the trial court erred in dismissing father’s petition to reduce child support and in finding him to be in criminal contempt. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Jane Bridgewater v. Robert S. Adamczyk, et al.
This appeal arises out of a boundary line dispute. On appeal, the landowners argue that the trial court erred in finding that the disputed property was owned by their adjoining landowner. The landowners further argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their thirdparty complaint against the individuals that sold them the property, and for refusing to award them an abatement in the purchase price based on the deficiency in acreage. After throughly reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Yolanda Uria v. Steve Uria
This appeal involves post-trial motions in a divorce case. Several years after the divorce decree was entered, the father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan to seek more parenting time, and he filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had prevented him from exercising his parenting time. The father later filed a motion asking the trial court to alter or amend the original divorce decree’s child support provision in order to reduce his child support obligation retroactive to the date of the decree, and the arrearage that he had accrued over the years. The trial court modified the parenting plan, found the mother in contempt, and altered the portion of the original divorce decree pertaining to child support, thereby reducing the father’s child support arrearage. The mother appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hilda Porter, Administratrix of the Estate of Louella May Sparks v. Larry Melton
Plaintiff was awarded a $100,000 judgment against Defendant in the trial court. In a prior appeal, this Court reversed the damage award, and remanded for a new trial. On remand, the parties entered into an Agreed Order for a $100,000 judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Ten years after entry of the Agreed Order, Plaintiff moved to renew the unsatisfied judgment, and Defendant claimed that the renewal motion was untimely. The trial court granted the motion to renew the judgment, and we affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Gwendolyn Jeffrey v. City of Memphis
Decedent’s spouse brought an action to recover HHL benefits for the death of her firefighter husband. The City of Memphis denied her claim and decedent’s spouse appealed to an ALJ. The ALJ, likewise, denied the claim for benefits finding that the City of Memphis had rebutted the statutory presumption of causation and that decedent’s spouse had then failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that decedent’s cardiac condition was caused by his employment. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the ALJ, and we affirm the decision of the chancery court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Dakota M. S.
Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights. Mother and Father’s rights were terminated on grounds of substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans and persistence of conditions. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Keisheal N.E. et al.
This is the second appeal by the father of three minor children challenging the termination of his parental rights. Mother’s parental rights were terminated in 2009 and are not at issue. In the first appeal, this Court found the Department of Children’s Services failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the father and therefore reversed the termination of Father’sparental rights.In re Keisheal,N.E.,No.M2009-02527-COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL 2176104, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2010). Following the first appeal, a new petition was filed. After the second trial, the trial court found the petitioners established the ground listed in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(8)(B)(i) that: “[t]he parent . . . is incompetent to adequately provide for the further care and supervision of the child because the parent’s . . . mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that the parent . . . will be able to assume the care and responsibility for the child in the near future. . . .” The trial court further found the Department of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the father, and that termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Cheyney McCarter, d/b/a USA Sports Grill, LLC v. City of Mt. Juliet, et al.
The Mt. Juliet Beer Board suspended the beer permit of a restaurant, and the restaurant owner appealed the suspension to the chancery court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari. The City did not file an answer within the requisite time period because it did not believe Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-108, which governs appeals of beer board decisions, required this. The City actively participated in the case in other ways by filing a motion to set the case for trial, filing a comprehensive pre-trial brief, and responding to discovery requests. The restaurant owner moved for default judgment based on the City’s failure to answer the petition, after which the City filed an answer. On the day set for trial, the trial court awarded the restaurant owner a default judgment based on the City’s failure to file an answer in a timely fashion and its failure to seek leave to file a late answer. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Fayette Janitorial Services and Technology Insurance Company, as Assignee of the Claims of Wesley Kennedy v. Kellogg USA, Inc.
This appeal involves a tort suit filed after a workplace injury. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it was a statutory employer within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113, and therefore, it was immune from the tort claim asserted on behalf of the injured worker. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dianna A. Gaddes v. Paul W. Gaddes, Jr.
Mother petitioned for criminal contempt against Father due to his alleged failure to pay child support as required and she further sought reimbursement for one-half of the children’s optical and dental expenses. Father counter-petitioned for contempt against Mother. The trial court found Father in criminal contempt, but it declined to impose incarceration. However, the trial court denied Mother’s request for optical and dental reimbursement, finding Father was under no obligation to pay such. We affirm in part and we reverse in part. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Beal Bank, SSB v. David and Connie Prince
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure of their claims for conspiracy, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from an alleged wrongful foreclosure.We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
The 4-J L.P. v. Scarbrough & Weaver, PLC et al.
In this case regarding title insurance company’s duty to seller of real property, the trial court found no factual dispute regarding the escrow agent’s apparent agency and granted summary judgment to title insurance company against seller of real property. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Connie Lou Jolley v. Ronald Van Jolley
In this divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s determination that, pursuant to the unclean hands doctrine, he is not entitled to proceeds of property sold in a partition action. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Nicolle M. Johnson v. Brian Keith Johnson
Mother and Father were divorced, and Mother was named the primary residential parent of their three children. Mother remarried and decided to relocate to California. Father opposed the relocation and sought to be named the primary residential parent. By the time of hearing, relocation of only one child was at issue. Father introduced expert testimony that the relocation would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to the child that outweighed the threat of harm to the child from a change of custody, as set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-6108(d)(1)(B). Relying on the expert’s testimony, the trial court denied Mother the opportunity to relocate with the child to California. Mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Suzanne Adkison Chambers v. Frank C. Chambers
Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony and partial attorney’s fees to Wife in this divorce action. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In re Devonta L.C. et al
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on three minor children (“the Children”). The defendants are Russell C. (“Father”) and Brandy C. (“Mother”). The Children were taken into custody by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in January 2008 because of repeated injuries sustained by the oldest child. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents in April 2010, alleging numerous grounds for termination. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father and Mother were in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and that the conditions leading to removal still persisted. However, the trial court found that severe child abuse was not proven. The court did find, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father and Mother appeal. We reverse in part and affirm in part. Termination of the parents’ parental rights is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
The Preserve at Forrest Crossing Townhome Association, Inc. v. Marsha DeVaughn and Keene Patterson
A townhome owner and her tenant challenge an amendment adopted by the owner’s townhome association prohibiting the owner from leasing her unit to a third party. The owner purchased her unit before there were any restrictions on leasing individual units. The amendment was adopted in accordance with the Horizontal Property Act and in accordance with the documents governing the units where she lives. The trial court granted the association’s motion for summary judgment enjoining the owner from renting her townhome to a third party and requiring the tenant to vacate the unit. On appeal we conclude the amendment is enforceable and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Keenan W. Carroll v. Chandra P. Carroll
This case involves the issue of retroactive child support and whether the trial court appropriately denied Wife’s request. Husband’s divorce petition was pending for more than three years before Wife answered. During that time the parties were separated, and Husband made monthly car payments on Wife’s vehicle in an amount that exceeded what would have been his child support obligation. We conclude that Husband satisfied his child support obligations based on the unique facts of this case and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Coffee County Bank v. Robert Eugene Hulan and Sherry Renee Hulan
A bank filed a complaint against husband and wife to recoup money owed on a credit agreement after a foreclosure sale failed to produce sufficient funds to repay the loan in full. The trial court entered a judgment against the couple, and the couple appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment because the bank relied on two different versions of a credit agreement, thereby failing to prove the existence of an enforceable contract with definite terms. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Erie Insurance Exchange v. Columbia National Insurance Company et al.
This is a declaratory judgment action wherein one insurance company, which provided general liability insurance coverage to the insured, asserts that another insurance company, which provided the same insured with automobile insurance coverage, had the primary duty to pay the cost of defending and to indemnify the insured in a third-party tort action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-112. The plaintiff insurer asserts that the defendant insurer had the primary duty to provide and pay the cost of the defense in that action and to indemnify the insured pursuant to its automobile insurance policy because an additional insured was operating a “boom truck” owned by the insured that was listed under the defendant’s auto policy when the injury to the third-party plaintiff occurred.Both insurers filed motions for summary judgment.The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted summary judgment to the defendant insurer holding that the plaintiff, not the defendant, is liable for providing and paying the cost of the defense and for indemnifying the insured in the third-party tort action. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals |
