David R. Smith v. Tennessee National Guard
Plaintiff was a full-time employee of the Tennessee National Guard until 2002 when he commenced active duty service in the Active Guard and Reserve. Near the completion of his active duty service in the Active Guard and Reserve, Plaintiff asked the Tennessee National Guard to rehire him pursuant to the Uniformed Service Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). When the Tennessee National Guard refused, Plaintiff filed this action alleging it violated USERRA. The Tennessee National Guard responded to the complaint by filing a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon sovereign immunity from USERRA claims. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Because the Tennessee General Assembly has not passed legislation to expressly waive its sovereign immunity from claims based on USERRA, as other states have done, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Elaine Dobbs v. Brooke Anthony Dobbs
In appeal from final decree in divorce action, Husband contends that the trial court erred in designating Wife as primary residential parent, in valuing the marital residence which was awarded to Wife, and in failing to require Wife to refinance the marital residence in her name alone. We affirm the designation of Wife as primary residential parent and the court’s valuation of the marital residence and remand the case for the courtto determine a reasonable length of time for Wife to secure Husband’s release from the indebtedness on the marital residence and to amend the final decree accordingly. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Sandra M. and David M.
Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights. Finding that two grounds for parental termination have been established and that termination is in the best interests of the children, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine Lee Poindexter v. John M. Poindexter, Sr.
This is a divorce action filed by the wife and counter-complaint by the husband both seeking the divorce. After the trial, the Trial Court divided the marital property, granted the wife a divorce, and granted the wife alimony. The husband has appealed. We affirm the award of alimony, but modify the marital property division. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Deanna Lynne Dodd v. Michael Thomas Dodd
In this post-divorce proceeding, the mother of the parties’ only minor child filed two motions to alter or amend the divorce decree in order to clarify the parties’ obligations under the marital dissolution agreement regarding their 2009 income tax returns, and two petitions for civil contempt. The contempt petitions alleged that the father failed to make timely child support payments and failed to reimburse the mother for mortgage payments, medical expenses, and school-related expenses for the parties’ child. The trial court denied the motions to alter or amend,finding that the amendment sought by the mother was unnecessary and that the father breached the tax provision of the MDA as written. The court also denied the petitions for civil contempt, finding that the father purged himself of the contempt prior to hearing on the petitions. The court ordered the father to pay the mother $10,302.36 plus post-judgment interest for the tax liability she incurred due to the father’s refusal to file a joint tax return and $3,500 for the attorney’s fees the mother incurred in filing the petitions for contempt. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Westgate Resorts v. James G. Neely, Commissioner, et al
This is an unemployment compensation case. Cynthia L. Vukich-Daw filed a claim for unemployment compensation following her termination from Westgate Resorts. The claim was originally granted by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and subsequently upheld by the Appeals Tribunal and the Board of Review. Westgate Resorts filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court reversed the Board of Review’s decision, finding that Cynthia L. Vukich-Daw was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because she was a qualified real estate agent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-207. Cynthia L. Vukich-Daw and the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
ARI, Inc. v. James G. Neeley, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development
This is an appeal of the Chancery Court’s order upholding the Tennessee Department of |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gossett Motor Cars, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc. et al.
This appeal concerns a car dealership’s protest of Hyundai’s proposal to enter into a |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anchor Pipe Company, Inc. v. Sweeney-Bronze Development, LLC et al.
This appeal concerns the priority of two liens, a mechanic’s lien and a bank’s deed of trust. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Robin Lipski v. Jerry Burkes
The order from which the appellant, Jerry Burkes, seeks to appeal was entered on Monday, October 24, 2011. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Monday, November 28, 2011, the 35th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not filed timely, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Elsie Renee Braswell v. Randy Bernard Braswell, Sr.
The order from which the appellant, Randy Bernard Braswell, Sr., seeks to appeal was entered on Wednesday, April 18, 2012. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Friday, June 29, 2012, the 72nd day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not filed timely, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Vysin C.G., Urrye E.G. and Zyren M.G.
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment for the failure to visit or support. On appeal, Mother asserts the trial court erred by determining that her failure to visit or support her children was willful. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Jonathan S. C-B
The mother of a five year old boy alleged that the boy’s father had sexually abused him, and she petitioned the juvenile court to have the father’s visitation privileges revoked. After a long course of proceedings that included an investigation by the Department of Children’s Services, testimony by a number of mental health professionals, and a report by the guardian ad litem, the court concluded that the Mother’s allegations were unfounded, that her hostility against the father was having a detrimental effect on the child, and that it was in the child’s best interest that the father be named as the child’s primary residential parent in place of the mother. The mother raises numerous procedural issues on appeal, and she also contends that her allegations of abuse against the father were true, or at the very least that she had a good faith belief in their truth. Having carefully considered the mother’s allegations and her arguments, we affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cheyenne Duffer v. Keystops, LLC
This appeal arises out of a personal injury suit, wherein the plaintiff and Dewayne Duffer filed suit against a trucking company for injuries suffered in an accident and for loss of consortium as a result of the accident. Plaintiff’s employer intervened to recover worker’s compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. Soon thereafter, the trucking company discovered that plaintiff was male, had filed the action using an assumed female identity, and had lied throughout the discovery process. The trucking company filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s and employer’s complaints,finding that plaintiff had committed a fraud upon the courtand thatemployerhad failed to file suitwithin the applicable statute of limitations because plaintiff’scomplaintwas rendered void ab initio. Plaintiff and employer appeal. We affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint but reverse the dismissal of employer’s complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Williams et al. v. Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company et al.
This action was filed after the defendant, a life insurance company, denied payment of benefits on the grounds that the decedent/insured made material misrepresentations in her application for life insurance. The specific basis for the denial was that the insured allegedly failed to disclose “methadone treatment for a narcotic addiction.” The trial court found there was no proof that the insured was taking methadone at the time of the application or that she was ever treated for “drug related problems.” On this basis, the trial court concluded the insured did not make anymisrepresentations in her application for life insurance and ordered the defendant to pay the death benefit plus pre-judgment interest. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: K. B. Ronald Lynn Brewer, Jr., et al. v. Ronald Lynn Brewer, Sr., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. On appeal, the sole issue presented by Mother is whether the trial court erred in determining that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Edward G. rochelle v. Grange Mutual Casualty Company, et al.
This appeal results from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee insurance company. Appellee denied Appellant’s claim for fire loss on the ground that Appellant made material misrepresentations in the application for insurance. The trial court determined that Appellant took contradictory positions in his examination under oath and in his discovery deposition on the question of whether his application for insurance was completed when he signed it, or whether he signed it in blank before it was completed by the insurance agent. The trial court determined that Appellant’s inconsistent statements were not effective to create a dispute of material fact for purposes of summary judgment. We conclude that the motion for summary judgment was improperly granted. Reversed and remanded. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley D. Ramsay v. Starlett J. Custer
In this case, the Trial Court initially granted plaintiff a default judgment against the defendant, and set a trial on the issue of damages. Defendant was given notice of the subsequent hearing, and defendant's attorney moved to set aside the default judgment, which the Trial Court granted and dismissed plaintiff's case. Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Hembrook
Defendant, who was arrested for DUI and subsequently refused to submit to a blood test, appeals the revocation of his driver’s license, contending that he was not properly informed of the consequences of refusal to take the test. We hold that the defendant was adequately advised under the circumstances presented and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Van Buren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re James Preston Hess, IV
This is an appeal from an order appointing a conservator for the adult son of divorced parents. The father contends that the evidence does not support the determinations that the son lacks the capacity to fully attend to his needs without assistance and that the appointment of a conservator is warranted; Mother contends that the father does not have standing to appeal. We affirm the court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Wade Robinson, et al v. State of Tennessee
Wade Robinson and Melanie Robinson (“Plaintiffs”) sued the State of Tennessee (“State”) regarding a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Plaintiffs’ son, Zachary L. Robinson. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that the State had not violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) or § 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), and that the actions of Zachary L. Robinson were the sole proximate cause of the accident. We find and hold that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s findings that the State did not violate Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I), that the State did not violate Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), and that Zachary L. Robinson was the sole proximate cause of the accident. We find and hold that Zachary L. Robinson was 50% at fault for the accident and that the State was 50% at fault for the accident. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca W. Ford v. State of Tennessee
Rebecca W. Ford (“Plaintiff”) sued the State of Tennessee (“State”) regarding a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Plaintiff’s daughter, Lynsey M. Ford. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that the State had not violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) or § 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), and that the actions of Zachary L. Robinson were the sole proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We reversed the Trial Court’s judgment as to Zachary L. Robinson being solely at fault, and held that the State was 50% at fault for the Accident in our Opinion in Robinson v. State, docket No. E2011-01540-COA-R3-CV (“Robinson v. State”), released contemporaneously with this Opinion. We, therefore, remand this case to the Trial Court for the calculation of damages awarded to Plaintiff from the State for the death of Lynsey M. Ford. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Willie Juanell Campbell
In this appeal, numerous beneficiaries under a will challenge the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees of $9,024.75 out of the funds of the estate to another beneficiary who is their adversary. At an earlier time, the court had entered an order setting the attorney’s fees of that beneficiary at $34,669.25 without specifying who was responsible for the payment of those fees. On the motion of that beneficiary, the court granted a new trial on the subject of attorney’s fees. When the matter came on for the “new trial,” the court announced that it would listen to argument but would not receive substantive evidence on the subject. Following that “hearing,” the court awarded the fees now before us. The court’s order does not articulate any findings with respect to whether the attorney’s services were reasonable, necessary or benefited the estate. The “challenging” beneficiaries filed a notice of appeal. We vacate the order awarding attorney’s fees and remand to the trial court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing and enter an order on attorney’s fees complying with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel J. Velez v. Christy M. Velez
Mother appeals the parenting plan adopted by the trial court, the award of child support, alimony and the allocation of the federal income tax dependent exemptions to Father. We affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the parenting plan and allocation of the federal income tax exemption.Finding error with the amount of income the courtimputed to Mother, and what appears to be an error regarding the cost of insurance, we reverse the award of child support and remand with instructions to impute Mother’s income based on the federal minimum wage and to recalculate the child support award in accordance with this opinion. We also hold that the trial court erred in denying Mother rehabilitative alimony,and therefore reverse and remand the issue of alimony to the trial court for a determination of the appropriate sum and duration of rehabilitative alimony. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Justin K. C. et al.
The parental rights of the parents of three children were terminated on two statutory grounds, persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3), and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(2), and the finding that termination of their parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Both parents appeal contending the trial court erred in finding any ground existed for termination and that termination of their parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
