State of Tennessee v. Allen Kelley
This is an appeal from the dismissal of Appellant/juvenile’s appeal of the juvenile court’s determination of delinquency to the circuit court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 37-1-159. While the appeal was pending, Appellant ran away from the group home, where he had been ordered to live. Appellee Department of Children’s Services filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The circuit court determined that the appeal should be dismissed based upon application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The court further determined that Appellant had capacity, under the Rule of Sevens, to be held responsible for his actions. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Leon Marshall v. Civil Service Commission of the State of Tennessee and the Tennessee Department of Safety
Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322, a former Tennessee State Trooper appeals the chancery court’s judgment affirming the Tennessee Civil Service Commission’s decision to terminate his employment. The Commission affirmed the initial order of the Administrative Law Judge, who upheld the Tennessee Department of Safety’s decision to terminate the trooper’s employment for violations of its policies and procedures and for the good of the service pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-30-326. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company v. Jami McNair Tuck, et al.
An insurance company filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that mother and child were residents of the insured’s household, and therefore, that coverage for the death of the child was excluded bythe relevanthomeowner’s insurance policy. The chancery court found that mother and child were not residents of the insured’s household at the time of the child’s death, and we affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Connor S.L.
In this paternity case, Father appeals the Carroll County Juvenile Court’s rulings with regard to custody and parenting time with his minor child. The trial court’s ruling as to the paternity of the child is affirmed. However, because the trial court did not comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the judgment of the trial court with regard to custody and the parenting schedule and remand for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Isobel V. O. and Bree'Ana J.A.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father based on abandonment for failure to support and failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. We reverse termination on the grounds of abandonment, and affirm termination of parental rights on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Leroy J. Humphries, et al. v. Nicolas C. Minbiole, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between adjacent landowners over Defendants’ installation of a private water line within a right-of-way easement across the Plaintiffs’ property. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Defendants’ private water line trespassed on Plaintiffs’ property. Further, the trial court ordered that the Defendants would be incarcerated if they did not remove the water line and return Plaintiffs’ property to its previous condition within thirty (30) days. Defendants appealed. We affirm in part and remand for further proceedings. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
James D. Holder and Barbara L. Holder v. S & S Family Entertainment, LLC
Plaintiff purchased family entertainment center businesses from defendants and it leased, from defendants, buildings in which the entertainment centers were operated. Plaintiff also purchased certain assets from defendants, but a dispute ultimately arose regarding certain assets’ inclusion within the sale. At the expiration of the building leases, defendants filed suit claiming that plaintiff had damaged their property, that plaintiff had improperly removed certain items from the buildings, and that it had failed to remove other items which it should have removed. Plaintiff filed an answer and counterclaim asserting ownership of the allegedly damaged, improperly removed, and non-removed property, and further claiming that defendants had reneged upon an agreement to sell it one of the buildings at issue. The trial court entered a brief order awarding defendants damages and dismissing plaintiff’s counterclaim. Plaintiff moved the trial court to alter or amend its judgment and for entry of a final order. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding there were no remaining issues in need of resolution. We find that the order appealed is not a final judgment, and therefore, that this Court lacks jurisdiction in this matter. Thus, we must dismiss this appeal and remand to the trial court for appropriate findings and entry of a final order. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Sammie Netters v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
This appeal involves an inmate’s petitions for writ of certiorari challenging the Board of Probation and Parole’s decisions to deny him parole on two separate occasions. The trial court dismissed the inmate’s claims related to one parole hearing but requiring further proceedings as to his claims related to the second parole hearing. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis Civil Service Commission v. Steven Payton
A City of Memphis firefighter who participated in the City’s employee assistance program was terminated after his second positive drug screen. The firefighter appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission. He argued that his drug screen results were confidential under federal law and that he had not executed a consent form to authorize the disclosure of the results to the City. The Commission overruled the firefighter’s motion to exclude the test results and upheld his termination. The chancery court reversed, finding that the drug screen results were inadmissible because the City had failed to comply with federal law. We find substantial and material evidence to support the decision of the Commission, and therefore reverse the decision of the chancery court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis Civil Service Commission v. Steven Payton - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s holding that the followup drug screen at issue was not a “[r]ecord[] of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment” of Mr. Payton, and therefore was not covered by 42 U.S.C.A. § 290dd-2(a). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Dill v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee, et al. - Concur
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Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Debbie Sikora ex rel. Shelley Mook v. Tyler Mook et al.
This is a custody action in which the father and paternal grandparents appeal the trial court’s designation of the maternal grandmother as the primary residential parent of the father’s seven-year-old daughter following the disappearance of the mother of the child, who was the primary residential parent. The trial court found that the father was unfit to parent the child and that he posed a substantial risk of harm to the child due to his history of domestic violence and the danger from exposure to the father’s drug activities and father’s associates. On appeal, the father and the paternal grandparents raise numerous issues relating to the trial court’s decision. They argue, inter alia, that the trial court erred in considering evidence of the father’s conduct that occurred prior to the entry of the Final Divorce Decree, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to overcome the father’s superior parental rights, that the decision to award custody to the maternal grandmother was not in the best interest of the child, that the trial court erred in awarding custody to the maternal grandmother, and that the trial court erred in allowing the maternal grandmother to relocate to Pennsylvania. We have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s factual findings and that the evidence clearly and convincingly established that designation of the father as the primary residential parent would expose the child to the risk of substantial harm. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s designation of the maternal grandmother as the primary residential parent of the father’s seven-year-old child. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Dill v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee, et al.
Former police officer sought certiorari review of the City of Clarksville’s decision to terminate his employment, contending that the City failed to follow the disciplinary procedure set forth in the City Code and that, as a consequence, his termination deprived him of due process of law. The trial court held that there was material evidence to support the decision to terminate petitioner and returned the case to the City to have the head of the human resources department conduct a review of the investigation and appropriateness of the penalty; following a report from the head of the human resources department, the court entered a final order granting judgment to the City. Concluding that the failure of the City to follow its disciplinary procedure deprived petitioner of his due process right, we reverse the judgment, vacate the termination and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jolyn Cullum, et al v. Jan McCool, et al
This is a negligence case in which Jolyn Cullum and Andrew Cullum sued Jan McCool, William H. McCool, and Wal-Mart for injuries arising in a Wal-Mart parking lot. Wal-Mart filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Cullums had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court dismissed the suit against Wal-Mart. The Cullums appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Shearer et al. v. Fred McArthur et al.
This appeal involves an option contract under which the defendants agreed to buy a piece of property from the plaintiffs at any time. We find no error in the trial court’s determination that the option contract was supported by consideration, that the plaintiffs exercised the option within a reasonable time, and that the plaintiffs did not waive the option by pursuing an inconsistent remedy. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Tasha Dayhoff v. Joshua D. Cathey
Father appeals the Madison County Juvenile Court’s judgment, entering a permanent parenting plan, setting child support, awarding a child support arrearage, awarding attorney fees to Mother, and granting a wage garnishment. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that Father is the legal and biological parent of the children at issue. However, having determined that no testimony was elicited at the hearing on this cause, and thus no evidence was presented from which the trial court could make a determination, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for an evidentiary hearing on all other issues in this case. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
John Brockman v. Wesley Wolfe, et al.
Plaintiff sued multiple parties after trees on his property were allegedly erroneously removed during the development of an adjacent subdivision. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment to a subdivision developer, who was sued in his individual capacity, finding that it was his limited liability company which had developed the property, and that the developer had not instructed that Plaintiff’s trees be removed. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the developer’s limited liability company, finding the claims against it were time-barred. A trial was held against the remaining defendant and a judgment was entered against him. However, the trial court then reduced the judgment against the remaining defendant based upon the comparative fault of the limited liability company. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Griffith, next of kin of Decedent, Bob Griffith v. Dr. Stephen Goryl and Upper Cumberland Urology Associates, P.C.
In this medical malpractice, wrongful death action the plaintiff alleges the defendant physician, a urologist, failed to timely diagnose and treat the decedent’s bladder cancer which caused his death. At the close of the plaintiff’s case in chief, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court held that the plaintiff’s only medical expert witness erroneously defined the standard of care and, upon that basis, excluded his testimony concerning the standard of care and breach thereof. With the exclusion of the plaintiff’s only expert testimony, the trial court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for medical malpractice and granted the motion for a directed verdict. We have determined the plaintiff’s medical expert did not erroneously identify the standard of care, he is competent to testify and, thus, the trial court erred in excluding his testimony and directing a verdict in favor of the defendant. We, therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Tommy Wright, et al. v. The City of Shelbyville Board of Zoning Appeals, et al.
This case involves a prolonged dispute over a proposed stone quarry that the plaintiff landowners, the Wrights, wished to establish on their property. While their application was pending, the city changed the zoning ordinance to rezone the Wrights’ property so that a quarry was no longer permitted as a conditional use. The Wrights filed suit, and on appeal this court held that the notice of the zoning amendment had been defective and that the zoning change was therefore void. The Wrights subsequently asked the Board of Zoning Appeals to consider their application under the property’s original zoning, but the BZA refused to put the application on its meeting agenda. The Wrights filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court found that the BZA’s action was arbitrary and illegal, but ruled that the Wrights were nonetheless precluded from obtaining any relief because of the operation of res judicata. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the petition on the basis of res judicata, because we find that doctrine inapplicable. We agree with the trial court that the BZA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
John Albert Cordell, Jr. et al. v. Burl Bruce Snyder et al.
This is an action for breach of warranty of title. The court found, after a bench trial, that the defendants breached the warranty by conveying an easement which they did not own. The defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry Hutson v. Safe Star Trucking et al.
In this case, Sherry Hutson filed a complaint in which she alleged her vehicle was struck by a tractor-trailer (“the tractor”) that left the scene of the accident. She seeks to recover under the uninsured motorist (“UM”) provisions of a policy providing coverage to the vehicle she was driving. The jury found that no “actual physical contact ha[d] occurred between” the plaintiff’s vehicle and the vehicle that left the scene. She appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
James Todd Harris v. Amy Price Harris
This appeal arises from a dispute over the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a magistrate’s order on child support. Amy Price Harris (“Mother”) filed a petition to increase child support from her former husband, James Todd Harris (“Father”), for their minor child. Two hearings were held before a magistrate, resulting in, among other things, an increase of child support. The trial judge did not confirm the magistrate’s order. This case later was transferred from the Fourth Circuit Court for Knox County to the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”). Several months later, Father filed a motion to correct the magistrate’s order concerning child support. The Trial Court held that it lacked jurisdiction at that point to change the prior child support arrearage judgment or hold a rehearing on that issue. Father appeals. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph J. Levitt, Jr. v. City of Oak Ridge, et al.
This appeal involves the efforts of Oak Ridge’s Board of Building and Housing Code Appeals to demolish buildings in Applewood Apartment Complex pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-21-101, Tennessee’s Slum Clearance and Redevelopment Statute. Owner filed a petition for writ of certiorari when the Board voted to demolish the buildings. The trial court granted the petition but granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment. Owner appeals. We reverse the grant of summary judgment on the issue of whether the Board acted without material evidence but affirm the grant of summary judgment on all other issues. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis R. Massengale et al. v. City of East Ridge
The plaintiffs in this case allege that they are adversely affected by a statute that legalizes the sale of fireworks inside the city limits of East Ridge, despite a general ban on the sale of fireworks in any county with a population of greater than 200,000, e.g., Hamilton County. They allege that the statute is unconstitutional. There are two distinct groups of plaintiffs (both groups being collectively referred to as “the Plaintiffs”). One group alleges that they are residents of the city and own property or businesses in the city (“the Citizens” or “the Citizen Plaintiffs”). The Citizen Plaintiffs allege that the sale of fireworks will result in diminished property values and an increased risk of fire or explosion with attendant increases in fire insurance premiums. The second group alleges that they are either in the business of selling fireworks, or are members of a purported “association” of persons or entities in the business of selling fireworks (“the Sellers”). They allege that they have put forth much effort and expense to establish businesses outside East Ridge, where fireworks sales are legal, only to see their efforts thwarted by the enactment of an unconstitutional statute permitting illegal competition. The Plaintiffs moved the trial court to enter judgment on the pleadings by decreeing the statute to be unconstitutional on its face. Instead, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, but did so without prejudice. The Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Bradley County, Tennessee v. The City of Cleveland, Tennessee
The plaintiff in this action is Bradley County (“the County”). The sole defendant is the City of Cleveland (“the City”). The County’s complaint seeks a determination that the proceeds of a 2009 local option county sales tax increase, enacted shortly after an identical increase by the City, is to be distributed between the parties according to a contract (“the Contract”) the parties signed in 1967 as opposed to a statutory provision for distribution based on the site of collection of the tax. The City filed a counterclaim which, as amended, seeks a determination that the Contract is void; that the Contract does not control distribution of the proceeds of a 1982 tax increase; that the Contract does not control distribution of the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase; and that, by statute, the City is entitled to all of the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase on sales made inside the city limits through the City’s 2010 fiscal year. The trial court upheld the validity of the Contract and further held that the Contract, as amended twice, i.e., in 1972 and in 1980, controls distribution between the parties of the proceeds of the County’s 1982 tax increase. The court held that the applicable statute, rather than the Contract, controls distribution of the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase; this latter holding is not at issue in this appeal. The court further held that the City’s statutory right to the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase on sales in the City ended June 30, 2009, which equates with the City’s 2009 fiscal year. The City appeals. We affirm that part of the judgment upholding the validity of the Contract and that part applying the Contract to the distribution of the 1982 tax increase. We reverse that part of the judgment that held the City’s statutory right to proceeds from the 2009 tax increase ended June 30, 2009. We hold that the City is entitled to the 2009 tax increase on sales in the city through the City’s 2010 fiscal year. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |
