In Re: Dakota D., et al
The order from which the appellant, Charlie D., seeks to appeal was entered on November 30, 2012. The Notice of Appeal was filed on January 4, 2013, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the November 30, 2012 order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Renita Dulaney v. Karla Davis, Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and Federal Express
This case involves a claimant’s right to unemployment compensation benefits. After initially being awarded such benefits, claimant was denied benefits based upon a finding that she had refused to return to her former position after being medically released to do so. The chancery court, however, reinstated her benefits concluding that her due process rights had been violated when a telephone hearing–as opposed to a face-to-face hearing–was conducted. We reverse the chancery court’s conclusion that the telephonic hearing violated claimant’s due process rights and we dismiss the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
O'Rane M. Cornish, Sr. v. Bennie G. Nunn, et al.
Appellant’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear the matter and therefore, this appeal must be dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Miljenovic v. Sherri E. Miljenovic
This appeal sought under Tenn. R. App. P. 3 is from an Order to Register Foreign Decree entered by the trial court on December 14, 2012, which order gave “full faith and credit for enforcement and modification purposes” to the parties’ New Jersey divorce judgment and subsequent consent orders entered by the New Jersey court on the issue of child custody. Subsequent to the entry of the December 14, 2012 order, the appellee (“Father”) filed a petition to modify the child custody provisions of the New Jersey judgment and consent orders. The trial court entered an emergency order on January 9, 2013, temporarily modifying the child custody provisions of the New Jersey judgment and orders to change custody of the parties’ minor children from the appellant (“Mother”) to Father. Pursuant to Rule 10 of Tenn. R. App. P., Mother then sought and was granted an extraordinary appeal from the January 9, 2013 order. See order in Michael Miljenovic v. Sherri E. Miljenovic, No. E2013-00238-COA-R10-CV, (Tenn. Ct. App., Knoxville, Feb. 5, 2013). That case is now pending in this Court. She also sought this Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal as to the trial court’s order of December 14, 2012. Since the trial court’s order of December 14, 2012, is not a final order, we have no jurisdiction to consider her Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Beverly Lynn Durham (Hess) Cook v. James Preston Hess, III
Father of adult child with spina bifida and other impairments challenges the trial court’s order requiring him to continue to pay child support. We have concluded that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case. We further find no error in the trial court’s determination that the adult child is severely disabled, in its calculation of child support, or in its determination of the amount owed by Father for past uncovered medical expenses. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Eric J. P. et al
The parents of three minor children appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court found the Department of Children’s Services established two grounds for termination: 1) severe child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4); and 2) persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3). In a previous dependency and neglect proceeding, the Franklin County Circuit Court found that Father severely abused the children’s half-sister and that Mother knew of the abuse but did nothing to protect her child. Neither parent appealed that judgment; as a consequence, the severe abuse findings are res judicata. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1113(g)(4), a court may terminate parental rights when the parent is found to have committed severe child abuse under any prior order of a court against any sibling or half-sibling. The trial court also found that termination of both parents’ rights was in the children’s best interests. We therefore affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Shantha Grace Pandian v. Juan Francisco Rodriguez
This appeal arises from a dispute over a parenting plan. Shantha Grace Pandian (“Mother”) sued Juan Francisco Rodriguez (“Father”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce. The case then proceeded to focus on a parenting plan for the parties’ two children, Christopher and Ethan (collectively, “the Children”), both boys with different special needs. Father requested equal time with the Children on a weekly alternating basis. Mother, on the other hand, wanted to have the Children most of the time, and argued that Father’s plan would be too disruptive for the Children. The Trial Court entered a parenting plan designating Mother as the primary residential parent and granting her most of the time with the Children. Father appeals, arguing that the Trial Court should have adopted his proposal for equal custodial time with the Children. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie D. Turner v. Kevin Turner
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Tina L. Milam, et al. v. Titlemax of Memphis and Dealer's Automobile Auction of the South, LLC
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Duff L. Brumley v. City of Cleveland, Tennessee
A detective with the City of Cleveland filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari with the Circuit Court, seeking review of the City Manager’s ruling affirming the City’s decision to terminate his employment. At the hearing before the trial court, the petitioner proffered new and additional evidence that was not presented to the City Manager. The trial court sustained the City’s relevancy objection and allowed the petitioner to make an extensive offer of proof. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the new and additional evidence, that there is material evidence supporting the City Manager’s decision, and that the City Manager did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding to uphold the City’s decision to fire the petitioner. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Paul Bengs v. Amy Dawn Bengs
Husband and wife entered into a post-nuptial agreement detailing the division of their marital estate. Upon Husband’s subsequent filing of a complaint for divorce, wife moved for a declaratory judgment that the post-nuptial agreement was valid and enforceable. Husband appeals the trial court’s holding that the agreement is enforceable and implementing its provisions. We affirm, holding the post-nuptial agreement is sufficiently definite to be enforced and that the agreement is fair and equitable. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Michael Myers et al.
Defendants appeal from an order of the trial court enjoining them from operating a wrecker service in Davidson County without a license. The trial court found that the ordinances at issue applied to Defendants’ wrecker services and that Defendants violated the provisions of the Metropolitan Code of Laws by their operation of a wrecker service without a license in Davidson County. The trial court also rejected Defendants’ arguments that the ordinances were preempted by federal law and violated the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The trial court then enjoined Defendants from operating a wrecker service in Davidson County. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alton Flatt v. State of Tennessee
The Departmentof Safety, acting pursuant toTennesseeCode Annotated § 39-17-1352(a)(1), revoked Petitioner’s handgun carry permit based upon the Department’s independent determination that Petitioner had been convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33). The revocation arises out of an incident in which Petitioner was charged with two counts of aggravated assault, one count that pertained to his ex-wife and one count that pertained to her male companion. Petitioner subsequently pled guilty to one count of simple assault under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-101. When Petitioner received notice that his handgun permit had been administratively revoked, he filed an appeal in the general sessions court, which reversed the Department’s decision and ordered reinstatement of Petitioner’s permit. The Department then appealed to the circuit court, which also ordered reinstatement of the handgun permit. This appeal followed. A “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), requires a use of force and a domestic relationship. In the underlying criminal case, Petitioner was charged with assaulting two people, Petitioner’s ex-wife and her male friend. Petitioner pled guilty to only one count of misdemeanor assault and the record does not establish whether Petitioner pled guilty to assaulting his ex-wife or her male companion. A “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” includes an offense “committed by” a person who had a specified domestic relationship with the victim, whether or not the misdemeanor statute itself designates the domestic relationship as an element of the crime and, pursuant to United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009), the victim’s domestic relationship with the defendant must be established beyond a reasonable doubt for the offense to constitute a crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The record in this case does not establish that the victim of the count of simple assault to which Petitioner pled guilty was his ex-wife. Therefore, the record does not support the Department’s determination that Petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Accordingly, we affirm. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Britany P. D.
The dispositive jurisdictional issue in this case is whether the underlying juvenile court proceeding was merely a custody action or a part of a dependency and neglect proceeding wherein custody was also at issue. The pleading that was tried in the juvenile court was Father’s Amended Petition for Custody and to Determine Parenting Plan and, in the Alternative, Petition for Dependent and Neglect. Following the trial on the amended petition, the juvenile court judge found the evidence insufficient to prove dependency and neglect; however, the juvenile court awarded custody of the parties’ child to Father on a best interest determination. Mother appealed the judgment of the juvenile court to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal on the motion of Father, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the juvenile court did not find the child dependent and neglected. The appeal was then transferred to this court. Although the juvenile court did not find the child dependent and neglected, the juvenile court awarded custody to Father following a trial which was part of a dependency and neglect proceeding. Therefore, as In re D.Y.H., 226 S.W.3d 327 (Tenn. 2007), instructs, the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear Mother’s appeal because the juvenile court’s custody decision arose from and was part of a dependency and neglect proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this appeal to the circuit court for a de novo hearing. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Landen P.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Landen P. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Kevin P. (“Father”) and Ciera P. (“Mother”). The Child was born in 2007, while the parents were residing in Florida. In 2008, Mother left Father and the Child and moved to Utah. Thereafter, she maintained sporadic contact with the Child only by telephone. Father subsequently moved with the Child to Cleveland, Tennessee in 2009. In 2011, Father’s mother and stepfather, Judy and Todd R., obtained custody of the Child through proceedings in the Bradley County Juvenile Court. Judy and Todd R. filed the instant petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights on August 1, 2011, for the purpose of adopting the Child. Having been arrested in May 2011, Father was incarcerated at the time of trial. Father consented to the adoption, and his parental rights were terminated on February 24, 2012. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition and terminated Mother’s parental rights. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to visit and support her during the relevant four-month time period and that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Tyrin Ross Price v. Sandra Ellen Price
This appeal involves the child support obligation of a man who is not the biological father of the children at issue. The wife gave birth to two children during the parties’ marriage. The husband filed for divorce, and subsequent DNA tests confirmed that the husband was not the father of either child. The trial court held that the husband had no legal obligation to pay child support. The wife now appeals, arguing that the husband should be required to pay child support because he is the children’s “legal father.” Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James C. Williams, Individually and on behalf of the heirs at law of Gayle Ann Williams, Deceased v. SMZ Specialists, P.C., et al.
This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to T.C.A. 29-26-121, which requires notice to defendants prior to the commencement of a health care liability lawsuit. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit asserting health care liability against the defendant health care providers within the applicable statute of limitations, but without providing the defendants with prior notice as required under Section 29-26-121. In ruling on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that Section 29-26-121 conflicted with Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. On this basis, it held that the statute infringed upon the authority of the judicial branch to enact rules governing the procedures for commencing a lawsuit, and thus violated the separation of powers clause of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendant health care providers were granted permission for this interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse, holding that pre-lawsuit notice requirement in Section 29-26-121 does not contravene the separation of powers clause of the Tennessee Constitution. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William D. Stalker and Stephen L. Young v. David R. Nutter and Tamara D. Nutter
This appeal arises out of a breach of contract action. Following the presentation of the plaintiffs’ proof, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. We vacate the decision of the trial court and remand the case for findings of fact required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2) and 52. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Webb and Evangeline Webb, Individually and as Husband and Wife v. Charles Roberson, M.D., et al.
In this interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, which requires a medical malpractice claimant to provide certain notice sixty days prior to filing suit. We conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 is not an unconstitutional infringement upon the courts’ rule-making authority, that it is not preempted by HIPAA, and that it does not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of state and federal law. Affirmed and Remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Deon S.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on several grounds, including abandonment by willful failure to visit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). We conclude that the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit is met by clear and convincing evidence in the record and that there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Affirmed and remanded. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dallas G.
The Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of the mother of a child on the ground of severe abuse; the court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals, contending that the evidence is not clear and convincing that termination of her rights is in the child’s best interest. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Brandon T. et al
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his four biological children. The trial court terminated his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. Finding that at least two of the grounds for termination are supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the Department of Children’s Services exerted reasonable efforts to reunite the family, we affirm the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kelley Higgins v. Bobby Higgins
In this divorce case, the trial court’s judgment ended the twenty-year marriage of Kelley Higgins (“Wife”) and Bobby Higgins (“Husband”). Husband appeals. He challenges the trial court’s classification and division of the parties’ property. He also contends that alimony was improperly awarded to Wife. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Ryne W. Brown v. Catherine L. Brown, Trustee, et al.
This case involves a trust. In a previous appeal, this Court remanded for the appointment of a corporate co-trustee as specifically required by the terms of the trust. Thereafter, the defendant existing trustee, who is also a beneficiary, unilaterally appointed a corporate cotrustee and then sought to have the trial court “ratify” her appointment. The plaintiff beneficiary challenged the appointment, claiming that the trustee was not authorized to unilaterally appoint a corporate co-trustee and arguing that the corporate co-trustee who was chosen did not meet the qualifications listed in the trust agreement. After hearing some testimony about the proposed co-trustee, the trial court decided that the plaintiff beneficiary lacked standing to participate in the selection or ratification of a corporate co-trustee. The trial court then granted the defendant trustee’s motion to ratify her appointment of the cotrustee. The plaintiff beneficiary appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Leo Holt v. Alma Jean Holt
This is an appeal from a divorce action in which the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. The trial court refused, however, to order Husband to pay for the costs of providing COBRA benefits for Wife. Husband and Wife appeal. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
