Tera Danielle Ward v. John Patrick Ward
In this divorce case, the father appeals the trial court’s designation of the mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ daughter. The child was born after the parties separated; at the time, the father lived in New Jersey and the mother lived in Tennessee. Divorce proceedings were initiated in Tennessee when the child was six months old; both parents asked to be designated as the child’s primary residential parent. After a trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced and designated the mother as the child’s primary residential parent; the father was granted parenting time for one week per month. The father now appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to declare the parties divorced and to designate the mother as the child’s primary residential parent. After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm the trial court’s decision to declare the parties divorced, and reverse the designation of the mother as the primary residential parent of the child. We vacate the parenting plan approved by the trial court and remand the cause for entry of an order and parenting plan designating the father as the child’s primary residential parent, with appropriate alternate parenting time for the mother. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Willie Beverly, Deacon of Antioch Baptist Church v. Farm Bureau Insurance and Tennessee Farmers Insurance Company
A general sessions judgment was appealed to circuit court. In the circuit court, the Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming that there were errors in the Defendant’s notice of appeal and appeal bond that rendered the documents ineffective. The circuit court denied the motion, and the case was resolved on its merits. The Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the circuit court should have dismissed the appeal based on the alleged errors in the notice of appeal and appeal bond. We affirm. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Randall v. Shelby County Unified School Board (inclusive of the former Memphis City Schools Board of Education), et al.
The trial court reversed the Board of Education’s decision to dismiss a City of Memphis school teacher. We reverse the trial court and reinstate the Board of Education’s dismissal of the teacher on the ground of unprofessional conduct. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ramey Michelle Long v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. et al.
Motorist brought suit against multiple defendants for injuries arising out of two car accidents. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of two defendants. Because genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, we reverse. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Franda Webb, et al. v First Tennessee Brokerage, Inc., et al.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court properly denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings. The defendants assert that Ms. Webb signed an agreement to arbitrate “all controversies” when she opened the brokerage account with them. The trial court determined, inter alia, that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable under state law, that Ms. Webb did not agree to arbitration, and that the account representative fraudulently induced Ms. Webb to enter into the agreement. We affirm the decision of the trial court only as to arbitration; we vacate any findings that go to the merits of the underlying case and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Jozie C.A.
The trial court granted Mother’s petition to modify custody and name Mother primary residential parent. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy O'Keefe and Sharon O'Keefe v. Barry Gordon, Roger Farley, and Plantation Title
Purchasers of home brought suit against sellers, purchasers’ investment advisor and real estate agent,title company,and several other parties seeking damages and other relief arising out of their purchase of the home. Jury found seller liable for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of warranties, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and found purchasers’ investment advisor liable for intentional misrepresentation. Trial court ordered rescission of the sales contract and awarded purchasers damages and attorneys fees for seller’s violation of the Consumer Protection Act Seller and awarded plaintiffs damages against their investment advisor. Seller and investment advisor appeal. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel Paul Allen, et al v. The City of Newport
The City of Newport sought to annex certain properties in Cocke County, Tennessee. A number of affected parties objected to the annexation and filed a complaint against the City. The trial court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to allege that the City was barred from annexing their properties because it had defaulted on a prior plan of services from an earlier annexation. The City filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the City’s motion on the ground that the statutory amendments on which the plaintiffs relied to support their claim could not be retroactively applied. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jakaeha A. L., et al
This is a parental rights termination appeal. The Department of Children’s Services petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the mother to her daughters, ages 2 three and one. The ground alleged was severe child abuse against a half sibling for which the mother was sentenced to more than two years imprisonment. After conducting a hearing, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4) and (5) upon finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re:Alyssa Y., et al
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Alyssa Y. and Brian Y. (“the Children”), the minor twin children of Juanita Y. (“Mother”). When the Children were three months old, their maternal grandmother filed a petition with the Knox County Juvenile Court, asserting that the Children were dependent and neglected due to Mother’s drug use. The Children were placed in the custody of the maternal grandmother by order of the court entered January 23, 2009. When the maternal grandmother became unable to care for the Children in November 2010, they were taken into custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed in foster care. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother on April 26, 2012. The petition alleged several grounds for termination, including abandonment based on Mother’s willful failure to visit and support the Children, persistent conditions, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition after finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Children due to her failure to pay child support. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan and that termination of parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jordan K. Wilson v. David W. Dossett, American Honda Motor Co., and Fox Head, Inc.
This appeal concerns a landowner’s potential liability to a person injured while riding a motorcycle on the landowner’s property. Jordan K. Wilson (“Wilson”) suffered severe injuries in a motorcycle accident on property owned by David W. Dossett (“Dossett”). Wilson sued Dossett in the Circuit Court for Campbell County (“the Trial Court”). Dossett filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting the affirmative defense for landowners under Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. The Trial Court held that Dossett was afforded protection under the statute as Wilson had been engaged in recreational activities on Dossett’s land. At a subsequent hearing, the Trial Court found that no exception to the statutory defense was applicable. Wilson appeals. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 applies to shield Dossett from liability as Wilson was engaged in recreational activities on Dossett’s property, and that no exception to the defense is applicable. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Perdue v. Estate of Daniel Jackson, et al.
The trial court granted summary judgment in this declaratory judgment action, finding that the will at issue was unambiguous. Having determined that the will at issue contains a latent ambiguity that must be resolved through the use of extrinsic evidence, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Meadows, etc. v. Tara Harrison, etc., et al.
In this case, Partner and Decedent created Double J Company for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. One month following the creation of Double J Company, Decedent personally purchased the Property, which he thereafter deeded to Double J Company. Following Decedent’s death, Partner filed a complaint against Heirs and the estate for partition. Heirs objected, arguing that Partner and Decedent never formed a valid partnership and that the Property was subject to the administration of Decedent’s estate. Following a hearing, the trial court deemed the Property partnership property and ordered the sale of the Property. Heirs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Pirtle v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board et al
Petitioner, an inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction, was charged with the prison disciplinary offense of Refusing a Drug Test because he failed to provide an adequate amount of urine for testing. Following a disciplinary hearing he was found guilty of the offense. He filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which was granted, and Respondents filed a certified copy of the record of Petitioner’s disciplinary proceedings. The trial court found the disciplinary board did not act in an illegal or arbitrary manner, and dismissed the case. We affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Rosalyn L. Caffey v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee Board of Zoning Appeals and Elizabeth W. Blair
Neighbor of property owner who received a variance from a side yard setback requirement in zoning ordinance filed an action seeking certiorari review of the Board of Zoning Appeals’ grant of the variance. The trial court determined that the Board’s action was within its authority pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-7-207(3) and affirmed the grant of the variance. We concur with the trial court and affirm the Board’s action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company v. W. Phillip Reed, et al.
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”) sued W. Phillip Reed, Personal Representative of the Estate of Carol LaRue; Rufus Everett; Delight Everett; and Lilla Farner seeking a declaratory judgment with regard to rights and obligations under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Tennessee Farmers filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing the Trial Court entered its order on June 12, 2012 granting Tennessee Farmers summary judgment after finding and holding, inter alia, that the insurance policy was not ambiguous, that the phrase “property damage” in the insurance policy did not include the type of loss allegedly suffered by the Everetts and Ms. Farner, and that the commercial general liability insurance policy provides no coverage to W. Phillip Reed as Personal Representative of the Estate of Carol LaRue for the claims filed by the Everetts and Ms. Farner. Rufus Everett, Delight Everett, and Lilla Farner (“Defendants”) appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Anne Kraus v. Barry Martin Thomas
In this appeal from the Final Decree of Divorce, the father of the parties’ four minor children challenges the division of marital property, the permanent parenting plan, an upward deviation in child support of $16,875 per year to help pay for private school for three of the children, and a $50,000 judgment for the mother’s attorney’s fees. We affirm the division of the marital property and the parenting schedule. As for requiring the father to pay up to $16,875 per year toward private school costs of three of the children, we have determined that the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard for such an upward deviation and find that the father does not have the financial means to pay an upward deviation. As for requiring the father to pay $50,000 of the mother’s attorney’s fees, we have determined that she was given 60 percent of the marital assets and her income is substantially more than that of the father’s, thus, applying the ability to pay and the need standard, we find no basis for requiring the father to pay the mother’s attorney’s fees at trial or on appeal. Thus, we reverse the award for attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel., Herbert S. Moncier, et al., v. Nancy S. Jones, et al.
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his complaint, which asserted numerous claims relating, inter alia, to the practice monitor condition of his suspension from the practice of law. The trial court dismissed the complaint finding the defendants in the action were immune under either sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, quasi-judicial quasi-prosecutorial immunity, qualified immunity, or Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Section 27 immunity. The trial court further found that the action was a collateral attack on the ruling by the Tennessee Supreme Court regarding Petitioner’s suspension; thus, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on matters in the disciplinary proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on all claims except for the Public Records Act, which we remand to the trial court for a determination of whether the records requested are subject to inspection and whether they have in fact been made available for inspection. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex re. Herbert S. Moncier, et al v. Nancy S. Jones, et al
Attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility filed suit against the Board’s counsel seeking damages for her conduct of the disciplinary proceeding and her removal from the position of Disciplinary Counsel; Attorney appeals the dismissal of his action. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Herbert S. Moncier v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
An attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility brought suit against the Board asserting violations of the Open Meetings Act and the Public Records Act. We have concluded that the trial court properly determined that the Open Meetings Act does not apply to the Board. Furthermore, we find no error in the trial court’s determination regarding the attorney’s right to records from certain Board meetings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Tanya Aina-Labinjo v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education, et al
Metropolitan Nashville Board of Education appeals the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling it to hear an appeal of the termination of a non-teaching employee. The Board contends that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ and that state law preempts the right to a hearing granted to employees of the Board under the Metropolitan Charter. We affirm the holding that the chancery court has jurisdiction under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-102(a) and 29-25-101 to issue the writ; we vacate the judgment issuing the writ and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the Board has developed a policy with respect to the dismissal of employees as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2301(b)(1)(FF) and whether such policy preempts the pertinent provisions of the Metropolitan Charter. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Tanya Aina-Labinjo v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education, et al. - Dissent
I concur in the majority’s holdings affirming the trial court’s jurisdiction and vacating the mandamus. However, I do not agree with the decision to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the declaratory judgment claim. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Mittie T. Alexander
Conservator filed suit to rescind a pre-conservatorship conveyance of real property by ward to her niece. The jury found in favor of niece and the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict. Conservator appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of her expert witness. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Brian J. & Nicole J.
This case involves an appeal from juvenile court to circuit court. The maternal grandmother of the child at issue filed a petition in juvenile court against her daughter, seeking court-ordered visitation with her grandson. The respondent mother of the child filed an answer denying all of the grandmother’s allegations and also filed a counter-petition for injunctive relief against the grandmother. The juvenile court granted the grandmother’s petition for court-ordered visitation but did not adjudicate the mother’s petition for injunctive relief. The mother then appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The mother now appeals. We affirm the decision of the circuit court, vacate the orders of the juvenile court based on subject-matter jurisdiction, and remand to the juvenile court, with specific instructions, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Mary L. Sparks v. James E. Dillingham, et al and James E. Dillingham, et al v. Prestige Title, LLC, et al
This case presents a question of first impression regarding the scope of the term “lender” as used within the Tennessee Home Loan Protection Act. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment: Plaintiff claiming that the Defendants were “lenders” subject to the Act and Defendants claiming that they were not “lenders” subject to the Act. The trial court concluded that Defendants were not “lenders,” and therefore it granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants, we grant partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
