In Re: Shannon P. et al
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the five minor children (“the Children”) of Tineaka P. (“Mother”) and Shannon P., Sr. (“Father”). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents on June 14, 2011. The petition alleged several grounds for termination, including severe child abuse, abandonment based on willful failure to support the Children, persistent conditions, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Following a bench trial, which concluded in February 2012, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother after finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had committed severe child abuse, that she had abandoned the Children due to her willful failure to pay child support, that she had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan, and that the conditions leading to removal persisted. Father was granted an additional ninety days to attempt to improve his situation, and a hearing date was set for May 10, 2012, regarding the termination of his parental rights. At the conclusion of the bench trial on May 10, the court also terminated Father’s parental rights after finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan and that the conditions leading to removal persisted. The trial court also found that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother and Father have appealed. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
BancorpSouth Bank v. David J. Johnson, Eugene Gibson, and Cheryl Gibson
This appeal involves the enrollment of a foreign judgment. The plaintiff creditor sought to enroll in Tennessee a deficiency judgment obtained in Arkansas. The defendant debtors contended that the Arkansas judgment should not be given full faith and credit in Tennessee, alleging inter alia the fraud exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the constitution. The trial court enrolled the Arkansas judgment, and the debtors appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lyle Douglas Vaughan, et al. v. Hawkins County, Tennessee, et al.
In a prior appeal of this matter, we affirmed the trial court’s determination that a road in dispute was private rather than public. Ten months after our decision, the defendants, the Brewers, filed a Rule 60.02 motion to vacate with the trial court based upon newly discovered evidence. The trial court overruled the motion. The defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Ramon Williams v. Dana Randolph
This is an appeal from the trial court’s final order modifying the visitation schedule as required upon remand from a prior appeal. See In re Iyana R.W., No. E2010-00114-COAR3- JV, 2011 WL 2348458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). The trial court denied the father’s attempt to modify custody of the minor child and ordered the case transferred to the Davidson County Juvenile Court as the more convenient forum for any further proceedings. The father appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jason C. Woods et al v. David Lowrey et al
The buyers of a house sued their real estate agent, the seller’s real estate agent, and others, alleging that the defendants concealed the fact that their home’s garage violated the neighborhood restrictive covenants. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding, as a matter of law, their garage did satisfy the requirement of the restrictive covenants, i.e., that the garage be large enough to accommodate at least two cars. Because the undisputed material facts establish that the plaintiffs’ home is in compliance, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Joshua P et al
This termination of parental rights case concerns Joshua P. and Quinn W. (“the Children”), the children of G.W. (“Mother”). The Children were placed in the protective custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) after both parents were arrested. Later, DCS petitioned the court to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the court found that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the Children’s best interest, both findings said to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Lori K. Wilhoit et al. v. Joshua Andrew Rogers et al.
This case involves an automobile accident wherein a refrigerator being hauled by Defendants fell from a truck and collided with Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Plaintiff, Lori K. Wilhoit, was driving the vehicle and filed suit regarding her personal injuries and the property damage to her vehicle. Her husband, Jeffrey Wilhoit, also asserted claims regarding property damage to the vehicle and loss of consortium with and services of his wife. A jury trial was held in November and December 2011. As the matter of liability was stipulated, the only issues submitted to the jury related to the amount of damages, if any, suffered by Plaintiffs. The jury returned a verdict awarding Plaintiffs $3,200 for property damage and zero damages for all other claimed injuries. Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm the jury’s verdict regarding property damage and Mr. Wilhoit’s claims, but we reverse in part the jury’s verdict regarding a portion of Ms. Wilhoit’s injuries and medical expenses. We remand this case for further proceedings regarding Ms. Wilhoit’s damages. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James E Miller
In this action, a creditor brought a claim against the decedent’s estate for the value of cattle and equipment. With the personal representative for the estate filing an exception to the claim, the creditor filed an amended claim, seeking to enforce an attached handwritten contract. The trial court dismissed the amended claim as both untimely and asserting a new and different cause of action. On appeal, the creditor raises two issues: whether the trial court erred (1) by finding that the claimant was not entitled to actual notice of the probate proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-306(d) (2010) and (2) by dismissing the amended claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-307(e)(2) (2010). Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Gerald Wallace Ardry et al. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
In this case arising out of a car accident, the defendant challenges the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on several bases, including comments and arguments of plaintiffs’ counsel and the evidence regarding loss of earning capacity. We find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court in accordance with the jury’s verdict. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Alexander A. Rogin v. Joelle L. Rogin
This appeal involves various financial issues related to a divorce. The trial court: (1) calculated both parents’ incomes for purposes of child support; (2) required Father to pay a portion of the children’s private school tuition; (3) entered a permanent parenting plan giving Mother final authority over major decisions regarding the children; (4) divided the marital property; (5) denied Father’s request for transitional alimony; (6) awarded Father alimony in solido; and (7) denied both parties’ requests for attorneys fees. We: (1) reverse the trial court’s determination that Father is willfully and voluntarily underemployed; (2) vacate the trial court’s calculation of Mother’s income; (3) vacate the trial court’s ruling requiring Father to pay a portion of the children’s private school tuition; and (4) remand for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm as to the remainder of the issues presented. Vacated in part, reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Michael Harris, et ux v. Mickey Deanne Haynes, et al.
This appeal concerns whether certain exclusions in a coverage document are permissible. Dennis Michael Harris (“Harris”), then a patrolman with the Anderson County Sheriff’s Department, was injured when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Mickey Deanne Haynes (“Haynes”). Harris and his wife, Judy A. Harris, (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”) sued Haynes and the alleged owner of the vehicle, Richard H. Furrow, in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). The Plaintiffs also raised claims against Anderson County’s motor vehicle liability coverage provider, Tennessee Risk Management Trust (“TRMT”), for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage. TRMT filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that under the relevant coverage document (“the Coverage Document”), Harris was excluded from uninsured coverage as he was an employee of Anderson County who had received workers compensation. The Trial Court granted TRMT’s motion. The Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Anderson County was self-insured through TRMT, and, therefore, the uninsured/underinsured motorist statutes do not apply. The Coverage Document excluded employees such as Harris from uninsured coverage. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Alicia K.A.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Linda J.M.A. (“Mother”) to the minor child Alicia K.A. (“the Child”) . After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered its Termination of Parental Rights and Final Decree of Guardianship finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence had been proven that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(3), and (g)(8), and that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to this Court. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: T.M.S.
This appeal involves disestablishment of paternity. The putative father allegedly signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and the child’s birth certificate when the child at issue was born. The mother did not tell him at the time that she had had sexual relations with another man during the time period in which the child was conceived. The State of Tennessee, on behalf of the mother, obtained an order against the putative father, establishing parentage and setting child support. After a private DNA test showed that the putative father was not the biological father of the child, he filed a petition in juvenile court to disestablish paternity and set aside under Tenn. R. Civ P. 60. The juvenile court denied the petition, holding that the putative father did not offer proof of fraud in the procurement of his signature on the alleged voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. The putative father now appeals. On appeal, we find no voluntary acknowledgment of paternity in the record, and no evidence regarding the alleged voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, and so cannot consider it in the appeal. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the putative father’s petition to set aside the order establishing parentage and child support under Rule 60.02, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel B. Phillips v. Susan W. Phillips
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the denial of a motion to recuse the Trial Court Judge from presiding over post-divorce contempt proceedings initiated by Susan W. Phillips (“Former Wife”) against Samuel B. Phillips (“Former Husband”). Having reviewed Former Husband’s Petition for Recusal Appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, and upon consideration of Former Wife’s motion to dismiss the appeal, we deny Former Wife’s motion to dismiss this appeal and affirm the Trial Court’s denial of Former Husband’s motion to recuse. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
John H. Patty v. Ray Lane, et al
This appeal involves the breach of an oral contract. Defendants approached Plaintiff about utilizing fill dirt on Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff agreed. Defendants subsequently executed a plan to control the sediment as they excavated the property. Over the course of the next three years, the City of Knoxville sent Plaintiff two notices of violation, one of which carried a fine, for improper sediment control, illegal dumping and discharge, and failure to obtain a city permit. Defendants paid the fine, applied for a city permit as required, and attempted to stabilize the property. Two years later, Plaintiff received two more notices of violation, one of which carried a fine. Plaintiff paid the fine and hired an engineer to properly stabilize the property after Defendants refused to respond to his request for assistance. Plaintiff then filed suit for breach of contract, seeking reimbursement for his payment of the second fine and for the cost of professionally stabilizing the property. Defendants denied liability and asserted that a contract had never been formed. The trial court found that a contract existed, that Defendants breached the contract, and that Plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of $29,249.02. Defendants appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Womble v. State of Tennessee
A nurse whose employment at the University of Tennessee Regional Memorial Medical Center was terminated by the hospital brought a complaint against the State, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and negligent deprivation of her property right to her position as a career state employee. The Claims Commission, William O. Shults, Commissioner, dismissed the claims, concluding that the Commission was without subject matter jurisdiction. The nurse appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Copper Basin Federal Credit Union, et al v. Fiserv Solutions, Inc.
This action sounding in negligence and breach of contract was dismissed by the trial court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Defendant negligently performed professional services concerning the provision and maintenance of web defense software and that Defendant breached its contractual duty to protect the computer system of Copper Basin Federal Credit Union from computer incursion. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to allow the case to proceed, and, therefore, dismissal was in error. The decision below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Mack Phillips, Et Al. v. Montgomery County, Tennessee, Et Al.
Property owners submitted a subdivision plat to the local planning commission for approval. The planning commission denied the proposed plan because the property lies in the path of a planned highway extension. The property owners filed a complaint alleging the planning commission’s denial constitutes a regulatory taking that is prohibited by the Tennessee Constitution, Article I, Section 21, and, also, inverse condemnation that is compensable pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-123. The trial court denied the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to the claim based on inverse condemnation, but reverse the judgment refusing to dismiss the regulatory taking claim. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Melody Crunk Telfer v. George Curtiss Telfer
This divorce appeal involves the classification of the appreciation in value of separate property. During the marriage, the wife’s family gave her ownership interests in two family companies. The parties used marital funds to pay their tax liabilities arising out of income from the companies that was attributed to them for tax purposes but retained by the companies. The trial court held that the appreciation in value of the wife’s ownership interests in the family companies were her separate property. We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the parties substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation in value of the wife’s separate assets, and so reverse the trial court’s classification of the appreciation in value as her separate property. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
David Scott Blackwell v. Bill Haslam, Governor of the State of Tennessee, Robert e. Cooper, Jr., Tennessee Attorney General, Victor S. (Torry) Johnson, III, District Attorney General, Kim Helper, District Attorney General, and The State of Tennessee
This appeal involves the Full Faith and Credit Clause and firearm rights. The petitioner was convicted of felony drug offenses in Georgia. The State of Georgia granted the petitioner a full pardon for his crimes; his Georgia pardon expressly restored his right to possess a firearm. The petitioner now resides in Tennessee. A Tennessee statute provides that it is a felony for a person who has been convicted of a felony drug offense to possess a firearm, and it does not make an exception for persons who have been pardoned for their crime. The petitioner filed this declaratory judgment action against the State of Tennessee, seeking a declaration that, because he received a pardon for his drug offenses in Georgia, he can purchase or possess a firearm in Tennessee without violating the Tennessee statute. The trial court held in favor of the petitioner, concluding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires Tennessee to recognize Georgia’s pardon in full and to permit the petitioner to carry a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee now appeals. On appeal, we consider the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. We hold that Tennessee’s public policy on the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted non-violent drug felon is not entirely inconsistent with Georgia’s public policy, so the public-policy exception to full faith and credit is not applicable in that situation. However, Tennessee public policy proscribes the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted violent drug felon, contrary to Georgia’s public policy allowing the restoration of firearm rights for all felons, violent or not. This Tennessee policy implicates public safety so as to warrant application of the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause under the appropriate circumstances. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Timothy Brown v. Janine Biache Brown
In this divorce case, the trial court divided property which had not been previously divided by agreement of the parties and awarded Wife alimony in solido. Wife appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in failing to classify the property as marital or separate prior to division, and in failing to award her alimony in futuro, rehabilitative alimony, transitional alimony, or attorney’s fees. Finding no error we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
James Eberle et al v. Lisa Parrott Elliott, et al.
This is a contested easement action regarding wooded mountain property in Monroe County. The Plaintiffs/Appellants, James and Edna Eberle, filed a complaint requesting that the Defendant/Appellee, Lisa Parrott Elliott, be enjoined from crossing the Eberles’ property from her adjoining thirty-acre tract without benefit of an easement. Following a bench trial, the Monroe County Chancery Court dismissed the Eberles’ complaint for injunctive relief and ruled that an easement exists for ingress and egress over the Eberles’ property, appurtenant to and serving Ms. Elliott’s property. The Eberles have appealed. At issue is whether the trial court erred by finding the existence of an easement, either express, prescriptive, or implied. The Eberles also assert that the trial court erred by failing to limit the easement to a use no greater than the use previously made over the servient property. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that an easement exists for ingress and egress and the court’s dismissal of the complaint for injunctive relief. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Raleigh Commons, Inc. v. SWH, LLC, et al.
This appeal arises from a prolonged dispute among business associates which they have come to refer to as a “business divorce.” The parties in this matter, each doctors, formed a limited liability company for the purpose of acquiring property and constructing a medical office building on the property. In order to acquire the property from the current owner, the doctors executed an assumption and modification agreement whereby the LLC and the doctors each individually agreed to be jointly and severally liable to the current owner for its obligations on a promissory note. Subsequently, one of the doctors, the Appellee, withdrew membership from the LLC and executed an indemnity agreement with the remaining LLC members whereby the Appellee would be held harmless from any liability of the LLC, including the note. Thereafter, the LLC and its remaining members defaulted on the note, and the holder of the note filed a complaint against the Appellee, the LLC, and the individual LLC members, seeking to collect the balance due under the note. In order to avoid having a judgment entered against him, the Appellee purchased the note and pursued a claim against the LLC and its individual members for indemnification and breach of the note. Ultimately, the trial court granted the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on his indemnification claim, awarded him attorney’s fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, and dismissed the Appellant’s cross-claims against the Appellee. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
City of South Pittsburg, Tennessee v. James C. Hailey and Company, et al
In April 2008 the City of South Pittsburg hired a contractor to enlarge its sewage treatment plant. During construction of the project several sink holes developed, the last of which occurred in February of 2009 and caused the plant’s lagoon to collapse. The City made claim on the contractor’s builders’ risk insurance policy; the insurer denied the claim, contending that construction of the project was complete at the time of the collapse. The City, which had filed suit against the contractor, amended the complaint, adding the insurer as a party and asserting a claim for breach of contract against the company; the City also requested that the court issue a declaratory judgment that the losses sustained by the city were covered by the policy. The court subsequently granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment and denied the city’s motion for partial summary judgment. The city and the engineering firm engaged by the City to plan the project appeal the grant of summary judgment to the insurer and the denial of the city’s motion. We have determined that the court erred in granting the insurer’s motion and denying the City’s; consequently, we reverse both judgments. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Lisa Gail Hayes v. Mark C. Pierret
In these acrimonious post-divorce proceedings, the father of two minor children filed a petition seeking, inter alia, to be given sole decision-making authority over the children’s educations, non-emergency health care, religion, and extracurricular activities, and to be designated the primary residential parent or alternatively to receive more parenting time. The trial court found a material change of circumstances had occurred due to the parties’ total inability to cooperatively co-parent and that it was in the children’s best interest to spend more quality time with their father. However, the court found it was in the children’s best interest for the mother to remain the primary residential parent and to have final authority over the children’s non-emergency medical care after consultation with the father. The court found that the other major decisions concerning the children should be made jointly. Each party was ordered to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. We affirm the foregoing decisions; however, we have determined the father may be entitled to a modification of his child support obligation, which was not addressed in the trial court’s final order, and we remand this issue for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
