James D. Holder and Barbara L. Holder v. S & S Family Entertainment, LLC
This dispute arose at the end of two long-term commercial leases and a contract for the sale of two businesses and their assets, which businesses operated at the leased premises. The issues pertain to what assets were purchased, whether the tenant properly maintained the premises during the lease term, and whether the tenant returned the premises to the landlord in the same condition as at the commencement of the leases. The trial court ruled that the tenant had not purchased the assets in dispute, which the tenant removed at the end of the lease; thus, the tenant was liable for removing the assets. The court also found that the tenant breached both leases by failing to maintain the premises and failing to return the premises in the same condition as at the commencement of the leases. The tenant insists the court erred in finding that the landlord owned the assets in dispute; it also insists it did not breach any duties arising under the leases. The tenant also contends it is not liable for any of the numerous categories of damages awarded because the landlord failed to prove its damages. We affirm the trial court’s rulings as to the ownership of the disputed assets and the findings that the tenant breached numerous provisions of the leases. As for the various awards of damages, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Baxter v. Heritage Bank & Trust, and Proctor Financial Insurance Corporation, Inc.
Homeowner sued Bank, alleging that it had settled her claim for damages to her house with Insurance Company without her consent. Bank served discovery on Homeowner, and when Homeowner did not comply with discovery requests to Bank’s satisfaction, Bank moved to dismiss Homeowner’s claims. Trial court granted Bank’s motion to dismiss, and Homeowner moved to set aside the dismissal pursuant to Rule 59. Trial court denied Homeowner’s motion to set aside, and Homeowner appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment denying Homeowner’s motion to set aside because (1) the scheduling order included a deadline for completing discovery that had not yet passed and (2) there was insufficient evidence of wrongdoing by Homeowner or her attorney. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Dickerson et al v. Regions Bank et al
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this action on February 17, 2009, to quiet title to property they own in Williamson County, Tennessee. At issue was a Deed of Trust that secured a 1997 promissory note, with an original maturity date in 1998, executed by a South Carolina limited liability company of which the plaintiff husband was a member. Plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that the statute of limitations for the 1997 note and deed of trust had lapsed; therefore, the deed of trust encumbering their property should be released. Defendant Beta, LLC, filed a counterclaim for judicial foreclosure asserting it was the assignee of an October 8, 1998 renewal note with a maturity date of October 1999, the maturity date of which was subsequently extended to October 2000 pursuant to a Change in Terms Agreement executed in October 1999. It is based on the Change in Terms Agreement that Beta insists the statute of limitations had not lapsed and it is entitled to enforce the deed of trust. Although Beta was unable to produce an original or photocopy of an October 1998 renewal promissory note or evidence that complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-8-101 to prove it was a lost negotiable instrument, the trial court held that a copy of the 1999 Change of Terms Agreement was sufficient to established the existence of the October 1998 renewal note and the extension of the maturity date to 2000; thus the statute of limitations had not run and Beta was vested with the right to enforce the deed of trust. Therefore, the court dismissed Plaintiffs complaint to quiet title and ruled in favor of Beta on the issue of foreclosure. On appeal Plaintiffs contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s rulings. Particularly, Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding that the Change in Terms Agreement dated October 8, 1999, was sufficient to establish Beta’s claims under an October 1998 promissory note of which there is no copy. We have determined the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy Beta’s burden of proof as the foreclosing party. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the specific relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeff and Melissa Fitzpatrick v. State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services
The petitioners are foster parents who were indicated by the Department of Children’s Services as perpetrators of child neglect for “lack of supervision” and also for “environmental neglect.” The lack of supervision allegation arose out of an incident in which a foster child who was placed in the petitioners’ home was found fondling the private parts of a younger foster sibling on two occasions during the same evening. The environmental neglect allegation was due to the condition of the petitioners’ home when the DCS investigator arrived to look into the report of child-on-child sexual abuse. The petitioners requested an administrative hearing. After a four-day contested case hearing before an administrative law judge, the indication for environmental neglect was deemed unfounded, but the indication for lack of supervision was upheld. The petitioners filed a petition for judicial review in chancery court, and upon reviewing the record, the court upheld the indication for lack of supervision. The petitioners appeal to this Court, arguing that there is no substantial and material evidence to support their indication for lack of supervision, that they have been denied procedural and substantive due process,and that they are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred in defending against the allegation of environmental neglect that was deemed unfounded, as well as the allegation of lack of supervision. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the chancery court in part, and we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Blackburn, et al. v. Henry E. McGee
Plaintiff in wrongful death action filed motion to quash Notice of Hospital Lien which had been filed in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §29-22-101 et seq. on behalf of medical center which rendered care to the decedent. The trial court held that the medical center had not properly perfected its lien and granted the motion; medical center appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lou Wadley v. Leonard Rowe
This action originated with the filing of a detainer warrant in General Sessions Court by the plaintiff, seeking possession of her home. The plaintiff obtained a judgment granting her possession of the home, and the defendant appealed that judgment to Circuit Court. Following a de novo trial, the Circuit Court likewise granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Nardone v. Louis A. Cartwright, Jr. , et al.
Charles Nardone (“Plaintiff”) sued Louis A. Cartwright, Jr. and Cartwright Communication Technology, Inc. (“CCT”) alleging, among other things, slander and libel. During trial, defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the Trial Court granted by order entered December 6, 2012. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claim for libel. We find and hold that Plaintiff failed to prove libel, and we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Nathaniel C.T., Jason J.T. and Emerald S.T.
This appeal concerns attorney’s fees. Two relatives (“Petitioners”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the parents (“Respondents”) to Respondents’ three minor children (“the Children”). The Chancery Court for Washington County (“1 the Trial Court”), pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13, appointed counsel to represent Respondents in the parental termination action. After a long, drawn out process, the parties resolved their legal dispute through a mediated agreement. The Children remained with Respondents. Respondents filed a motion for attorney’s fees, arguing that they should be awarded attorney’s fees under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). The Trial Court held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) was inapplicable under these circumstances and denied Respondents’ motion for attorney’s fees. Respondents appeal. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Estate of Earsie L. Kirkman
The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Nathaniel C.T., Jason J. T. and Emerald S.T. - Concurring
I concur completely in the majority opinion. I write separately to state that I do not believe the language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103 is broad enough to encompass a dispute between two biological parents on one side and two third persons with no custodial rights on the other. As I parse the wording of § 36-5-103, it only pertains to a dispute between spouses or a dispute between a “spouse” and an “other person to whom the custody of the child, or children, is awarded.” Since this case does not present either of these factual scenarios, I would hold, as an additional basis for the Court’s decision, that the language of § 36-5-103 is simply not applicable to these facts. See Brewster v. Galloway, E2011-01455-COA-R3- CV, 2012 WL 2849428 at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed July 11, 2012) (Susano, J., concurring). |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Ann Pereira Brown v. Dwain Allen Brown
This appeal involves the grant of a Rule 60.02 motion to modify a default divorce decree entered nearly eight years prior. The husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion seeking relief from the parties’ divorce decree; he argued primarily that the provision pertaining to his retirement benefits was inequitable. The trial court initially denied the motion, and the husband filed a timely notice of appeal. Almost two years later, the husband voluntarily dismissed his appeal. The trial court then entered an order setting aside its prior denial of the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion, held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, and eventually entered an order granting the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion. The wife now appeals. We hold that the effect of the dismissal of the earlier appeal was to affirm the trial court’s denial of the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion, so the trial court was precluded under the law of the case doctrine from reconsidering its earlier denial of the Rule 60.02 motion. Consequently, we vacate the trial court’s order setting aside its prior denial of the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion, as well as the order granting the husband the relief requested. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Torrance Randle v. State of Tennessee
Civil Service Employee filed a grievance with the Civil Service Commission complaining he was not given supervisory responsibilities in accordance with the job description that was posted when he accepted the position. The administrative law judge dismissed Employee’s grievance because it was a “non-grievable matter” as that term is defined in the rules promulgated by the Department of Human Resources, leaving the Civil Service Commission without subject matter jurisdiction. Employee petitioned the Chancery Court for judicial review. The Chancery Court affirmed the administrative law judge’s dismissal of Employee’s grievance. Employee appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals, and we affirm the dismissal of Employee’s petition |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryne B.F. v. Michael B.
In this post-divorce case, Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of Father/Appellee’s motion for involuntary dismissal of her petition to be named the primary residential parent of the parties’ child. Implicitly finding that there has not been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the last custodial order, the trial court granted Father’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2) motion to dismiss Mother’s petition. The trial court also denied Father’s request for attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-103(c). Because the trial court’s order does not comply with Rule 41.02(2) in that it neither finds the facts specially upon which the court based its determination that there has been no material change in circumstances, nor indicates the court’s reason(s) for denial of Father’s request for attorney’s fees, we are unable to conduct a meaningful review. Vacated and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryne B. F. v. Michael B. - Separate Concurrence
I fully concur in the majority’s decision to remand the case to the trial court for it to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are sufficient to enable this Court to review the matter on appeal. I write separately only to comment on some points that we can glean from the appellate record about the trial court’s reasoning. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Faye Thompson v. Kim Kail
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. The complaint alleged that the defendant circuit court clerk failed to timely send to the appellate court a case file in a matter other than the case that was on appeal. The defendant court clerk filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; the trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy W. Hudson v. Delilah M. Grunloh
This case involves a claim for contractual attorney fees and a counterclaim for legal malpractice. The trial court dismissed the legal malpractice claim at the summary judgment stage, it granted summary judgment on certain aspects of the attorney’s fee claim, and, following a trial, it awarded a judgment in favor of the attorney. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
David L. Trantham by Betty J. Ward Hartsell, as his attorney in fact v. Evelyn Nix Lynn
This is a boundary line dispute based upon competing surveys. Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action against Defendant, seeking to have the boundary line declared. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded the property to Plaintiff and assessed damages against Defendant for damage caused to a bridge located on Plaintiff’s property. Defendant appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Mildred Joan Pantik v. Martin Julius Pantik
This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Shelby County courts over a petition for an order of protection. The petition was originally filed in general sessions court, but it was transferred by consent to circuit court, where another matter was pending between the parties. Thereafter, the circuit court denied a motion to transfer the petition back to general sessions court but sua sponte granted permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 due to a perceived conflict between two statutes addressing the courts’ jurisdiction. We granted the application for an interlocutory appeal and now affirm the decision of the circuit court. This case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michelle Rye, et al. v. Women's Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC d/b/a Ruch Clinic, et al.
This interlocutory appeal concerns the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to the Defendant/Appellee medical providers on various issues. The Plaintiff/Appellant couple filed a complaint for damages stemming from the medical providers’ failure to administer a RhoGAM injection during wife’s pregnancy. The couple alleged causes of action for compensatory damages associated with medical malpractice, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and disruption of family planning. The trial court granted summary judgment to the medical providers on the wife’s claim for future medical expenses, husband’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the couple’s claim for disruption of family planning. The trial court declined to grant summary judgment on wife’s physical injury claim, her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, and the claim that wife could present evidence of the disruption of her family planning as evidence in her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on wife’s claim for future medical expenses associated with future pregnancy and husband’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, which he may support with evidence concerning the disruption of the couple’s family planning. The trial court’s ruling is affirmed in all other respects. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Clifton A. Lake, et al. v. The Memphis Landsmen, LLC, et al.
This appeal is from a jury verdict in a negligence and products liability case. Plaintiff-Husband suffered a traumatic brain injury when he was a passenger on a bus that collided with a concrete truck. Plaintiff-Husband and Plaintiff-Wife filed suit against the bus manufacturer, the bus owner, and the bus owner’s franchisor. The jury found that the Plaintiffs suffered $8,543,630 in damages, but apportioned 100% of the fault for the collision to the owner of the concrete truck, with whom the Plaintiffs reached a settlement prior to trial. Plaintiffs appealed. We find that the jury’s verdict was proper and is supported by material evidence. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ms. B., Individually and on Behalf of Minor Child, John Doe, "N" v. Boys and Girls Club Of Middle Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiff filed an action against Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, in addition to its Tennessee affiliate and others, seeking damages arising from alleged sexual and emotional abuse of a minor child by a Big Brothers Big Sisters of Middle Tennessee volunteer. The trial court determined that the national organization did not owe a duty to the minor child and entered summary judgment in favor of the organization. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Francis L. Johnston, as Trustee of the Mae Charlayne Johnston Revocable Family Trust v. Charles Glen Johnston
This action involves a dispute regarding the validity of an $80,000 check written against the revocable living trust account of the decedent by the defendant, who is the decedent’s nephew. Two days before the decedent’s death, the defendant deposited the check into a personal savings account he held jointly with the decedent. The plaintiff, serving as trustee and as personal representative of the decedent’s estate, filed a complaint seeking recovery of the $80,000. The trial court issued an ex parte restraining order, directing, inter alia, the bank where the joint account was held to transfer $80,000 to the clerk and master for safekeeping in the registry of the court. Following a bench trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the $80,000 check at issue was a forgery and that the defendant did not have permission from the decedent to sign the check. The court directed the $80,000 to be transferred from the clerk and master to the decedent’s estate account and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim for damages. The defendant appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Colette Suzanne Turman v. Fred Turman
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Meeks v. Bryant Leo Meeks
In this child support case, Father appeals the trial court’s determination that he was voluntarily underemployed. We have reviewed the record and the relevant authorityand find that the trial court did not err in concluding that Father was underemployed for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Wayne McElhiney v. Elizabeth Allison Billips
This appeal involves a post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. Mother appeals the trial court’s decision modifying the parenting plan to designate Father the primary residential parent of the parties’ children. Finding no error in the court’s ruling, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |
