William E. Cherry et. al. v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of the Department of Revenue for the State of Tennessee
Plaintiffs filed suit to recover income taxes paid under protest pursuant to Tennessee’s Hall Income Tax. At issue is a “Special Dividend” Plaintiffs received that was classified by the corporation for income tax purposes as a return of “paid-in capital.” Plaintiffs contend the Special Dividend was exempt because the Hall Income Tax states, in pertinent part, that “no distribution of capital shall be taxed as income under this chapter, and no distribution of surplus by way of stock dividend shall be taxable in the year such distribution is made; but all other distributions out of earned surplus shall be taxed as income when and in whatever manner made, regardless of when such surplus was earned[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-2-104(e)(7) (2011). The trial court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs based upon a finding that “[t]he Special Dividend was not a leveraged dividend and as such the reduction in book value could have onlycome through a return of capital distribution.” We have determined the mere fact the dividend was not a leveraged dividend is not sufficient to prove the dividend was exempt from the Tennessee Hall Income Tax. To qualify for the exemption, Plaintiffs had the burden to prove the Special Dividend was paid out of capital. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-2-104(e)(7). We, therefore, reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the Department of Revenue and for other proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Lampley, et al. v. Town of Chapel Hill, Tennessee, et al.
A real estate developer entered an agreement with the Town of Chapel Hill to purchase sewer and water taps in exchange for the Town’s extension of a sewer line to the developer’s property. The developer paid the money and the Town extended the line, as agreed. Developer later lost the property through foreclosure before development occurred. When the property was sold to a third party, the Town transferred the sewer and water taps to the purchasers. The developer filed a complaint alleging the Town breached the agreement by transferring taps that belonged to the developer to the third party purchasers. The Town denied it breached the agreement and moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Town’s motion for summary judgment and the developer appealed. We affirm. The agreement evidences the parties’ intention that the sewer and water taps were to be used in connection with the development of the property the developer owned when the agreement was executed. When the developer lost the property through foreclosure, the developer had no more interest in the taps. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Cindy Wheatley, et al. v. Robert J. Martineau, et al.
This appeal arises from a certiorari proceeding instituted in December of 2011 in which owners of property adjoining a landfill sought review of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation’s decision in October 2011 to issue a modification of a permit to operate a Class II disposal facilitywhich was issued in 2008. The trial court held that the approval of the modification in 2011 was invalid because it was grounded on the 2008 permit, which the court also held to be invalidly approved; the court ordered the Commissioner to take action to void the 2008 permit and 2011 modification. The Commissioner and landfill owner appeal the holding that the 2008 permit and 2011 modification are null and void; adjoining landowners appeal the denial of their request for injunctive relief and ask this court to decide two issues which the trial court did not address. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the issuance of the 2008 permit and to declare it void; that the Commissioner’s authority to approve the 2011 modification was not conditioned on the expansion project being approved by the city and county legislative bodies; that the landfill owner was not required to submit the 2011 modification application to the regional solid waste board prior to securing the Commissioner’s approval; and that the Commissioner had no dutyto require thatthe material to be placed in the landfill be determined not hazardous prior to approving the modification. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Qui Pham v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
Inmate filed petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of decisions of the Board of Parole denying him parole and setting a two year period for his next consideration. Trial court dismissed petition; finding no error, we affirm the decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Breckinridge Wheeler v. Joseph Robert Wheeler
Following a 26-year marriage, Wife was granted a divorce,designated the primary residential parent of their children and given sole decision making authority for the minor children’s education, health and medical care, and extracurricular activities; Husband was ordered to pay child support, pendente lite support of $7,000 per month, post-divorce support at the same rate as pendente lite support until the marital residence was sold, transitional alimony of $3,600 for 48 months commencing upon the sale of the marital residence, and $25,000 of Wife’s attorneys’ fees. The parties’ separate and marital assets were classified, and the marital assets and debts were divided. Husband appeals, challenging Wife’s designation as the sole decision making authority for the children’s educational and extracurricular activities, the amount of Wife’s income for purposes of child support, the awards for pendente lite support, the indefinite award of post-divorce support and the additional award of transitional alimony for 48 months. Husband also challenges the classification and division of the marital estate, including holding him liable for one-half of the $335,000 home equity line of credit debt, most of which was incurred during the pendency of the divorce, and the award of attorneys’ fees to Wife. We have determined that Wife is not entitled to receive post-divorce support of $7,000 per month in addition to the award of transitional alimony of $3,600 for a term of 48 months; therefore, we reverse the indefinite post-divorce support award of $7,000 per month. We also modify the award of transitional alimony of $3,600 per month, reducing the term from 48 months to 24 months with the term commencing upon the entry of the Final Decree of Divorce. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. As for Wife’s request to recover the attorneys’ fees she incurred on appeal, we respectfully deny that request. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bayrock Investment Co. v. Joseph D. Blankenship, M.D., et al.
This is a breach of contract case stemming from a commercial lease between Plaintiff Landlord and Defendant Tenants. Beginning in August 2011, Defendants failed to make rent payments in violation of their lease with Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently filed this lawsuit seeking damages specified in the lease. In response, Defendants raised the affirmative defense of unclean hands, contending that Plaintiff breached the lease first by objecting to and/or interfering with Defendants’ right under the lease to sublease the property without Plaintiff’s consent. The trial court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, finding that Defendants failed to perform under the lease by failing to pay rent, and finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding any allegation that Plaintiff interfered with Defendant’s ability to sublease the property. The Defendants argue that summary judgment was inappropriate because there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bayrock breached the lease first by interfering with Defendants’ right to sublease. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Stanley Walker v. Bradley County Government, et al.
This appeal arises out of an inmate’s allegedly improper early release from jail. Stanley Walker (“Walker”), alleging that he was improperly released early from jail because the authorities did not want to pay for his medical care, sued Bradley County and Capt. Gabriel Thomas (“the Defendants”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court dismissed certain of Walker’s claims for failure to state a claim and ultimately granted summary judgment for the Defendants on the remaining claim. Walker timely appealed. We hold, inter alia, that Walker has no private right of action for being released early from jail, and we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Laurel Hills Condominiums Property Owners' Association v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority
A water utility challenges the authority of the Tennessee Regulatory Authority to order it to divest itself of the water system and to continue providing service until the sale. We find no error in the actions of the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Grayson H.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Grayson H., the minor child (“Child”) of Steven H. (“Father”) and Jessica L. (“Mother”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on March 9, 2012, following Father’s incarceration and Mother’s subsequent arrest. Mother’s parental rights to the Child were terminated in a separate proceeding. On October 17, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father. Following a bench trial held on July 11, 2013, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Father had abandoned the Child by showing wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare and (2) the conditions causing the removal of the Child into protective custody persisted. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda S. Harper v. William H. Harper
The parties to this proceeding were divorced in 2003; in the final decree, Wife was awarded one-half of Husband’s military retirement. In 2005, the court modified the final decree to provide that the portion of Husband’s retirement pay designated for his disability benefits was not marital property and, therefore, was not to be included in the amount Wife received from Husband. Wife filed a contempt proceeding in 2011 alleging that Husband was failing to pay her the amount of his retirement pay he was required to pay. In March 2012, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it did not find Husband to be in contempt; Wife thereafter filed various motions seeking to have the court modify the manner in which Husband was computing the amount she would receive. Wife appeals the denial of relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
LeAnn Barnes v. David Ellett Barnes
Following a five-day divorce trial, the trial court valued and divided the parties’ sizeable marital estate, awarded $6,000 per month in alimony in futuro to Wife, and declined to award attorney’s fees to either party. On cross-motions to alter or amend, the trial court altered its division of marital property as to several assets, and it modified the alimony award from $6,000 per month in alimony in futuro to $4,300 per month in rehabilitative alimony for four years. Wife then filed another post-trial motion, pro se, which the trial court denied. Wife appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for such other proceedings as may be necessary. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Christina A. Brown, et al v. Marisol Juarez, et al.
This appeal involves Plaintiffs’ motion to set aside an order to dismiss for failure to prosecute in a personal injury action. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse Bentley v. Wellmont Health System, et al
This is a health care liability action in which Defendants sought dismissal, claiming that the action was barred by the three-year statute of repose, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116, as interpreted by Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005). Plaintiff alleged that the Court’s interpretation of the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his case. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Denzil Russ Partin v. Gary Perkins, in his capacity as Campbell County Sheriff
This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 8, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until August 9, 2013, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the order to which it is directed. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Anthony Norfleet v. Audra Ann Norfleet
This is an appeal from a finding of contempt. When the parents of a six year old girl divorced, they agreed to name the father as the child’s primary residential parent. The mother subsequently acted in a hostile and uncooperative way towards the father, and her parenting time was reduced. Shortly thereafter, the father filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had failed to pay court-ordered child support for four consecutive months. Following a hearing, the trial court held the mother in contempt. She argues on appeal that the trial court erred by trying criminal and civil contempt in the same proceeding. She also argues that the trial court’s order was invalid, because it did not specifically state that her actions were “willful.” We affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ty-Shawn H.
The Juvenile Court for Johnson City (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Frank G. (“Father”) to the minor child Ty-Shawn H. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to this Court. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Pepper & Brothers P.L.L.C. v. Brett Jones
A homeowner who was sued by a contractor hired an attorney to defend against the suit. The homeowner and the attorney entered into a contract where by the attorney would charge $225 per hour, calculate the bill in quarter hour increments and bill monthly. The homeowner made his monthly payments as the litigation progressed, but after he became dissatisfied with the service he was getting, he stopped paying . He subsequently discharged the attorney and hired other counsel. The attorney sent the homeowner a final bill for $8,529. The homeowner paid $4,000 and offered to settle the remainder for a lesser amount. The attorney refused and brought suit against the homeowner for the unpaid balance. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the attorney. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hannah W., et al.
The Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of Ralph D.M. (“Father”) to the minor twin children Alexis W. and Hannah W. (“the Children”) on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(2), and persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights asserting that he is neither the biological father nor the legal father of the Children and, therefore, had no parental rights to the Children to be terminated. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father is the Children’s legal father, that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights, and that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Children. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Maury Bronstein, IRA v. Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc.
The trial court vacated an arbitration award in favor of Respondent Morgan Keegan on the ground of evident partiality. Finding Petitioner failed to introduce evidence to support allegations of evident partiality, we reverse and remand to the trial court for confirmation of the arbitration award. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Alissa Owen (Formerly Haas) v. Darin Haas
Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 petition to set aside the marital dissolution agreement and permanent parenting plan in their final decree of divorce; she contends she entered into the agreements under duress due to coercion by her husband. The trial court concluded the marital dissolution agreement and permanent parenting plan were not entered into under duress; the court also found that the permanent parenting plan was in the best interests of the children. Finding the trial court applied the correct legal standards and the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
John Payne as next of kin on behalf of the legal minor heirs of Marcus K. Payne v. Tipton County, Tennessee
This is a negligence case filed against Tipton County for injuries an inmate sustained as a result of a severe hypertensive crisis that occurred while he was confined in the Tipton County jail. The trial court denied the claim, finding that Tipton County did not breach the duty of care. Based on the evidence in the record, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this matter for consideration of damages. Reversed and remanded. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Stanley Don Runyon v. Melanie Fortner Runyon
This is a Rule 10B appeal of the denial of a petition for recusal. In this divorce case, the trial court bifurcated the issues and conducted a 15-day evidentiary hearing solely on the parties’ parenting arrangement. Months later, the trial court entered an order designating the father as the primary residential parent and giving the mother supervised parenting time. The mother was denied permission for an interlocutory appeal from the parenting order. Several months after that, the mother discovered that, in the course of drafting the parenting order, the trial judge’s office had an ex parte exchange with the guardian ad litem to confirm a minor factual matter. The mother alleged that the trial judge had violated ethical rules against such ex parte communications and filed a motion asking the trial judge to recuse herself. The trial court denied the motion to recuse. The mother filed this accelerated interlocutory appeal of the denial of her recusal motion pursuant to Rule 10B of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules. We decline to adjudicate whether there was a breach of any ethical rules. As to the trial judge’s denial of the motion for recusal, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bradford E. Holliday, et al. v. Homer C. Patton, et al.
Bradford E. Holliday, Michael A. Holliday, and Clayton E. Holliday (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Homer C. Patton and Jeffrey B. Presley (collectively “Defendants”) for breach of contract and specific performance. Plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted after finding and holding, inter alia, that the release provision contained in an amended agreement executed by Defendants “contains broad release language which the Court finds to be adequate to release claims of fraud asserted now by the Defendants in this action.” Defendants appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the release was sufficient to waive claims of fraud and whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Defendants could not have reasonably relied upon representations made by Bradford E. Holliday. We find and hold that the release language contained in the amended agreement was insufficient to release claims of fraud and that there are genuine issues of material fact as to the issue of reasonable reliance, and we reverse the grant of summary judgment. We, however, affirm that portion of the Trial Court’s order memorializing Defendants’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice of their counterclaims for fraud against Michael A. Holliday and Clayton E. Holliday. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tonita Reeves v. Pederson-Kronseder, LLC, d/b/a Pederson's Natural Farms, Inc.
Employee and Employer were preparing to arbitrate Employee’s age discrimination claim when parties began discussing settlement. Employer was responsible for arbitration expenses and made an offer to settle Employee’s claim before incurring bulk of expenses. Employee was aware of Employer’s motivation to avoid paying these fees. Employee attempted to accept offer of settlement three days before arbitration was scheduled, which was after Employer was required to pay $9,000 deposit for arbitration and incurred other necessary expenses preparing for hearing. Employer informed Employee its offer had lapsed and was no longer open. Employee sued for breach of contract. Trial court found Employee did not accept Employer’s offer within reasonable period of time and that there was no settlement contract to enforce. Employee appeals trial court’s judgment. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gabriel B. et al
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Gabriel B., Gracie B., and Zachary B., the minor children (“Children”) of Donna B. (“Mother”) and Richard B. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on June 9, 2011, after they had been found in the care of an inappropriate caregiver while Mother was out of state. On April 19, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Father subsequently surrendered his parental rights to the Children and is not a party to this action. Following a bench trial held on November 9, 2012, and January 4, 2013, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans, (3) the conditions causing the removal of the Children into protective custody persisted, and (4) Mother’s mental condition was impaired to the point of being unable to provide for the further care and supervision of the Children. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals |
