In re Jamie G.
In this termination of parental rights case, Mother appeals the trial court’s findings of abandonment by willful failure to support and the persistence of conditions as grounds for termination. Mother also appeals the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best interest. Pre-adoptive parents appeal the trial court’s decision declining to find the ground of willful failure to visit. We affirm the trial court’s findings of willful failure to support and persistent conditions. Further, albeit for different reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision declining to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of willful failure to visit. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest, and therefore, affirm the termination of the Mother’s parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Stephen Keown v. Alyson Savino Keown
The parties were married for less than two years, and they had one child together who was three years old at the time of the divorce. Shortly after the child’s birth, Mother moved with the child to New York to be near her family. The trial court named Mother the primary residential parent, ordered Father to pay $697 a month in child support, awarded Father one weekend a month of visitation, and ordered Mother responsible for the transportation costs of the child to visit Father, including the cost of an additional ticket for a parent or guardian to fly with the three-year-old child. In dividing the parties’ property, the trial court found that a 2006 Range Rover, purchased by Father’s business before the marriage, was not marital property. Mother appeals the trial court’s ruling that she pay all transportation costs to facilitate Father’s parenting time, and the classification of the Range Rover. We have determined that the annual cost to Mother to transport the child to Tennessee to facilitate Father’s parenting time will likely exceed the annual award of child support until the child reaches the required age to fly alone, creating an injustice to Mother; moreover, Father only requested that Mother be responsible for half of the cost of transportation, not all costs. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion, we modify the trial court’s judgment to require both parties to equally share the costs of transportation concerning Father’s parenting time. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Spydell Davidson v. Nader Baydoun, et al.
This is Plaintiff’s second appeal of the dismissal of his legal malpractice claim. The first appeal arose from the grant of a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) wherein the trial court concluded that Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued more than one year before the complaint was filed and was time barred. Based solely on a review of the allegations in the complaint, we concluded that the action was not time barred. See Davidson v. Baydoun, No. M2008-02746-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 2365563 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2009). On remand, the parties engaged in discovery, which revealed that Plaintiff knew he had been injured by Defendants’ alleged negligence more than one year before the commencement of this action. Defendants then filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.02 motion for summary judgment, which was properly supported by a statement of undisputed facts, contending they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding it was undisputed that Plaintiff knew he had suffered an injury because of Defendants’ alleged negligence more than one year before the commencement of this action. The trial court also granted Defendants’ motion for discretionary costs. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and by awarding Defendants discretionary costs. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kline Preston v. W. Stanford Bralock, et al.
This is a malicious prosecution case. In the underlying case, plaintiff was sued by defendants for abuse of process. That case was resolved on summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiff filed this case for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Braydon C.
Petitioners Father and Stepmother filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment for failure to visit and failure to support. The trial court denied the petition upon determining that Petitioners failed to demonstrate willful abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In re Wesley P.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of both mother and father on the ground of severe abuse. Because there is sufficient evidence to conclude that mother and father were engaged in methamphetamine manufacture in their home, we affirm the finding of severe abuse. However, because no clear and convincing evidence exists in the record that termination is in the child's best interest, we reverse the termination of both mother's and father's parental rights. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Burke Pair v. Chris Franklin Pair
In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s finding that Husband did not dissipate marital funds, the award of alimony, and the division of marital property. Finding that the award of support and division of property is supported by the evidence and consistent with the applicable law, we affirm the judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
David R. Smith v. The Tennessee National Guard
This is the second appeal from an action filed by Plaintiff against the Tennessee National Guard in which he contends Defendant violated the Uniformed Service Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”) by refusing to rehire Plaintiff after he returned from active duty military service. In the first appeal, we affirmed the grant of Defendant’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon sovereign immunity from USERRA claims, noting that only the Tennessee General Assembly could waive the state’s sovereign immunity. See Smith v. Tennessee Nat. Guard, 387 S.W.3d 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). Shortly after we issued that opinion, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-208, which waives sovereign immunity for USERRA claims that accrue on or after July 1, 2014. Relying on the new statute, Plaintiff filed a Rule 60 motion seeking to have his original lawsuit reinstated. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiff’s claim was still barred by sovereign immunity because it accrued before July 1, 2014. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Synovus Bank v. David A. Paczko, et al
Bank sued borrowers on a lost or destroyed promissory note. Borrowers, among other defenses, denied that the note was in default and the amount due. Borrowers also claimed that bank had destroyed the note with the intention of discharging the obligation. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment in favor of bank. Borrowers appeal, claiming the affidavits filed in support of the bank’s motion for summary judgment were deficient, the existence of disputed material facts, the indebtedness had been discharged, and that further discovery should have been permitted by the trial court. We vacate and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Justin H.
This appeal involves a child support order entered after an international adoption. The trial court found that the child's adoptive mother failed to pay child support as previously ordered by the court, and therefore, the mother was adjudged in contempt. On appeal, the mother argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the previous order requiring her to pay child support and also lacked jurisdiction to hold her in contempt of that order. Alternatively, she argues that she did not willfully violate the court's order. Finally, the mother argues that a separate injunction entered by the trial court is also void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or procedural irregularities. We affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of Leonard Malugin
This is a will contest case. The Decedent executed a will in 2006 and a codicil to the will in 2012. The will specifically disinherited the Appellant, and the codicil removed one of the Decedent’s children as co-executor of the estate. Appellant contested the will, arguing both that the Decedent lacked the testamentary capacity to execute either the will or the codicil and that the will was executed under undue influence. The trial court found that the Decedent possessed the testamentary capacity necessary to execute both the will and the codicil and that the Decedent did not execute the will or codicil under undue influence. On appeal, Appellant only challenges the trial court’s findings regarding the Decedent’s testamentary capacity. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. White, et al v. Turnberry Homes, LLC, et al.
Homeowners sued the builder and others for defects in their home. The builder sought to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the purchase agreement. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration except as to the fraudulent inducement claim. The builder appealed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Phyllis Smith v. Shelby County
In this premises liability action, Appellant Phyllis Smith (“Ms. Smith”) appeals the trial court’s finding that Shelby County (“the County”) is immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Because we conclude that the order appealed from is not a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ophelia Carney v. Santander Consumer USA
This appeal involves the trial court's denial of a recusal motion. We affirm the trial court's decision to deny the motion to recuse, but vacate the order entered by the trial court while the recusal motion was pending. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In re Conservatorship of Timothy Beasley
A man was injured in an accident, and his relatives initiated conservatorship proceedings in the probate court of Rutherford County. The conservators were dissatisfied with the probate court’s handling of the case and moved to have the case removed to the chancery court. The probate court granted the motion to remove, but the chancery court determined the removal was improper and sent the case back to the probate court. The conservators appealed the chancery court’s decision to review the probate court’s order granting the removal. On appeal, we note that the probate court and the chancery court in Rutherford County have concurrent jurisdiction over conservatorship proceedings. Neither court is inferior to the other, and an appeal from either court is to the Court of Appeals. The chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine any issues in the conservatorship once the case was filed in the probate court. We vacate the judgment by the chancery court and remand the case to the probate court for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Abdelrahman Amrokbeer v. Richard Roberts, et al.
A corporate officer responsible for paying over the sales taxes collected by a corporation pled guilty to attempted tax evasion under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-1-1440. As part of his plea agreement, the criminal court ordered the corporate officer to pay restitution in the amount of $17,500. After completing probation, the Department of Revenue notified the corporate officer of an individual sales tax assessment of $137,493.76 arising from the corporation’s operations. The corporate officer filed a complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court challenging the assessment. The corporate officer argued that the amount of the criminal restitution, which he had already paid, was the full amount of his individual liability to the Department. The Department filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Concluding that criminal restitution and civil tax liability are separate and distinct, we affirm the dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Milton Arledge v. Brenda Pauletter Cripps Arledge, et al.
This case concerns the applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-12-119(c). When the trial court grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Section 20-12-119(c) requires the trial court to award the dismissed party his or her reasonable attorney’s fees. In this case, Appellant was dismissed from the lawsuit, but the trial court denied an award of attorney’s fees. Because the trial court’s orders do not specify on what grounds it dismissed Appellant, we cannot determine whether Section 20-12-119(c) was triggered in this case. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for entry of an order specifying the grounds for dismissal. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In re Ariana S., et al
This case arises from the termination of parental rights of the father of two children, Ariana S., born April 2002, and Luis S., born February 2003. Father left his children and moved to Puerto Rico in 2007; he has been incarcerated since 2012. Father’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit or support and persistence of conditions; he appeals. We reverse the termination on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and persistence of conditions and affirm the termination of Father’s rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Teneccia Brown v. Memphis Housing Authority
Appellee commenced a lawsuit in the Shelby County Chancery Court seeking to invalidate a writ of possession that previously had been filed pursuant to an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court. After conducting a hearing on the matter, the Chancery Court entered an order granting Appellee her request for relief. Because we conclude that Appellee’s lawsuit constituted a collateral attack of the Circuit Court judgment, and there is nothing in the record indicating that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction, the Chancery Court’s order is hereby vacated. We remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an order dismissing Appellee’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Tanasia A.
This case involves a petition for grandparent visitation filed by the paternal grandparents of the child at issue. The trial court granted the petition for visitation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306. Because the trial court did not make appropriate written findings in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we do not reach the merits of this appeal. We vacate and remand for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Erastus James Mummery v. Mark Lucko, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint in a negligence case. After Appellant’s case was dismissed, he filed a notice of appeal pro se. Significant procedural shortcomings in Appellant’s brief on appeal prevent this Court from reaching any substantive issues. We therefore affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Dill v. City of Clarksville
Plaintiff was terminated from his employment as a City of Clarksville police officer in August 2010. The trial court affirmed, and Plaintiff appealed. We determined that the City had failed to follow its disciplinary procedures when it terminated Plaintiff’s employment, vacated the termination, and remanded the matter. Upon remand, the City upheld termination of Plaintiff, and the trial court again affirmed. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In re T.L.G.
In this termination of parental rights case, J.L.B., Jr. (Father), appeals the order terminating his rights to his minor daughter, T.L.G. (the Child). The Department of Children's Services (DCS) removed the Child from the home of her mother, G.M.G. (Mother) after Mother was arrested for domestic violence. DCS took temporary custody and placed the Child in foster care. The Child was subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected. Some eight months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate each of the parents' rights. After a trial, the court granted the petition.1 The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) multiple grounds for termination exist, and (2) termination is in the Child's best interest. Father challenges the finding of grounds for termination, but does not question the court's decision that termination is in the Child's best interest. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Borla Performance Industries, Inc. v. Universal Tool and Engineering, Inc.
Borla Performance Industries, Inc. (Borla) entered into two contracts with Universal Tool and Engineering, Inc. (UTE), by the terms of which UTE was to repair and refurbish six of Borla's pipe bending machines, which machines are used in Borla's business of designing and manufacturing automobile exhaust systems. Borla later sued UTE for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Borla alleged that as a result of UTE's failure to timely repair and deliver the machines, which are also known as “benders,” Borla incurred lost profits in the amount of $486,166. After a four-day bench trial, the court dismissed Borla's negligent misrepresentation and TCPA claims; the court did grant Borla a judgment for $11,839.98 on its breach of contract claim. The trial court held that Borla failed to prove that it incurred lost profits as a result of a breach of contract by UTE. Borla appeals the trial court's judgment denying its claims for lost profits. Borla also appeals the court's judgment dismissing the TCPA claim. UTE appeals the judgment against it for breach of contract. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Autumn L.
This appeal arises from a termination of parental rights proceeding. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Ashley L. (“Mother”) and Aaron B. (“Father”) to their minor child Autumn L. (“the Child”) in the Juvenile Court for Claiborne County (“the Juvenile Court”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child on a number of grounds. Mother and Father appeal to this Court. In addition to challenging the termination of their parental rights to the Child, Mother and Father argue that the case should be remanded to the Juvenile Court because the Juvenile Court did not enter an order within 30 days of the hearing as required by statute. We hold, inter alia, that remand is not an appropriate remedy for this noncompliance with statute and would serve no purpose. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in all respects. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals |
