Marlene J. Bidelman-Dye v. James D. Dye
In this post-divorce matter, numerous issues arose after the former wife, the primary residential parent, sought to relocate with the minor child. The trial court allowed the wife to relocate with the child to Pennsylvania and adopted her proposed parenting plan with certain modifications. On the issues raised in this appeal, the trial court ruled in the husband's favor. The wife appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Lynn Odom, et al. v. Claiborne County, Tennessee, et. al.
An “affidavit of complaint” was issued against Lisa Odom for custodial interference. Deputies from the Claiborne County Sheriff's Office visited Ms. Odom for the purpose of taking custody of her child and returning her to Ms. Odom's ex-husband, Scott Odom. Ms. Odom objected to the removal of her child, and William Phipps, Ms. Odom's father, asked to see a warrant prior to the removal of the child. After a prolonged standoff, the deputies called Assistant District Attorney General Amanda Sammons, who explained over a speakerphone that a warrant was not necessary because there was a court order for Ms. Odom to return the child to Mr. Odom. During the course of the phone call, Ms. Odom overheard General Sammons use derogatory language when referring to her. Ms. Odom was ultimately arrested for custodial interference. Nearly a year later, Ms. Odom and Mr. Phipps (collectively the plaintiffs) filed a complaint against General Sammons alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy. General Sammons filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Farley v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security
This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for judicial review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioner is seeking to recover a motor vehicle he claims to own that was seized due to “illegal alterations to the vehicle’s identification numbers.” It is undisputed that the petitioner was never the registered owner of the vehicle, that he was not in possession of the vehicle when it was seized, and that he did not receive notice of the seizure of the vehicle or the issuance of the notice of forfeiture. More than 60 days after the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security issued the Order of Forfeiture, which constitutes the Department’s final order, the petitioner filed his petition for judicial review. His primary contention was that the Department of Safety failed to provide him with proper notice of the issuance of forfeiture warrant. The chancery court rejected this contention, concluding that he was not entitled to notice because he was never the registered owner. The court also found the petition for judicial review was untimely filed because administrative orders become final pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b)(1)(A) if a petition for judicial review is not filed within 60 days from the entry of the order. Concluding that the 60-day limitation period is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Clayton Keltner, et al v. Estate of Mary Lois Simpkins, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute arising from the plaintiff’s attempted exercise of an option to purchase a tract of land. In part, the contract provided that “a fair and equitable price for said property will be established at a later date.” The trial court held that the option was not enforceable because it was too vague with respect to price. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
In re K.J.G.
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Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In re K.J.G. - Dissenting
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Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Wendy W. Rose v. Lisa Bushon, et al.
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
BancorpSouth Bank v. 51 Concrete, LLC, et al.
This is a conversion case. The appellant bank perfected a security interest in collateral for a loan made to its debtor. The debtor subsequently sold the collateral to appellee companies, representing that there were no liens on the collateral. The appellee companies subsequently resold the collateral. Later, the debtor defaulted on the loan, and the appellant bank obtained a default judgment against him. The debtor then filed bankruptcy. The appellant bank filed this lawsuit against the appellee companies for conversion, seeking the proceeds from the sale of the collateral. The trial court awarded judgments against both appellee companies, plus prejudgment interest accruing from the date of the appellant bank's prior default judgment against the debtor. The appellant bank appealed arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in determining the date from which prejudgment interest began to accrue. The appellee companies contend that the appellant bank should not be awarded prejudgment interest. On appeal, we affirm the trial court's decision to award prejudgment interest but modify the amount of the award. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Michelle Amanda Creigton v. James Michael Hayner
Father seeks to declare a child support arrearage judgment entered in January 2005 void ab initio for lack of service of process. The dispositive issue is whether the petition for civil contempt and summons issued in August 2004 were properly served on Father. It is undisputed that the 2004 petition and summons were delivered to an attorney’s office and left with the receptionist. After learning that a summons and petition had been “served on Father” at her office, the attorney promptly notified Mother’s attorney she was not authorized to accept service on Father’s behalf and that she did not represent Father in the pending matter. When the petition came on for hearing, no one appeared on behalf of Father, and the juvenile court entered an arrearage judgment for the amount owed. Several years later, Father filed a motion seeking to set aside the 2005 judgment as void for lack of service of process. The motion was supported by affidavits from the attorney and Father. The attorney testified that she was not authorized to accept service on Father’s behalf and that she did not represent Father in the pending matter. In his affidavit, Father confirmed the testimony of the attorney and he further stated that he was in the United Kingdom when service of process was attempted. The juvenile court held that Father was properly served and denied the motion. Father appealed, insisting the January 2005 arrearage judgment was void ab initio for lack of service of process. The State, acting on behalf of Mother in this appeal, admits in its brief that service of process was not properly effectuated, and that the judgment obtained on January 2005 is void. We agree. Accordingly, the judgment of the juvenile court entered on November 25, 2014, is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions for the juvenile court to enter an order declaring the January 2005 arrearage judgment void. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth D. Hardy v. Tennessee State University, et al
Former state university police officer brought suit against the university, its governing board, and the university’s chief of police asserting causes of action under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”); the officer alleged that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his sex and in retaliation for filing a complaint of discrimination with the university and charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and that he was subjected to a hostile work environment and constructively discharged. At a hearing on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all causes of action the trial court orally granted the motion in full; in the final order the court adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law which had been prepared by counsel for defendants. The officer appeals the dismissal of all causes of action except for sex discrimination; he also asserts that the findings and conclusions do not comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Holding that the findings and conclusions adopted by the court reflect the court’s independent analysis as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 with respect to the incidents which were alleged to violate the TPPA, we review the grant of summary judgment and affirm the judgment. As to the causes of action arising under Title VII and the THRA, we conclude that TSU was only entitled to summary judgment on the claim that the officer was constructively discharged and on all claims of retaliation except those arising from his transfer to the downtown campus and from multiple warnings the officer received for tardiness, and from his claim of a hostile work environment with respect to numerous write-ups he received. Accordingly, we remand the case for further proceedings related to those claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alexis Breanna Gladden v. Cumberland Trust and Investment Company et al.
We granted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9 in this case to consider whether the signature of the trustee of the Alexis Breanna Gladden Irrevocable Trust (“the Trust”) on an investment/brokerage account agreement agreeing to arbitration binds the minor beneficiary of the Trust to conduct arbitration of unknown future disputes or claims. We find and hold that while the plain language of the trust agreement does allow the trustee to agree to arbitrate claims and disputes that have arisen, it does not allow the trustee to agree to arbitration of unknown future disputes or claims. Therefore, the signature of the trustee of the Trust on an investment/brokerage account agreement agreeing to arbitration does not bind the minor beneficiary to conduct arbitration of unknown future disputes or claims. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Daniel E. Blandford v. Tanya L. Blandford
This appeal involves a juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction to address a post-divorce matter of child support. The parties were divorced through judgment entered by the Knox County Fourth Circuit Court. Although the Circuit Court initially ordered the mother to pay child support for the parties’ three children, the Circuit Court subsequently entered an agreed order in 2008, directing that neither party would be obligated to pay child support from that date forward. The father commenced the instant action on June 7, 2010, by filing a petition in the Knox County Juvenile Court, alleging dependency and neglect as to the mother. Following a hearing conducted on February 14, 2011, the Juvenile Court entered an agreed order awarding “custody” to the father and finding the children dependent and neglected as to the mother. The father subsequently filed a petition to set child support. Following a hearing conducted on June 1, 2012, the Juvenile Court magistrate entered findings and recommendations, setting the mother’s child support obligation. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Wayne Masse v. Mandy Joe Masse Cottar
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Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Jarratt Bell et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County et al
In 1979, a property owner (“Owner”) was notified that his property was in violation of the zoning ordinance, which allowed a maximum of two dwelling units in that area. The property contained five dwelling units. Owner appealed the zoning administrator’s decision to the board of zoning appeals (“BZA”), which permitted him to retain the five units for as long as he owned the property. In 2014, when Owner decided to sell the property, he petitioned the zoning administrator to remove the ownership condition so that another owner could maintain the five units. The administrator denied this request, and Owner appealed to the BZA, which removed the ownership condition. Five nearby property owners filed a writ of certiorari in chancery court challenging the BZA’s decision. The chancery court vacated the BZA’s decision, finding that the BZA acted arbitrarily in removing the ownership condition and then failing to consider the effect of this decision, namely, the creation of a new permanent variance without a determination that the property met the statutory standards. The chancery court remanded the case to the BZA for further consideration. Owner appeals, and we affirm the chancery court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Judith Moore-Pennoyer v. State of Tennessee, et al.
This is a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal for a determination as to whether a person who has prevailed in a judicial election, but not yet assumed the office of judge, acts as a “state officer or employee” for purposes of the waiver provision set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(b), when making administrative staffing provisions. The plaintiff filed this action alleging tortious interference with an employment relationship by the defendant, a newly elected circuit court judge. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that he was entitled to immunity based upon his position as a state officer. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the defendant did not enjoy any form of immunity and that the waiver provision did not apply because he was not yet a state officer or employee when the actions at issue took place before he took the oath of office and assumed his position. The court denied the motion to dismiss but granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9. We granted permission to appeal and now affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Troy L. Boswell p/k/a Leroy Troy v. RFD-TV The Theater, LLC, et al
This appeal arises out of a breach of contract action filed by a musical performer after the defendant venue owner cancelled the show in which the plaintiff performed. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff performer and ordered the defendant to pay $70,744 in damages for breach of contract, $59,864.18 in prejudgment interest, and $90,000 in attorney’s fees. The defendant appeals, arguing that the awards of prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees were erroneous according to Nebraska law, which the parties chose to govern their contract. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald David Jones v. Kelly Ann Jones
This appeal arises from a long and turbulent custody dispute. Under the terms of the Permanent Parenting Plan, each parent was designated primary residential parent for one of the parties’ two minor children. A few months after the divorce, the father filed an emergency petition to be named the primary residential parent of the younger child. After a hearing, the trial court dissolved the ex parte restraining order but awarded temporary custody of the child to the father. Five months later, the father filed a second emergency petition to suspend visitation with the mother. After a hearing, the trial court dissolved the second restraining order but left the temporary custody order in place. Two years after the father filed the original petition to modify custody, the court conducted a final hearing. The court found a material change in circumstance had occurred sufficient to justify a change in custody and the custody change was in the best interest of the child. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact concerning the issue of material change of circumstance, as required by Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and the credibility of witnesses is at issue, we are unable to conduct an effective appellate review. While normally we would remand this case to afford the trial court the opportunity to state its findings of fact, the judge who tried this case has retired. Therefore, we have no choice but to reverse the judgment and remand for a new hearing. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
World Classic Productions, Inc. v. RFD-TV The Theater, LLC, et al.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Yount v. Fedex Express
This is an age discrimination case. The 50-year-old plaintiff worked for the defendant company as a manager. In 2007, an internal investigation revealed that the plaintiff had violated two of the company’s policies. The plaintiff was ultimately terminated for violating the policies. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging age discrimination. The company filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie claim for discrimination or that the company’s explanation for terminating him was a pretext for discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the company. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mark T. Harthun v. Joan M. Edens
This appeal arises from a contract to purchase real estate. Appellee contracted to sell Appellant the property at issue, subject to the property appraising at a certain value and the Appellant obtaining financing. Upon discovering that the property was subject to an easement held by the Tennessee Valley Authority, Appellant refused to purchase the property, contending that Appellee could not convey good and marketable title. Appellee filed suit for specific performance and also sought injunctive relief to prevent Appellant from purchasing other real property. In response, Appellant first filed a motion for summary judgment. Later, Appellant filed an answer and countercomplaint, seeking damages for breach of contract. Appellant then filed a motion for voluntary nonsuit of her countercomplaint and, on the same day, filed an amended motion for summary judgment. Appellee then filed a motion for leave to take a voluntary nonsuit. After Appellee filed his motion for nonsuit, Appellant filed a motion for attorney's fees, costs, and the return of earnest money. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for nonsuit, notwithstanding the Appellant's pending motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied Appellant's motion for attorney's fees and costs, but granted the motion for return of earnest money. Appellant appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Gabrielle R., et al.
Following an announcement in open court that the parties agreed to the terms of a permanent parenting plan, the trial court entered an order purporting to adopt the agreed-upon plan. Father appeals from this order, arguing that certain terms of the plan entered by the trial court do not match the announced agreement. Having reviewed the record, we observe that there is neither an attached child support worksheet reflecting what Father's child support would be based on the modified parenting schedule, nor any ruling on child support by the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that the order appealed is not a final judgment so as to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Gabrielle R., et al. - Dissent
The majority holds that because a reconsideration of child support is necessarily “[i]ncident to” the reconfiguration of a parenting plan, the trial court’s failure to rule on the child support modification action implicit in all successful modification of parenting time proceedings deprives this Court of jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Because I cannot accept that an agreed upon change in a parenting plan automatically necessitates an unrequested reconsideration of the parties’ child support obligations, I must respectfully dissent. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Ann Morrow Granoff v. Andrew Scott Granoff
This second appeal of this post-divorce case concerns the husband's continued occupation of the marital residence. Upon remand, the trial court imposed a rental obligation upon the husband and established a reserve price for the auction sale of the residence. We modify the court's decision to reflect an imposition of rent that conforms to the marital dissolution agreement. We affirm the decision in all other respects. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jasmine G.
At issue is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying Mother’s request for attorney’s fees. Mother filed a petition to modify child support. Father filed an answer denying the petition and a counter-petition requesting, inter alia, that he be awarded primary custody of their child. The case was initially tried before the magistrate who denied Father’s petition and granted Mother’s petition to increase child support; however, the magistrate did not rule on Mother’s request for attorney’s fee. Both parties filed motions asking the juvenile court judge to conduct a de novo review. The juvenile court judge affirmed the magistrate’s recommendations; the judge also denied Mother’s request for attorney’s fees without explanation. On appeal, Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by refusing to award any of her attorney’s fees. Given the significant disparity in the parties’ income and realizing that Mother prevailed on the issues of child support and custody, we have determined that Mother is entitled to recover the attorney’s fees she reasonably incurred that relate to the issues of child support and custody and that she is entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the juvenile court to award the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees Mother incurred relating to her petition for modification of child support and Father’s petition for custody. We also remand for the juvenile court to award Mother her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Ashton B.
Petitioner adoption service filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights, alleging several grounds under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) and abandonment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(1). The trial court denied the petition, finding no grounds to support termination. Based upon the Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586 (Tenn. 2010), that the grounds contained within Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) cannot apply to putative biological fathers, we affirm the trial court's denial of termination on those grounds. We also affirm the trial court's finding that Petitioner failed to prove abandonment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(1) by clear and convincing evidence. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
