Margaret McClain Sneed Wills v. David Kyle Wills
This is an appeal of the trial court’s award of alimony. Husband appeals the trial court’s decision to award alimony in futuro as well as the amount of alimony awarded. We vacate both the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro and the amount awarded. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Gibson v. Young Men's Christian Association Of Middle Tennessee
This is an appeal from an order denying summary judgment. The appellee signed a YMCA membership application and release agreement prior to tripping and falling on a sidewalk in front of the YMCA. The appellee filed suit, alleging negligence. The YMCA then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the appellee expressly assumed the risk of her injuries. The trial court denied the YMCA’s motion for summary judgment but granted a motion for interlocutory appeal. We reverse the trial court’s order denying summary judgment and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Siamak Kadivar v. Nahid Fathiamirkhiz a/k/a Nancy Amir
This is a divorce case. Prior to the parties’ marriage, Husband started a used car dealership with his father. Husband continued to operate the business after he and his wife were married. Husband bought his father’s interest in the company after the marriage and became the sole owner. After the parties separated, the business’s value continued to increase. Husband filed for divorce, citing irreconcilable differences. The trial court granted the divorce, and the parties agreed that the business was marital property at the time of the marriage. The trial court found that Wife did not substantially contribute to the business after the parties separated and that any increase in its value was Husband’s separate property. We reverse the trial court’s finding that the business was separate property after the parties separated, modify the judgment to reflect this reversal, and affirm in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Karla J. Dennis, et al. v. Donelson Corporate Centre I, LP, et al.
This is a negligence case. Appellee, an elevator maintenance company, contracted with building owner to provide maintenance service for the building’s elevators. Plaintiff was injured when one of the elevators allegedly did not level properly, causing her to fall as she was exiting the elevator. Plaintiff and her husband brought suit against the building’s owner, the building’s management company, and Appellee. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Appellants appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmie D. Gulley d/b/a Kleen-Way Disposal v. Robertson County Planning & Zoning Commission
This is a zoning dispute arising out of a trash-collection business being operated in an agricultural-residential zone. The county planning and zoning commission determined that the business did not comply with existing zoning. The business owner sought review before the board of zoning appeals and, when the board affirmed the commission’s decision, filed a petition for certiorari review in chancery court, which held that the board’s action was not arbitrary and was supported by material evidence. We affirm the judgment of the chancery court. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of Lois Culp
This case involves the distribution of assets in a testamentary trust. The decedent’s will provided for her real property to be left in a trust established for the benefit of her children and grandchildren. After the will was admitted to probate, the trustee filed a petition seeking judicial authorization to sell the property to avoid reoccurring expenses and prevent waste. One of the beneficiaries submitted a response in which he asserted that he and all of the other beneficiaries opposed selling the property. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it held that the will granted the trustee unrestricted authority to sell the property without judicial authorization if, in her best judgment, doing so would be in the beneficiaries’ best interest. The beneficiary appealed. We affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. Grant v. Kathy H. Grant
After a long-term marriage, the wife obtained a divorce based on the husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court determined the value of the marital property, divided the marital estate, and awarded the wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. The husband appealed, arguing the court erred in valuing his ownership interests in three general partnerships, in dividing the marital estate, and in awarding the wife alimony. After reviewing the extensive record in this case, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. Grant v. Kathy H. Grant
After a long-term marriage, the wife obtained a divorce based on the husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court determined the value of the marital property, divided the marital estate, and awarded the wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. The husband appealed, arguing the court erred in valuing his ownership interests in three general partnerships, in dividing the marital estate, and in awarding the wife alimony. After reviewing the extensive record in this case, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Benson et al v. Knox County et al.
This appeal arises from a zoning and land use dispute. The defendants applied to rezone most of the property at issue from Agricultural to Planned-Residential and sought approval of a development plan for a multi-dwelling project consisting of 312 apartment units. They also requested a Use-Permitted-on-Review approval for a marina on a portion of the property that would remain zoned as Agricultural. At issue before us are three separate actions taken by Knox County legislative and administrative bodies in relation to the requests, specifically: (A) the County Commission’s rezoning of the property from Agricultural to Planned-Residential at 1to 5 dwelling units per acre; (B) the Board of Zoning Appeals’ approval of the development plan for 312 apartment units; and (C) the Board of Zoning Appeals’ denial of the marina proposal. The trial court upheld the actions. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Mooney, et al. v. Genuine Parts Company d/b/a National Automotive Association, Inc. ("NAPA"), et al.
This appeal arises out of a premises liability case involving a plaintiff who fell while exiting an auto parts store. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We affirm and remand for further proceedings |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jimmy B., Jr.
This is a termination of parental rights case. In May 2015, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in Sevier County Juvenile Court seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child’s father. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was appropriate on the following grounds: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support; (2) severe child abuse; and (3) persistence of conditions. The juvenile court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interests. Father appealed. We hold that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to support termination on the grounds of abandonment for willful failure to support and persistence of conditions, and we reverse as to those grounds for termination. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Marianne Greer v. Philip Ernest Cobble
This is the second appeal of this case involving the distribution of a marital estate. Appellant appeals the order denying him relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 60.02). Because the appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence conveying an accurate and complete account of what transpired as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we conclude that the findings made by the trial court were based upon sufficient evidence. Affirmed and remanded. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Ian B., et al
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment. The lack of a transcript prevents us from determining whether sufficient evidence supported the termination and denies Father proper appellate consideration of his claims. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Richard H. Roberts, Commissioner, Department of Revenue
|
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marcus Belton, et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights claims based upon the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-104. Because Appellant's complaint, taken as true at the motion to dismiss stage, sufficiently alleges post-contract formation conduct on the part of the Defendants/Appellees, we conclude that the four-year federal catchall statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 1658 applies to Appellant's claims in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of Appellant's civil rights claims and remand for further proceedings. Because Appellant did not designate the dismissal of his state law contract claims as issues on appeal, however, we affirm the dismissal of those claims. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Elyse J. Reid v. Rooms To Go, A Tennessee Corporation
Plaintiff who brought action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act appeals the dismissal of the case on statute of limitations grounds. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment dismissing the case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Aniston M. et al.
This appeal arises from a termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children‘s Services ("DCS") filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Sevier County ("the Juvenile Court") seeking to terminate the parental rights of James W. ("Father") to his children Aniston and Chloe ("the Children"). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father‘s parental rights to the Children on the ground of wanton disregard and, also, finding that termination of Father‘s parental rights was in the Children‘s best interest. Father appeals, arguing that the Juvenile Court‘s failure to grant his request for appointed counsel during the earlier dependency and neglect proceeding warrants reversal of the Juvenile Court‘s order terminating his parental rights to the Children. We hold that any alleged deficiencies in the dependency and neglect proceedings were remedied by the protections afforded by the termination proceeding, and that, in any event, Father was not disadvantaged by any alleged deficiencies. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
John D. Glass v. Suntrust Bank, et al.
This appeal involves a trust. A beneficiary of the trust filed this lawsuit against the bank that served as trustee of the trust, alleging that the bank mismanaged the trust in various respects and violated several duties owed to the beneficiary. After a five-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the trustee-bank on all claims. The bank was awarded its attorney's fees and expenses. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel B. Eisenstein v. WTVF-TV, et al.
On remand from a prior appeal, the parties engaged in discovery and the defendants then moved for summary judgment on the two remaining issues – claims of false light invasion of privacy against a television station and its employees. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the standard of actual malice was not met and awarding discretionary costs against the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rogers Group, Inc. v. Phillip E. Gilbert
Judgment debtor appeals the entry of a charging order which subjected the debtor’s interest in a limited liability company to satisfaction of the judgment debt. Finding that the charging order is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Tristan B.
Father appeals the trial court's determination that termination of his parental rights is in the child's best interest. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard, persistent conditions, and substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan. The trial court thereafter determined that termination is in the child's best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm both the trial court's rulings regarding grounds and its determination that termination is in the child's best interest. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Angela Michelle Newberry v. Jeremy Mack Newberry
Father filed a petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan to make him the primary residential parent. The trial court granted Father’s petition, finding that there had been a material change of circumstances and that a change of primary residential parent was in the best interest of the two younger children. Because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in making its determination of a material change of circumstances, we vacate and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Douglas Brent Walker v. G.UB.MK Constructors
In 2003, an employee sustained injuries to his spine, pelvis, and shoulder while working for his employer. In 2007, the trial court determined that the employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the work-related injury and that his employer was responsible for authorized future medical treatment directly related to the work-related injury. In 2013, the employee filed a motion to compel medical benefits, asserting that his employer had refused to pay for medical treatment determined to be reasonable and necessary by his authorized treating physician. The trial court denied the motion, and the employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of George Lambert v. John Arnold Fitzgerald
George Lambert ("Lambert") sued John Arnold Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald") in connection with money that Lambert gave to Fitzgerald to invest alleging claims for, among other things, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, violation of the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980, and unjust enrichment. After trial and a hearing on a motion to amend, the Chancery Court for Rhea County ("the Trial Court") entered its order awarding Lambert a judgment against Fitzgerald for $33,840.28 in principal, pre-judgment interest, and attorney‘s fees pursuant to a promissory note, and dismissing Lambert‘s remaining claims. Lambert appeals to this Court raising issues with regard to the dismissal of his claims for fraud, intentional misrepresentation, violation of the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980, and unjust enrichment. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Tambra Jo Swonger v. James Henry Swonger
This appeal arises from a default judgment entered in a divorce action, wherein the wife was granted, inter alia, a permanent order of protection against the husband. The husband sought to have the permanent order of protection provision contained in the parties' divorce decree set aside, asserting that the statutory scheme pertaining to orders of protection did not provide authority for entry of a permanent, open-ended order of protection. The trial court entered an order denying relief to the husband and affirming its entry of a permanent order of protection. Husband timely appealed. Determining that the trial court was without statutory authority to enter a permanent order of protection with no time limitation, we vacate that portion of the trial court's order. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
