Timothy Roberson v. Cherry Lindamood, et al
An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed this lawsuit against three prison employees seeking to recover certain personal property. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice based on the inmate’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-805, which requires inmates wanting to proceed in forma pauperis to submit to the trial court a complete list of every previous lawsuit or claim filed by the inmate. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Frank et al. v. Ronnie Fields
This case involves a claim of undue influence against an attorney-in-fact for his role in changing bank accounts and certificates of deposit owned by the principal to be payable on death to the attorney-in-fact. The principal, or decedent in this action, died at the age of ninety-five in January 2012. The decedent was survived by two nieces and three nephews, one of whom, the defendant, was the decedent’s attorney-in-fact and the personal representative of his estate. The decedent’s two nieces and one other nephew filed a complaint alleging undue influence arising from a confidential relationship. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon finding that although a presumption of undue influence had been raised by a confidential relationship between the attorney-in-fact and the decedent, the attorney-in-fact had successfully rebutted the presumption. The plaintiffs appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Lena G.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the child, Lena G. (“the Child”), who was fifteen years of age at the conclusion of trial. On October 8, 2013, the Washington County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she has remained since that date. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order on June 11, 2014, adjudicating the Child dependent and neglected in the care of the parents. On November 19, 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Child’s mother, Sherry G. (“Mother”), and her father, Teddy G. (“Father”). The trial court admitted Mother’s hospital records as an exhibit during trial over her objection. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child after determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parents failed to provide a suitable home for the Child, (2) the parents failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, (3) the conditions that led to the removal of the Child from the parents’ custody still persisted, and (4) Mother was mentally incompetent to adequately care for the Child. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Both Mother and Father have appealed. Having determined that the Child had not been removed from the parents’ home for six months by court order when the petition to terminate parental rights was filed, we reverse the trial court’s ruling regarding the statutory ground of persistence of conditions as to both parents. We conclude that the trial court erred in admitting Mother’s hospital records but determine this error to be harmless. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Kristie Linley Sibley v. Corey D. Sibley
This is a divorce case. Wife was granted a divorce due to Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court then made a division of the parties’ marital property and debt, which included an award to Wife of the marital residence and the equity therein. The court further awarded Wife $1,100 per month for 36 months in rehabilitative alimony and $3,000 in attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Husband appeals the trial court’s awards of the marital residence and alimony to Wife. Wife seeks attorney’s fees for defending this appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. Specifically, we affirm the trial court’s award of the marital residence to Wife, and we vacate and remand for additional findings on the issues of alimony and attorney’s fees. We deny Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Katrina Parrish v. Michael Griggs
This appeal involves a petition to establish paternity, which was filed when the child was a teenager. DNA testing established the father as the biological father of the child. In the father’s counter-petition for custody, he claimed that, shortly after the child’s birth, the mother informed him that he was not the child’s father. After a two-day trial, the juvenile court entered an order establishing the father’s parentage, naming the mother primary residential parent, and changing the child’s surname to the father’s surname. The court also ordered the father to pay child support retroactive to the date of the child’s birth. On appeal, the father challenges the court’s decision regarding retroactive child support and the court’s exclusion of certain documents from the appellate record. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the father’s request for a deviation from the child support guidelines. We also conclude that the court’s error in excluding documents from the appellate record was harmless in this instance. However, we conclude that the court erred in ordering the child’s surname to be changed from Mother’s to Father’s. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jayson M.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit, contending that he was not properly notified of the hearing to terminate his rights and was denied his right to counsel. Upon review of the record, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Tamala Teague, et al. v. Garnette Kidd, et al.
In this fraudulent conveyance action, a trial by jury resulted in judgment for decedent’s estate against defendants. Defendants filed a motion for a new trial asserting that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after counsel for decedent’s estate made a comment about one of the defendant’s credibility from “past cases” purportedly in the presence of the jury; and (2) no evidence supports the jury verdict. The trial court denied the post-trial motion and affirmed the jury verdict. Defendants appealed. We affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Martese P.
This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The child was removed from Mother’s custody in November 2013, when the child was twelve months old, after Mother and the child tested positive for drugs. On the petition of the Department of Children’s Services, the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected based on the finding that Mother committed severe child abuse as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102. In September 2014, DCS placed the child in the custody of Petitioners. One year later, Petitioners filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse and the finding that termination of her rights was in the child’s best interest. Mother appealed. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Jason Baine v. Brenda Woods
A father appeals the denial of his petition to modify a permanent parenting plan. The juvenile court found no material change in circumstance had occurred sufficient to modify the primary residential parent designation. The court also denied the father’s subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because the father failed to file a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we presume that the evidence presented at trial supported the court’s determination that no material change in circumstance occurred. Therefore, we affirm both the judgment of the juvenile court and the denial of the father’s motion to alter or amend the judgment to conform to the evidence presented at trial. We also find that this appeal is frivolous. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re: Colby L.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit and support, contending that her failure to visit and support was not willful. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy D. Ogle v. Julie D. Duff
Husband and Wife were married for approximately five and one-half years when Husband filed a complaint for divorce. Wife filed a counter-complaint for a divorce. The trial court granted the parties a divorce based on stipulated grounds, classified the parties’ assets as separate or marital, and divided the marital estate. Husband appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) divesting a revocable trust of all assets and refusing to enforce a valid postnuptial agreement associated with the revocable trust; (2) classifying the increase in value of the marital residence as marital property; (3) classifying the increase in value of Husband’s premarital IRA as marital property; and (4) dividing the marital estate equally between the parties given the short duration of the marriage. We affirm as modified and deny Wife’s request for an award of attorney fees on appeal. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
William Dale Alsup v. David C. Alsup
This is a declaratory judgment case. Decedent, mother to the parties, died testate, leaving a holographic will that divided her real property between her two sons, David Alsup/Appellant and William Alsup/Appellee. The probate court admitted the will to probate. Following completion of the probate proceeding, William obtained a survey dividing the property as provided for in Decedent’s will. David refused to accept the survey procured by William, and William then filed this action to quiet title and for ejectment. David filed an answer but did not file a counterclaim or a countervailing survey. William moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Lynn E. Harrison v. Edwin B. Harrison, Jr.
This divorce case involves a marriage of eight years’ duration. Because the parties had reached an agreement with regard to the division of certain marital assets, the trial court was requested during a bench trial to divide the parties’ retirement and pension accounts, or the marital portion thereof, and other limited marital assets and liabilities. The trial court considered the relevant statutory factors and apportioned the remaining assets and liabilities 60% to the wife and 40% to the husband. The trial court also awarded the husband $1,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $180.42 in court reporter fees. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Deedra Climer Bass v. Jose Ramon Gonzalez-Perez
Jose Ramon Gonzalez-Perez (“Father”) appeals the March 7, 2016 order of the Juvenile Court for Shelby County (“the Juvenile Court”) finding him in contempt for non-payment of child support. Father raises several issues including whether Father can be held guilty of contempt when benefits Father receives pursuant to 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq., the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, are exempt from “all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, and attachment or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt . . . ” under § 916 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act; whether the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act preempts inclusion of Father’s benefits from the calculation of child support; and whether Father was guilty of contempt for non-payment of child support. We find and hold that although the benefits Father receives are exempt from levy, execution, attachment, etc., Father may be found guilty of contempt; that the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act does not preempt the inclusion of the benefits Father receives from the calculation of child support; and that Father had the present ability to pay child support and willfully failed to do so making Father guilty of contempt. We, therefore, affirm the March 7, 2016 order of the Juvenile Court finding Father in contempt for non-payment of child support. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Claire Nicola Bell v. Timothy John Bell
This appeal concerns visitation in a post-divorce setting. Claire Nicola Bell (“Mother”) and Timothy John Bell (“Father”) are parents of the two minor children at issue, ages eleven and seven at trial (“the Children”). Mother and Father divorced in 2012. Both parents were named “co-primary residential parents” and each parent received equal visitation time with the Children. Later, as the arrangement grew contentious, Mother filed a petition for modification seeking to be named exclusive primary residential parent. Father, in turn, filed a counter-petition seeking the same designation. A hearing was conducted before the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Afterward, the Trial Court named Father primary residential parent and awarded him increased visitation time with the Children. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Claire Nicola Bell v. Timothy John Bell - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s determination that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s judgment (1) finding a material change in circumstances; (2) holding that “the best interest of the children [is] that [Mr. Bell] be the Primary Residential Parent;” and (3) awarding father 215 days of residential parenting time with the balance of days awarded to mother. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Winston Keith Kyle v. Janice Gomer Kyle
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court's final decree of divorce included a division of marital property but failed to adjudicate the issue of alimony. A subsequent order states that the parties “agreed that [Wife’s] claim for alimony in futuro and rehabilitative alimony . . . are dismissed.” The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellant Procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding. Affirmed and remanded. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Wayne A. Howes, et al. v. Mark Swanner, et al.
Homeowners filed suit for breach of contract and fraud and/or negligent representation against the owners of a restoration business who performed repairs on their house after a fire. When the defendants failed to respond to or appear at the hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The defendants then filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion and affidavits stating that they did not receive notice of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The trial court held a hearing on the Rule 60 motion and denied the motion. Because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence regarding the hearing on the summary judgment motion or on the Rule 60 motion, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ Rule 60 motion. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie Kay Cardle v. Daniel Marcum Cardle
Wife filed a complaint for divorce following a fifteen-year marriage. The trial court granted Wife a divorce, distributed the marital estate, and awarded Wife alimony. The trial court granted Husband’s request to pay the alimony in solido award over a period of six years, with post-judgment interest payable at 10% interest per annum. Husband appeals the division of some of the marital assets and debts, the award of alimony in solido, and the post-judgment interest award. We affirm the trial court’s division of the marital estate and the award of alimony in solido, but we modify the post-judgment interest rate from 10% to 5.50% to conform with the interest on judgments statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip Jay Seifert v. Maria Coveny Seifert
The principal issues in this divorce action arise from the parties’ antenuptial agreement. The trial court declared the parties divorced, classified the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property, divided the modest amount of assets that were classified as marital property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro of $8,000 per month and alimony in solido of $500,000. Both parties appeal. Wife contends the court erred in classifying the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property and that the alimony awarded to her is insufficient. She also requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. Husband contends that all of the income he earned during the marriage is his separate property, that all assets he acquired with that income is his separate property, and that the antenuptial agreement prohibited the trial court from considering the value of his separate property in awarding alimony to Wife. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Wife is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Debeora D. Whitfield v. Holly Thrasher Schroeder
This appeal involves an option to purchase real estate. After a bench trial, the circuit court awarded the tenant a judgment for $12,000. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable meaningful appellate review, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hailey K., Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The Trial Court Judge announced a ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the final hearing below and then subsequently entered a written order vacating the oral ruling. The order vacating the oral ruling contemplates further proceedings in the Trial Court. Because there is no final written order terminating the parental rights of the appellant, Shanna K., to her children, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Gallatin Housing Authority v. Mahoganee Pelt
This appeal arises from an indigent tenant’s petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for a de novo review of an unlawful detainer action originally filed in general sessions court. The tenant sought to remain in possession of the leased premises during the review without posting a possessory bond. The circuit court initially issued the writs and, in lieu of a bond, ordered the tenant to pay rent as it became due. The landlord objected, arguing that a possessory bond was mandatory under the applicable statute. The circuit court then ordered the tenant to post a bond and, after the tenant failed to comply, dismissed the previously issued writs. On appeal, the tenant argues that the circuit court erred in calculating the amount of the bond and in dismissing the writ of certiorari with the writ of supersedeas. She also contends that the landlord executed the writ of possession in violation of the initial stay of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 62.01. We conclude that, although it erred in including court costs as part of the possessory bond in light of the tenant’s indigence, the trial court properly dismissed the writs of certiorari and supersedeas after the tenant failed to file a possessory bond. We also conclude that Rule 62.01 did not stay the dismissal of the writ of supersedeas. Consequently, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Mindy Leigh Veard v. Edward Eugene Veard, Jr.
This accelerated interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. After carefully reviewing the trial court’s ruling pursuant to the de novo standard of review required under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion for recusal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Wesley Finch v. O.B. Hofstetter/Anderson Trust, et al.
This appeal stems from a dispute over a tract of real property in Nashville. The plaintiff, who claims to have entered into an enforceable contract for sale of the disputed tract, brought multiple claims against multiple defendants after the land was not transferred to him. After competing cross-motions for summary judgment were filed, the trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims, finding, inter alia, that the plaintiff never entered into a valid, enforceable contract regarding the subject property. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
