In Re: Maya M., Et Al.
This post-divorce appeal concerns the mother’s filing of a petition to find the children dependent and neglected based upon the father’s behavior during his co-parenting time. The juvenile court granted the petition and ordered supervised visitation. The father appealed to the circuit court for a de novo hearing, held approximately one year later. The circuit court dismissed the petition, finding that the children were no longer dependent and neglected. The mother appeals. We affirm |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Joyce Elaine Myers Et Al. v. Michael Questell
Appellants appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee, medical doctor. The trial court found that Appellant’s petition for declaratory judgment sounded in health care liability and was barred by the statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(1). Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Specialtycare IOM Services, LLC v. Medsurant Holdings, LLC, Et Al.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s entry of default judgment as a discovery sanction against it. Because there is insufficient evidence of contumacious conduct on the part of Appellant to justify default, we reverse the trial court’s entry of default judgment on liability. We vacate the trial court’s award of damages on the jury verdict, but affirm the award of attorney’s fees as an initial discovery sanction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Snodgrass v. AHA Mechanical Cont., LLC
The trial court denied Appellant, employee, relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and employee appeals. Because the trial court’s judgment does not clearly show that it applied the correct legal standard in deciding the case, we vacate and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Enoc Miranda v. CSC Sugar, LLC
This is a premises liability case. Appellant, a construction worker, fell from scaffolding while working in Appellee’s factory. Specifically, Appellant ran an extension cord across the warehouse floor to reach an electrical outlet to power a screw gun used to install new sheetrock required in the warehouse renovation. Appellee’s employee drove a forklift over Appellant’s extension cord, entangling the cord and dislodging the scaffolding. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee finding that there were no disputes of material fact and that Appellee had no duty to warn Appellant of a dangerous condition that Appellant created. Because there are material factual disputes that preclude the grant of summary judgment, we reverse and remand. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Desiree Dawn Roberts Et Al. v. Wellmont Health System Et Al.
This interlocutory appeal involves a health care liability action. Plaintiff gave written presuit notice of her claim to all potential defendants. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) (Supp. 2013). Later, she filed a complaint against the same defendants. In doing so, she relied upon the 120-day extension of the one-year statute of limitation as provided for in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c). Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Prior to a hearing on those motions, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her complaint. Plaintiff subsequently served each defendant with new pre-suit notice and later re-filed her complaint in reliance on the one-year savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105, and the 120-day extension pursuant to § 29-26-121(c). Defendants moved to dismiss the second complaint. The trial court denied defendants’ motions. In doing so, the court took “judicial notice” of the practice of some attorneys in the Second Judicial District of providing their adversaries with “blank” authorizations. The court ultimately held that the medical authorizations in the first pre-suit notice were not only HIPAA compliant, but “overly” so. The trial court concluded that, because the first pre-suit notice was, according to the court, valid, the first-filed complaint was timely filed. Upon the request of the defendants, the court granted them permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We likewise granted defendants permission to file a Rule 9 discretionary appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the plaintiff’s suit with full prejudice. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: McKenzie O., Et Al.
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two children on the grounds of (1) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan and (2) persistence of conditions. She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: McKenzie O., Et Al. - Dissenting
While I understand my learned colleagues’ desire to bring finality and stability to the lives of these children who so desperately deserve it, I must unfortunately conclude that this case cannot be resolved based upon the order entered by the trial court. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Shay Ryan Doming v. Kelly Deann Doming
Father appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to alter, amend, or modify parenting plan and award of attorney’s fees in favor of Mother. Because the appellate record contains neither a transcript nor a statement of the evidence required by Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we are not able to review the trial court’s substantive holdings. Therefore, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings. Based on the plain language of the permanent parenting plan, Mother is awarded her attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re D.N. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). Because there is clear and convincing evidence to support both the ground for termination and the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest, we affirm and remand. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ashton B. et al.
The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition for temporary emergency custody under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) after a mother from Alabama who was travelling through Tennessee with her two minor children was arrested on charges including reckless endangerment. The juvenile court determined that the children were dependent and neglected, and the mother appealed for a de novo hearing in circuit court. When an Alabama court entered an order granting custody to the children’s father, the circuit court lost jurisdiction, and the circuit court’s subsequent order finding the children dependent and neglected became null and void. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Darrell Trigg v. Joseph Church, Et Al.
This appeal involves an action where the plaintiff sought to divest the defendants’ interest in their property by showing that their purchase of the property occurred through theft or the exploitation of the plaintiff’s ex-wife. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff’s motion for a mistrial and the action itself. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Arianna Y., Et Al.
The father of four minor children began serving a five year sentence on March 16, 2015. The minor children were living with their paternal grandmother and mother, and on December 29, 2016, were removed from the custody of their mother due to substance abuse. The children were adjudicated dependent and neglected and placed in the custody of DCS where they have been in the care of foster parents since that date. DCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to father and the Juvenile Court of Knox County terminated his parental rights on the grounds of wanton disregard. Father appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Jesse L McCants Sr
This appeal concerns exceptions that were made to a “final accounting” offered by the personal representative during probate proceedings. After the exceptions were made, an order of reference was entered by the trial court directing the Clerk and Master to hear proof and report her findings. The Clerk and Master determined that a number of expenses incurred by the personal representative in relation to a particular piece of real property should not be allowed because the expenses were made outside the four-month period outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-2-323. Upon reviewing the Clerk and Master’s report for questions of law arising therefrom, the trial court held that the report had “properly identified” Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-2-323 as limiting what expenses could be charged to the estate. For the reasons stated herein, the trial court’s approval of the Clerk and Master’s report is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Specifically, we hold that the trial court erred in disallowing expenses incurred by the personal representative during a period of time when the real property at issue was titled in the name of the estate. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Philip Roseman 2012 Irrevocable Gift Trust
Philip Roseman, now deceased, petitioned the trial court to set aside a quitclaim deed, which he admittedly executed, transferring title of his house to his son as trustee of the Philip Roseman 2012 Irrevocable Gift Trust. Philip Roseman averred that he did not have the requisite intent to make a complete gift when he executed the quitclaim deed. The trial court determined that the deed was valid and granted summary judgment to the trustee. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Philip Roseman 2012 Irrevocable Gift Trust
Philip Roseman, now deceased, petitioned the trial court to set aside a quitclaim deed, which he admittedly executed, transferring title of his house to his son as trustee of the Philip Roseman 2012 Irrevocable Gift Trust. Philip Roseman averred that he did not have the requisite intent to make a complete gift when he executed the quitclaim deed. The trial court determined that the deed was valid and granted summary judgment to the trustee. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Angelina Rae Hubbard Findley, Et Al. v. Richard Odel Hubbard, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a civil action filed in 2016 to establish a constructive trust and/or resulting trust to a share of the $25,500,000 proceeds from a 2005 Tennessee Lottery ticket. The essence of the claim is that the defendants, who are the respective former spouses and mother and father in-law of the plaintiffs, wrongfully deprived the plaintiffs of their rightful shares to the lottery proceeds. The defendants filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim on grounds including the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs responded contending, inter alia, that their respective claims did not accrue until 2007 for one of them and 2010 for the other, and that their claims were timely because the “catch all” 10 year statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-110(a)(3) applied to constructive and resulting trusts. The trial court disagreed and dismissed all claims as time barred. We affirm. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Apex R.
This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights. John C. and Kellee C. (“Petitioners”), uncle and aunt respectively of Apex R. (“the Child”), filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate Dustin R. (“Father”)’s parental rights to the Child. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights on the grounds of willful failure to visit and support. The Trial Court found also that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest, all by clear and convincing evidence. Father appeals, arguing among other things that the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“the UCCJEA”) because the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County, Alabama (“the Alabama Court”) made the initial custody determination, the Child’s mother remained in Alabama, and the Alabama Court never relinquished its exclusive and continuing jurisdiction. We hold that the Trial Court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination petition. We hold further that grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Bonnie Harmon, et al. v. Hickman Community Healthcare Services, Inc.
This suit was brought by the children of a woman who died while incarcerated at Hickman County Jail. Defendant is a contractor of the jail that provides medical services at the jail; a nurse in Defendant’s employment treated the decedent for symptoms of drug and alcohol withdrawal. She passed away shortly after. The children brought this suit under the Health Care Liability Act claiming negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. In due course, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to causation and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that element of Plaintiffs’ claim; the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and subsequently denied a motion to revise, filed by the Plaintiffs. This appeal followed. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jarrett P. Et Al.
In this action, the trial court terminated the appellant mother’s parental rights to her three children upon the court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the statutory grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit, (2) abandonment by willful failure to financially support, and (3) severe child abuse. The court also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother has timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Tina Gregg, Et Al. v. Shawn Smoot
Defendant in wrongful death action appeals the judgment entered against him in favor of the mother and personal representative of the decedent’s estate. Over the course of the litigation, the defendant failed to comply with multiple orders to compel discovery, and as a result, the court entered a judgment by default in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 37.02. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Wiseman Bowen v. William S. Wiseman, II
This case involves a post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. Father petitioned the court seeking equal parenting time and major decision-making authority with respect to decisions involving the child’s education, non-emergency healthcare, and extracurricular activities. Mother filed a counter-petition seeking additional parenting time and exclusive major decision-making authority. Mother also asked the trial court to clarify the meaning of several terms in the parties’ parenting plan. The parties’ disagreement concerning the meaning of several terms had prompted ongoing conflict. The trial court found that there had been a material change in circumstances and that modification of the parties’ parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. The trial court modified the parties’ parenting plan, awarding Mother additional parenting time. However, the trial court ordered that major-decision making authority in the areas of non-emergency healthcare, extracurricular activities, and religious upbringing remain joint. The trial court also awarded Mother a portion of her attorney’s fees. Father timely appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and award Mother her attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In re Chase L.
In this termination of parental rights case, the trial court terminated Mother’s rights on the grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit; (2) abandonment by wanton disregard; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; and (5) persistent conditions. In its brief, DCS conceded that it cannot defend the grounds of failure to establish a suitable home and persistent conditions. As such, we reverse as to the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistent conditions. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bonnie Harmon, et al. v. Hickman Community Healthcare Services, Inc. - dissenting
This suit was brought by the children of a woman who died while incarcerated at Hickman County Jail. Defendant is a contractor of the jail that provides medical services at the jail; a nurse in Defendant’s employment treated the decedent for symptoms of drug and alcohol withdrawal. She passed away shortly after. The children brought this suit under the Health Care Liability Act claiming negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. In due course, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to causation and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that element of Plaintiffs’ claim; the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and subsequently denied a motion to revise, filed by the Plaintiffs. This appeal followed. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Leigh Ann Urbanavage, et al. v. Capital Bank, et al.
Homeowners in housing development brought suit against their homeowners association, its directors and the bank that assumed management of the development after the developers defaulted on their loans used to finance the development; the homeowners sought damages and other relief arising from the defendants’ alleged failure to fulfill their obligations to properly maintain the subdivision. Plaintiffs asserted claims for tortious interference with their contract rights, breach of fiduciary duties, invalid liens, and slander of title. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the various claims, and plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to the bank on plaintiffs’ claim of tortious interference, and to the homeowners association on its counterclaim for recovery of delinquent assessments; we vacate the award of counsel fees to the association and the order quashing the notice of deposition of a director of the association and the association’s counsel; in all other respects we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
