Unitta Sue Newman v. State of Tennessee
A patient in a state psychiatric facility was killed by another patient. The surviving spouse of the deceased patient brought suit against the State and was awarded damages for the wrongful death of her husband. Because the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act applies to the surviving spouse’s claim, and because she failed to comply with the Act’s requirements of pre-suit notice and good faith certification, we must reverse the decision of the Claims Commission. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Michael Morton v. Knox County Sheriff's Department, et al.
The plaintiff brought this action under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-215 after a Knox County deputy seized a vehicle in which the plaintiff had a perfected security interest. The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security and Knox County both filed motions to dismiss the complaints against them on sovereign immunity grounds. After the motions to dismiss were denied, permission to appeal under Rule 9 was granted. In this interlocutory appeal, we have been asked to determine whether the trial court properly ruled on the sovereign immunity issue. After review, we affirm the trial court’s denials of the motions to dismiss and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Paetyn M., et al.
Father petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the mother of his child. Father later married and, along with his spouse, joined in an amended petition for termination of parental rights and for adoption. The amended petition alleged mother abandoned the child by failure to visit and failure to support. On the date scheduled for trial, Mother failed to appear, and her attorney was denied a continuance. Following the trial, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that mother had abandoned her child by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support and a third statutory ground not asserted in the amended petition. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. On appeal, mother challenges the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Mother also asserts that the court erred in denying her request for a continuance and that the proof was less than clear and convincing as to the grounds for termination and the child’s best interest. We conclude that the record only supports one statutory ground for termination of parental rights, abandonment by willful failure to visit. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Hewitt Et Al. v. Karin McClain
The pro se appellants, Travis Hewitt and Dustin Hewitt, seek to appeal from a final order entered on October 17, 2018. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until December 3, 2018, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the final order. The appellants accompanied their Notice of Appeal with a motion asking this Court to accept the latefiled notice as having been timely filed. The appellee, Karin McClain, filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing, in part, that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. Because it appears from all the pleadings filed in this case that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and no discretion to waive the filing of a timely Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Memphis Light Gas & Water Division v. Tykena Watson, et al.
At issue in this appeal is whether nurse case management fees are recoverable as part of an employer’s workers’ compensation subrogation lien under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-112. The trial court answered this question in the negative and also determined that the employer’s subrogation lien should be reduced by attorney’s fees awarded to the employee’s attorney. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Belinda Puller Ex Rel. Darel Puller v. Judith Roney
Defendant Judith Roney hired Darel Puller as a handyman to do periodic odd jobs in maintaining her house. Mr. Puller died in an accident when he fell from defendant’s roof while clearing it of debris. No one witnessed the accident. A housekeeper found him unconscious on a patio, with an extension ladder lying on the ground next to him. Defendant testified that she had not spoken to Mr. Puller the day of the accident, and that she did not know he was going to get her ladder from a back garage and use it to get on the roof. She also said that the ladder was probably at least forty years old and that it was missing one of the extension latching hooks. Mr. Puller’s widow, Belinda Puller, brought this action alleging defendant was negligent in failing to warn him of the defective condition of the ladder. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court on the ground that “the Plaintiff is unable to establish in any way, the cause of the injury to the Plaintiff or the relation of the Defendant to the Plaintiff’s injury.” We affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Gloria Andrews, Et Al. v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
This appeal arises from a widow’s suit over her husband’s alleged exposure to asbestos. Raymond Andrews (“Decedent”) worked for Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) for 24 years before retiring. He later died of lung cancer. Decedent’s wife, Gloria Andrews (“Plaintiff”), sued Norfolk Southern in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) alleging that her late husband had been exposed to asbestos while working for Norfolk Southern. Norfolk Southern filed several evidentiary motions which the Trial Court granted. Norfolk Southern subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which also was granted. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising several evidentiary issues. We hold that the Trial Court did not err in excluding lay testimony regarding the presence of asbestos in areas where Decedent worked because these witnesses lacked personal knowledge about the alleged asbestos. Plaintiff was unable to produce any admissible evidence at the summary judgment stage to support her claim that Norfolk Southern failed to maintain a safe working environment. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: H. A., Et Al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing that termination was not in the children’s best interest. We conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports both the grounds for termination found by the trial court and the trial court’s best interest determination. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Serenity W. - concurring in part and dissenting in part
The majority holds, in its own words, that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to two of the statutory grounds but the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support one ground for termination. But because we also conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing that termination was in the child’s best interest, we reverse the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Brasfield & Gorrie, LLC et al.
After street closures allegedly affected its business, Appellant filed suit against the construction company. The company answered the complaint denying that any street closures occurred without the permission of Appellee Metropolitan Government of Nashville. More than a year after the construct company filed its answer, Appellant filed an amended complaint against Appellee, averring nuisance, inverse condemnation, and federal taking. Appellee moved for dismissal under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion, arguing that the one-year statute of limitations barred Appellant’s claims. The trial court found that Appellant was on notice of Appellant’s involvement in the road closures based on the construction company’s answer and granted the motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE AUTUMN L. ET AL.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving two minor children. Appellants, who have custody of the children, appeal the trial court’s denial of their petition to terminate Mother/Appellee’s parental rights. The trial court found that Appellants met their burden to show the grounds of persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal from Appellee’s custody and abandonment by wanton disregard by an incarcerated parent. However, the trial court found that termination of Appellee’s parental rights was not in the children’s best interests. We affirm the trial court’s findings as to the grounds for termination but reverse its finding as to best interests. We remand the case for entry of an order terminating Appellee’s parental rights to the children. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Serenity W.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. After the mother tested positive for drugs at a court hearing, the trial court awarded temporary legal and physical custody of the child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. Over two years later, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence three statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the child. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to two of the statutory grounds but the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support one ground for termination. But because we also conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing that termination was in the child’s best interest, we reverse the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Rafia N. Khan, Individually, And In Her Capacity As Trustee Of The Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable Trust v. Regions Bank
This is the fourth appeal arising from a disputed arbitration award in favor of Regions Bank (the Bank) “against Rafia N. Khan, individually, and as trustee” of the Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable Trust (the Trust). Pursuant to this Court’s mandate in the first appeal, the trial court entered an order confirming the arbitration award “as to the Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable Trust and to Rafia N. Khan as Trustee of the Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable Trust.” Later, the trial court entered an order granting the Bank $72,156 in attorney’s fees and $2,094.05 in costs. Of that amount, the court assessed $45,928.92 against the Trust and assessed $28,321.13 against Ms. Khan individually. Ms. Khan’s notice of appeal states that she is appealing (1) the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration award; (2) the court’s order granting the Bank attorney’s fees and costs; and (3) the court’s order denying Ms. Khan’s motion to alter or amend. We affirm the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration award pursuant to the law of the case doctrine. We modify the court’s order awarding attorney’s fees. The award shall include attorney’s fees incurred by the Bank in the trial court and on direct appeal but not attorney’s fees incurred by the Bank in federal bankruptcy court proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jackson Miller v. Phyllis Frevik
This case originated when the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant, alleging that the plaintiff was entitled to the proceeds from a life insurance policy. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant did not appeal that order but subsequently filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, and the defendant appealed. Having determined that the defendant has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Katherine Mae Pruitt v. Travis Pruitt
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside a final judgment obligating him to pay child support. The record shows that Appellant voluntarily executed a document placing his name on the child’s birth certificate and thereafter entered into a marital dissolution agreement and parenting plan obligating him to pay child support with full knowledge that he was not the biological parent of the child. Because Appellant has failed to present sufficient evidence of a ground for relief under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we affirm the decision of the trial court to deny Appellant’s request to set aside the judgment. We reverse, however, the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees based on the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
State Ex Rel. Candice McQueen v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education Et Al.
A metropolitan board of education adopted a policy preventing the provision of student information to the State of Tennessee in its role as the administrator of an achievement school district pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-13-132. The State filed a petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment, and the chancery court granted the writ of mandamus. The board of education appeals. We affirm the decision of the chancery court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan George Carter v. Elizabeth Jo Browne
Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce in which it determined that Appellant/Wife was not entitled to an award of alimony in futuro, but awarded Wife alimony in solido and transitional alimony. The trial court further determined that the parties’ marital residence was Wife’s separate property. On appeal, Wife argues that the trial court erred in denying her alimony in futuro, while Appellee/Husband appeals the classification of the parties’ home as Wife’s separate property. With respect to the trial court’s decision that alimony in futuro is inappropriate in this case, we affirm. However, because we conclude that the trial court erred in classifying the parties’ home as Wife’s separate property, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. William S. Lockett, Jr., ET Al.
The mortgagors sought to rescind the foreclosure sale of their property, claiming that the sale was invalid because it had been conducted improperly. A jury found the sale process was properly followed and the verdict was approved by the trial court. The mortgagors appeal. We affirm |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate Of Mary Ruth Davis Hudson
In this estate proceeding, the appellants, three of the five adult children of the decedent, appeal the probate court’s interpretation of the decedent’s last will and testament as demonstrating the decedent’s intent to have her real property administered as part of her estate by her personal representative. Having determined that the probate court’s order was premature due to ongoing proceedings in the decedent’s conservatorship case, we vacate the probate court’s order interpreting the last will and testament. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re J'Khari F.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Alexis F. (“Mother”), to her minor child, J’Khari F. (“the Child”), who was five years old at the time of trial. On April 10, 2015, the Warren County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) entered an order removing the Child from Mother’s custody and placing the Child into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), effective April 9, 2015. The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he remained at the time of trial. The trial court subsequently entered an order on September 24, 2015, finding that the Child was dependent and neglected due to Mother’s insufficient housing, Mother’s insufficient means to support the Child, and the Child’s positive drug test result for methamphetamine. On April 18, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to support him, (2) Mother had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit him, (3) Mother had abandoned the Child by engaging in conduct prior to her incarceration that exhibited wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare, (4) Mother had not substantially complied with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans, (5) the conditions leading to the Child’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted, and (6) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Upon a determination that the evidence presented at trial did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to support him during the four months prior to her incarceration, we reverse as to that statutory ground. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Alan Ellis v. Donica Ann Woods Ellis
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $9,000 per month. In addition, the trial court awarded Wife her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido in the amount of $121,873.81. We vacate the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro and, for the reasons stated herein, remand the issue of Wife’s alimony for reconsideration. Additionally, we vacate the trial court’s award of Wife’s attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to reconsider whether or not to award Wife her attorney’s fees and, if so, to award a reasonable attorney’s fee and state the basis for its decision. We also vacate the trial court’s order denying Wife’s motion for discretionary costs, and remand the issue to the trial court for a reconsideration of Wife’s motion on its merits. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
McKayla Taylor v. Miriam's Promise Et Al.
This action arises from an agreed-upon adoption that the birth mother revoked within 30 days of the child’s birth. The defendants include three adoption agencies, three social workers, two attorneys, a hospital, and the prospective adoptive parents. Generally stated, the complaint alleges that the defendants acted in concert to abduct the mother’s child by inducing the mother to surrender her parental rights, consent to the adoption, and waive her right of revocation. The articulated claims include conspiracy to commit fraud and tortious civil kidnapping, negligence, professional negligence, healthcare liability, and conversion of her child. All defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 for some or all of the following reasons: (1) the adoption documents were valid under Tennessee law and not fraudulent; (2) Tennessee does not recognize the torts of civil kidnapping and conversion of a child; (3) the claims are time-barred; (4) the mother’s first certificate of good faith was non-compliant because it did not disclose a prior violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122; (5) the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act barred the mother’s intentional tort claims against the hospital; and (6) the mother released some of the defendants from liability by signing a release agreement. Additionally, the healthcare providers contended the complaint should be dismissed because the mother failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. The trial court granted the motions on various grounds and dismissed the complaint with prejudice for all defendants. Having determined that Tennessee does not recognize a tort of conversion of a child or tortious civil kidnapping and that conspiracy to commit fraud is not a standalone claim, we affirm the dismissal of these claims. We also affirm the dismissal of all remaining claims as time-barred. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Beth Harcrow v. Clyde Harcrow
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursued pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Because Appellant admits that no order has been entered by the trial court with respect to her motion to recuse, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Ronna Lyn Ueber v. Anthony James Ueber
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because the record contains insufficient evidence of bias requiring recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly J. Smith v. Gregory A. Smith Et Al.
Judgment creditor appeals the trial court’s decision to set aside a conditional judgment, to dismiss her claims of bad faith, civil contempt, and conversion against the garnishee, and to deny certain requests for discovery and sanctions. We affirm the trial court’s decision to set aside the conditional judgment, as well as the dismissal of the judgment creditor’s conversion claim. We reverse, however, the trial court’s dismissal of the judgment creditor’s claims of bad faith and civil contempt. We also vacate the trial court’s decisions with regard to sanctions and discovery, except to the extent that the trial court allowed withdrawal of certain requests for admission, which is affirmed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |
