Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: James F. Russell
This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued defendant physician for injuries allegedly caused to wife by the physician's negligence. Physician moved for summary judgment supported by his affidavit that he conformed to the required standard of care. Plaintiffs, in opposition to the summary judgment, filed a deposition and affidavit of a physician practicing in Kentucky that expressed his knowledge of the standard of care in Memphis and similar communities. Physician moved to strike the affidavit primarily on the ground that plaintiffs' physician expert did not show a familiarity with the standard of care in Memphis, Tennessee. The court granted the motion to strike the affidavit and also granted summary judgment to defendant physician. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse and remand.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield
This appeal arises from a dispute between relatives over a parcel of real property. Although the parties executed a contract which stated that the purchase price was due in one year, the parties disregarded the contract language for eleven years. The trial court ruled that the parties had acquiesced in the extension of the contract and that they were now estopped to deny the contract's validity. As a result, the trial court ordered that the home be sold as per the terms in the contract. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This appeal involves a change of custody motion filed by Mother in the chancery court which had previously entered a divorce decree awarding joint custody of the minor child, with primary physical custody with Father. The chancery court dismissed the motion, holding that it had no jurisdiction to hear a change of custody motion by virtue of a previously filed petition in juvenile court to declare the child dependent and neglected, which petition was dismissed by the juvenile court. Mother was granted an interlocutory appeal. We vacate and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Clayburn L. Peeples
Buyer, under warranty deed, sued seller for breach of warranty against encumbrances after receiving notice of trustee's sale pursuant to deed of trust encumbering the property. Seller answered the complaint and filed a third party complaint against the lawyer he retained to perform a title search, which search failed to show the deed of trust. The third party defendant filed a counter complaint against the seller. The trial court granted the buyer judgment on the pleadings against seller, dismissed seller's third party complaint, and granted third party defendant summary judgment against seller. Seller appeals. We reverse in part and modify in part.
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Ben H. Cantrell
In this custody case the General Sessions Court of Wilson County changed its custody order from joint care and control with primary custody in the father to exclusive custody in the father and standard visitation to the mother. The record shows, however, that the mother has had primary custody of the children since the divorce and that both parties are fit parents. They each love the children and take good care of them. Under those circumstances, we hold that there is a presumption in favor of continuity of placement. Therefore, we reverse the lower court's order and grant primary custody to the mother.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
In this post-divorce case, each party sought modification of the child support order. The obligor father sought a decrease based on the older child's eighteenth birthday and graduation from high school. The obligee mother sought an increase based upon her belief that the father's income had increased. The trial court ordered a decrease based upon the older child's emancipation, but increased the amount due for the remaining minor child. The mother appeals, contending that the trial court failed to consider some of the father's work related benefits when setting the support. Because the mother had the burden of proving additional income to the father, and because she failed to meet that burden, we affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal involves a dispute over a promissory note. The jury below found for the Plaintiff. We affirm the trial court and remand for a determination of reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiff with respect to this appeal.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Christy R. Little
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother upon a finding that the grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the minor child's best interests. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The Weisses procured supplemental insurance from State Farm through its agent, Mr. Brooks. In procuring such insurance, Mr. Weiss rejected uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Mrs. Weiss was involved in an automobile accident wherein she sustained damages exceeding the amount covered by her insurance policy. As the other driver involved in the accident was either uninsured or underinsured, the Weisses sought recovery from State Farm. State Farm denied the claim, determining that the Weisses did not have coverage under their umbrella policy. The Weisses brought an action against State Farm and Mr. Brooks. State Farm and Mr. Brooks filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
This appeal arises out of a dispute over an annexation ordinance passed by the City of Memphis. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants due to its finding that Plaintiffs did not properly file a complaint contesting the annexation ordinance. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers
This appeal involves a claim of medical malpractice. The plaintiff's minor child suffered brain damage during delivery. The only remaining defendants, Dr. Moore and Dr. Lawrence, moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This is a premise liability action arising from an incident wherein Mrs. Stiffler was struck in the back by shopping carts, knocked to the floor, and sustained injuries as a result of the fall. At trial, the jury awarded Mrs. Stiffler $75,000 and awarded $5,000 to Mr. Stiffler on his loss of consortium claim. Kroger filed a motion to set aside the verdict, for a new trial, or, alternatively, for remittitur. The trial court denied Kroger's motion, and this appeal ensued. We affirm.
In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff alleges that counsel for the defendants committed misconduct during the trial and appeals the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos
At issue in this case is a stock redemption agreement executed by the owners of a closelyheld corporation. The Chancellor issued a mandatory injunction instructing the holder of the stock certificates to abide by the stock redemption agreement and turn over the shares to the corporation, and the holder appealed. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William Michael Maloan
This appeal involves a divorced couple who decided to forego certain provisions in 2 their marital dissolution agreement concerning ownership of the marital residence without the consultation of counsel or the court. This matter began as a divorce action in the Chancery Court of Weakley County, Tennessee, and was styled: Palma Diane Harrison vs. Robert E. Harrison. Robert (“decedent”) and Palma Diane Harrison (“appellee”) entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement on June 27, 1994. The divorce was granted on September 12, 1994, and the final decree of divorce incorporated the Marital Dissolution Agreement therein. In pertinent part, the Marital Dissolution Agreement provided:
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark
This is a premises liability case in which the captioned plaintiff tripped over an obstruction in the aisle of a retail store. The Trial Court rendered summary judgment for the store because the obstruction was open and obvious. Plaintiff has appealed and presented the following issues:
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
This is a divorce action wherein the trial court declared the parties divorced. Husband appeals the trial court's decision to admit evidence regarding his retirement plan; its valuation of the same; its award of rehabilitative alimony to Wife; its award of attorney's fees to Wife; its division of marital debt; its adopting Wife's proposed final decree of divorce; its division of marital property; its admitting evidence regarding Husband's use of pornography; and its refusal to permit Husband's Rule 15 Memorandum in the record on appeal. Additionally, Wife seeks her attorney's fees on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
In this medical malpractice case, patient and wife sued physicians and their professional association for damages resulting from defendants' negligence, deviation from applicable standard of care, and lack of informed consent. The trial court granted defendants a partial summary judgment for all claims concerning incidents that occurred more than one year prior to the date suit was filed, as barred by the statute of limitations. Subsequently, the trial court granted summary judgment on the merits as to all remaining claims. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: James F. Russell
Plaintiff truck driver was required to submit to a random urine drug test pursuant to his employer's drug policy and mandatory Department of Transportation (DOT) guidelines. After the specimen tested positive for the presence of cocaine metabolites, plaintiff was discharged from his employment. Plaintiff sued the laboratory that conducted the test, alleging negligence in the testing procedure that resulted in a false report. The trial court granted the laboratory summary judgment, and plaintiff appeals. We reverse.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
This is a breach of contract case. The defendant bank hired the plaintiff as a consultant to contact supermarkets about placing branch banks in their stores. In August 1988, the parties signed a written consulting contract which expired by its own terms in November 1988. In that contract, the plaintiff was to receive a salary plus $2,000 for each branch bank placed in a store as a result of his efforts. This contract expired, but the plaintiff continued to work for the bank for about ten years with no other written agreement. The plaintiff was never paid the $2,000-per-store bonus. In 1990, the plaintiff asked the bank to pay the $2,000-per-store bonus, and this request was ignored. The plaintiff's employment was terminated in 1998. In May 1999, the plaintiff sued the bank for breach of contract, claiming that they owed him the $2,000-per-store bonus under the original contract. The trial court granted the bank summary judgment based on the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the cause of action accrued, at the latest, in 1990 when the plaintiff requested the bonus and his request was ignored.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This appeal arises from a divorce action. Husband and Wife divorced after 22 years of marriage. Both had received property by bequest during the marriage. Husband had received stocks and securities, real property, and Company, which he owned and operated. Wife received property which she subsequently sold. The proceeds of these sales were deposited in a separate investment account after first passing through a marital checking account and were later used to buy Condo. The trial court specifically found that Wife had not substantially contributed to appreciation of stocks and securities, but awarded her 25% of their appreciation. The appreciation of Husband's real property was found to be marital property, as well as the entire value of Company. Wife's Condo was found to be separate property. We affirm in part, reverse in part, modify and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Robert S. Benham
This appeal arises from the trial court's finding that a bank account was part of Decedent's estate and not the property of Executrix. In 1987, Decedent added Executrix to a bank account. Decedent failed to mark the portion of the card signifying that the account was to have rights of survivorship. After Decedent died, Executrix conducted an accounting in which she did not include the account. Beneficiary contested the accounting arguing that account should be part of the estate. Executrix argued that the addition of her name to the account created a presumption that the account's right of survivorship was a gift inter vivos. The trial court found that no presumption existed and that the account was part of the estate. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
This appeal arises from the trial court's denial of a motion in limine. Employee was fired from his position at Company. At a pre-trial deposition, Manager testified on behalf of Company that Employee was terminated due to Manager's observation of Employee's lack of sales skills. Employee filed a motion seeking to bar testimony of other Company employees during the trial. These employees were to testify on Employee's lack of sales skills. Employee argued that this testimony would be inconsistent with Company's pre-trial deposition that Employee was terminated due to Manager's observation of his lack of sales skills. We affirm.
