State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. A.C., et al.
The State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of A.C. (“Mother”) to her three children, L.A.L.R., K.M.C., and R.S.C. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3). The Juvenile Court also determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals, claiming DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. Mother also claims DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights would be in the best interests of the children. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of James Clifford Smith
Estate appeals probate court’s determination that subject estate was liable to Bureau of Tennessee for Medicaid nursing home benefits correctly provided to a pre-deceased spouse. We reverse. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of James Clifford Smith - Concurring
When read together, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (West 2003) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-116(c) (2004) plainly permit the State of Tennessee to recover correctly paid medical assistance benefits from the estate of a recipient’s surviving spouse. However, I concur with the court’s conclusion that the property from which these benefits can be recovered is limited to property owned by the recipient at the time of his or her death that passed to the surviving spouse “through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.” |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re. I.C.G., B.M.D., T.N.C., & T.L.C.
In this appeal, S.L.B. (“Mother”) contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to four of her five children. Mother does not challenge the propriety of the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights as to the fifth child. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of her children. Therefore, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Patricia Danielle Stinson, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving two minor children. The mother of both children and the father of one of the children appeal separately from the Order of the Juvenile Court of Hardin County terminating their respective parental rights. Both Appellants assert that the grounds for termination of their parental rights are not met by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that termination of their parental rights is not in the best interest of the minor children. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Spencer Brown - Dissenting
With great reluctance, I must part ways with the court regarding the dismissal of this will contest. Based on the facts of this case, I have concluded that the trial court erred by dismissing the will contest without first disposing of Don Brown’s motion to implead additional parties and Alton Brown’s petition to intervene. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Estate of: Spencer Brown
Four years after the contest of his uncle’s will was filed, Alton Brown filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24 Motion to Intervene in the contest of his uncle’s will. The motion, however, was not accompanied by a proposed pleading setting forth the claim for which intervention was sought as required by Rule 24.03. Subsequent to the filing of the motion, an order of dismissal of the will contest was entered. Thereafter, the movant filed his proposed pleading following which the trial court denied the Motion to Intervene based upon a finding the movant had slept on his rights. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
William James Jekot v. Pennie Christine Jekot
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Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Theressa Joanne Booker v. Ricardo Baytonia Booker, Jr.
This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Theressa Joanne Booker (“Wife”) a divorce from Ricardo Baytonia Booker, Jr. (“Husband”), divided the parties’ property, and decreed an award of alimony in solido and alimony in futuro. Husband appeals, asserting that the division of marital |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Lakenya L. Johnson v. Otha L. Mayfield, Jr.
Appellant challenges trial court’s order setting aside the consent order acknowledging paternity and ordering no child support after July 1, 2005, based on the results of DNA tests which conclusively prove that Appellee is not the father of the child. We affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Andre L. Dotson v. City of Memphis
This is an appeal from the dismissal of an inmate’s civil action for failure to pay costs in prior lawsuits. The plaintiff inmate, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in the trial court against the defendant municipality alleging violations of the government tort liability act, proceeding as a pauper. The City filed a motion to dismiss the case based on Tennessee Code Annotated §41-21-812, because the plaintiff had failed to pay costs in previous lawsuits filed by him. Realizing that his lawsuit was subject to dismissal under the statute, the plaintiff then paid the initial filing fee |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
C. Phillip McDow v. Sara Ciaramitaro McDow
This is a divorce case in which grounds were stipulated. Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Wife. He asserts, in the alternative, that if this Court affirms the award of alimony the matter must be remanded for reconsideration of the division of property. We vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Hal Gerber v. Robert R. Holcomb, Salans, Holcomb Management, Inc., Holcomb Investments, L.P. and Vanderbilt University
This is a garnishment action. The plaintiff lawyer filed a lawsuit against the defendant to collect on a promissory note. This lawsuit was settled by a consent decree requiring the defendant to make installment payments. The defendant became delinquent in the agreed payments. The plaintiff then issued a garnishment request to the defendant’s employer, based on the consent decree. In response, the defendant filed a motion in the trial court to stay the garnishment and establish installment payments. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order as to the monthly amount to which the plaintiff was entitled in garnished wages. This amount was less than the maximum statutory amount permitted for garnishment. The plaintiff now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by not awarding the maximum statutory amount. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Vanessa Ann Webster v. Brad Anthony Webster
This is a parental relocation case. The parties were divorced and, under their MDA, the mother was designated the primary residential parent for the parties’ two children. Within a month after the divorce decree was entered, the mother wrote the father a letter saying that she was moving to Canada with the children. The father filed an objection to the relocation in the trial court. The mother filed a response and a petition to relocate with the children to Canada, stating that she intended to marry a citizen of Canada who was currently serving in the Canadian armed services. After a hearing, the trial court denied the mother’s petition, finding that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose and that the relocation was not in the children’s best interest. The mother now appeals. We reverse, holding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of no reasonable purpose under the parental relocation statute. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Christina Marie Keelyn and Edward Malachowski
This is an appeal from an unusual order in a termination of parental rights case. The child involved in this action was placed into state custody soon after the child’s birth, because both the mother and the child tested positive for cocaine. The child was placed in the custody of a foster mother who was a single parent. The state filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological parents of the child. After a trial, the trial court terminated the parents’ parental rights. Additionally, the trial court sua sponte ordered the state to find a suitable dual-parent home in which to place the child and ordered the state to consult with private adoption agencies to accomplish this task. The state now appeals the portion of the trial court’s order requiring it to place the child in a dual-parent home. There is no appeal from the termination of parental rights. We reverse the trial court’s order regarding placement of the child, concluding that the trial court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate placement of the child after the parents’ rights were terminated and the state was given complete guardianship over the child. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Iain Hiscock v. Sue E. Hiscock
Husband appeals the type and amount of alimony awarded to Wife after the termination of a twenty-seven year marriage. The decision of the trial court is affirmed as modified. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: B.G.J., a Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age, State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services, Petitioner, and Glenn and Patricia Mullins, Intervening Petitioners/Appellees, v. S.R.J. Respondent/Appellant
In this case to terminate parental rights, the Trial Court entered a Default Judgment against the father and terminated his rights as a parent without hearing any evidence. On appeal, we vacate and remand. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Wendy Hill v. Don Triplett
This is an appeal from an order of the juvenile court increasing child support. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Jude v. Fred K. Riddle, et al.
In this appeal, landowner sued builder alleging that the parties had entered into a partnership and an oral contract to construct a house on property belonging to landowner. Landowner claimed that builder failed to pay him the total consideration for the sale of the land after landowner deeded the property to builder and that builder failed to equally divide the profits from the sale of the improved property once the house was sold. Builder denied the existence of a partnership and oral contract, alleged that the lot had been paid for in full, and claimed that landowner had no interest in the property or the proceeds from the sale of the improved property. The trial court found that a partnership and oral contract existed between the parties and awarded landowner the balance on the sale of the land and one-half of the profits from the sale of the improved property. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Dora W. Moore v. James G. Neeley, Commissioner of The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, and U.S. Postal Service
This case involves a claim for unemployment compensation filed with the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development. The claimant was initially denied unemployment benefits based on the Agency’s finding that she had been terminated for work related misconduct. First-level appeals from agency decisions are allowed within fifteen days. The claimant appealed and an inperson hearing was scheduled. She requested a re-scheduling of the hearing, and her request was accommodated. She then canceled the second scheduled hearing and requested a withdrawal of her unemployment claim. Later, she attempted to re-appeal the initial agency determination outside the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Earl Ingram and Christa Ingram v. Cendant Mobility Financial Corporation, Cassandra Lee Dees, and John L. Dees, Jr., and Underwood Home Inspection
Plaintiffs, house purchasers, sued defendant, seller, for breach of contract, negligent and fraudulent concealment, negligence, wilful and negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Consumer Protection Act on the grounds the house was subject to flooding. The Trial Court granted summary judgment. We affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: H.A. (D.O.B. 10/08/98) & J.R.B., JR. (D.O.B. 11/24/99); State of TN, Department of Children Services v. Michelle Adair
This is a termination of parental rights case. In 1999, the children involved in this action were taken from the mother’s custody into state custody. They were later adjudicated dependent and neglected by the juvenile court. The children remained in foster care, and the state developed several permanency plans with the goal of returning the children to the mother. The plans required the mother to, inter alia, attend parenting classes and anger management programs and to obtain stable housing and employment. The children remained in foster care for the next six years. Meanwhile, the mother obtained stable housing, but she failed to complete either parenting classes or an anger management program, and she failed to obtain stable employment. The goal of the plans was changed to adoption. The state filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on persistent conditions and failure to comply with the permanency plans. After a trial, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights on both grounds. The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports termination on both grounds. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Long v. Holli Colleen Hartsell Harbin
In this post-decree child custody case, the trial court changed custody from the mother to the father after finding, among other things, that the mother had smoked marijuana while operating a motor vehicle in which the child was a passenger. Based upon this finding and evidence that the change of custody was in the best interest of the child, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Barabara L. Wolf, as Trustee for Lani Wolf and Shaye Wolf, v. John Luther Summitt
In this dispute over a right of way, the Trial Court granted summary judgment to defendant on grounds the suit was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. On appeal, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
William A. Cohn v. Michael T. Baker, et al.
This case arises from the termination of Appellant’s membership in a private country club. Appellant asserts a proprietary interest in the assets of the club, and seeks to have his membership reinstated. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the club/Appellee and Appellant |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
