Blackburn & McCune, PLLC v. Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. and Pre-Paid Legal Services of Tennessee, Inc.
This appeal involves legal insurance. The defendants have sold legal insurance for many years. The plaintiff law firm provided legal services to policyholders pursuant to the defendants' legal insurance policies. After Tennessee began to regulate legal insurance, the defendants were required to obtain State approval of their insurance rates and plans. The defendants submitted plans to the State. The plans included proposed rates and anticipated claims expenses, consisting primarily of the fees paid to the plaintiff law firm. The State informed the defendants that the initial filings did not reflect a sufficient loss ratio, that is, ratio of expenses to premium rates. The defendants revised the State filings to reflect an increase in the compensation paid to the plaintiff law firm. At the same time, the defendants presented the plaintiff law firm with a contract that required the plaintiff to pay the defendants for certain administrative services. The amount to be paid to the defendants essentially equaled the amount by which the defendants increased the plaintiff's compensation rate. Years later, the plaintiff discovered facts that caused it to conclude that the contract was a subterfuge to allow the defendants to recoup the increased compensation to the law firm while appearing to comply with the State's loss ratio requirement. The plaintiff informed the State of these facts and of its suspicion that the purpose of the arrangement was to circumvent the loss ratio requirement. After receiving this information, the State took no adverse action against the defendants. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit seeking restitution, asserting that the contract with the defendants was fraudulently induced and that it was void and unenforceable as against public policy. The plaintiff also asserted a claim under the filed rate doctrine, seeking to recover the difference between the pay rate that the defendants filed with the State and the rates actually paid to the plaintiff. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the claims of fraudulent inducement and violation of public policy, finding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to those claims. We affirm the trial court's decision on all remaining claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joann Butler, et al. v. Marion County, Tennessee
Landowners filed suit to determine ownership of that portion of Ann Wilson Road that crosses their property. Defendants sought and were granted summary judgment based on the running of several statutes of limitations. Landowners appealed. We affirm. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya L. Gerakios v. Michael T. Gerakios, Jr.
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, equitably divided the parties' property, and awarded the wife alimony in solido. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Harold Lee Harden v. Judy Kay Harden
This is a divorce action. Husband/Appellant appeals from the trial court's division of marital assets, award of attorneys fees to the Wife, and the stay of the proceedings during the pendency of the appeal. Affirmed as modified. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Wilson County Board of Education v. Wilson County Education Association and Steve Johnson
An assistant principal was transferred to a teaching position and grieved the transfer pursuant to a locally negotiated agreement between the local board of education and the organization representing teachers. After pursuing remedies through the school board, the teacher asked the trial court to compel the board to arbitrate resolution of the dispute. The trial court granted summary judgment to the school board, concluding that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 49-2-303 applied since "assistant principals" are statutorily the same as "principals" and, under the holding in Marion County Board of Education v. Marion County Education Association, 86 S.W.3d 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), the director of schools has the authority to transfer principals unrestrained by locally negotiated agreements. Mr. Johnson and the association appealed, claiming that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 49-2-303 does not apply to assistant principals and that the director of schools must comply with their agreement in making transfer decisions. We agree that the arbitration provision is not enforceable, but for a different reason. We hold that there was no meeting of the minds as to the procedure to be used as the final step in the grievance procedure. Consequently, there was no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas M. Gautreaux vs. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority
Thomas M. Gautreaux ("Gautreaux") filed a petition pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act for access to a settlement agreement involving Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority ("the Hospital" or "Erlanger") in a previous lawsuit. The Hospital denied the request, claiming that the document was privileged under the Tennessee Peer Review Law. Gautreaux then filed a petition for a show cause hearing. After the hearing, the trial court determined that the settlement agreement was exempt from disclosure under the Peer Review Law. Gautreaux appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Charles D. Stechebar vs. Deere & Company & John Doe
This case concerns a complaint for review by writ of certiorari and supersedeas. The initial action was a personal injury suit, arising from an automobile accident in which Plaintiff Charles D. Stechebar's vehicle was allegedly hit by a tractor-trailer owned by Defendant Deere and Company ("Deere") and driven by Defendant John Doe, an unidentified employee of Deere. The personal injury suit was dismissed with prejudice in the general sessions court when the plaintiff failed to appear for the initial trial date. The record reflects that twelve days before the initial trial date, the plaintiff had filed an amended civil summons and obtained a new trial date. Fifty days after the dismissal, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the circuit court, asserting that he had not been notified of the dismissal in time to file an appeal within the ten-day window required by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 27-5-108(a)(1). The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff then filed the complaint for review by statutory writ of certiorari and supersedeas. The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the writ on the ground that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for which review could be granted. We hold that the plaintiff stated a claim for relief under statutory writ of certiorari and supersedeas. The trial court's judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Marion Barker v. Angel Chandler
This is the second appeal from a parenting plan entered by the trial court. The only issue in both appeals involved the necessity of a "paramour provision" in the parenting plan. On remand from the first appeal, the trial court was directed by this Court to determine whether a paramour provision was in the best interests of the children. After a hearing, the trial court determined that it was in the best interests of the children to have a paramour provision in effect. Mother appealed. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring a paramour provision as the record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that the paramour provision is in the best interests of the children. Reversed. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Robertson, a/k/a Jere Robertson vs. Clara Robertson Hodges, et ux., et al
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Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
James Erwin vs. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America
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Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Benn vs. Public Building Authority of Knox County, et al
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Billy Joe Stricklan
This appeal involves contested wills and a settlement agreement involving minors. After the death of Billy Joe Stricklan ("Decedent"), his daughter, Teresa Diane Stricklan Coleman ("Daughter"), filed two wills for Probate. Finding the first will valid would result in the entirety of Decedent's estate being awarded to Daughter, while finding the second will valid would result in the estate, minus $100 to Daughter, being divided among Decedent's greatgrandchildren. After the probate court certified the case to circuit court for a will contest, Daughter and the guardian ad litem for the great-grandchildren negotiated a settlement. These parties obtained the probate court's approval of the settlement over the objection of the proponent of second will, Decedent's brother, Reed Stricklan ("Brother"). The probate court also ordered a partial distribution of the cash assets now held in the estate to Daughter. Brother appeals. We vacate the settlement order. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Madison N.J.M.
This is a case involving the custody of a minor child, Madison N.J.M. ("the Child"). The Child lived with her mother, K.S. ("Mother"), until she was four. After 1 the Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected, she was placed in the temporary custody of her maternal grandmother, L.R. ("Grandmother"). Grandmother later sought permanent custody. A paternity suit was filed and it was ultimately determined that C.A.M. ("Father") is the Child's biological father. Soon after paternity was established, Father entered into a mediated agreement which provided that Grandmother would remain as the Child's primary caregiver with parenting time for Father. A final order adopting the terms of the mediated agreement was entered and Grandmother was granted custody of the Child. Father actively pursued a parental relationship and increased time with the Child; he later sought full custody. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court ordered a change of custody from Grandmother to Father based upon its finding of a material change in circumstances and its determination that custody with Father is in the best interest of the Child. On appeal de novo to the trial court, the judgment was affirmed. Grandmother appeals. We also affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Lara L. Battleson vs. Dean L. Battleson
Approximately 29 months after the parties' divorce became final, Lara L. Battleson ("Wife") filed a motion in the trial court asking that Dean L. Battleson ("Husband") be held in contempt because of his failure to pay child support. Wife served a copy of the motion and notice of hearing on Douglas R. Beier ("Counsel"), the attorney who had represented Husband in the divorce action. Counsel filed a motion to dismiss supported by an affidavit stating that he no longer represented Husband and that his mail to Husband had been returned undeliverable. The trial court found that service on Counsel was sufficient. As a consequence of this ruling, the court denied Counsel's motion to dismiss; it also granted the motion for contempt. Husband appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment of contempt and remand for further proceedings. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tyler M.
At an earlier time, i.e., November 1, 2004, the trial court, inter alia, ordered Pamela M. ("Mother") to pay Gregory L. E. ("Father"), the then-custodian of their child, Tyler M. ("the Child"), a child support arrearage of $7,920 (through October 31, 2004) and prospective monthly child support of $165 plus $35 to be applied on the arrearage. Over the years that followed, several petitions were filed, the disposition of which are not germane to the issues on this appeal. On November 23, 2005, Mother filed a petition for modification based upon the fact that the Child was then in her custody under an order of the trial court. The trial court entered an order on February 15, 2006, providing that "current support is terminated because [Mother] now has custody of the [C]hild." The record contains a number of subsequent pleadings and orders that also are not relevant to this appeal. Finally, on January 16, 2009, Mother filed a petition for modification seeking "to terminate all arrearage and liquidate arrearage to [F]ather." The trial court entered an order on July 17, 2009, determining that "the arrearage balance was proper based on the fact that child support cannot be modified retroactively." The court did reduce Mother's monthly arrearage payment from $50 to $35. Mother appeals and both sides raise issues. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kay & Kay Contracting, LLC vs. Tennessee Department of Transportation
Kay and Kay Contracting, LLC ("Contractor") entered into a contract with the Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT") to build a bridge in Campbell County, Tennessee. Contractor subsequently entered into a subcontract with Whitley County Stone, LLC ("Subcontractor") to provide the excavation and grading work on the project. Subcontractor does not have a written contract with TDOT. Both Contractor and Subcontractor filed claims with the Claims Commission alleging they were owed money by TDOT. Subcontractor was dismissed as a party because it did not have a written contract with TDOT, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 9-8-307(a)(1)(L). The Commissioner, however, determined that Contractor was allowed to prosecute Subcontractor's claim as a "pass-through" claim. The sole issue on this interlocutory appeal is whether Tenn. Code Ann. _ 9-8-307(a)(1)(L) removes the State's sovereign immunity such that Contractor can assert a "pass-through" claim against TDOT on Subcontractor's behalf. We conclude that sovereign immunity from such a claim is not removed, and we reverse the judgment of the Claims Commission. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Regina D. Wiser vs Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr.
This appeal concerns post-divorce modification of alimony and child support. The parties had two children; during the marriage, the wife remained at home and cared for the parties' children. The husband was self-employed through his solely owned company. Ultimately, the parties divorced on stipulated grounds, and the husband was ordered to pay child support. The husband was awarded his business. The trial court awarded two commercial buildings to the wife and ordered the husband to pay the associated mortgage. The husband was ordered to pay alimony until the buildings were paid off, after which the wife's income was to be derived from the buildings. After the divorce, the income of the husband's company increased substantially and the husband refinanced the buildings. Two years after the divorce, the wife filed a petition for modification of alimony and child support. After a trial, the trial court declined to increase the alimony. It granted an increase in the husband's child support obligation to the maximum under the guidelines, but declined to award more than the guideline amount. The trial court also declined to award the wife attorney fees. The wife now appeals. We find that the increase in the income of the husband's company was a substantial and material change in circumstances, and that the decision not to increase alimony was an abuse of discretion, and therefore modify the alimony award. We affirm the trial court's refusal to grant an upward deviation from the guideline amount of child support. We reverse the trial court's denial of the wife's request for attorney fees with respect to child support and alimony, but affirm the denial of attorney fees for the refinancing of the two buildings awarded to the wife. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Glen Cruzen vs Ayman Awad
This case arises out of the alleged breach of a contractual agreement entered by and between Appellant and Appellee for the repair and renovation of a commercial building. Appellant filed suit, asserting that Appellee had failed to fully compensate Appellant for his work on the building. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant was an unlicensed contractor under Tenn. Code Ann. _62-6-102, and that his recovery was, therefore, limited to actual documented expenses under Tenn. Code Ann. _62- 6-103(b). Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shawn Howell, Individually and as Administrator for the Estate of Jesse Franklin Browning, Jr. vs Claiborne and Hughes Health Center
This is a medical malpractice action. Appellant originally filed a claim in 2007 in the name of an estate. The original claim was subsequently non-suited. Less than one year later, the claim was then re-filed, also in the name of an estate. With permission of the court, the Appellant later amended the complaint to name the administrator of the estate as the plaintiff. However, upon the Appellee's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint finding: (1) the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations as there were no allegations in the complaint which would invoke the savings statute; (2) the complaint failed to state with particularity the specific acts of negligence; and (3) that the Appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements for a medical malpractice action found in Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 29-26- 121. Finding that the trial court erred, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Parsley vs. Elmer Price
Charles Parsley ("the plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, sued Elmer Price ("the defendant") in the General Sessions Court for Hawkins County. In attempting to allege his cause of action, the plaintiff employed a civil warrant form with the pre-printed designation, "Detainer Summons." The general sessions court transferred the case to the trial court. The trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff's suit was not a detainer action but rather a suit "in the nature of either quiet title or of ejectment." Following a bench trial on September 22, 2009, the court incorporated its written memorandum opinion into an order and granted "judgment in favor of the defendant." Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel C. Wicker, II, et al. vs. Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Revenue
Plaintiffs were assessed, and paid taxes under the Drug Tax, which was later declared unconstitutional. Plaintiffs sought refunds individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated. The trial court certified the class, and the Department filed this interlocutory appeal challenging certification. Because the Taxpayer Remedies Statute, which must be strictly construed as a derogation of sovereign immunity, does not contemplate the maintenance of a class action, we reverse the trial court's grant of class certification. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Dara Demetra Owens vs. Daniel Lee Owens
Husband seeks to set aside a divorce decree and permanent parenting plan entered by default on the ground that the provisions of such differed significantly from the relief sought in Wife's complaint for divorce and proposed parenting plan. We reverse the trial court's decision insofar as it failed to grant Husband the relief sought. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Dutton, et al. vs. Farmers Group, Inc., et al. - Concurring
I agree with the majority that, given the present state of the record in this case, summary judgment is not appropriate. As the record now stands, “[w]hether the plaintiff[s] exercised reasonable care and diligence in discovering the injury or wrong is . . . a fact question for the [trier of fact] to determine.” Wyatt v. A-Best Company, 910 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tenn. 1995). In other words, there is a genuine issue as to this material fact. At trial, the finder of fact must determine if the plaintiffs filed suit within one year of the point in time when they first knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 1 have known that an actionable injury had occurred. Id. at 856-57. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Dutton, et al. vs. Farmers Group, Inc., et al.
Plaintiffs' home flooded and incurred severe water and mold damage when the hot water tank burst. Plaintiffs began to experience varying illnesses after moving back into the home. Despite Defendants' assurances that the home was safe, three years after moving back into the home, Plaintiffs discovered that their home was contaminated with toxic mold. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants alleging various claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint asserting that the statute of limitations barred the claims. After a hearing, the trial court agreed and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment; the trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Corey N.A., Kayla M.A. and Robert L.A.
The Department of Children's Services petitioned the Court to terminate the parental rights of both parents to the minor children. Following trial, the trial judge ruled that grounds to terminate the parental rights by clear and convincing evidence existed, as well as clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the parents. The parents have appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the trial court. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals |
