Cydnie B. O'Rourke v. James P. O'Rourke
In the last proceeding in this protracted post-divorce litigation, the trial court transferred custody, or primary residential placement, of three children of a divorced couple from the mother to the father. In this consolidated appeal, the mother claims that the trial court erred in a number of ways. However, a number of her arguments relate to orders or actions that have been rendered moot by the final order, including her challenges to the use of a"parenting coordinator." As to the final order modifying residential placement, we hold that the trial court did not err in declining to use Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-6-406 to limit the father's visitation with the children and that the court acted within its discretion in limiting the testimony of Mother's expert witness as a discovery sanction. We also hold that the trial court's award of $330,000 in attorney fees to the father was not error. We affirm the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Joshua Todd Daniels vs. Kevin Grimac, et al
This is an appeal from a judgment summarily holding attorney Herbert S. Moncier in direct, criminal contempt of court. Because the trial court improperly exercised its summary contempt authority several weeks after the cited conduct occurred, we vacate its judgment and remand this case for additional proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
International Market and Restaurant, Inc., et al. v. Belmont University, et al.
International Market and Restaurant, Inc. and Patti Myint, owner of the P.M. Café, sued the Belmont University and the Metropolitan Government because representatives of Belmont and the United States Secret Service informed the plaintiffs that the streets and sidewalks around plaintiffs’ establishments would be closed for security purposes the evening of the Presidential debate at Belmont pursuant to a plan developed by the Secret Service. The plaintiffs closed the businesses that evening; however, the sidewalks were not closed. The plaintiffs claim that they lost revenue by closing and seek compensation based on negligent representation, constructive fraud and breach of the indemnity agreement between Belmont and Metro. The trial court granted Belmont’s motion for summary judgment and Metro’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Regions Bank, Successor-In-Interest to Union Planters Bank v. Lost Cove Cabins and Campgrounds, Inc., et al.
The trial court entered judgment against the borrowers and guarantors on two promissory notes. On appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court erred in striking their jury demand and that they are entitled to relief under an alleged written commitment for permanent financing or under various equitable theories. We find the defendants' arguments to be without merit and affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Van Buren | Court of Appeals | |
Terrance Lowdermilk v. Tennessee Department of Safety
Petitioner filed this petition for judicial review in 2009 to challenge the propriety of the seizure of $5,518 in cash following the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation executing a search warrant on Petitioner’s residence in May of 2001. A notice of seizure was served on Petitioner; also a forfeiture warrant was issued and mailed to Petitioner at his residence. The Department of Safety subsequently entered a final administrative order forfeiting the money. When Petitioner filed this action almost eight years later, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petition was not timely filed. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carol L. Brandon v. Williamson Medical Center, et al.
Plaintiff timely filed a complaint for medical malpractice, but failed to file a certificate of good faith within ninety days as required. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for enlargement pursuant to Rule 6.02 and a proposed certificate of good faith. The trial court granted defendants' motion, finding plaintiff had failed to demonstrate "good cause" for failing to file the required certificate. Because we find that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate either "good cause" or "excusable neglect," we affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Wade Phelps/Phelps Harrington Construction Co., Inc. v. C & C Construction Co., LLC, et al.
Contractor agreed to build duplex for property owner, with plaintiff providing construction financing. At closing, contractor was paid, but contractor did not pay plaintiff as agreed. Plaintiff sued property owner, contractor, and bank. We previously affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the bank, finding that contractor and plaintiff were in a joint venture, such that payment to contractor was payment to plaintiff. Property owner then moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Because we find no separate agreement between property owner and plaintiff requiring repayment directly to plaintiff, plaintiff's cause of action against property owner is precluded, and the trial court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Bonner Givens, et al. v. Mark S. Josovitz, et al.
After an elevated PSA test in October 2000, Dr. Josovitz referred Decedent to a urologist. After an even higher PSA level on retest, the urologist performed a biopsy, which was benign. Despite being informed of his need for additional PSA testing, decedent did not return to the urologist, and, despite routinely seeing decedent for other health issues, Dr. Josovitz did not again discuss the need for repeat testing with decedent until 2004. In May 2004, decedent was diagnosed with advanced prostate cancer, and he died in September 2005. Plaintiffs' expert testified that decedent's prostate cancer must have been diagnosed by December 2001 in order for decedent to survive. However, it is undisputed that the defendants had no knowledge of his prostate cancer by that time. Plaintiffs filed suit in this case beyond the three-year statute of repose for medical malpractice. Because they are unable to prove defendants had knowledge of decedent's prostate cancer, fraudulent concealment is unavailable to toll the statute of repose. Accordingly, we find that plaintiffs' wrongful death claim is barred by the statute of repose and further that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering. Summary judgment is granted to defendants, and the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Clarence E. Miller vs. Marian N. Miller
Husband filed for divorce after twenty-five years of marriage alleging inappropriate marital conduct as grounds for divorce. Wife filed a counter-claim for divorce also alleging inappropriate marital conduct. After a bench trial, the court found that the parties had lived separately for at least 10 years; awarded a divorce to Husband; and awarded alimony in futuro to Wife. Wife appeals challenging the trial court's award of a divorce to Husband, the division of the marital property, and the award of alimony. Upon review of the record, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Arthur B. Roberts, et al vs. Robert Bailey, et al
Robert Bailey, Lisa Bailey Dishner, and Richard Neal Bailey ("the Baileys") were sued by Arthur B. Roberts and Tia Roberts with regard to a boundary line dispute. The Baileys filed a third party complaint against Dale Littleton, Alice Littleton, Kimber Littleton, Mark Lee Littleton ("the Littletons"), and Charlotte Dutton seeking to quiet title to real property, including the property involved in the boundary line dispute. The Baileys filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the Littletons. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for summary judgment and certifying the judgment as final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. The Baileys appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Charles E. Foust, Jr. v. Larry E. Metcalf, et al.
Plaintiff filed this action to quiet title to a strip of land along a former railroad line. Defendant, an adjacent landowner, asserts that plaintiff has no interest in the disputed property because the deed that purportedly conveyed the property to plaintiff was champertous and void due to the fact defendant was adversely possessing the property under color of title at the time of the deed. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff, finding that defendant failed to establish that plaintiff's deed was champertous or that defendant had acquired title by seven years of adverse possession under color of title for thirty years. We have determined the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard by holding that defendant had to prove seven years of adverse possession to establish that plaintiff's deed was champertous. Instead, defendant need only prove that he was in adverse possession at the time of the deed to plaintiff. Defendant established he was in adverse possession under color of title of the disputed property at the time of plaintiff's deed; accordingly, the deed is champertous. Champertous deeds are void; therefore, plaintiff never acquired a legal interest in the disputed property. We reverse the judgment of the trial court quieting title in favor of plaintiff. As for defendant's prayer that he be declared the owner of the disputed property, we have determined that an indispensable party is missing, the grantor of the deed to plaintiff; therefore, we make no ruling concerning defendant's claim that he owns the property by adverse possession of at least seven continuous years under color of title pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-105. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Beverly Angel v. Diane Nixon
The paternal grandmother of a three-year-old child filed a petition seeking visitation pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-6-306. The grandmother contended that the child's mother prevented the grandmother from seeing the child following the death of the child's father. Grandmother also contended that she had a significant existing relationship with the child and that the loss of this relationship was likely to cause severe emotional harm to the child. The trial court granted the petition and awarded the grandmother three hours of visitation every third Sunday at the grandmother's home. The mother appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in making the award to the grandmother, because the mother did not oppose visitation. Alternatively, she argued that the proof did not support a finding that the grandmother had a significant existing relationship with the child or that the child would be severely emotionally harmed from severance of that relationship. We affirm the trial court's determination that the grandmother is entitled to three hours of visitation every third Sunday. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Michael C. M., Shania M. J., and Jania M. J.
The trial court terminated Father's parental rights upon a finding of abandonment and upon determining termination was in the best interests of the children. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer (Pitts) Bradford vs. David Wilson Pitts
The father was paying child support, became disabled and filed a Petition to suspend child support payments until his disability insurance began paying. By the time of the hearing on his Petition, his disability insurance began paying a monthly amount. The Trial Judge ultimately refused to lower the child support payments, finding that the father established no variance between his income before and after his disability. The father tendered his income tax return for the year when the child support obligation was set, but the Trial Court refused to consider this evidence. On appeal, we vacate and remand. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Quint Bourgeois vs. McCurdy and Candler, LLC, et al
The pertinent order in this case was entered by the trial court on August 25, 2010. Therefore, the thirtieth day from and after the date of entry of the order was Friday, September 24, 2010. The date of September 24, 2010, was not a legal holiday and there is nothing before us to indicate that it was a day when "weather or other conditions have made the office of the court clerk inaccessible." Tenn. R. App. P. 21(a). The appellant's notice of appeal was received and filed by the trial court clerk on Monday, September 27, 2010. As can be seen, the notice was not filed and received by the trial court clerk within 30 days of the date of entry of the order from which the appeal was taken. Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction of this appeal due to the untimely filing of the notice of appeal. Appeal dismissed. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine M. Love et al vs. Doris Lakins Woods
This case arises from the trial court's denial of Plaintiff/Appellants' motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Appellants, the surviving children of decedent, filed a wrongful death claim against the Appellee herein, the driver of a car involved in the accident that killed decedent. During negotiations, Appellee/Defendant's attorney proposed a settlement in the amount of Appellee's insurance policy limit, which Appellee's attorney misstated to be $100,000, when, in fact, the policy limit was $50,000. The trial court denied Appellants' motion to enforce the $100,000 settlement finding that the settlement was not enforceable, as it failed to contain certain material terms of the agreement. We conclude that the trial court failed to determine whether an agency relationship existed between the Appellee's attorney and the insurance company and also whether the insurance company is required to be a party to this litigation. Vacated and remanded. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Szemborski, et al vs. Roger Sayner
The order from which the appellant Roger Sayner seeks to appeal was entered in the trial court on August 18, 2010. A notice of appeal was filed with and received by the trial court clerk on September 21, 2010. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction of this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs taxed to the appellant. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy Freeman, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of John R. Freeman, Deceased v. CSX Transportation, Inc., a Florida Corporation, et al. - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion that Rutherford County was an appropriate venue for this action and, consequently, that the Rutherford County court had subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, I disagree with the majority’s statement that “unless the plaintiff and at least one ‘material defendant’ reside in the same county and that county is where the cause of action accrued” the common county rule does not apply. Essentially, the majority holds that the venue statute does not apply, a conclusion that I believe is erroneous. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy Freeman, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of John R. Freeman, Deceased v. CSX Transportation, Inc., a Florida Corporation, et al.
The issues in this case are whether Tennessee's "common county rule" deprived the Rutherford County Circuit Court of subject matter jurisdiction and whether the court erred in assessing discretionary costs. This wrongful death action arises from a fatal vehicular accident in Normandy, Bedford County, Tennessee, in which the decedent's vehicle was stuck by a train owned by CSX Transportation, Inc. The mother of the decedent, in her individual capacity and as the personal representative of the decedent's estate, timely filed this action in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County against CSX and the conductor of the train. Over the next five years the parties conducted extensive discovery. On the first day of trial, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. On the motion of the defendants, the Rutherford County Circuit Court assessed $34,098.27 in discretionary costs against plaintiff. In this appeal, plaintiff contends the Rutherford County Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a consequence of the common county rule, and that it erred in awarding discretionary costs. We have determined that the common county rule does not apply, the Rutherford County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs of $34,098.27 against plaintiff after she voluntarily dismissed this action. Accordingly, we affirm the award of discretionary costs. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Eddie Ward vs. Teresa Yokley, et al
In this action to enforce a contract to purchase real estate, the trial court declared the contract enforceable, the seller had breached the contract by refusing to sell to plaintiff, and held that a third party who had a lien against the property tortiously interfered with the sale. The trial judge rescinded the quit claim deed to Tyler Lawson from Yokley and assessed costs and damages. On appeal, we reverse the trial judge and hold the contract became unenforceable because plaintiff did not comply with the conditions set forth in the contract. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Maysoon M.A.A.K., and Falasteen M.A.A.K., Muhammad I.S. and Tessa D. S., v. Sonya G.
Petitioners, custodians of two minor children, filed this action to terminate the mother's parental rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge found there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination, based upon willful failure to support/visit and persistent conditions. The court also found that the evidence was clear and convincing that termination was in the children's best interest. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Providence Crossings, LLC v. SC Realty Capital, L.P., SC Capital, LLC, and Smith Realty Interests, L.P. - Concurring
I write this concurring opinion because I find it very difficult to believe that the contractual rights at issue were not foreclosed upon and, thus, passed to the bank as a result of the foreclosure, in which event Defendants would be entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as the trial court found. However, as the majority correctly notes, there may be a small crack in the evidentiary chain that pertains to material facts at issue. I am not fully convinced there is a deficiency, but for purposes of summary judgment the court must be convinced that material facts are not in dispute. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Providence Crossings, LLC v. SC Realty Capital, L.P., SC Capital, LLC, and Smith Realty Interests, L.P.
Purchaser of landlocked property brought action against the sellers, seeking to recover damages allegedly caused by the failure of the sellers to complete a road extension or otherwise to insure reasonable access to the property, which had been purchased for development of multi-family rental units. The trial court granted summary judgment to the sellers, finding that the right of the purchaser to proceed with the action was extinguished when the bank that provided financing for the development of the property foreclosed on the loan secured by the property and subsequently sold the property to another entity. The court concluded that the purchaser did not have standing to pursue the claims. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the purchaser's cause of action was included in the assets foreclosed upon, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Christopher M. - Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Ebony M.
Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and mental incompetence. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Isaiah L. - Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Dianne P.
This is an appeal from a finding of dependency and neglect. An off-duty employee of the petitioner Tennessee Department of Children's Services witnessed the respondent mother hitting the subject child in the parking lot of a retail store. After an investigation, the State filed a petition for dependency and neglect, alleging abuse based on the parking lot incident. The juvenile court determined that the child had been abused and held that the child was dependent and neglected. The mother appealed to the circuit court, which conducted a two day trial de novo. After hearing the evidence, the circuit court below entered an order finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child had been abused and declaring the child to be dependent and neglected. The mother now appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
