Danielle Harris v. Tennessee Department of Children's Services
This appeal results from the trial court’s order, finding six of Appellant’s children dependent and neglected. Because there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings of dependency and neglect and severe child abuse, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
American Bonding Company v. Sandra Vaughn
This dispute involves a bail bond contract which the Appellant contends should be invalidated due to illegality, lack of mutual consent and because she allegedly executed the contract under duress. The trial court found the contract to be enforceable and entered a $4,000.00 judgment against Appellant. Appellee appeals the trial court’s denial of its application for counsel fees as provided for in the contract. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Madison K. P.
This application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9 arises from the trial court’s decision to stay the implementation of the parenting plan that the trial court was directed to adopt pursuant to our decision in In re Madison K.P., No. M2009-02331-COA-R3-JV, 2010 WL 4810665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2010). The Supreme Court denied the father’s application for permission to appeal on April 14, 2011 and the mandate of this court was issued on April 27, 2011. Despite this, the ruling of this court has yet to be put into effect, because the parenting plan that was to be approved and entered by the trial court, and which was approved and entered, was immediately stayed by the trial court following its entry, rendering our decision and the parenting plan of no effect. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Ann Winn v. Welch Farm, LLC, et al.
The buyer of unimproved real property sued the sellers for breach of implied warranties, imposition of a permanent nuisance, and diminution in value of the property; buyer also sought damages for alleged violations of the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act, the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and negligence. The trial court held that Tennessee does not provide a cause of action for breach of implied warranty in the sale of unimproved real property; the court also held that buyer had not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the lot was “unbuildable.” The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the buyer appealed. Buyer asserts that the sellers had a duty to disclose “possible adverse soil conditions.” She also urges this Court to adopt a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of suitability for residential construction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Hartman v. Tennessee Board of Regents d/b/a Tennessee Tech University
In this employment dispute, a former employee claims she was unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of her gender. The plaintiff, a long time employee, was terminated after failing to adhere to her employer’s policies and procedures concerning the purchase of inventory and equipment. Claiming this reason was pretextual, she filed this action pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. After discovery, the employer moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding the employer demonstrated that the plaintiff could not establish that a similarly situated male employee was treated more favorably. We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
John Griff Lucas v. City of Waverly, Tennessee, et al.
In this inverse condemnation action, the trial court granted summary judgment to condemning authority on ground that statute of limitations barred suit; landowner appeals. Condemning authority urges affirmance of the dismissal on alternative grounds. Finding that the action is not barred by the statute of limitations and that genuine issue of material fact exists which precludes summary judgment, we reverse the dismissal of this action and remand for further proceedings. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Mitchell Eads, TDOC #243729 v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al
Petitioner filed a Common Law Writ of Certiorari, alleging he was convicted of a disciplinary infraction while incarcerated, and that the conviction was illegal, arbitrary and fraudulent. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Petition contained no oath or affirmation and did not state it was the first application for a writ pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §27-8-104(a) and 106. Further that petitioner failed to file a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §41-21-807(a). The Trial Court entered an Order of Dismissal for the deficiencies set forth in the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner has appealed and we affirm the Trial Court's Order of Dismissal on the grounds set forth in that Order. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Almeta Ellis, as the Administratrix of the Estate of Jonah Ellis, and the Estate of Jonah Ellis, Individually v. Minder Music Limited, Lonnie Simmons and Robert Louis Whitfield
This appeal concerns venue in an action to recover royalties. The plaintiff songwriter resided in Shelby County, Tennessee. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in Shelby County against the defendant music company to recover past-due royalties, asserting that he was the sole author of three musical compositions. The defendant music company, domiciled in the United Kingdom, filed a motion to dismiss based on, inter alia, improper venue. The trial court held that venue was improper and granted the motion to dismiss. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Valerie Cossar Clark and Estate of Ricky Cossar v. Donnie Houston, Larry Sisco, and Brenda Sisco
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal more than thirty (30) days after the order appealed was entered by the trial court. Consequently, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Alan Bradley Pounders v. Tiffany White Pounders
This is an appeal of an award of attorney fees in a post-divorce matter. The father had filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan, seeking to increase his parenting time and reduce his child support obligation. Approximately six months later, after Father’s discovery deposition was taken, he asked the court to dismiss his petition to modify without prejudice. The trial court dismissed the petition but awarded the mother $20,000 for her attorneys’ fees. The father appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to award attorney fees and that the amount awarded was arbitrary and unreasonable. We find that the trial court had the authority to award attorney’s fees, but due to the lack of findings by the trial court regarding the reasonableness of the fee award, we vacate the award and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Ann Thomas (Rossie) v. Joseph Richard Rossie
The former husband appealed the trial court's order finding him in willful contempt of the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A'Mari B.
This is termination of parental rights case involving A’Mari B. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Troy B. (“Father”) and Rebecca S. (“Mother”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took the Child as an infant into state custody after both Father and Mother were arrested and jailed. The Child was promptly placed with Christopher N. and Dean N. (collectively, “the Custodians”), the prospective adoptive parents, where she has remained. Five months after obtaining legal custody, the Custodians filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father and Mother in order to facilitate their adoption of the Child. Following a bench trial, at which Mother appeared, the court terminated both natural parents’ rights to the Child based on the court’s finding of multiple forms of abandonment. Over Father’s objection, his case was tried without his presence or participation. Father and Mother, by separate notices of appeal, challenge the termination order. As to Father, the judgment is vacated and the case remanded for a new trial – our action being based on the fact that Father was denied due process in the termination proceeding. As to Mother, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that there is clear and convincing evidence that she abandoned the Child and that termination of her rights is in the Child’s best interest. Accordingly, as to Mother, the judgment is affirmed |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Ray Adkins et al v. Bluegrass Estates, Inc. et al
The purchasers of lots in a “subdivision known as Timberlake Estates, Phase One” – described in a plat and restrictive covenants as a twenty-lot subdivision – acquired with their deeds the right to use a boat ramp and parking area to be located in a common area within the subdivision. When they learned that additional lots – not located within the combined acreage of the twenty lots – were being advertised for sale along with the right to use the same boat ramp and parking area, they filed this action against their predecessor in interest.1 After a trial on the merits, the court held that only the purchasers of lots in “Phase One” were entitled to use the boat ramp and parking area. The defendants appeals. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Alfie Tucker v. Tabitha Finch
In this legal malpractice case, Alfie Tucker filed suit against his attorney, Tabitha Finch, alleging that she had negligently represented him in his lawsuit against his former employer by failing to timely file his claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission (“TCC”). Ms. Finch filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the applicable statute of limitations had passed. The trial court granted Ms. Finch’s motion and dismissed the case. Mr. Tucker appeals. We affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Carol D. Davis v. Kolo Lynn Davis, et al
In this post-divorce case, Kolo Lynn Davis (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s classification of an agreement to maintain health insurance through his company, Cleveland Building Materials (“CBM”), as alimony in futuro. Husband and Carol D. Davis (“Wife”) were married in 1964 and divorced in 1995. Pursuant to the mutual agreement of the parties, Wife was given the option of maintaining health insurance through CBM. In furtherance of this agreement, Wife was given a paid position as a non-voting member of CBM’s board of directors, which allowed her to maintain health insurance through CBM. Wife was tasked with reimbursing CBM for all costs associated with the health insurance coverage. Husband later sold CBM to Kolo Lynn Davis, II (“Son”). Son, through CBM, continued to pay Wife for her services as a board member. In 2005, CBM discontinued its group health insurance, thereby removing Wife from the plan and ceased paying Wife for her services as a board member. Wife filed suit, naming Husband and CBM as parties. Following a hearing, the trial court classified the payments from CBM as alimony in futuro, held Husband personally liable for CBM’s non-payment, and instructed Husband to continue with future payments pursuant to the agreement. Husband appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin B. Smith, et al v. Gary Hankins, et al
This appeal involves a boundary line dispute raised by the plaintiff, Melvin B. Smith and his wife, Charlotte E. Smith (“the Smiths”) and a request for an easement by the defendants, Gary Hankins and Stanley Hankins (“the Hankinses”). After a trial, the court entered rulings in favor of the Hankinses as to both the establishment of the boundary line and the easement. The Smiths appeal. We affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Tri Am Construction, Inc. et al v. J & V Development, Inc. et al
This interlocutory appeal stems from a lien enforcement action. Tri Am Construction, Inc. (“Tri Am”) filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Rhea County (“the Trial Court”) against J & V Development, Inc. (“J & V”), Randall E. Vick, Brenda B. Jung, and Branch Banking and Trust Company (“BB&T”) to enforce a lien. BB&T moved to dismiss Tri Am’s complaint, citing alleged fatal procedural defects. The Trial Court denied BB&T’s motion to dismiss and allowed Tri Am to amend its complaint to cure the procedural defects. We granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We find that the Trial Court did not err in liberally construing the revised mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens statutes to permit Tri Am to amend its complaint in order to cure the procedural defects. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in declining to hold that BB&T’s rights would be retroactively impaired by the liberal application of the revised mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens statutes. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Unknown Tenant of Foreclosed Property ( Martin Goss)
A show cause order was entered in this case on July 15, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has failed to respond to the show cause order within the time specified. The review of the record reveals that the judgment to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3 a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as premature. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Roger Washington Bouldin
Daughter of decedent filed claim against estate. The probate court dismissed the daughter’s claim on the ground that it was not timely filed. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
SecurAmerica Business Credit v. Karl Schledwitz and Terry Lynch
This is a guaranty case. Appellants personally guaranteed a line of credit for their trucking company. Later, Appellants sold the trucking company to two employees, but were not released by the Appellee lender from their guaranties. Under new ownership, the company falsified borrowing documents so that more money was extended on the line of credit than was collateralized per the loan agreement. This was done with the complicity of the lender, but without the knowledge of the guarantors. The debtor trucking company defaulted, and the lender sought repayment of the loan from the guarantors. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellants liable for their personal guaranties, but denied prejudgment interest and punitive damages due to what the court characterized as the fraudulent actions of Appellee. In an apparent clerical mistake, on the same date that the trial court entered its final judgment, it also entered an order voluntarily dismissing all claims against Appellants. More than a year later, the trial court entered an order clarifying its prior order of dismissal. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that: (1) the trial court properly afforded Appellee relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 to clarify its prior order of dismissal; and (2) the trial court made incomplete and contradictory findings of fact and conclusions of law, such that further appellate review is precluded. Consequently, we vacate and remand for additional findings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sara Ann (Spencer) Wangerin v. Shawn Allen Wangerin
In an action for divorce and custody, Father appeals the trial court’s decision to declare Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. Because Father failed to file a transcript or statement of the evidence pertaining to a portion of the trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
K.B.J. v. T.J.
This is a contested divorce case involving two minor children. K.B.J. (“Husband”) was the first to file a complaint for divorce. T.J. (“Wife”) answered his complaint and coupled a counterclaim with her answer. The trial court found that Husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct and awarded Wife a divorce, but made Husband the primary residential parent of the minor children with final authority on certain parental decisions. The court ordered equal parenting time on an alternating week basis. It also denied Wife’s request for spousal support and allocated to her approximately $32,350 of the marital debt. Wife appeals. We reverse that part of the judgment making Husband the primary residential parent with final decision-making authority and modify the parenting schedule. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Maddox B.S., et al
Lyndsey S. (“Mother”) and Trey S. (“Father”) are the biological parents (“Parents”) of Maddox B.S. and Rylie M.S. (“Children”). Veronda S. and James S. (“Grandparents”) are the paternal grandparents of Children. Mother, acknowledging that her consent would result in the termination of her parental rights, sought to consent to the adoption of Children by Grandparents. Grandparents and Mother petitioned the trial court to terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights and allow Grandparents to adopt Children. The court accepted Mother’s consent and terminated her parental rights. The court terminated Father’s parental rights in a default judgment, citing abandonment as the ground for the termination of Father’s rights. Shortly thereafter, Mother moved the court to set aside the final order of adoption, citing fraud and duress as grounds. Father also moved the court to set aside the termination of his parental rights and the order of adoption, citing fraud and misrepresentation as grounds. Mother and Father subsequently alleged that the court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of Children. The trial court found that it had failed to enter sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law and set aside the final order of adoption. Mother then sought to revoke her consent. The trial court allowed the revocation, finding that the final order of adoption that had been set aside was the only document in which Mother had consented to the termination of her parental rights and subsequent adoption. Grandparents appeal the court’s action of setting aside the order, the allowance of Mother’s revocation of consent, and the dismissal of the case. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
James W. Grooms, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The State of Tennessee (“the State”) appeals the Hawkins County Circuit Court’s determination that the Department of Safety could not suspend James W. Grooms, Jr.’s handgun permit because the permit had been confiscated previously by a police officer, and Mr. Grooms, therefore, was unable to surrender the permit. We reverse. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
John D. Glass v. SunTrust Bank, Trustee of The Ann Haskins Whitson Glass Trust; SunTrust Bank, Executor of the Estate of Ann Haskins Whitson Glass; and William Glass
This is an appeal from an action originally filed in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, seeking damages for Appellees’ alleged breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, mismanagement, negligence, and breach of duty to diversify in its roles as executor of Decedent’s estate and Decedent’s successor trustee. Decedent’s son, the Appellant herein, filed his original suit in the Probate Court of Shelby County, seeking return of administrative costs and fees charged by Appellee. The probate court affirmed the fees, and Appellant filed a subsequent complaint in the chancery court. The chancery court complaint was eventually transferred to the probate court, where it was dismissed on grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Appellant appeals. We conclude that there was no final order in the first probate proceeding and, consequently, the criteria for both collateral estoppel and res judicata are not met. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
