In Re: Dylan H., et al.
This is a parental rights termination case in which Karen C. and Raymond C. (collectively the “Grandparents”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Valerie H. (“Mother”) and Ronnie H. (“Father”) to minor children, Dylan H. and Jade H. (collectively the “Children”). Temporary custody of the Children was awarded to the Grandparents in July 2007. The Grandparents, alleging abandonment, persistence of conditions, and failure to adhere to a permanency plan, filed a petition to terminate parental rights in February 2010. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed the petition as to Father but found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment and that it was in the best interest of the Children to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals. We do not believe the Grandparents proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned the Children. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as may be necessary. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Reynoldo Collazo, et al. v. Joe Haas, d/b/a Haas Construction, et al.
This is an action to recover uninsured motorist benefits following a motor vehicle collision involving the plaintiff and another vehicle. The driver of the defendant vehicle left the scene and has not been identified.The owner of the vehicle was subsequently identified, but denied knowing the identity of the driver and claimed no one had permission to operate the vehicle at the time of the accident. The named defendants in this action are the owner of the vehicle and John Doe, the unknown driver. Plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist insurance carrier, Nationwide Insurance Co., is an unnamed defendant. The defendant owner has liability insurance coverage through State Farm Insurance Co. The plaintiffs settled all claims against the defendant-owner and State Farm for $90,000, $10,000 less than the uninsured motorist limits with Nationwide. Thereafter, the plaintiffs continued to pursue their claims against Nationwide for uninsured motorist benefits, insisting the settlement with the owner of the vehicle did not bar their claims against the uninsured John Doe driver. Upon motion for summary judgment by Nationwide, the trial court found that because the owner of the vehicle had $100,000 of liability insurance, there was not an “uninsured motor vehicle.” Based on this finding, the trial court summarily dismissed the plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist claim against Nationwide. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Phillips v. Todd Shrader
This is a dispute between two neighbors over the use of land. The plaintiff, Carol Phillips, charged the defendant, Todd Shrader, with trespass. She sought an injunction and damages, along with removal of encroaching structures. The trial court dismissed Ms. Phillips’s action, finding it barred by Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-103. Ms. Phillips appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey L. Dillon v. NICA, Inc., et al.
After his claim for insurance benefits for an injury sustained while making a delivery was denied,plaintiff filed suitagainstthe delivery company,the companyproviding the insurance coverage and its president, and the third party administrator of the insurance plan, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and conspiracy to evade the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act. The jury found the company providing the insurance and its president liable for violation of the Consumer Protection Act and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, the insurance company and president contend that the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff was an employee of delivery company rather than an independent contractor, in excluding various exhibits and testimony, in denying the president’s motion for a directed verdict, and in awarding punitive damages. Because the punitive damage awarded was predicated on the violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, which does not authorize an award of punitive damages, the award of punitive damages is vacated and the case remanded for a determination of whether an award of treble damages under the Consumer Protection Act should be awarded. In all other respects, the judgment and rulings are affirmed. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
David White v. Empire Express, Inc. and Empire Transportation, Inc.
The case involves a lease-purchase agreement. The plaintiff truck driver worked for the defendant hauling company. He entered into a lease-purchase agreement with the codefendant leasing company, affiliated with the employer hauling company, to purchase the truck he drove in his employment. At the end of the lease, the leasing company refused to transfer title to the truck to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against both defendant companies, alleging breach of contract, conversion, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The defendants asserted the affirmative defenses of set-off and recoupment based on the plaintiff’s employment agreement. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff on all of his claims. However, based on an arbitration provision in the employment agreement, it granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration of the defendants’ affirmative defenses of set-off and recoupment. The defendants now appeal. In light of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration, we dismiss the appeal and remand for entry of an order staying the proceedings pending the arbitration. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas H. Gilreath, et al. v. Donald G. Peters, II
Thomas H. Gilreath and Carol L. Gilreath (“Plaintiffs”) sued Donald G. Peters, II (“Defendant”) with regard to a right-of-way. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on February 17, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that Defendant had interfered with Plaintiffs’ use of the right-of-way, and that the right-of-way “should remain open and unobstructed ….” Defendant did not appeal this judgment. Plaintiffs later filed a motion for contempt. During a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion, Defendant made an oral motion seeking to set aside the February 17, 2010 order pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(5). After the hearing, the Trial Court entered its order denying Defendant’s Rule 60.02(5) motion, and finding Defendant in contempt of the Trial Court’s February 17, 2010 order. Defendant appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the denial of his Rule 60.02(5) motion, and the finding of contempt. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Bric Constructors, LLC, f/k/a Bric Contractors, LLC, and Patricia McIntosh
This is an action to collect a debt and to recover collateral. The defendant LLC obtained a line of credit from the plaintiff bank. The LLC borrowed against the line of credit to purchase certain property, and the property was pledged as collateral. Several months later, the line of credit was converted into a fixed amount loan over a longer term, and a new security agreement was executed pledging the same collateral. On the same day, the LLC obtained another line of credit secured by the LLC’s accounts receivable. The next day, the LLC took an advance on the new line of credit. The LLC made monthly payments on both obligations for almost a year, and then it defaulted. The plaintiff bank filed this lawsuit against the LLC and its principal to collect on the loans and to recover the collateral. The LLC contended that the principal of the LLC did not sign key documents, did not authorize advances, and did not authorize the pledge of the collateral. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the bank based on, among other things, its finding that the principal of the LLC had ratified any allegedly unauthorized advances made under the lines of credit. The defendants now appeal. We reverse the finding of ratification as to one advance and remand for further findings; in all other respects, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Patrick Jones v. Jennifer Jones Smith, et al.
Paternal Grandparents filed a motion to intervene in a divorce action between Mother and Father, seeking custody of the parties’ two minor children. The trial court ultimately awarded custody to Mother and ordered Grandparents to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees and costs. Grandparents appeal, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c) only provides for awards of attorney’s fees against spouses in a custody matter, and therefore, the trial court was not authorized to order them to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Raymond L. Smallman, Deceased, Mark Smallman, et al. v. Linda Caraway, et al - Dissenting
CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., dissenting. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Maria A., Rickey A., Jr. and Angel A.
DCS filed a Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court determined there were statutory grounds to terminate the father's parental rights, and that it was in the best interest of the children that his rights be terminated. The father appealed and did not question that statutory grounds existed for termination, but argued that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his children. We conclude the father failed to demonstrate that the Department did not make reasonable efforts for reunification. The evidence is clear and convincing that the Department made reasonable efforts for reunification. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Raymond L. Smallman, Deceased, Mark Smallman, et al. v. Linda Caraway, et al
The two sons of decedent asked the Court to declare that their father died intestate and that his marriage to appellant a few days before he died was void because he was neither competent to make a will or enter into a marriage contract. Upon trial, the jury determined that the deceased was not of sound mind when he executed a will, a copy of which was filed in evidence, and the will was obtained through undue influence of appellant. The jury also found that the marriage between the decedent and appellant was invalid as well. The Trial Judge approved the jury verdict and appellant has appealed. We hold that material evidence supports the jury verdict as approved by the Trial Judge and remand. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Charlotte Scott Forbess v. Michael E. Forbess
This case involves the valuation of assets for division of marital property and alimony. Wife filed for divorce, seeking an equitable division of the marital assets, including Husband’s one-half interest in a real estate partnership. At trial, each party introduced experts to testify as to the value of Husband’s interest in the partnership. The trial court valued the partnership at a fair market value that was between the values testified to by the experts. The court awarded Wife one-half of the value, awarded Wife one-half of a note that was based on property Husband owned prior to the marriage, and awarded Wife alimony. After a motion to alter or amend, the trial court reduced Wife’s interest in the partnership and the note to take into account Husband’s tax liability. Wife appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in valuing the partnership and in its alimony award. Affirmed. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberlie Lois Edmonson v. Terry Lynn Wilson
In this case, Kimberlie Lois Edmonson (“Ms. Edmonson”) filed suit against Terry Lynn Wilson (“Mr. Wilson”) for breach of an alleged partnership agreement. Prior to trial, the parties reached an agreement. Following the announcement of the agreement in court by counsel, Ms. Edmonson refused to honor the agreement. Mr. Wilson filed a motion to enforce the agreement, and the trial court denied the motion. The case proceeded to a bench trial, and the court held in favor of Ms. Edmonson. Mr. Wilson appeals. We hold that the court should have enforced the settlement agreement and reverse the decision of the court. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Orlando Residence, LTD. v. Nashville Lodging Company, Nashville Residence Corp., and Kenneth E. Nelson
This appeal centers on the effective date of a judgment against Appellant–2000 or 2004. Appellant argues that both the equitable estoppel and law of the case doctrines bar Plaintiff from arguing that the judgment was entered in 2004, and therefore, that it has not expired. The trial court found that the judgment had not expired, and we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Prime Locations, Inc. v. Shelby County and the City of Memphis
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendants Shelby County and the City of Memphis upon determining that, under Tennessee Code Annotated 37-7-210, Defendants have authority to regulate billboards pursuant to private acts applicable to Memphis and Shelby County. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm entry of a judgment in favor of Defendants on the grounds of standing and ripeness. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Franklin Steadman Murdaugh, Barbara Murdaugh Warner v. Rudy W. Young
This case arises from a will contest. Appellant, the executor and sole beneficiary of the contested will, appeals the trial court’s finding that Appellant did not met his burden to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption of undue influence based upon the existence of a confidential relationship between Appellant and Decedent. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Maria Welchez Catulan v. Juan Manuel Welchez
Husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in holding a hearing on his wife’s petition for an order of protection when his attorney was not present. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Mize, et al. v. Victor Mark Consulo, et al.
Purchasers of house sued sellers for breach of contract because, contrary to the sale agreement, the house was not connected to the sewer. After a trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the purchasers for the cost of connecting the house to the sewer. In this appeal, the sellers argue that the trial court erred in applying the wrong statute of limitations, in finding in favor of the purchasers, in using the wrong measure of damages, and in the award of attorney fees. We find no error in the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Janice Brooks, et al. v. Rivertown On The Island Homeowner Association, Inc.
Appellee filed an action to set aside Defendant Homeowners’ Association non-judicial foreclosure sale of a condo unit for allegedly unpaid homeowners’ association fees. The trial court set aside the sale upon determining that there was no credible basis upon which to determine the amount due at the time of the sale. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donna F. Smith Thompson v. Ameriquest Mortgage Company
Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale of her property. The trial court dismissed the case based on Plaintiff’s failure to effect service of process on the Defendant. We affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Smith, as Devisee of Ronnie Crabtree v. Linda D. Hatfield
This is a breach of contract case. The defendant seller entered into a contract to sell a mobile home to the plaintiff’s decedent. The contract required the decedent to make monthly payments by a date certain for eighty-four months, and if he failed to do so, all of his payments would be forfeited as rent. The decedent failed to make all of his payments in a timely manner. Later, the decedent died. The plaintiff, the decedent’s sole devisee, offered to pay the contract off by making a lump-sum payment to the defendant. The defendant rejected this offer. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, seeking to require the defendant to accept the lump-sum payment and convey the property to her. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims upon the close of her proof, because the undisputed evidence showed that she had not made the required monthly payments under the contract. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm and award attorney fees for a frivolous appeal. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hannah M. N.
This is an appeal from a child support action. A juvenile court magistrate found the father to be willfully and voluntarily unemployed and imputed income to him for the purposes of calculating his child support obligation. The magistrate refused to consider a motion to modify or vacate. On appeal to the juvenile court judge, the father was refused review on the basis that the magistrate had heard the motion to modify or vacate pursuant to Rule 34(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure. The father appealed. We vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and remand for further proceedings. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Chanda Keith v. Regas Real Estate Company, et al.
This is a negligence case in which Chanda Keith (“Ms. Keith”) filed suit against Regas Real Estate Company (“Regas”) and LDB Corporation operating in Tennessee as Mr. Gatti’s Incorporated formerly doing business as Mr. Gatti’s and/or Mr. Gatti’s, L.P. (“Mr. Gatti’s”). The trial court dismissed the suit against Regas. Approximately ten years after the initial suit was filed, the trial court dismissed the suit against Mr. Gatti’s without prejudice, finding that Ms. Keith failed to comply with an order. One year later, Ms. Keith filed a new suit against Regas and Mr. Gatti’s. The trial court dismissed both suits. Ms. Keith appeals. We affirm the trial court relative to the dismissal of the suit against Regas but reverse the trial court relative to the dismissal of the suit against Mr. Gatti’s. The case is remanded. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy A. Moore v. Hugh A. Butler, Individually and as Agent and Servant of Anthony Wommack d/b/a Wommack Trucking, and Anthony Wommack d/b/a Wommack Trucking, and McCoy's Heating & Air, Inc.
This appeal involves summary judgment in a vehicular accident case. In a line of vehicles, the defendant service vehicle was first, followed by the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer, and then by the co-defendant’s tractor-trailer. The defendant’s service vehicle allegedly made a left turn without braking or using a turn signal, forcing the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer to brake quickly. This resulted in the co-defendant’s tractor-trailer rear-ending the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer. The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant tractor-trailer for rear-ending him, and against the defendant service vehicle that turned in front of him. The defendant service vehicle owner filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the defendant service vehicle owner had negated the element of proximate cause. The defendant tractor-trailer owner appeals. We reverse under the summary judgment standard in Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Nicolle Elizabeth Anderson v. Donald W. Anderson
In this divorce action, the husband appeals the entry of a default judgment and the resulting Order of Divorce and Permanent Parenting Plan. The husband was properlyserved but never filed an answer. Months later, upon motion of the wife, the trial court granted a default judgment against the husband as he had not filed an answer to the complaint for divorce when the motion was heard. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals |
