Heather Russell Wilder v. Joseph Chamblee Wilder
In this contentious divorce action, after numerous hearings, the Trial Court entered a Final Judgment of Divorce incorporating the parties' Marital Dissolution Agreement and the Permanent Parenting Plan. The Court suspended the PPP and reserved the child support issues. The mother appealed, arguing that the Trial Court refused to permit her to produce her argument, and erred in confirming the referee's recommendations. We hold that the record before us does not substantiate her contentions, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dannye J.C.
At a proceeding in Juvenile Court, appellant was found guilty of severe child abuse, which she appealed to the Circuit Court. On motion of the Department of Human Services, the Trial Court dismissed the appeal without a trial. On appeal, we reverse the Trial Court on the grounds that Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159 requires the Trial Judge to conduct a de novo trial on the appeal from Juvenile Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Rand, Inc. v. Automation Industrial Group, LLC et al
The first time this case was before us, see Tennessee Rand, Inc. v. Automation Industrial Group, LLC, No. E2009-00116-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3852317 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Sept. 29, 2010) (“Rand I”), we reversed that portion of the trial court’s judgment decreeing that Automation Industrial Group, LLC (“Automation”) was not entitled to recover on its counterclaim due to its fraud and we reinstated the trial court’s earlier judgment awarding Automation $2,270,759.22 plus prejudgment interest of $256,705.19. The trial court had entered its earlier judgment against Tennessee Rand, Inc. (“Rand”) on Automation’s counterclaim, and then set it aside on Rand’s motion to alter or amend. Although the parties had not addressed in the first appeal the prejudgment interest portion of the trial court’s earlier judgment, we, without extended discussion, reinstated the prejudgment interest as originally calculated by the trial court. What the parties did not put at issue or otherwise stress in the first appeal was the fact that Rand had challenged, in its motion to alter or amend, the accuracy of the trial court’s calculation of prejudgment interest. In that motion, Rand had argued that the trial court had obviously miscalculated prejudgment interest. In Rand I, we also reversed an award of discretionary costs to Rand because we concluded that Automation was the new prevailing party. Upon remand following our decision in Rand I, Rand asked the trial court to correct the miscalculation of prejudgment interest. Rand also asked the court to start the accrual of post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the trial court’s judgment on remand. Automation filed a motion for discretionary costs as the new prevailing party. The trial court on remand determined that it had miscalculated prejudgment interest but held that our opinion in Rand I prevented it from granting Rand any relief with respect to the miscalculation as well as with respect to the other relief requested by Rand. The trial court also denied Automation’s motion for discretionary costs, based, at least in part, on Automation’s substantial windfall award of prejudgment interest due to the miscalculation. Rand now appeals the denial of its motions, and Automation challenges the denial of its request for discretionary costs. Automation also asks us to determine an issue pertaining to interest on the unpaid portion of the judgment entered on remand. We conclude that, in the interest of justice, we must take corrective action pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 36 by granting Rand relief from the miscalculation of prejudgment interest. Since the erroneous and inflated award of prejudgment interest was one of the reasons given by the trial court for denying discretionary costs, we vacate that denial and remand for further consideration of Automation’s request. We affirm that part of the judgment, as modified by us, holding that Automation is entitled to post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the original judgment in its favor. Rand obtained a stay of collection of Automation’s judgment pending appeal upon posting a bond to cover interest accrued between the original judgment date and the date of the judgment on remand. The amount set by the trial court to obtain a stay did not include interest accrued on the unpaid portion of the judgment. We hold that Automation is entitled to recover post-judgment interest accrued on the judgment. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is vacated in part and modified in part. As vacated and modified, the judgment is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Freddy Edwards v. Rodney Collins
The circuit court entered a judgment against Defendant following a bench trial. Defendant appealed, but he failed to provide this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence. Due to our limited ability to review the proceedings below, we affirm the decision of the |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Redland Insurance Company v. Don Willis
The appellant has appealed from an August 30, 2011 final judgment awarding him $1733.00 in damages. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Bessie Louise Thornton
In this will contest, the jury found that a confidential relationship existed between the principal beneficiary of the will and the testatrix; however, the jury also found that the will was not the result of undue influence and, therefore, the will was valid. The contestant filed post-trial motions pursuant to Rules 50.02 and 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict, and alternatively, for a new trial. The trial court set aside the judgment of the jury, and entered judgment declaring the will invalid on the grounds that it was the result of undue influence. The trial court did not expresslyrule on the alternative motion for a new trial.The proponent of the will appeals, contending the trial court erred in setting aside the jury’s verdict and entering judgment in favor of the contestant. We agree that the trial court erred by entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; however, we have also concluded that the trial court, acting in its role as thirteenth juror, implicitly and conditionally granted the contestant’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we remand the case for a new trial. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Minor Miracle Productions, LLC, et al. v. Randy Starkey
A pro se defendant appeals the decision of the trial court denying his motion to set aside a domesticated foreign judgment on the grounds that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the case and that the judgment of the foreign court was obtained fraudulently. We affirm the trial court because the foreign court had jurisdiction, the judgment was not the product of fraudulent acts that were pled with specificity, and the judgment does not violate Tennessee public policy. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Herbal Integrity, LLC, et al. v. Scott Huntley, Jr., et al.
The parties agreed to submit the valuation of Defendants’ membership in Plaintiff LLC to arbitration. Following arbitration, Defendants moved to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The trial court denied the motion and entered final judgment in the matter. Defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Annia J.
The trial court modified a previous custody order and named father the primary residential parent. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding a material change in circumstances. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Ann (Stickney) Compton v. Neil Scott Stickney
This is a post-divorce dispute over father’s obligation to help pay for the parties’ child’s college education. We conclude that, pursuant to the parties’ permanent parenting plan, father is contractually obligated to continue paying support in the amount of $790 a month until the child reaches the age of 21 as long as the child is in college. We affirm the trial court’s decision as modified. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Chadwick David Dorman Moyer v. Nashville Midnight Oil, LLC, d/b/a Cadillac Ranch
Plaintiff sued to recover for injuries sustained while riding a mechanical bull in a bar owned byDefendant. Defendantappeals the trial court’s determination that it was 100% at fault and resulting judgmentfor plaintiff. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Landon H.
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the ground that Father abandoned the child by engaging in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. Father appeals, contending that the pleadings did not allege abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground upon which termination was sought; Father also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his counter-petition for custody. Because we have concluded that the petitioners failed to plead abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground for termination, we vacate the termination of Father’s parental rights on that ground and remand for consideration of whether Father’s parental rights should be terminated based on a ground alleged in the petition or supplemental petition; we affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s counterpetition for custody. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David Scott Blackwell v. Bill Haslam, Governor of the State of Tennessee, et al.
This is a declaratory judgment action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-14102.The petitioner, who was convicted of three felony drug offenses in Georgia, was granted a full pardon by the State of Georgia that expressly restored his right to possess a firearm, now resides in Tennessee and desires to purchase and possess firearms. Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) makes it a Class E felony offense for a person, who has been “convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence or a deadly weapon” or who has been “convicted of a felony drug offense,” to possess a firearm in Tennessee. Therefore, Petitioner filed this action seeking a declaration that he would not be in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) by purchasing or possessing a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee responded to the petition by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Second and Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Second Amendment, and article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution.The chancery court ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction and denied the State’s Rule 12.02(1); however, the chancery court granted the State’s Rule 12.02(6) motion finding that the petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) as applied to him under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution,the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The State raises one issue on appeal, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed for that reason. We affirm the chancery court’s finding that it has subject matter jurisdiction. As for the decision to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), we have determined that the complaint for declaratory relief states facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy concerning the matter at issue; therefore, the chancery court erred by granting the State’s motion pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) instead of rendering a declaratory judgment as the facts and law require. Accordingly, the complaint for declaratory relief is reinstated and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joshua N. Lee v. Lyons Construction Company, Inc.
Plaintiff and others sustained injuries in a single car accident and sued defendant construction company and the Tennessee Department of Transportation, alleging that defendant construction company had recently completed work on that section of the highway where the accident occurred, and that a low point in the pavement caused plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and wreck. Defendant answered, stating that they had completed the required construction on that section of the highway, and the State had accepted its work pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §12-4-501 et seq. which provides upon proper completion of the work the contractor "is discharged from all liability to any party". Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court granted and plaintiff appealed. We hold that summary judgment for the defendant in this case was proper, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca L. Inman v. James A. Inman, et al.
A show cause order was entered in this case on November 21, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. The appellant has responded to the show cause order within the time specified, but the argument presented in the response does not appear to present good cause for maintaining this case in this court. The review of the record reveals that the judgment to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Specifically, the order of dismissal does not address the counterclaims filed by the appellees below or finally resolve the award of attorneys’ fees to the appellees. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as premature. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
CK Development, LLC v. Town of Nolensville, et al.
The Developer of a Planned Unit Development in Nolensville sought final approval from the planning commission of phase 7 of the development. The planning commission conditioned its approval of the plan on the developer’s agreement to construct the roads in phase 7 in accordance with more recent road standards that were adopted in 2007. The developer filed a petition for writ of certiorari claiming it had vested rights in the earlier road standards and that complying with the more rigorous standards would require it to spend more money than it had originally planned. The trial court agreed with the developer and concluded that it had vested rights in the earlier road standards. The town appealed. We reverse the trial court’s decision because the developer did not rely on any final governmental approval, the application of the improved road standards was not a zoning change, and the developer has neither engaged in substantial construction of phase 7 nor incurred substantial liabilities with respect to phase 7. We also reject the developer’s argument that the planning commission exceeded its jurisdiction by acting in a legislative rather than an administrative capacity when it determined the developer was required to comply with the 2007 road standards. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Frederica April Dawn Bell v. Dennis Lynn Bell
This is an appeal from an order returning temporary custody of the parties’ child to the father pending a further hearing. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel Alexandria Price v. Christopher Childers
The State brought this action against the defendant to establish paternity and require support for the dependent child. A default judgment was taken against defendant, which determined that he was the father of the child and he was ordered to pay child support, and it was ordered that the child support be withheld from his paycheck. During these proceedings the defendant was a member of the United States military, and he subsequently filed a pro se motion for DNA testing. The DNA test established that he was not the biological father of the child, and the support withheld from his paycheck was ordered reimbursed to defendant. The State appealed, and we hold that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to require the State to reimburse defendant for the child support withheld from his paycheck. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
2850 Parkway General Partnership v. C. Dan Scott, et al
Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory judgment, asking the Court to declare that while plaintiff's sublease required it to pay the property taxes, the master lease required the lessor to pay the property taxes, and asked the Court to declare the lessor liable for the property taxes. Following trial, the Trial Court declared that the sublessee was liable for the property taxes, as it agreed to pay under the sublease. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court on the grounds that under the fact of this case, plaintiff is equitably estopped to avoid paying property taxes, as agreed to in the sublease. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Benjamin M. Bates and Estate of Pearl Bates
This appeal arises from a claim filed against two decedents’ estates to recover the value of improvements made to real estate since 2000. The claimant is one of nine children of the decedents, husband and wife, who died in 1959 and 1962, respectively. The court granted the appellee’s claim for the value of improvements made since 2000 to the decedents’ former home place. Because the decedents died intestate, their real property immediately vested in their heirs in 1962. Therefore, the real estate the claimant improved beginning in 2000 was not owned by either decedent at that time or thereafter; thus, the award of a claim against the estates of these two decedents is a nullity. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Anne Chavez v. James Albert Chavez, Jr.
Wife sought a divorce and Husband counterclaimed for a divorce. The trial court granted the divorce to both parties. Wife was designated the primary residential parent and was awarded transitional alimony and alimony in solido. Husband appeals. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William N. Nusbaum v. Lucile E. Nusbaum
In this divorce appeal, wife challenges the distribution of husband’s federal retirement benefits, the award of transitional alimony, and the court’s failure to award her attorneyfees. Because of an error in the percentage of husband’s FERS classified as marital assets, we reverse the trial court’s decision. As to transitional alimony, we affirm the award of $500 per month but extend the award until the time of husband’s retirement. We affirm the trial court’s decision regarding attorney fees. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Rheaetta F. Wilson, et al. v. Americare Systems, Inc., et al.
Decedent’s next of kin filed this wrongful death action against an assisted living facility, two nurses, and the facility’s management company for failure to provide proper care and treatment. This appeal concerns only the jury verdict and judgment finding the management company directly liable for failure to provide adequate staff at the assisted living facility. We find no material evidence to support a conclusion that any staffing deficiency proximately caused the decedent’s death. We therefore reverse the judgment finding direct liability on the part of the management company. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline L. Shultz v. Kirby Fuller
Upon the divorce of the parties, the permanent parenting plan designated the mother as the primary residential parent of the couple’s daughter. Both parties eventually filed petitions to modify the permanent parenting plan. The trial court concluded that there had been a material change of circumstance and that it was in the best interest of the daughter that her parenting be shared equally between the parties. Mother appeals the trial court’s modification decision. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings regarding the best interest of the child. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Steven Devore v. Rhonda M. Devore
This is a post-divorce case in which Mark Steven Devore (“Husband”) petitioned for modification of child support. Rhonda M. Devore (“Wife”) counter-petitioned for contempt. The trial court held that Husband was no longer liable for child support because the children had reached the age of majority but that the amount of overpayment was offset by obligations provided for in the marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). The court also held that Husband was liable for future college expenses. Following Wife’s motion to reconsider, the court held that Husband owed $11,230.43 for past due college expenses. Husband appeals. We hold that the court erred because it did not use a child support worksheet to calculate the amount of support owed. We vacate and remand for the court to utilize a worksheet. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals |
