In the Matter of: Estate of John J. Goza
The trial court determined that Petitioner’s petition to turn over assets was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Michael West, et al. v. Derrick Schofield, in his official capacity, et al.
Plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, asserting the lethal injection protocol used to carry-out the death penalty in Tennessee violated constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. While the matter was pending in the Tennessee Supreme Court, the State revised the protocol. The supreme court remanded the matter for further proceedings. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the State. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Antywon B., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Natasha D. and Antywon M. B. to their four oldest children. The trial court terminated Antywon M. B.’s parental rights to all four children. The court terminated Natasha D.’s parental rights to all but the oldest child, Jaiwon B. Natasha D. appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Hefferlin + Kronenberg Architects, PLLC v. CLP Development, LLC, et al.
Plaintiff brought this action claiming, inter alia, that it was entitled to a mechanics' lien on the subject property. Defendant filed Motions to Dismiss, one ground being that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Trial Court subsequently ruled that the Complaint did not establish a cause of action to entitle plaintiff to a lien on the property. Plaintiff has appealed and we hold that upon review of the Complaint, and applying the rules governing the test of the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint, that the Complaint states a cause of action. We vacate the Trial Court's Judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Crystal Stoots v. Michael Stoots
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Bourland, Heflin, Alvarez, Minor & Matthews, PLC v. Rodney Heaton and Margaret Heaton and Loeb Properties
The parties entered into a Contract for the sale and purchase of commercial real estate, and the purchaser deposited $50,000.00 earnest money. The purchaser terminated the Contract, citing the economic downturn and the purchaser’s resulting inability to secure retail tenants for its planned development. The parties disputed whether such termination was appropriate under the Contract, and thus, whether the purchaser was entitled to a return of its earnest money. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the purchaser and further awarded the purchaser its attorney fees and expenses. We find the economic downturn did not provide an appropriate basis for termination of the Contract. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the purchaser, and we enter summary judgment in favor of the sellers. The sellers shall be awarded the $44,362.57 remaining in the escrow account, and the purchaser shall pay the sellers an additional $5,637.43, for a total of $50,000.00. Additionally, pursuant to the Contract, the sellers are awarded attorney fees and expenses incurred in both the trial court and in this Court, and we remand for a determination of such award. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Janessa R.K.B.E. and Kyle L.E.
Petitioners petitioned the Trial Court to adopt three children. The Trial Court, upon hearing the evidence, held that the adoptive parents had met all the legal requirements to adopt the children and that it was in the best interest of the children for the petitioners to adopt them. Following the adoption order, one of the children's grandmother filed a motion in the Trial Court seeking Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 relief. The Trial Court overruled the grandmother's motion and the grandmother appealed to this Court. We hold the grandmother was not a necessary party at the proceedings, did not seek to intervene in the adoption proceedings, and was not entitled to seek relief under the Rule 60 motion. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Mitzi Sue Garner v. Robert Allen Garner
This is a divorce case. The parties had two children, still minors at the time of the divorce trial. After the trial, motions to alter and amend were filed, one of which disputed the number of parenting days awarded each party. The divorce decree was amended in response to the motions to alter or amend, and the trial court ordered the parties to try to resolve the dispute on the number of parenting days and report back to the court on the issue. Without attempting such resolution, the father filed his notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Lee Cain v. Bonnie Jean (White) Cain
This appeal requires us to construe a provision of the parties’ 1987 divorce decree with respect to the amount of Bonnie Jean White Cain’s (“Wife”) share of Gregory Lee Cain’s (“Husband”) military retirement benefits. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in interpreting the 1987 divorce decree. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Kee and Larry Kee v. City of Jackson, Tennessee
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby J. Spears v. Wendy Weatherall
This is a grandparent visitation case. Appellant is the former stepfather of the Appellee. After approximately twenty-five years of marriage, Appellant and Appellee’s mother divorced. During the marriage, Appellant maintained a close relationship to Appellee and Appellee’s child. Even after the divorce, Appellee allowed Appellant to regularly visit with her child. After Appellee began limiting Appellant’s contact with her child, Appellant filed a petition for grandparent visitation. The trial court concluded that Appellant did not fall within the definition of “grandparent” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306(e), and dismissed the petition for lack of standing. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Delta Development Corporation, et al. v. F. Fani Gulf International, et al. v. Fariborz Ferdowsi, et al.
Defendants made a series of loans to Plaintiffs and a dispute arose as to the interest and principal owed. A judgment was entered in favor of Defendants. However, Defendants appealed the award, claiming that the trial court erred in admitting evidence, which allegedly reduced the judgment amount, and in refusing to hold all shareholders of the Plaintiff companies liable for the judgment. Plaintiffs also claim, on appeal, that the Special Master and the trial court set an incorrect “starting point” for determining the judgment owed. We affirm the Special Master and the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Veronica Monde Barone v. Frank A. Barone
After obtaining a sizable judgment against her former husband in a Canadian court, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit in Tennessee in 1999 seeking to have property allegedly owned by the former husband sold in partial satisfaction of the judgment. After the former husband failed to appear or defend the Tennessee lawsuit, the circuit court also entered a default judgment against the former husband. However, other related issues involving other parties were tried and eventually appealed over the next several years. In 2011, the trial court finally ordered the sale of the former husband’s property in partial satisfaction of the judgment. Husband appealed from the entry of that order, and he argues on appeal that the wife’s attempt to execute on his property is time-barred under various statutes and Rules of Civil Procedure. Finding no merit in his arguments on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
U.S. Waste Atlanta, LLC and Clarence Emmer v. Mark Englund and William Englund
This appeal arises from an alleged agreement concerning a waste collection business. In 2007, U.S. Waste Atlanta, LLC (“U.S. Waste Atlanta”), filed suit against Mark Englund and William Englund Sr. (“the Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”), alleging that the Defendants improperly took possession of certain trucks. U.S. Waste Atlanta argued, among other things, that written documents demonstrated that William Englund Sr. had an agreement with Clarence Emmer, owner of U.S. Waste, LLC (“U.S. Waste”), to transfer trucks to U.S. Waste Atlanta in exchange for an interest in the company. Clarence Emmer, on behalf of U.S. Waste Atlanta, made finance payments on the trucks but the transfer never happened. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court partially granted the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, awarding Clarence Emmer a judgment against William Englund Sr. for $36,073.90. The Trial Court also made this a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. William Englund Sr. appeals, arguing that a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether an agreement existed bars summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Cristy Irene Fair v. Stephen Lynn Cochran
The Trial Court dismissed this case based upon its finding that although plaintiff’s Summons was issued the day she filed her Complaint, proof of service was not made to the clerk until 412 days later, and, because plaintiff had failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4, plaintiff was not entitled to rely on Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 to toll the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Christy Irene Fair v. Stephen Lynn Cochran - Dissenting
I agree completely with the majority that return of “proof of service to the court” 412 days after process was issued by the trial court clerk is hardly a “prompt[]” return of proof of service. I also agree – as I must – that such a delay in the return of proof of service violates the clear mandate of the first sentence of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(1): “The person serving the summons shall promptly make proof of service to the court . . .” (Emphasis added.) |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John P. Konvalinka, Trustee v. American International Group, Inc.
This is an appeal of an order setting aside a default judgment. The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant. The defendant then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which was granted. The order setting aside the default judgment was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff now appeals. We find that Rule 54.02 certification was improvidently granted, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Mohinder N. Sud v. Man Keng Ho, aka Simon Ho, et al
The Trial Court held Man Keng Ho liable for unpaid rents on commercial property that Ho had leased from his landlord. Ho claimed against Soon Lee Pang, appellant, on the grounds that Pang was the guarantor on the lease. At the subsequent trial between Ho and Pang, Ho acting as an interpreter for Pang, the Trial Court entered Judgment against Pang for the full amount of the Judgment against Ho as guarantor under the terms of the lease. Pang then filed a Rule 60 Motion seeking relief from the Judgment, principally on the grounds that he was entitled to an interpreter and the Trial Court erred in utilizing his co-defendant, who had an interest in the case, as Pang's interpreter. The Trial Court overruled the Rule 60 Motion and Pang appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in not complying with Rules 41 and 42 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, and remand for a retrial on the merits. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Cardiac Anesthesia Services, PLLC v. Jon Jones
This case involves the application of the statute of limitations to a legal malpractice action. Appellee attorney drafted a contract for Appellant medical provider; the contract contained a fee-split clause in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6-225. When the other party to the contract, a hospital, allegedly breached the contract and sued the medical provider, the medical provider counterclaimed for breach of contract. The hospital answered the complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the contract was illegal and unenforceable.The trial court ruled that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6225 did not apply to the contract at issue. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the medical provider for more than one million dollars. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6-225 invalidated the contract, and remanded the case for dismissal. Within one year of the Court of Appeals opinion, the medical provider filed this legal malpractice case against the drafting attorney. The trial court dismissed the case as beyond the one-year legal malpractice statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Sandy Green v. Virginia Evans
This is a grandparent visitation case. The child at issue was adjudicated dependent and neglected; the appellant paternal great-grandmother was awarded legal custody. Months later, the child’s mother died. The appellee maternal grandmother then filed a petition in juvenile court seeking both custody and alternatively grandparent visitation. The order denying the grandmother’s petition was appealed to the circuit court for a de novo hearing. The circuit court denied the grandmother’s petition for custody, but awarded grandparent visitation. The custodian great-grandmother now appeals. We reverse and dismiss the grandmother’s petition. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Renee Reed v. Michael Eugene Reed
Mother appeals from the trial court’s post-divorce determination that a substantial and material change of circumstances occurred that warranted a modification of the parenting plan and the designation of Father as the primary residential parent of their children. Mother also appeals the termination of her alimony payments and an award of attorney’s fees to Father. We affirm the finding that a substantialand material change of circumstance occurred and that it is in the best interests of the children that Father be the primary residential parent. We affirm the termination of alimony to Mother and the award of attorney’s fees to Father. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Fred H. Gillham v. City of Mt. Pleasant, et al.
A residential property owner challenged the procedures used by a planning commission and city commission in granting a rezoning application submitted by two industrial companies. The companies asked that the zoning for 95.2 acres of land be changed from agricultural to special impact industrial for the purpose of developing a landfill to dispose of salt cake produced as a byproduct of their smelting businesses. The property owner also asserted that two of the commissioners had a conflict of interest and that their participation granting the application invalidated the procedure. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions after concluding the planning commission and city commission complied with the procedural requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §§13-7-203(a) and 6-20-215 and that the two commissioners had no conflict of interest since they had no ownership interest in the rezoning applicants. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the property owner’s complaint. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn M. Claiborne v. Larry W. Goldston
In this case, Kathryn M. Claiborne sought to set aside a quitclaim deed relating to property given to Larry W. Goldston. The trial court set aside the deed but awarded damages to Larry W. Goldston based upon his counterclaim for unjust enrichment. Kathryn M. Claiborne appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Lauren Ephgrave Jarrell v. Emmett Blake Jarrell
The parties’ Parenting Plan required that major decisions regarding religious upbringing be made jointly, and if no consensus could be reached, that the dispute be submitted to a mediator. Mother had the parties’ children baptized without Father’s knowledge or consent, and Father filed a petition for civil and criminal contempt against Mother. The trial court found Mother in civil contempt, but it dismissed the criminal contempt petition, apparently for insufficient notice. We reverse the trial court’s finding that Mother was in civil contempt, and its award of attorney fees to Father based upon the civil contempt finding. We also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Father’s criminal contempt petition, and we remand for further criminal contempt proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wendy Ann Burton v. Robert Mark Mooneyham
In this divorce appeal, husband challenges the trial court’s valuation of his business, the division of marital assets, and the allocation of the debt on the marital residence. Husband also argues that the trial court erred in the amount and length of the alimony award and in awarding attorneyfees to wife. We find that the trial court erred in changing its net valuation of the business, after a second hearing, from $200,000 to $280,000 based upon the updated status of Husband’s payments on the tax lien. As this change did not affect the trial court’s division of the marital estate or the alimony award, however, the error is harmless. In all other respects, we find no error in the trial court’s decision. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals |
