City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, et al. v. Hargreaves Associates, Inc., et al
The plaintiffs in this matter, the city and a redevelopment group, filed this action against the defendant entities involved in the design and construction of a large municipal project on the city’s waterfront. Also named as a defendant was the development manager for the project. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-105. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, et al. v. Hargreaves Associates, Inc., et al - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority's Opinion affirming the Trial Court's granting of summary judgments to all defendants. In my view, the record in this case does not demonstrate that this case is ripe for summary judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Robin Turner v. Jamie Reed
This appeal arises from a judgment for arrears in child support. The State of Tennessee ex rel. Robin Turner (“the State”) filed a civil contempt petition against Jamie Reed (“Reed”) in the Juvenile Court for Cocke County (“the Juvenile Court”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court ordered Reed to pay $75 per month towards satisfying his $17,330 in arrears. The minor child at issue had attained majority age by the time of these proceedings. The Juvenile Court found Reed to be in substantial compliance with his payments, and he was given an opportunity to comply with the Court’s order. The Juvenile Court rejected Reed’s demands for a jury trial and for discharge of the arrearage. Reed appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Payton A.D.L.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother argues that the evidence presented to the trial court did not clearly and convincingly establish that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Janet Charlene Hooberry v. Ronald Scott Hooberry
Wife filed a complaint against Husband seeking a legal separation or, in the alternative, an absolute divorce. Husband counter-claimed for a divorce. Both Wife and Husband alleged the other had engaged in marital misconduct. The trial court awarded Wife a legal separation for two years, ordered Husband to pay Wife $1,500 per month as alimony during that period, and divided the marital estate between the parties. The trial court refused Wife’s request for attorney’s fees. Wife appealed, claiming the trial court erred by failing to award her alimony in futuro, a larger portion of the marital estate, and her attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. First, the statute addressing legal separation directs the trial court to make a final and complete adjudication of the parties’ support rights following the parties’ legal separation when the court awards the parties an absolute divorce. Thus, Wife’s request for alimony in futuro is premature. Second, Wife failed to show the court’s division of marital property was inconsistent with the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4121(c) or was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Third, Wife failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for attorney’s fees. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey R. Smith, et al. v. Richard Garvin and Serena Garvin
Homeowners in a subdivision used water from a sulfur well to water their lawn. Neighbors complained about the noxious odor, and when the Homeowners continued to use the sulfurous water, the neighbors sought and obtained an order permanently enjoining them from using their well for irrigation purposes. Three years later the Homeowners began using the sulfur well to water their lawn again, and the neighbors filed a petition seeking to hold the Homeowners in contempt for violating the court’s order. The Homeowners filed a retaliatory complaint against the neighbors, and the neighbors sought Rule 11 sanctions for having to defend that action. The trial court consolidated the hearing of the two motions, and following a hearing where testimony and documentary evidence were introduced, the court found the Homeowners had willfully violated the court’s order on at least nine occasions. The court also found the Homeowners’ action was filed in violation of Rule 11 and fined the Homeowners $1,000. The Homeowners appealed,claiming the two motions should not have been heard together and that the evidence did not support the court’s finding of willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in hearing the two motions in the same proceeding, and that the evidence was not insufficient for the court to have found the Homeowners guilty of willfully violating its earlier order beyond a reasonable doubt. We thus affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Lynn Rogers v. Jon Roach, et al.
Landowner owns property that was once part of a single parcel of land. The only way she can access her property is over a gravel roadway approximately nine feet wide that crosses through her neighbors’ property. One of Landowner’s neighbors erected fence posts near the roadway that Landowner alleges interfere with her ability to pull her horse trailers back and forth to her property. Landowner filed a complaint alleging she has the right to a forty foot easement across her neighbors’ property. After Landowner presented her proof at trial, Defendant neighbors moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. The trial court dismissed Landowner’s complaint. We reverse the dismissal as to the Landowner’s claim for interference with her use and enjoyment of the easement because she presented evidence to establish the elements of that claim. We also reverse the dismissal of the claim for damages resulting from the interference. Dismissal of the other claims by Landowner is affirmed. We remand this case for further proceedings. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
James Johnson and wife, Elaine Johnson v. The Torrington Company, et al.
The plaintiff was severely injured while working on the premises of his employer. Because the employer was immune from liability in tort under the Workers’ Compensation statutes, the employee’s negligence suit named as defendants two other companies whose equipment was implicated in his injury. After a five-day trial, the jury found that the employer was solely at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, resulting in no award. The plaintiff then filed a motion for new trial. The trial court granted the motion ten months after it was filed, declaring that in his capacity as the thirteenth juror he had found the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence. The case was tried before a second jury, which reached a different verdict, finding that one of the defendant companies was 90% at fault for the plaintiff’s injury while the plaintiff himself was 10% at fault. The net verdict for the plaintiff amounted to $2,925,000. The defendant company argues on appeal that the trial court erred in vacating the first jury verdict, that the second jury verdict was “contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,” and that the amount of the verdict was excessive. We affirm the jury verdict and the judgment based on it. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Laurie Jo Edwards v. Gary Wayne Edwards
Wife was granted divorce on the grounds of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court distributed the marital property and awarded Wife transitory alimony for four years. Wife appealed, arguing she should have been awarded a larger portion of the marital estate and was entitled to alimony in futuro. She also argued she should have been awarded her attorneys’ fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. The trial court equitably distributed the marital assets and did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife transitional alimony to help her adjust to living as a single person again. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
City of Maryville, Tennessee v. Wallace Scott Langford
This appeal arises from a dispute over the constitutionality of City of Maryville (“Maryville”) ordinance 16-110 (“the Ordinance”). The ordinance requires the issuance of a permit for certain public meetings and parades in Maryville. Wallace Scott Langford (“Langford”) and two associates engaged in street preaching at a Maryville intersection. Langford declined to apply for a permit and was cited for violating the ordinance. After a default judgment was rendered against him in municipal court, Langford appealed to the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”). Langford challenged the constitutionality of the Ordinance on grounds that it is overly broad and vague. Following a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order upholding the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Langford appeals. We hold that the Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as it is vague, overly broad, and affords too much discretion to the officials charged with issuing permits. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Jack B. Hill, Jane Ann Steffey, Executrix
This appeal involves a dispute over the decedent's Codicil to his Will. The Codicil divided decedent's real property between decedent's daughter and Jeff W. Powell. When decedent was on his death bed he asked a lawyer to prepare the Codicil, which described where certain property lines between the parties would be drawn, and the Codicil essentially gave 45 acres to decedent's daughter and 55 acres to Powell. During the administration of the Estate, the parties employed a surveyor to survey the property lines for the purpose of preparing the respective deeds. The surveyor determined that the description of the boundaries in the Codicil gave Powell 80 plus acres and the decedent's daughter 19 plus acres. Essentially, the Trial Court held that the descriptions created patent ambiguities, but he also concluded that even if the ambiguities were latent, extensive governance would be required to validate the Codicil, which is not appropriate. Accordingly, he voided the Codicil altogether. Powell has appealed. We reverse the Trial Court and hold that the decedent's intent was to give his daughter 45 acres and Powell 55 acres, and we reinstate the Codicil with directions to the Trial Court to direct the surveyor to reconfigure the boundaries to carry out the intent of the testator. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Hong Samouth (Sam) Rajvongs v. Dr. Anthony Wright
A patient who alleged that he had been negligently injured by his podiatrist filed a complaint against him for malpractice, and then voluntary dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Less than a year later, he furnished the defendant podiatrist with the sixty day notice of potential claim required by a recently enacted statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26121(a). He subsequently refiled his complaint in reliance on his rights under the saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint was time-barred under the saving statute because it was filed more than one year after the dismissal of the original complaint. The plaintiff contended, however, that he was entitled to the benefit of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c), which extends the statute of limitations on medical malpractice claims by 120 days if the plaintiff has complied with the sixty day notice requirement. The defendant responded by arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) does not apply to complaints filed under the saving statute. The trial court dismissed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, but allowed him to file an application for interlocutory appeal because of the novelty of the legal question involved. After careful consideration of the relevant statutes, we hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26121(c) does apply to the saving statute, and we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Beach Community Bank v. Edward A. Labry, III, et al.
This case involves personal guaranties on a loan to purchase real estate. The Appellants entered into a partnership for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. The partnership obtained a loan in the amount of $2,611,000.00 to purchase real property located in Florida. The Appellants each signed a personal guaranty on the loan in favor of the Appellee bank. By the express terms of the guaranties, the Appellants guaranteed “up to a principle amount of $795,600.00.” The partnership defaulted on the loan and the bank sued to enforce the guaranties. The Appellants answered that the guaranties were joint and several and that, because they were only 30% owners of the partnership, they could only be liable for 30% of the amount of the defaulted loan. In addition, the Appellants argued that the bank breached the covenant of good faith in failing to foreclose on the subject property. The trial court found that, under Florida law, the guaranties were not ambiguous, but were separate guaranties holding each Appellant separately liable for $795,600.00. The trial court also awarded interest on the entire debt. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the guaranties unambiguously require each Appellant to be separately liable for $795,600.00, but hold that the term regarding interest is ambiguous. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this issue and remand to the trial court for the consideration of parole evidence regarding the amount of interest and fees chargeable to the Appellants. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Lee Kailar Cooper v. Christopher Aaron Brown
Upon the Court's inquiry as to whether the order appealed was a final judgment, Appellant filed an application for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although we must dismiss Appellant's Rule 3 appeal, we grant Appellant's Rule 10 application and vacate in part the trial court's order of October 26, 2011, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of: Jai'Shaundria D.L.R.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child. The trial court found two grounds for termination, abandonment and persistence of conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s home. The finding of abandonment was based on the mother’s incarceration at the time of the filing of the petition to terminate and because the mother engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child, as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). The trial court also found termination was in the child’s best interest due to the fact that the mother lacked a meaningful relationship with the child, that the mother failed to make adjustments to her home and lifestyle to make it safe for a child, and that the child was happy and healthy in her foster home of over two years such that removal would have a detrimental impact on the child’s emotional and psychological condition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Middle Tennessee State University v. Tracy Sorrell Simmons a/k/a Tray Simmons
A former student who obtained a student loan from Middle Tennessee State University appeals the judgment of the trial court holding him liable on the student loan, including interest that accrued thereon, costs of collection, attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of Lyle L. Lawton - Stephen Lawton v. Lyle L. Lawton
This appeal involves a conservatorship. After the parties announced in open court that they had reached an agreement on a partial conservatorship, the appellant ward stood up in court and asked to speak. The hearing was adjourned and subsequently the partial conservatorship was ordered in accordance with the agreement. The ward now appeals, arguing inter alia that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, failing to make the requisite findings, and failing to hear from the ward. We find no error and affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Sandi D. Jackson v. Mitchell B. Lanphere
In a previous appeal, this court vacated and remanded the trial court’s order dismissing a petition for an order of protection based upon the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. On remand, the trial court issued an order making the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law and again dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of proof and thereby abused its discretion. We find no merit in this argument. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Song & Song Corporation, and Jin Y. "Jim" Song, Individually v. Fine Art Construction Company, LLC, et al.
Property owner hired a general contractor to perform construction work on a commercial building. The parties subsequently discovered that when the building was originally constructed, there were no fire dampers installed in the ductwork. The contractor performed the additional work necessary to install the missing fire dampers, but when the work was completed, the property owner refused to pay the amount invoiced by the contractor for the additional work. Both parties asserted that the other had breached the contract. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the contractor and awarded her a judgment for the unpaid balance and other damages. The property owner appeals. We affirm as modified. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Knox County Election Commission v. Shelley Breeding
This case addresses the issue of whether an announced, and otherwise qualified, candidate for the District 89 (Knox County) seat in the State House of Representatives satisfies the residency requirement to run in the Democratic primary on August 2, 2012. The trial court held that she was not eligible to run because the court found that she was a resident of Anderson County. She appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Hubert Morrison, et al. v. The City of Bolivar, et al.
We granted this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal to answer the question of whether the Tennessee Revenue Bond Law, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-34-101, et seq., permits a private right of action on behalf of Appellees, utility rate payers, against Appellants, the City of Bolivar and its utility. The trial court denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that Appellees could maintain a private cause of action because Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-34-115(f) did not provide the sole remedy for violation of the statutory scheme. We hold that the Revenue Bond Law does not expressly create an individual private right of action, and that Appellees have not carried their burden to establish that the legislature intended to imply such a right. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants. Reversed and remanded. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Case Handyman Service of Tennessee, LLC v. Helen Marie Harben Lee
Homeowner retained Contractor to remodel her residence and paid Contractor two out of three installments as provided in the contract. Homeowner was not satisfied with Contractor’s work and refused to pay the final installment. Contractor sued for breach of contract and Homeowner filed a counterclaim asserting Contractor breached the contract by failing to perform the job in a workmanlike and reasonable manner. Homeowner also claimed Contractor violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act by engaging in unfair and deceptive practices. The trial court dismissed Contractor’s complaint and held Contractor breached the contract by failing to perform the work in a reasonable and workmanlike manner. The court found Contractor was not liable for double or treble damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act because Homeowner did not prove its deficiencies were intentional or willful. Homeowner appealed, claiming the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend her counterclaim to assert a claim for rescission and erred in holding Contractor did not violate the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We affirm the trial court’s judgment |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dan C. Ray et al. v. Sadler Homes, Inc.
Plaintiff-homeowners filed this action for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act against the builder and seller of their home alleging that the home was not constructed in a workmanlike manner. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendant breached the contract and the express and implied warranties, and violated the TCPA. The court awarded damages of $90,000 for the diminution in value of the home. The court also held Plaintiffs were entitled to recover their attorney’s fees pursuant to the TCPA. Defendant appealed arguing that Plaintiffs failed to prove causation, that the trial court erred in awarding damages in the amount of $90,000 for the diminution in value of the home, and erred in finding it violated the TCPA for which the trial courtawarded attorney’s fees.We affirm the trial court’s findings as to Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and breach of warranty and affirm the trial court’s determinations as to damages; however, we find the evidence preponderates against the finding of a violation of the TCPA and therefore the trial court erred by awarding Plaintiffs their attorney’s fees. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Tom R. Smith v. Thomas Harding Potter
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for attorney fees and court costs and executed an order to that effect. The plaintiff filed a motion for relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 arguing that the trial court violated his due process rights by awarding the defendant attorney fees without providing proper notice and the opportunity to be heard. We reverse the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Butcher v. Ronald Butcher
Husband appeals the trial court’s division of property in this divorce action. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
