Allison Jacob v. Alexis Partee, et al.
The circuit court denied Appellants’ Rule 60.02 motion on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Allison Jacob v. Alexis Partee, et al. - Concurring Opinion
I concur fully in the result in this case as well as in the reasoning espoused to reach such. However, I write separately to clarify this Court’s holding in Jacob I. The majority implies that Jacob I required the filing of an appeal bond “with no monetary limit” to satisfy the requirements of section 27-5-103. Such was not the holding in Jacob. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carson Combs v. Brick Acquisition Company
This appeal calls into question the validity of a covenant not to compete. A former employee of a seller and distributor of brick brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that his agreement not to compete for two years with his former employer in the employee’s sales territory is unenforceable. Following a bench trial, the court held the covenant unenforceable and void. We hold that, because the employee had access to confidential pricing and profit margin information and was the sole commercial brick salesperson for the company in the Chattanooga area, the employer had a legitimate protectable business interest. We further hold that the terms of the non-compete agreement are reasonable under the facts of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Byars v. Earl Young
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stacy Ramsey v. Phillip Ramsey
In this divorce action, Stacy Ramsey (“Wife”) and Phillip Ramsey (“Husband”) stipulated grounds for divorce but proceeded to trial regarding several issues, including classification and division of the parties’ assets, as well as child support, spousal support, and attorney’s fees. Following a bench trial, the trial court valued the parties’ marital assets and divided the marital estate equally. The court awarded Husband both homes owned by the parties upon his payment to Wife of one-half the combined equity. The court found no basis to modify the parties’ mediated co-parenting agreement and set child support accordingly. The court also found that Wife was not entitled to alimony and awarded Husband $450 in attorney’s fees due to Wife’s failure to appear at a previous hearing. Wife appeals. We modify the trial court’s property division to correct mathematical errors, and we reverse the trial court’s calculation of child support. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
F. A. B. v. D. L. B.
This post-divorce appeal involves the suspension of parenting time. The mother made repeated allegations that the father was abusing their child; the father denied all of the allegations. After numerous proceedings, the father asserted that the mother was coaching the child to make false allegations of abuse and asked the trial court to terminate the mother’s parenting time. The trial court ordered a psychological evaluation of both parties and the child. After considering the evaluations and substantial testimony, the trial court determined that the father had committed no abuse and found that the child would be emotionally harmed by continued contact with the mother. The trial court then suspended the mother’s parenting time and enjoined all contact with the child until the mother obtains mental health counseling and treatment. The mother appeals. Based on our careful review of the record, we affirm. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Karl S. Davidson v. Governor Phillip Bredesen, In His Individual Capacity and David Cooley, Deputy To the Governor, In His Individual Capacity
Participant in protest action which took place at the Tennessee State Capitol brought an action alleging that former Governor and Deputy Governor retaliated against him for the exercise of his First Amendment rights during the protest. Participant appeals the grant of summary judgment against him and the trial court’s ruling that certain documents created by the Governor’s legal counsel were protected from discovery by the attorney-client and deliberative process privileges. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Mary Reeves Davis, Deceased
Decedent passed away in 1999, and Husband filed a petition for an elective share and a year’s maintenance. Days before the trial was scheduled to begin in 2012 Husband discharged his attorneys and requested a continuance to find replacement counsel. The trial court permitted Husband’s attorneys to withdraw but denied Husband’s motion to continue. The trial court denied Husband’s petition for an elective share because Husband had already received the bequest Decedent left him in her will. The trial court also denied Husband’s request for a year of maintenance because Husband had transferred to himself over $250,000 from Decedent’s accounts shortly before her death, and the amount Husband transferred to himself exceeded the amount Husband sought as maintenance. Husband appealed the trial court’s judgment, and we affirm in all respects |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Isabella Z.S.
This is an appeal by Darlene H. from an order entered on May 21, 2013, which dismissed her petition for grandparent visitation on grounds that she lacked standing to intervene in the termination of parental rights and adoption proceedings involving her biological grandchild. A final order of adoption terminating the parental rights of Darlene H.’s daughter, Whitney H., to her daughter, Isabella S., was entered on April 24, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed by counsel for Darlene H. until June 21, 2013, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the May 21, 2013 order. The adoptive parents, Jason O. and Rachel O., filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based upon the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter Of: Caleb F.N.P, Jonathan S.F., Olivia B.F., and Chloe N.F.
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment as an incarcerated parent, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and incarceration under a sentence of ten years or more when the child was less than eight years old at the time of sentencing. Mother argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Mother also argues that none of the grounds for termination are supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the trial court erred in determining that termination was in the best interests of the Children. We affirm termination of parental rights on the enumerated grounds. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the Children. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Gay Patterson Lattimore v. James S. Lattimore, Jr.
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Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Aubrey E. Givens, Administrator of the Estate of Jessica E. Givens, Deceased, et al. v. The Vanderbilt University D/B/A Vanderbilt University Hospital, et. al.
This is a medical malpractice action arising from the death of Decedent. Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal. We hold that section 29-26-121 does not mandate dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance with its terms and that the failure to comply with the notice requirements does not mandate dismissal under the facts of this case. We vacate the dismissal order and remand for further proceedings |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Yenny Walker v. Janek Pawlik
This appeal arises from the granting of an order of protection. Yenny Walker (“Walker”) dated Janek Pawlik (“Pawlik”). Walker broke off the relationship and later filed a petition for an order of protection against Pawlik. The general sessions court entered an order of protection. Pawlik appealed to the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Walker an order of protection against Pawlik based on a finding of stalking. Pawlik appeals, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s finding that he was stalking Walker. After reviewing the record, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding of stalking. Also, in keeping with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-617 and relevant case law, we remand for the Trial Court to determine and award to Walker her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending this appeal. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald E. Blackburn, et al. v. George Blackburn, et al.
Defendants challenge only the Chancery Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order regarding a 444 acre farm located in Fayette County. For the following reasons, we find the Chancery Court acted with subject matter jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Chancery Court, therefore, is affirmed. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Buford Taylor, Decedent, et al. v. Suntrust Bank, Successor Trustee
Gerald Huffman and Dorothy Jean Riley Hale (“Petitioners”) filed suit seeking to terminate the testamentary trust of Buford Taylor (“the Trust”) and have the remaining assets distributed. Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, in pertinent part, that contingent remainder beneficiary Tommy Hamer previously had received an advancement of his portion of the Trust, and therefore, his heirs were not entitled to any further distribution from the Trust. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted the motion for summary judgment after finding and holding, inter alia, that an affidavit given by Sherrie Hamer was not properly before the court, and that Tommy Hamer previously had received an advancement of his portion of the Trust and, therefore, his heirs were not entitled to any portion of the remaining Trust assets. The heirs of Tommy Hamer appeal the grant of summary judgment to this Court. We find and hold that neither Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-203 nor Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101 bars consideration of the affidavit of Sherrie Hamer, and that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding a grant of summary judgment. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Powell Hudson, Individually and As Surviving Spouse and Executrix of the Estate of Robert Melvin Hudson, Deceased v. Town of Jasper
This is a wrongful death action against the Town of Jasper. The surviving spouse of the decedent, who died of complications resulting from a myocardial infarction, alleges that the town was negligent and negligent per se by failing to register its three automated external defibrillators with the emergency communications district dispatch as required byTennessee Code Annotated § 68-140-703 and that such negligence contributed to the decedent’s injuries and death. The town filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the basis the statute did not create a private right of action; the trial court denied the motion to dismiss but granted a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal. We have determined there is no express language creating a private right of action in the statute, and, looking to the statutory structure and legislative history of the statute, we have also determined the legislature did not intend to create a private right of action by implication. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and enter judgment accordingly. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Cathleen Jackson v. Roger L. Kash
The issues on appeal in this financially catastrophic divorce proceeding include who is liable for the debt of $240,000 that Wife incurred after the complaint for divorce was filed. The trial court held Wife liable for the entire sum and Husband jointly and severally liable for $75,889.59 of that amount upon the finding that $75,889.59 was used to preserve the parties’ principal marital asset, the residence, pending its sale. Husband contends this was error for he expressly refused to be liable for this debt. The court also awarded a judgment against Husband in favor of Wife for $101,714 of expenses she incurred to maintain the marital residence. Wife was awarded one half of Husband’s pension and $75,000 of her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, and sixty months of rehabilitative alimony, at $1,250 per month. Husband contends that all of these awards were error. Husband, however, provided no transcript of the evidence or statement of the evidence; therefore, there is no evidence before this court upon which to find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s findings of fact in all respects. Further, we find no error with the trial court’s legal conclusions or judgments by classifying the award as alimony in futuro. All other rulings by the trial court are affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce Rishton v. Jim Morrow, et al
Bruce Rishton (“Rishton”), formerly an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court for Bledsoe County (“the Trial Court”) against officials Warden Jim Morrow, Deputy Warden Andrew Lewis, and, Associate Warden of Operations C. Owens (collectively “the Respondents”). Rishton alleged that the warden acted illegally and arbitrarily in denying him his musical instrument. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. The Trial Court dismissed the case, holding, inter alia, that the warden’s decision was administrative in nature and not subject to review by writ of certiorari. Rishton appeals. We hold that, as Rishton has since been released from TDOC custody, this case has become moot on appeal. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Browns Installation, LLC v. Watermark Solid Surface, INC.
Subcontractor B hired subcontractor A to install bathrooms in fulfillment of subcontractor B’s contracts with general contractors. After it was terminated by subcontractor B, subcontractor A sued to recover payments owed for work subcontractor A completed before termination. Subcontractor B filed a counterclaim for damages and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court dismissed subcontractor B’s counterclaim and found that subcontractor A was entitled to quantum meruit recovery. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Burchfield, et al v. Timothy J. Renfree, M.D.
This is a health care liability action wherein the trial by jury resulted in a judgment for the Defendant, Dr. Timothy Renfree. Plaintiffs, Larry and Dinnie Burchfield, filed this lawsuit against Dr. Renfree alleging that he negligently performed surgery on Mr. Burchfield’s right arm and caused nerve damage. After the jury returned its verdict in favor of Dr. Renfree, the Burchfields filed post-trial motions seeking relief from the judgment and alleging numerous errors in the administration of the trial. The trial court denied the post-trial motions and affirmed the jury’s verdict as thirteenth juror. The Burchfields appealed. We vacate the jury’s verdict, finding reversible error in the administration of the trial, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
American Traffic Solutions, Inc. v. The City of Knoxville, Tennessee, et al.
This appeal concerns the application of a statutory amendment to a contract the plaintiff had with the city. The plaintiff claims the amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55- 8-198, effective July 1, 2011, violates article I, section 20 of the Tennessee Constitution. In the alternative, the plaintiff argues that the amendment does not apply to existing contracts. The trial court concluded that the retroactive application of the amendment was not a constitutional violation. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John R. Roberts, M.D. v Saint Thomas Health Services d/b/a Saint Thomas Hospital, et al
St. Thomas Hospital suspended a surgeon’s hospital privileges and restored them less than three months later, as part of a settlement in which the doctor also waived a “fair hearing,” which was the next step in the hospital’s procedures. The surgeon subsequently sued the hospital, contending that it had not properly followed its own bylaws in regard to the suspension of his privileges and that he was therefore entitled to damages for breach of contract, defamation of character, and tortious interference with business relations. The hospital denied that it had violated any of its bylaws and asserted that it was entitled to immunity for its actions under the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 and the Federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986. The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital. Because the surgeon failed to show that the hospital did not follow its bylaws, because of his settlement and waiver of a fair hearing, the hospital was entitled to the immunity granted to the peer review process. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Romalis Gray v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
The petitioner, a state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for declaratory order, in which he alleged that the respondents, Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and Morgan County Correctional Complex (“MCCX”), denied his due process rights and violated TDOC policies when he was placed on administrative segregation following a disciplinary hearing. The trial court found that the petitioner had failed to pay court costs from a previously filed action and dismissed his petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-812 (2010). Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Chandra Berry v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Individually and as Nominee for Mortgage Lenders Network USA, et al.
Plaintiff defaulted on her mortgage and Defendants advised Plaintiff of their plan to foreclose. Plaintiff then sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order preventing foreclosure, which it dissolved after granting Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Rickman v. Virginia Rickman, et al
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Warren | Court of Appeals |
