B&W Pipeline, LLC v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority Et Al.
B&W Pipeline, LLC (“B&W”), a public utility that owns a gas pipeline in three Tennessee counties, filed a petition with the Tennessee Regulatory Authority (“the Authority”) seeking a rate increase. As part of the rate increase request, B&W sought to include in the rate base $2.6 million in acquisition costs that it had incurred when it purchased the pipeline and several oil and gas wells in 2010. A contested case hearing took place on September 14, 2015. Following deliberation, the Authority denied B&W’s proposed acquisition adjustment and instead utilized a 2008 federal income tax return filed by the pipeline’s previous owner to establish the pipeline’s value for the purpose of determining the rate base. The Authority issued its final order on March 10, 2016. B&W timely filed a motion for reconsideration. The Authority denied the motion for reconsideration with respect to the value of the pipeline while granting the motion for reconsideration with respect to certain due diligence and other costs B&W incurred in the acquisition. After the submission of briefs, the Authority affirmed its decision to exclude the additional acquisition costs. The Authority issued a final order concerning reconsideration on August 4, 2016. B&W filed a timely petition for review with this Court on October 3, 2016. Discerning no error, we affirm the Authority’s decision. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Conservatorship of Otto Tillman Stiefel
This is a conservatorship dispute. The trial court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that Appellant was in need of a conservator. We conclude that the evidence presented at trial was not clear and convincing as to whether Appellant was in need of a conservator. Because there is some question in the record, however, as to whether the parties reached an agreement to allow the appointment of a conservator, we vacate and remand this case to determine this issue. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Holder, et al. v. Shelby County, Tennessee
This is the second appeal of this governmental tort liability action. After his son committed suicide while in custody at the Shelby County Jail, Appellee filed suit against the Appellant Shelby County for negligence under a theory of vicarious liability. On remand from this Court, the trial court held a bench trial and determined that Appellant’s employee’s failure to perform wellness checks was negligent conduct but not intentional. Accordingly, the trial court held that Appellant was not immune from suit under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205, and entered judgment in favor of Appellee. Shelby County appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Glen Travis Campbell
This appeal involves attorney’s fees awarded during the course of a conservatorship. Upon a petition filed by the ward’s eldest two children, a response filed by the ward’s spouse, the report of a court-appointed guardian ad litem, and a mediated agreement, the probate court entered an order establishing a conservatorship for the ward and appointing the ward’s spouse as conservator on May 11, 2015. During the course of the conservatorship, the trial court found in three instances at issue that the conservator was entitled to attorney’s fees in disputes involving various requests to release information concerning the ward in a public forum. The trial court subsequently denied a motion to set aside, vacate, and stay enforcement filed by the original petitioners, who have appealed to this Court. Having determined that the original petitioners were given insufficient notice of two of the three hearings resulting in the assessment of attorney’s fees and costs against them, we vacate the trial court’s respective orders awarding attorney’s fees and costs in those two instances. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects at issue on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Van Floyd Et Al. v. Lisa A. Shirley Akins Et Al.
This case concerns a dispute involving Lisa Akins, Kimberly Floyd, and Donna Helms, the three daughters of Eldon Shirley (the deceased). The initial dispute regards a deed from the deceased to Akins, reserving a life estate. Prior to the execution of the deed, the deceased executed a power of attorney appointing Akins as his attorney-in-fact. Thereafter, Floyd filed this action to set aside the deed on the ground of undue influence. She also alleged that Akins converted other assets of the deceased. Helms later filed an intervening complaint adopting the allegations in Floyd’s complaint. Helms prayed that the real property deeded to Akins be declared a resulting and/or constructive trust. Akins filed a counterclaim alleging that Helms was indebted to her. Akins asked the court to compel Helms to file an accounting of the funds in dispute. The trial court bifurcated the trial. It first heard the undue influence claim. The court held that the deed was procured by the undue influence of Akins. The second stage of the trial involved the status of other assets and accounts. The court determined that specific payments to Helms were loans. The court found that other payments to and charges made by Helms involved no promise to repay and were gifts or payments for the care of the deceased. Akins appeals. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Briley R.
This appeal arises from the adoption of a permanent parenting plan and the determination of a father’s child support obligation. The father argues that the juvenile court erred in both its fashioning of the parenting plan and its calculation of his child support obligation. Because the court made insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we vacate and remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Cindy Phillips, Et Al. v. Rural Metro Of Tennessee, L.P., Et Al.
We granted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9 in this case to consider whether the allegations set forth in the Complaint make this a ‘health care liability action’ as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101 et seq. (“the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act”) such that the pre-suit notice and certification requirements set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and – 122 are applicable. We find and hold that the allegations set forth in the Complaint filed in this case do not make this suit a health care liability action as defined by the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. We affirm that portion of the judgment of the Circuit Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding that the allegations set forth in the Complaint filed in this case do not make this suit a health care liability action as defined by the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act.1 |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brantley B.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son resulting from a petition for termination and adoption filed by her son’s Father and Stepmother. The trial court terminated Mother’s rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and persistence of conditions, and on a finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Upon a thorough review of the record, we reverse the termination of Mother’s rights on the ground of persistence of conditions; we affirm the termination of her rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to support and the holding that termination is in the child’s best interest. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Voya Retirement Insurance And Annuity Company v. Mary Beth Johnson, Et Al.
A plan administrator filed an interpleader action asking the court to determine the proper beneficiary of death benefits in a retirement plan. After the plan participant died, both his former wife and his estate demanded payment from the plan administrator. Although the former wife was listed as the designated beneficiary in the plan, the estate claimed that the beneficiary designation had been revoked in the couple’s marital dissolution agreement. The former wife filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a counterclaim alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the administration of the plan. The trial court denied the former wife’s motion, awarded the disputed proceeds to the estate, and dismissed the counterclaim. The former wife appealed. Upon review, we conclude that the marital dissolution agreement did not revoke the previous beneficiary designation. We also conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the counterclaim. Thus, we reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Joe Marce Abbott
This is a Rule 10B appeal of the denial of a petition for recusal. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to recuse, and Appellant filed this accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court. We affirm in part, modifying the trial court’s order to deny the motion to recuse and vacate its order regarding the validity of the will. We remand for further hearing regarding the validity of the will at issue. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Joanna Marie Vlach v. Gregory Alan Vlach
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the former spouse of a military retiree is entitled to a share of his military retirement. The military retiree submits that, because of his service-connected disability rating of 100%, his former spouse is not entitled to a share of his military retirement. Based on its interpretation of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, the trial court ruled in favor of the former spouse and awarded her a percentage of the retiree’s “total military retired pay,” including disability benefits. Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding the former spouse a percentage of the retiree’s disability benefits. But the trial court correctly determined that the military retiree’s disability rating did not deprive his former spouse of an interest in his military retirement. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Ana Tania Gomez, Et Al. v. Sable-Imagination On Sand, Et Al.
This is an appeal from a bench trial. Due to the deficiencies in the appellants’ brief on appeal, we find that they waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Regina Edwards v. Allenbrooke Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC
This appeal involves an arbitration agreement executed in connection with a nursing home admission. The trial court found no evidence that the individual who signed the arbitration agreement on behalf of the resident had authority to do so, and that, in any event, the form itself was not properly completed. Accordingly, the trial court denied the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration. The nursing home appeals and argues that the trial court erred in deciding these issues because they should have been resolved by an arbitrator. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Weidlich v. Lisa Rung
This appeal concerns a defamation claim. Lisa Rung (“Rung”) put up a Facebook post featuring a photograph of the back of Robert Weidlich (“Weidlich”)’s vehicle. Weidlich’s vehicle had a number of bumper stickers on it, some of which incorporated |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Commercial Bank & Trust Company, Et. Al. v. Children's Anesthesiologists, P.C., Et Al.
Commercial Bank & Trust Company, Legal Guardian of the Estate of Albert P. Mjekiqi, a Disabled Minor; Omer Mjekiqi and Gabriela Mjekiqi, Individually and as Legal Guardians of the Person of Albert P. Mjekiqi; and Volunteer State Health Plan, Inc. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Children’s Anesthesiologists, P.C.; Heather D. Phillips, D.O.; Kari L. Clinton; Neurosurgical Associates, P.C.; Lewis W. Harris, M.D.; and East Tennessee Children’s Hospital Association, Inc. d/b/a East Tennessee Children’s Hospital alleging health care liability in connection with surgery performed on Albert P. Mjekiqi (“Albert”) in May of 2011. After a trial, the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) entered judgment on the jury’s verdict finding no liability on the part of the defendants. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court raising issues with regard to admission of evidence and jury instructions. We discern no error, and we affirm |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Eric G.
In this termination of parental rights case, a mother appeals the termination of her rights to her son on the grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, persistence of conditions, and mental incompetence and upon the finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Upon our review, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Alice Marie Cherqui v. Moshe Laor
This case involves the interpretation and enforcement of an alimony termination provision in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Wife filed a Notice of Termination of Alimony Payments in the Chancery Court of Madison County, alleging that Husband’s non-compliance with the parties’ permanent parenting plan relieved her of any further obligation to pay alimony pursuant to the alimony provision of their marital dissolution agreement. Husband then filed a motion to enforce the marital dissolution agreement and for a temporary injunction. Wife subsequently moved for summary judgment to enforce the alimony provision of the marital dissolution agreement. Husband did not dispute that he failed to comply with the “Passport Provision” of the parties’ permanent parenting plan but argued that his violation of the agreement did not relieve Wife’s obligation to continue to pay alimony in solido. The trial court concluded that the marital dissolution agreement unambiguously provided that Wife would be immediately relieved of her total obligation to pay alimony if Husband failed to comply with his obligations under the parties’ permanent parenting plan and granted Wife’s motion for summary judgment. Husband appeals the trial court’s granting of summary judgment, while Wife seeks an award of her attorney’s fees on appeal. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s granting of summary judgment and award the Wife her attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal which the trial court shall calculate upon remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Neighbors of Old Hickory, Et Al. v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee, Et Al.
This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiff property owners sought a finding that the defendant’s right to operate a rock quarry had not vested prior to the adoption of BL2015-13, which prohibits such activity on the property in question. All parties then moved for summary judgment as relevant to their respective positions. The trial court granted summary judgment in the defendant’s favor, finding that the quarry qualified as a pre-existing nonconforming use. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Christen Nicole Pankratz v. Dion Pankratz
This case involves a post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. The trial court found that there had been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the parties’ existing parenting plan. Mother appeals the trial court’s modification of the parenting plan insofar as the trial court did not adopt, in toto, her proposed plan. Father appeals the trial court’s finding that a material change in circumstances occurred since entry of the parties’ existing parenting plan but argues, in the alternative, that the trial court should be affirmed. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp #215 v. City of Memphis, ET AL.
Appellant appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee concerning appellees' authority to rename three city parks by way of resolution. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stacey Fair, Et Al. v. Clarksville Montgomery County School System
This appeal involves a determination by a school system that children were attending the wrong schools based upon their domicile within the county. We grant the school system’s motion to consider post-judgment facts indicating that the children no longer attend any school in the school system and accordingly dismiss this appeal as moot. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Craig Robert Nunn v. Tennessee Department of Correction, Et Al.
This case involves a sex offender’s complaint for declaratory relief under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 raising various constitutional and other challenges to the conditions imposed on him in accordance with his sentence to community supervision for life. The trial court found that most of the offender’s constitutional claims were time-barred. The trial court reviewed the substantive merit of the remaining claims and found them meritless. As a result, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, the Tennessee Department of Correction and the Tennessee Attorney General. The offender raises numerous issues on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Joe Greenwood v. Tennessee Board of Parole
This appeal arises from the denial of parole to an inmate by the Tennessee Board of Parole (“the Board”). The inmate was convicted in 1990 of first degree murder and first degree burglary. The Board denied parole on the basis that the inmate’s release at the time of the hearing would depreciate the seriousness of the crime for which he was convicted. The inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Davidson County Chancery Court (“trial court”), alleging violations of due process and equal protection. The trial court denied relief, determining that no grounds existed to disturb the Board’s decision. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Jo Slocum v. Jamie Don Slocum
This is a divorce case. Jamie Don Slocum appeals the trial court’s division of the marital estate and the trial court’s award of rehabilitative support to his spouse, Amy Jo Slocum. Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding that he dissipated marital assets (1) before the parties’ separation and (2) during the pendency of the divorce. Husband also asserts that wife has an earning capacity higher than the $1,449 per month found by the trial court. Wife posits that the trial court’s findings of fact are correct and supported by the preponderance of the evidence. She argues, however, that her spousal support award of $1,264 per month until May 31, 2025, should be classified as transitional support rather than rehabilitative. We hold that the trial court’s judgment with respect to spousal support should be modified to reflect that her support award is in the nature of transitional spousal support. As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Veronica Stewart
This appeal arises from a will contest. The contestant insists the purported Last Will and Testament of the decedent, dated June 19, 2015, is invalid because the attesting witnesses, who duly executed the attestation affidavit, failed to affix their signatures to the will as required by the Tennessee Execution of Wills Act at the time the will was executed. The proponent insists the will was validly executed based on a 2016 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104, which applies to wills executed prior to July 1, 2016, and states “to the extent necessary for the Will to be validly executed, witness signatures affixed to an affidavit meeting the requirements of § 32-2-110 shall be considered signatures to the Will.” The trial court ruled that the 2016 amendment did not apply because the testator died before it went into effect. Consequently, the 2015 will was invalid because it was not executed in accordance with the law then in effect. We have determined that the 2016 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104 applies retrospectively to wills executed prior to July 1, 2016, because that is the clear and unambiguous intent of the legislation. We have also determined that the retrospective application of the law does not impair any vested legal right of the contestant. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Warren | Court of Appeals |
