In Re Tristan J.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) sought the termination of the mother’s and father’s parental rights to their son in the Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“the Juvenile Court”). The Juvenile Court found that DCS had failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. Although the Juvenile Court found sufficient evidence for grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights, it declined to find that termination was in the child’s best interest given that the mother retained her parental rights. The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) appealed, and DCS joined in filing briefs arguing that the Juvenile Court erred. Upon careful review, we find that the Juvenile Court misapplied the law in its consideration of the ground of persistent conditions and provided insufficient findings of fact addressing relevant testimony in its consideration of both persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody as alleged against the mother. The Juvenile Court also provided conclusory statements for each best interest factor that it considered in relation to the father. We accordingly vacate the Juvenile Court’s judgment and remand this case for the Juvenile Court to properly apply the law in its analysis of persistent conditions against the mother and provide sufficient findings of fact in support of its conclusory statements in its analysis of persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody against the mother. We also remand for the Juvenile Court to provide factual findings in support of its conclusions as to the best interest factors applied to the father. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Walker & Associates, Inc. v. Cecilia Walker Heffington, et al.
This is an appeal from a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to enforce a settlement |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Madison County, Tennessee v. Vatisha Evans-Barken
In this appeal, an employee of the Madison County Sheriff’s Department challenges the termination of her employment on the ground that she lacked a required certification to serve as a police officer after a psychological examiner deemed her not qualified to hold her position. The local civil service board initially upheld the termination, but that decision was vacated by the trial court, and the matter remanded. On remand, the local civil service board disapproved of the termination and reinstated the officer. The matter was appealed once again to the trial court, where a different judge held that the board’s decision was based on improper procedure, unsupported by substantial and material evidence, and arbitrary and capricious. We reverse the decision of the trial court and reinstate the decision of the local civil service board. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Paschall v. Pension Board of the Memphis Light Gas and Water Division Retirement and Pension System, et al.
The petitioner was employed at the Light, Gas, and Water Division of the City of Memphis (“MLGW”). During his employment, the employee participated in a pension plan. The employee was terminated in July 2016 but did not apply for his pension benefits. In 2022, the employee filed two retirement applications that were rejected. Both applications sought the payment of pension benefits retroactive to the 2016 termination date. The employee appealed to MLGW’s pension board. The pension board accepted the second application and instituted the payment of benefits as of its filing date. However, the board declined to award benefits retroactive to 2016. The employee sought judicial review in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The court held that the decision to deny the first application was arbitrary and capricious and ordered the payment of benefits to be deemed effective as of the date it was filed. However, it found that the decision to deny the claim for retroactive benefits stemming from the date of termination was not arbitrary and capricious as it was in accordance with the pension system’s plan. The employee appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jontae A. Fischiettie v. Econo Auto Painting of West Tennessee, Inc.
Appellant brought this action after his car was painted the wrong color. During the course |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE NAME CHANGE OF JOHN MONTRAIL DARISAW
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Cedar Nordbye v. University of Memphis
The University of Memphis initiated termination proceedings against a tenured faculty |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
HAMILTON COUNTY v. TAX YEAR 2010 DELINQUENT TAXPAYERS
Following lengthy proceedings arising out of a delinquent tax sale of real property and attempted redemptions by two parties, the chancery court concluded that the taxpayer properly redeemed her property. The court then awarded the tax sale purchaser interest on the amount he had tendered for the sale, to be paid in part by the redeeming taxpayer and in part by another party that had unsuccessfully attempted redemption. The purchaser appeals, arguing that the court should have awarded him greater interest. The party that unsuccessfully attempted redemption argues that the trial court improperly disbursed to the purchaser funds beyond those to which he was entitled. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE THE CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARK T. YOUNG, ET AL. v. MARK T. YOUNG
This appeal concerns the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees in a conservatorship action. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm as modified. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
LOVEDAY SPRINGS ET AL. v. KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE ET AL.
In this zoning matter, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondent county and property development company and dismissed the petitioners’ declaratory judgment action. The petitioners had challenged a sector plan amendment and rezoning as illegal. Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, the trial court specifically found that the county zoning body maintained the authority under Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 to impose conditions on the rezoning of the subject property. The petitioners have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE JARROD ANDERSON
This is an appeal from a final order entered on November 3, 2025. The notice of appeal |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
William Kenneth Wade v. Robert Crosslin
This is an appeal from a will contest wherein the decedent executed the will at the hospital where he was a patient. Two hospital employees signed the will as attesting witnesses, and their signatures were then notarized by another staff member. After the decedent died, his son contested the validity of the will, and the matter was set for a hearing. The proponent of the will attempted to serve subpoenas on the two attesting witnesses at the hospital where they signed the will, one by process server and the other by certified mail. Neither attempt at service was successful, and consequently, neither of the attesting witnesses appeared at the will contest hearing. The notary did appear and testified as to the identity and presence of the attesting witnesses at the will’s execution. The proponent of the will sought to have both witnesses declared unavailable. The trial court declared unavailable the witness who was served using a process server but declined to do the same regarding the witness who was served by certified mail. Consequently, the court determined that the will was invalid. The proponent of the will appealed, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion when it made a distinction between serving a subpoena using a process server and serving a subpoena by certified mail. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Margaret Bush (Wright) v. Ronald Stevens Wright, Jr.
This appeal arises from post-divorce petitions and counterpetitions for enforcement and modification of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (the “MDA”), and permanent parenting plan (the “PPP”). The dispositive issue on appeal is whether either party is the prevailing party for the purpose of recovering his or her attorney’s fees. Because the final decree of divorce incorporated a mandatory dispute resolution provision, we must first determine whether either party qualifies as the prevailing party concerning claims “to procure enforcement” of the MDA or PPP. We then consider whether either party qualifies as the prevailing party pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), (the “Statute”), which has a broader application but is discretionary. During the pendency of the action, the defendant/father delivered two checks to the plaintiff/mother, one in satisfaction of the mother’s claim for past due child support and a second check in satisfaction of her claim for past due alimony. Thereafter, the remaining claims went to mediation, after which the parties approved an agreed order resolving all remaining claims except attorney’s fees, reserving the fee issue for the trial court. Each party, claiming to be the prevailing party, sought to recover their respective attorney’s fees. The trial court ruled that “[s]ince both parties were awarded their beneficial, judicial relief that materially altered the other party’s behavior, the court cannot consider either party the sole ‘prevailing party.’” Thus, neither was awarded any attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. Because the father paid the child support and alimony arrearages after the mother filed her petition and motion to enforce the MDA and PPP, we find that the mother is the prevailing party on the enforcement claims, for which she is contractually entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the dispute resolution clause in the MDA. As for the respective claims and defenses related to modification of the MDA and PPP, for which the Statute applies, we affirm the trial court’s decision to not award attorney’s fees based on the finding that neither party can be considered the prevailing party. Thus, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to award the mother a judgment for the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs she incurred to enforce the father’s obligations to pay child support and alimony pursuant to the MDA 03/13/2026 - 2 - and PPP. Because neither party can be considered the sole prevailing party on appeal, we deny both parties’ requests to recover their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Stockton Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a AccuWorks v. Lamont Bell et al.
Defendants appeal from a final judgment in a dispute over a construction contract. Because the defendants did not file their notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Elijah S.
Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), and on its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Monsieur Shawnellias Burgess v. Bradford Hills HOA et al.
This is a dispute between a neighborhood homeowners’ association (“HOA”) and a homeowner in the HOA’s neighborhood. On remand after a prior appeal, the trial court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the homeowner. The homeowner appealed the declaratory judgment and then filed multiple motions in the trial court seeking inherent authority sanctions and costs against certain attorneys who had been involved in the case. The trial court denied the motions, and the homeowner appealed those determinations. We affirm the trial court’s decisions in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Woodall v. Robert D. Cooper et al.
This is an action to enforce an oral agreement for the transfer of stock in a corporation formed to purchase a parcel of commercial real estate. The plaintiff alleged that he helped obtain financing for the purchase in exchange for 50% of the company. The defendants alleged that the plaintiff had only an option to buy a 50% interest within one year of closing. The trial court credited the plaintiff’s testimony and awarded him a judgment for his share of the company’s profits. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Eugene Moxley v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc. d/b/a Saint Francis Hospital, et al.
The trial court granted Appellees’ joint motion to dismiss Appellant’s healthcare liability action based on its finding that Appellant failed to substantially comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Eden B. et al.
The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to two minor children after finding that the mother abandoned the children through failure to support and subjected the children to severe abuse. The mother appeals to this Court, and, discerning no error, we affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
4U2ASKY Entertainment, Inc. v. Blessing Chibueze Offor
A music publisher sued a musician for breach of contract. The musician, saddled with legal fees related to this litigation, eventually filed for bankruptcy and claimed certain musical works as his own intellectual property during the bankruptcy proceedings. The parties settled by agreeing that ownership rights to a subset of the musician’s songs would be transferred to the publisher. Subsequently, the publisher contacted a licensing agency in pursuit of royalties, claiming ownership of more songs than were actually provided for under the settlement. The musician objected to the licensing agency, asserting that the publisher misrepresented the breadth of works it obtained in the settlement. This led to a second lawsuit with the music publisher asserting breach of contract against the musician. The musician filed a counterclaim against the publisher in this second lawsuit, asserting that the publisher’s communications with the licensing agency amounted to tortious interference with the musician’s existing and prospective business relationships. The publisher sought to dismiss the musician’s counterclaim under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). The trial court dismissed the publisher’s TPPA petition. The publisher appeals the denial of its TPPA petition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tino Cartez Sutton v. State of Tennessee et al.
This is an appeal from an order denying relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Dahlia S.
A father filed several documents in the Juvenile Court for Madison County (the “trial court”) seeking, inter alia, parenting time with his minor child. The trial court dismissed the father’s petition, and the father filed a timely appeal to this Court. Because the father’s brief fails to comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure addressing briefing, father waives any issues purportedly raised. This appeal is dismissed. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Legends Bank v. Samson Orusa et al.
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to reconsider. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE AYBREE Y.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial with neither the mother nor her counsel present, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother argues on appeal, inter alia, that the court erred in permitting counsel to withdraw on the day of the hearing. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
MARY SUE GASTON LEE v. DANNY C. LEE
In this divorce matter, the trial court classified and valued the parties’ assets, subsequently fashioning a distribution of the marital assets and liabilities that the court deemed equitable. The husband has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination regarding the classification and valuation of two assets and remand those issues to the trial court for further determination. Accordingly, because of these unresolved classification and valuation issues, we vacate the trial court’s overall distribution of marital property and remand that issue for further determination as well. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals |
